

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

*The quality of the materials used in the manufacture
of this book is governed by continued postwar shortages.*

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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PREFACE

The original edition of this book was undertaken in the belief that social psychology was coming to serve as a bridge between sociology and psychology, much as biochemistry evolved to unite biology and chemistry, and that the time had come to attempt a synthesis of the psychological and sociological approaches. In the years since, social psychology seems to have passed its adolescence and to have reached such maturity that a reasonably consistent and systematic statement of the field is now possible. The present edition was undertaken in this belief.

The basic analytical pattern of the original book has been refined. To improve the clarity of statement and to bring those statements into accord with the latest findings, the materials have been rewritten almost in their entirety. New evidences and a significant drift in the concerns of social psychologists have led to the dropping of four of the original chapters and to the introduction of five new ones. The format has been modified in such a way as to make the citations more readily accessible to the reader and yet not deprive the more advanced student of the special materials embodied in the original chapter appendixes.

In light of the developments which have taken place these past few years, we have found it permissible to state the thesis that human behavior is interactional rather than reactional with much more assurance and firmness than was originally possible. Around this thesis we have endeavored to construct, not a system of social psychology, but a systematic frame of reference for the study of socio-psychological phenomena.

RICHARD T. LAPIERE,
PAUL R. FARNSWORTH.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
May, 1942.

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PART I

The Nature of the Individual and of Society

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The age in which we live is one of violent and fundamental change. Old social norms are being outmoded, and new social norms are not yet available. Ours is a period of history in the making, a period that the historians of the future may designate as either the epoch of dissolution or the era of reconstruction, depending on the outcome of contemporary events and on the scale of values that the future uses in its judgment of that outcome. But for us of the present, the salient aspect of our age is incessant change and concomitant social uncertainty. We live in the midst of individual and collective confusion and conflict, the only certainty being that tomorrow will be different from today.

Social uncertainty is not peculiar to the modern world, and the philosophers may justly point out that it is during periods of social change that men's minds are most freed from social bondage to work out new and perhaps better ways of social life. But such observations provide slight comfort to us who are distressed by the disorders of the present. That some few survive though many die is hardly consolation to the man who is suffering from cancer. He wants a cure; he wants to know what can be done to restore his body to its healthy state, to make it function normally once again. And because many men suffer from physical disabilities and wish to be cured of them, medical scientists the world around are probing into the nature of organic life and are endeavoring to discern the causes of disorder to that life. Human anguish underlies the efforts of such investigation, for it is pain that makes man curious about the workings of his body.

It is pain, too, that makes man aware of and concerned with his society. When he loses his job and can find no other, when his lifelong savings are wiped out by inflation, when the happy marriage dissolves in misery, when the perfect son turns out a wastrel, when peace is seen as but the prelude to war and political reforms as but a step toward rebellion—

when such things happen, man is distressed. That distress is no less agonizing because it is mental.

That the uncertainties and conflicts of contemporary life have brought us to the breaking point is evidenced by our frantic struggles to achieve some sort of social stability, some way of life that will at least give us assurance of continuity, give us tomorrows that stem directly from yesterdays. These struggles take varied forms.

Individually, we may endeavor to preserve the social practices of the past, refusing to face the inescapable fact that many of these practices are incompatible with present circumstances. Or we may briefly lose ourselves in some utopian faith, ignoring all else until we are at last returned, disillusioned, to the chaotic present. Or, utterly despairing, we may retreat into a world of our own imagining or else terminate our personal uncertainty by resort to death, the one unvarying end of life.

Concurrent with individual strivings are varied and conflicting collective endeavors. Some are directed toward a recapturing of the past; some are but an attempt to preserve the present—to freeze the processes of history; some are a sanguine effort to speed the coming of the unknown future. War and peace, revolution and counterrevolution, prosperity and depression are the names we give to the more striking phases of these collective efforts. But these endeavors do not alleviate the uncertainties and the conflicts of present social life; they merely aggravate them.

It is the view of the social scientist that, if he can learn why man is as he is and does as he does, it is possible—just possible—that man can be cured of his social disabilities. To put it another way, knowledge—as distinct from belief and superstition—about the causes of social change may introduce a new factor into the determination of those changes, a factor of deliberate control, just as knowledge of the causes of organic disease has made it possible to check or foreshorten the course of many diseases.

As one of the specialists in the search for knowledge, the social psychologist has gradually discovered that the behavior of man is largely a product of the behavior of other men, known collectively and abstractly as society. The ramifications of this discovery are many and will be discussed one by one in the chapters that follow. For one thing, we now know

in a general way why men are distressed by the conflicts and uncertainties of contemporary life, why they prefer social stability to instability, social coherence to incoherence, the well-worn path to the untracked wilderness. We know, too, something of the ways in which the relatively stable society fits the individual to it, training him to relive the patterns of his forefathers with a complacent disregard for other possibilities. We now also vaguely understand why a changing social order does not prepare the individual to adapt to constant change and why, on the other hand, it so often malprepares him for the many circumstances he will meet during life. These understandings are not yet complete, but they have liberated us from the fallacious and degrading thesis that our troubles are inherent and inevitable.

THE FIELD OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Social psychology is a specialized discipline within the general field of the social sciences. Its metes and bounds are not subject to precise definition; they vary as our knowledge grows. The distinction between the social psychologist and other social scientists is perhaps most meaningful when made in terms of the particular problems with which he and those others deal. The social psychologist has made his appearance rather late in the development of the social sciences and as a response to the gradual discovery that there were problems of social life not adequately studied by the older disciplines. This same sort of discovery has occurred also in the physical and biological sciences, where geophysics has developed to fill in the gap between geology and physics, and biochemistry has arisen in recognition of the fact that there is no sharp line between chemical and biological phenomena. To put it in the simplest possible terms, social psychology is to sociology and psychology as biochemistry is to biology and chemistry.

The sociologist (and in different ways the historian, the economist, and the political scientist) has taken as his problem the study of the social organizations of men. He studies the patterns of group life, the forces that make for the rise and decline of specific patterns, the relations of group to group, and the like. These patterns of group organization are the elements of society, all of which he studies, as we shall later see in detail, in abstraction. The psychologist, on the other hand, has historically been interested in the nature of the individual human being, endeavoring to discover the processes involved in his adjustments to his environment, the machinery and processes of learning, and the like. As sociological and psychological knowledge have

increased, it has become evident that there is a third problem: the relation between the psychologist's "individual" and the sociologist's "society." This is the general problem with which the social psychologist is concerned.

It is now evident, although long overlooked, that there can be no group life apart from the individual human beings whose coming together forms the group. It is also now evident that there can be no individual human being apart from the groups in which and through which he lives.* There could be no pattern of family life were it not for the existence of actual Mr. and Mrs. Smiths and their sons and daughters. There could be no Mr. and Mrs. Smiths and their sons and daughters were it not for the existence of the family as a social group. Social psychologists have endeavored to resolve this apparent contradiction, taking as their problem the study of the relationship between the individual human being and his society.

Interactionism.—In the study of this relationship, the social psychologist has gradually found it necessary to abandon the original concept of one-way cause and effect (*i.e.*, that society causes the individual or that the individual causes society) in favor of the idea of interaction. This shift in conceptualization constitutes a major revolution in sociopsychological thought. Prior to the present century, as we shall shortly see, most ideas about human behavior were based upon the concept of one-way cause and effect. Thus, human nature (the typical behavior of the members of a particular social group) was thought to be the effect of this or that cause. Today we realize that behavior is produced in large part through the interactions of men with men. But before entering upon a detailed analysis of this new point of view and the findings that have given rise to it, it may be well to consider briefly the prescientific period during which men's minds were dominated by the idea of one-way cause and effect.

Description versus Explanation.—Interest in human nature is probably as old as history. Men have shown constant concern with how men behave. Generalized statements regarding the nature of human nature are to be found in the records of all literate peoples. They are descriptions, presumably based on experience, of how people behave under this or that circumstance and, thus, of how they may be manipulated into doing whatever is desired of them. Although usually condensed into proverb form, these descriptions are reminiscent of a modern book on how to win friends, sell merchandise, or secure votes.

* The May, 1939, issue of *The American Journal of Sociology* is devoted to articles representative of the various modern approaches to the subject of the relationship of the individual and the group.

Only, however, during periods of social change, when old precepts have lost their effectiveness and life has become one vast confusion and uncertainty, have men sought an understanding of why men behave in whatever way they may behave. And this question, why men behave as they do, is a crude statement of the problem of the modern social psychologists. The prescientific answers were, however, often quite different from the present one.

CLASSICAL THEORIES

Platonic versus Aristotelian Views.—Decadent Greek civilization produced, among other things, two diametrically opposed theories of the origins of human behavior. Plato,* an idealist who hoped to save Greece from final dissolution, proposed the setting up of a new social system and in so doing advanced a concept of the origins of human behavior that is now, some twenty centuries later, not entirely incompatible with sociopsychological findings. He insisted that people behave as they do because they have been taught so to behave. They are born capable of learning to act in the ways in which society trains them. If, therefore, we do not like the way that men behave, the system of social education should be adjusted to our ideas of what is desirable. Plato did not make the mistake of thinking that education is simply a matter of reading, writing, and arithmetic. He saw it as the entire process that we now term socialization, a process that begins shortly after birth and ends only at death and that includes all the directional influences of all the human beings with whom the individual lives.* Plato anticipated the idea of innate differential capacity to learn and yet did not, as has since been done, assume a direct relationship between the social position of parents and the biological capacity of their offspring.

Plato's concept did not, however, survive the extremely simple, though highly pessimistic, views advanced by his disciple Aristotle.† To Plato the behavior of the individual was a consequence of the society by which the individual had been trained. The nature of an individual's behavior would depend, therefore, upon the character of his society. Aristotle, however, reversed the Platonic view and found the cause of society in the "nature" of the individual. He believed that society is but a consequence of the instinctive and therefore unchangeable character of the individual. Thus, since it is impossible

* See *The dialogues of Plato* (B. Jowett, 1892). Plato's most direct statement of a theory of human nature occurs in *The laws* (Vol. V, pp. 708-709).

† The social views of Aristotle can be examined in *The politics* (B. Jowett, 1895). Note particularly I: 1 and 2 and VII: 13 and 15.

to change men's nature, it is impossible to modify society. Aristotle buttressed his interpretation with a careful and impressive study of the formal constitutions of the Greek city-states, a factual survey that has led some to acclaim him the first of the social scientists.

Although Plato undoubtedly overestimated the plasticity of society, he did not overestimate that of the human organism. He displayed a perception and depth of insight totally lacking in Aristotle, who suffered from a common human failing—a social form of myopia. From his observation that the people of Greece behaved in a quite uniform manner, Aristotle fallaciously concluded that this was the only way men could behave. He did not realize that all around the Greek peninsula there were men who lived in social ways that were very different from the Greek pattern. If he had, he would not have been able to conclude that society is a consequence of a constant biological cause. Such a conclusion reduced men to the status of biological slaves, removed in degree but not in kind from social insects. Untenable as this concept subsequently proved to be, it nevertheless persisted as a grim and foreboding specter haunting the thinking of social scientists even down into the present century.

Hedonistic Description of Behavior.—Whenever men suffer from the consequences of social disorganization, there are always those among them who insist that such disorder is natural and therefore inevitable. Such a philosophy of human behavior arose as a justification for the individual manifestations of the disorders of decadent Greece. Sensitive moralists were apparently pleading with the digressors to give up wine, women, and song for the sober life of their ancestors. For, as though in reply to moralists, there was advanced a theory of individual behavior, usually accredited to Socrates and now termed early hedonism, which led to the conclusion that men naturally do that which pleases them and avoid that which displeases them. They cannot, therefore, reform or be reformed. This pleasure-pain explanation of human actions survived the decline of Greece to receive acceptance on the part of many Roman philosophers.

Early hedonism* is exceedingly realistic in its approach to the facts of human behavior but is somewhat futile as a doctrine of causation. The early hedonists succeeded in describing what some men do under some circumstances. Their failure lay in the assumption that it is "natural" for men to do these things and equally natural for them to avoid doing anything else. We now realize that, although it is natural (native or biologically determined) for men to respond in certain

* For a discussion of the older hedonistic theories see *Hedonistic theories* (J. Watson, 1895).

generalized ways to a few specific stimuli, most of his ways are socially designated. What is pleasurable to the human animal may, in fact, become "painful" to the social human being. Thus the early hedonists made the same basic mistake as did Aristotle: they assumed that natural, biological forces determine what human beings will do. Like Aristotle, they believed society to be an outcome of the natural character of man and consequently unchangeable.

The Legalistic View.*—Greek civilization withered away, and for a time Rome was the cultural center of the Western world. When, toward the close of the pre-Christian era, Roman social organization began to crumble, a legalistic interpretation of human nature came into vogue. Based on Greek hedonism, it predicated the view that we can change society by governmental manipulation of the rewards and punishments that follow any given human act. Since men will do only those things that give them pleasure, and since pleasure is obtained from money or the things that money will buy, they can be made to do desirable things if a bonus is given for the desirable act. Conversely, since men avoid pain, they can be made to avoid doing whatever the ruler thinks is undesirable by making physical pain the consequence of such acts.

Many recent practices of meting out rewards and punishments in accordance with governmental ideas of social desirability have been erected upon this legalistic view of the origin of human behavior. Our penal system is, in the main, still operating on the punishment theory. Our laissez-faire economic system operates upon the basis of the "profit incentive," which is the other aspect of the same hypothesis. Centuries of failure have not shaken legislators, judges, juries, or executioners from their faith in the legalistic theory. And only recently have even the students of criminology recognized that the professional criminal may at times get far more pleasure from the approval of his associates than he does "pain" from the ever-present threat of brutish physical punishment.

MEDIEVAL VIEWS

Free Will Devoid of Freedom.—Aristotle called the determinant of man's behavior, and thus of society, "nature." When the medieval social system began its long slow disintegration, the medieval theologians changed the symbol from nature to God. This change in point of reference necessitated some explanation of the fact that not all men behaved in the ways that the church deemed to be satisfactory to the Creator. Since nature is nonethical, the Aristotelian view avoided this

* See *The political works of Marcus Tullius Cicero* (F. Barham, 1841).

obvious contradiction. But God, being both omnipotent and good, could not be the cause of evil human behavior; yet men frequently behaved in contradiction to the laws of God. To escape this dilemma, the theologians postulated a personalized force opposed to God. His name was Satan; and he offered men, the creatures of God, rewards (temporary but enticing) for living in ways contrary to those designated as satisfactory to man's Creator. Man frequently succumbed to these empty promises, and so not all men were good. Thus was the unethical behavior of man, a divine creation, explained away.

Now if men could, as they all too frequently did, go the way of the Devil rather than that of God, it followed that God had given them the right and power of free choice. He had created them in His own image. He had also designated, through the church authorities, the divine design for living. But, as though He were above utilizing to the fullest His powers of control, God had granted men the liberty of choosing freely between the right way of life and the wrong.

The idea that men are individually free to decide for themselves whether they will follow the ways of God or the Devil is known as the theory of free will.* It is a heritage arising from the logical dilemma of medieval theology. It is interestingly persuasive and exceedingly deceptive. Perhaps the majority of modern men still believe, however vaguely, that they possess this entity known as free will and can make, therefore, free and uninfluenced decisions. The term "free will" is actually a misnomer, for the theory did not postulate a human individual who was free from forces beyond his control. It simply divided those extrahuman forces into two mutually exclusive categories and said that the individual was free to decide to which of these behavior-determining force units he would submit. Thus under the freewill concept man is as fully bound as he was under Aristotle's dogma that society is the outward consequence of native human instincts. It simply makes the "natural" society of Aristotle a duality: there are, then, two distinct societies or modes of human conduct, one prescribed by God, the other, by His opponent, the Devil. Between these two, man is free to make a choice. The character of each of these societies is, however, fixed by forces external to man. He is not, therefore, free to will his own society; it is ready made for him.

As long as the accepted social system is a reasonably effective one, this doctrine serves admirably to keep people in line. They can behave in the ways of the majority of men or else in those of some minority. Those who follow the former ways are the godly; those who follow the

* The doctrine of free will was implicit in the writings of all the medieval theologians. See *A student's history of philosophy* (A. K. Rogers, 1907).

latter, the satanic. But in a period of social transition—the latter Middle Ages or, indeed, our own era—it is difficult to discern a pattern of majority social ways; and so the theoretical “choice” loses even its theoretical possibilities. What, the modern man might ask, are the forms of behavior that have divine sanction?

Never more than a rationalistic postulate, the doctrine of free will granted man no power of self-determination; and with the growth of social disorder and uncertainty it even lost all rationalizing value.* Having long since been discarded as unrealistic by psychologists and sociologists alike, it did, however, reappear in new garb and new terminology as one of the stumbling blocks to the scientific approach to human behavior.†

Machiavellian Realism.—Before this revival, however, the doctrine of free will was vigorously attacked by a long line of social philosophers who defied the theologians and thereby paved the way for the development of the social sciences. Foremost among those who questioned the idea of freewill choice between the ways of God and those of the Devil was Niccolò Machiavelli, adviser to Italian princes and father of chauvinistic political theory. In the early part of the sixteenth century Machiavelli revived the concept of the Roman legalists and, mixing it with the bitter wine of experience, proclaimed that man is by nature bad, that he has no choice in the matter, and that he will go the way of the Devil unless persuaded to do otherwise by wise and wily political leadership. Thus Machiavelli advised the Italian prince to accept as his burden the duty of preventing men from destroying themselves and one another. Since men are by nature bad, there is no use in pleading with them to do right; they cannot be taught or forced to do the proper thing. Only by tricking them into thinking that they

* The terms “rational” and “rationalism” refer to the dogma that the “mind” contains innate ideas and functions with an innate logic. The term “rationalization,” on the other hand, refers to the advancing of pseudological or rational explanations for their behavior after the act (or after deciding to perform the act). When the average man explains to his friends why he bought a new car, he is probably rationalizing. He may say that the new car is a necessity, that it is cheaper to operate than was his last year’s model, and that, therefore, the purchase was economically desirable, etc. The actual forces that led him to make the purchase are, generally, entirely beyond his comprehension.

† Even to this day the notion that man possesses freedom of choice has not lost its appeal. Emboldened by the uncertainties of modern subatomic physics, particularly by Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy, certain popularizers of science have again offered this dogma to a perplexed world. Thus we read: “The future may not be as unalterably determined by the past as we used to think; in part at least it may rest on the knees of whatever gods there be” (Sir James Jeans, 1930. p. 27).

are achieving their evil ends while they are actually contributing to the welfare of the state can the prince succeed in getting good behavior from them.

Under the guise of giving frank advice to political leaders, Machiavelli recorded, perhaps for the first time, the stratagems that successful politicians have no doubt used since the beginning of human history. For saying what every well-informed person already knew, his name was made the symbol of all that is mean and underhanded. But his book *The prince*, written in 1513, remains today an excellent manual of political craftsmanship for "ward heeler" and president alike.

Climatic Interpretation.—The concept of the native and therefore permanent badness of human behavior did not, however, go unchallenged. For some centuries, while the power of the church was declining and that of the state was ascending, theologians and political realists debated whether man was by nature bad or good. The growth of trade relations in later medieval Europe, the discovery of new lands inhabited by strange peoples, and all the forces that were breaking down European isolation undermined the provincial outlook of European philosophers.

In the early part of the eighteenth century there arose a man so puzzled by the discovery that the members of different societies lived, and with apparent satisfaction, in different ways that he asked, "Just what is good behavior and what is bad?" This man, Charles de Montesquieu, advanced a theory of the origins of human behavior that, although not entirely original with him, was to become the basis for what remains today an important school of social thought and study.* His theory has proved to be one of the first significant steps toward a science of social psychology since the time of Plato.

The idea that men are by nature either good or bad is logically permissible only to those who suffer from that social myopia mentioned some pages ago. Unless the behavior of men can be categorically separated into that which is good and that which is bad, it is senseless to consider men as naturally either good or bad. Within the closed circle of a single social system perhaps this is possible: adherence to the social pattern is good; all else is bad. But, when we find that the social pattern varies among societies, the entire concept crashes. Montesquieu, discovering that what was accepted as good behavior in Morocco or Algiers was in many instances considered bad in France and England

* For three modern books whose basic philosophy resembles that of Montesquieu, see *Season of birth; its relation to human abilities* (E. Huntington, 1938); *The patient and the weather* (W. F. Petersen and M. E. Milliken, 1936); and *Geopsyche* (W. Hellpach, 1935a).

and that practices acceptable in these latter countries might be thought very undesirable in the former, realized that, whatever it was that determined the behavior of men, that cause must be a variable.

This realization, which was implied in the theories of Plato, was undoubtedly one of the most important for the future of the social sciences, since it led to the study of social facts and to the discard of ancient preconceptions. It is unfortunate that in casting about for a variable that would explain the variations in human behavior, Montesquieu singled out climate.* Climate varies between different geographic regions, and Montesquieu thought he saw a correlation between temperature and what was locally considered to be good behavior. And so on the basis of the then current theories of human physiology he proceeded to explain such things as the social acceptance of slavery in southern countries and its prohibition in temperate ones in terms of climatic variations. Heat, he said, relaxes the fibers of the body and makes men lazy; so enforced labor is necessary if men in warm climates are to provide themselves with the necessities of life. In temperate regions slavery is deemed an evil because it is unnecessary, since cold contracts the fibers of the body and makes men energetic. Likewise he explained the differences between political systems, class organizations, family structures, and all morals and manners.†

Although this concept of the relationship between the individual and society gives man the possibility of escaping from unsatisfactory social existence by moving to a different climate, it happens to be at odds with the facts. The physician's advice to his patient to take a trip to the mountains or to the seashore may be sound; and, if it is followed, the patient's health may improve. But there are at least two factual disproofs for the theory that climate is the important determinant of human behavior and thus of the character of society. In the first place, many of the same social practices are to be found

* According to Wheeler, the cold periods of history are associated with "atomistic" world conditions, whereas warm periods occur with "Gestalt" conditions. The former are identified with scientific atomism, political chaos, democracy, utilitarian morality, religious agnosticism, philosophical materialism, the flowering of program music, etc. The latter are associated with idealism, religious faith, political harmony, moral law, totalitarian government, the flowering of institutionalized music, and the like (R. H. Wheeler, 1935; and R. H. Wheeler and T. Gaston, 1941).

† The concept of climatic determination of human behavior was implicitly expressed in *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (J. Bodin, 1572). It was somewhat more directly applied in *La science nouvelle* (G. B. Vico, 1844) and became the basic means of explaining differential social behavior with Montesquieu in his *Spirit of laws* in 1746. Montesquieu served to dogmatize and popularize the idea.

existing under extremely different climatic circumstances. Christianity knows no climatic boundaries. Both monogamy and polygamy can be found among peoples living in temperate, in tropical, and in subarctic conditions. As the basic means of securing a livelihood agriculture, in contrast to dependence upon fishing, hunting, or the pastoral arts, is to be found in vastly differing regions from the tropics to the subarctic. Industrialism, although concentrated at present in the more temperate regions of the Northern Hemisphere, is rapidly spreading into the tropics and the Southern Hemisphere.

In the second place, migration from one climatic region to another does not noticeably change the social life of peoples. The white man takes his clothes, whisky, and modes of conduct into the tropics. Perhaps for the sake of health and convenience he should take over the methods that the natives have worked out for living in heat and humidity, but he seldom does. He is more inclined to teach the native those forms of behavior that he has brought from temperate climes and thereby to decimate the native population.

The climatic theory of human behavior is somewhat akin to the theological with the ethical connotations left out. Not God but nature, acting through climate, determines the social systems under which men live. The individual has free will to select his climate and thus indirectly his modes of behavior.

NEOTHEOLOGICAL VIEWS

The Empiricists.*—Montesquieu did not, however, revive the free-will theory. That was being done by the followers of the great English epistemologist, Francis Bacon. The revival was accompanied by all that verbal clamor which finally freed us from the theological and metaphysical preconceptions of the past and ushered in the age of science. For centuries the great question had been, What is the source of human knowledge? The theologians had contended that the church was the fountainhead and that the source was God. The metaphysicians, mainly German philosophers, had argued in favor of innate or intuitive sources. But Bacon, and after him Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and others, came to realize that human experience is the source of human knowledge. It is upon this philosophic assumption that the world of science rests; with this assumption no scientist would think to quarrel.

But out of this assumption came an unfortunate by-product, an idea of individual psychological processes that is exceedingly flatter-

* For an account of the British philosophers of this period see *British thought and thinkers* (G. S. Morris, 1880).

ing to man but is no more than the freewill theory dressed up in new terminology. Man is, according to this view, a sort of fact-digesting machine. Through experience he gathers the facts of the world about him and then decides upon a course of future action in accordance with those facts. The method by which facts are used in the shaping of expedient human action is logic. From a given set of facts there will be a logically derived specific form of action. Thus if a man wants to cross a canyon one hundred feet wide and two hundred feet deep and if he knows that he can jump only twenty feet and that he will be killed if he falls fifty, he is logically prevented from trying to jump across.

But the truth is that men are constantly doing things that cause them or others unhappiness and death. Thus it is obviously necessary to postulate a second realm of behavior—illogical. This is looked upon not as a failure of the human mechanism but as a consequence of inadequate factual knowledge. Thus, if men knew all the relevant facts, the argument continues, they would behave logically; and society would be perfect. Its imperfections are due to the inadequacy of knowledge upon which men base their behavior. Under this assumption the hope for a perfect society lies in the extension of the scientific method.

The tremendous improvement in technological efficiency that followed the application of the scientific method to the study of physical nature is ample evidence that men can learn through experience and that they may apply their knowledge to the achievement of social ends. But the disorders of contemporary social life clearly show that men may fail to profit from repeated experience and may fail to apply the knowledge they do possess to the shaping of expedient behavior. There is, it appears, nothing automatic about the learning process; and certainly no inevitable connection exists between what a man knows and what he does. Men are quite likely to disregard what they know and to do whatever they have been taught to do. Many of the current political movements are based upon appeals to ancient social stereotypes long since deflated by scientists; much of the commercial advertising appeals to beliefs contrary to easily obtained factual evidence; and the universally admitted fact that war between nations is invariably disastrous to everyone, including the self-styled victor, has not checked the social forces making for further war.

Early empiricism is but the freewill theory with logic substituted for God and illogic substituted for the Devil. The same questions may be raised against it as were raised against the freewill doctrine. Just what in human behavior is logical and what illogical? If man's behavior is an outcome of the laws of logic, how does it happen that,

although some of us may consider it expedient to postpone marriage until an economic competence has been secured, others with the same body of facts available may consider such postponement quite unreasonable if not actually immoral? Comparison shows that what is considered logical behavior in one society is not necessarily deemed logical in another.* Human behavior cannot, therefore, be adequately explained as the product of an innate fact-digesting machine.

Empiricism did not, it is true, make man a slave to his instincts; but it did make him an automaton responding automatically to factual experience. It ignored to the point of distortion the fact that man's experience is mostly social, and, furthermore, that he may learn one set of "facts" and behave in accordance with another.

The Positivists.—Closely associated with this concept, and in part an extension thereof, is the positivism of Auguste Comte† and others. The positivists realized that the social behavior of the individual is a consequence of society. But they believed in addition that human societies pass progressively, as a consequence of more or less inevitable social processes, through three distinct intellectual stages. The first is theological, in which men's minds are dominated by the idea of a super-being, God, who is made the basis for the perpetuation of all sorts of unreasoned superstitions and irrational social practices. The second is metaphysical, in which men have escaped from the idea of divine control but, meanwhile, have become victims of a colossal self-conceit. In this stage they turn inward and try to obtain the principles of social life by sheer speculation regarding the nature of the universe in which they live. Finally, men reach the positive stage of social life, that in which the scientific method brings a new social order that is based directly upon experience. Men then behave not in accordance with traditional practices, false beliefs, myths, and superstitions, but upon the basis of a social system scientifically designed, presumably by the social scientists.

This final and perfect stage of social life was the one that Comte and his followers saw opening before them. Their concept is a sociological application of the Baconian type of psychology and stands

* Logic, it has become evident, is a cultural matter; and the conclusions to be drawn from a given set of facts will depend upon the culturally determined system of "conclusion drawing" in which a person has been trained. For an elaboration of this thesis see *Logic* (J. Dewey, 1938). For illustrations of reasoning in primitive societies see *Primitive mentality* (L. Lévy-Bruhl, 1923).

† For a presentation of the social philosophy of Comte, see *The positive philosophy* (A. Comte, 1896).

or falls with it. A century of waiting for the advent of the scientific society has not yet entirely discouraged some social scientists.*

As a corollary to this theory of social causation, the positivists advocated governmental regulation if not ownership of private property and the gradual establishment of a socialistic state. It remained for Herbert Spencer, great defender of economic individualism, to reverse this theory to make it fit in with the then accepted economic doctrine of the existence of natural laws of economic life with which the state should not interfere (H. Spencer, 1897). He contended that society was a superorganic entity, which passes naturally and without purposive control on the part of individual men through fixed and definite stages. The process works out through conflict of group with group rather than by an evolution of social intellect, as the positivists believed. Men are therefore subservient to natural law and should not strive to change the course of social evolution.

The Racial Determinists.—There was yet another line of thinking that, following the lead set by Charles Darwin, found the growth of human rationality a matter of individual biological development. By the slow process of biological selection those members of society who are innately most rational would tend to survive and would come in time to be numerically dominant. Thus the level of social behavior would improve by biological selection rather than by the establishment of a scientific social system.

What could be applied to individual members of society could also be extended to include entire groups of people. Following the views advanced by J. A. de Gobineau in 1853, it soon became fashionable to think of human behavior in terms of social groupings, each presumed to represent biological or racial units. At first on the grounds that the races have different instinctive tendencies, and more recently on the assertion that the members of some races are biologically incapable of learning as much as those of other races, pseudo scientists have proclaimed that "their" people were destined to rule the universe or, as the pessimistic Stoddard thought, to be swallowed up by the "rising tide of color."†

* Two scholarly attempts to interpret social changes along the positivist pattern are *Social process and human progress* (C. M. Case, 1931) and *Cultural evolution* (C. A. Ellwood, 1927).

† The "racial" interpretation of cultural differences is a commonplace myth. Its elevation to the status of a scientific concept must be credited, however, to de Gobineau. See his essay on the subject, translated under the title *The inequality of human races* (J. A. de Gobineau, 1915).

The racial myth has been utilized at various times in the effort to arouse suffi-

We need not consider the problem of group, social, and biological differences at this point. It will be discussed more fully in a later chapter. It will suffice to say here that the early theories of racial determinism were exceedingly naive. The question, Why do people behave differently or have different social systems? was answered by saying that different peoples are born with the qualities that make for different societies. But all that could be advanced as proof was the fact that people do have varying social systems. This is altogether too much like asserting that the reason that a man's hair is black is that he has black hair.

The contention that the members of some societies are naturally superior to others and thus have more nearly "perfect" social systems was but an elaboration of early empiricism. Racial determinism did not provide a substitute for this doctrine, which was, it should be remembered, but a modified freewill theory. The breaking of the tradition of free will apparently required a revival of Aristotle's instinctivistic concept.

Tarde and the Theory of Imitation.*—Of all the theories so far advanced Montesquieu's is the only one that entirely escapes the criticism that the explanation of human behavior is in terms of itself. He conceived of human behavior as a natural response to climatic forces, which, being variable, could be used to explain variations in human behavior. It remained for another Frenchman, Gabriel Tarde, to fix attention upon another factor external to the individual. A jurist, Tarde had apparently learned by repeated experience that men are not notably responsive to factual argument. After many years of service on the bench he became convinced that the cause of criminal behavior was to be found not, as was the current belief, in the organic nature of men but in society. Thus his experience in dealing with criminals, added perhaps to the fact that he had lived through two great political upheavals, led him to the idea that human behavior is contagious, spreading from one person to another through a process which he termed imitation. Briefly, his view was that men are by nature suggestible and tend to do what they see other men doing.

cient antagonism on the part of a people to permit the precipitation or completion of a war, in an attempt to justify the harshness of dictatorial political rule (as with Hitler in Germany), and as a means of forcing an otherwise justifiable restrictive immigration act through our American Congress (1924). See *The racial myth* (P. Radin, 1934) and *We Europeans* (J. S. Huxley et al., 1936).

* See *The laws of imitation* (G. Tarde, trans., 1903). For the application of certain aspects of the theory of imitation to the behavior of groups, see *The crowd* (G. Le Bon, trans., 1917).

Thus the criminal is a man who happens to live among criminals and, imitating the behavior of those around him, acts in ways that society considers criminal. A revolutionist is one who has been exposed to the sight and sound of revolutionary behavior, to which he responds imitatively.

Since we shall have occasion to discuss the concept of imitation as a rather effective descriptive device in later chapters, we need only observe at this point that the failure in Tarde's theory lay in thinking that a description of phenomena provides us with an explanation of them.* It is permissible to say that men do imitate each other. That is a description of observable facts. But we are then faced with the question, Why and how do they imitate? Tarde assumed that men imitate the behavior of those around them because it is a natural, an automatic, thing for them to do. He thereby somewhat anticipated the mistake of the instinctivists, whose great fallacy served the useful purpose of destroying the tenacious hold of that equally erroneous idea that man is by nature a reasonable animal.

THE INSTINCTIVISTS

The Revival of the Instinct Theory.—At the opening of this century Charles H. Cooley analyzed human nature as the accumulation of habits acquired out of social experience.† E. A. Ross approached the same basic conception from a slightly different angle in his *Social control*, an analysis of the social pressures that operate within society to make the individual conform to the group norm. Although he later introduced, as an elaboration of the major thesis, Tarde's concept of imitation, the fruitfulness of Ross's distinctive approach and of Cooley's thesis was not immediately recognized (1).‡

* There is a vital difference between describing a thing and explaining it; the difference is, however, one of degree, not of kind. In the sense of final cause only the theologian and, possibly, the philosopher attempt to provide an explanation of any phenomenon. But the scientist endeavors to describe the intimately associated processes that precede and accompany; this type of description may be justly termed a scientific explanation. To say that water runs downhill is to describe the obvious. The reduction of this phenomenon to the mathematical laws of mass "attraction" is not, it is true, an explanation of it in terms of final cause but is, rather, a description of all the perceivable "causal" sequences; this is what we mean by "explanation."

† See *Human nature and the social order* (C. H. Cooley, 1902).

‡ Numbers in parentheses refer to the various Appendix notes. These notes consist of elaborations of the statements to which they are keyed and are either descriptions of relevant research findings, discussions of controversial issues, analyses of subsidiary problems, detailed illustrative materials, or summaries of the literature on the topic.

In the meantime sociologists, like the boy on horseback, were riding off in all directions. Many leaned toward the positivistic view of Comte or toward the highly deterministic interpretation of Spencer. Others were endeavoring to apply the viewpoints of such psychologists as William James and J. M. Baldwin. There was therefore the utmost confusion in regard to the origins of human behavior until 1908, when William McDougall pointed the way by offering a fallacious certainty. Possibly he, more than any other individual, was responsible for the revival of the Aristotelian view.* His was an instinctivistic interpretation of individual behavior and thus of social causation. It was acclaimed and adopted by a majority of sociologists and not a few psychologists. For ten years or more this concept dominated students of social psychology.†

Looking back, we find it difficult to see why the particularistic views of the instinctivists gained acceptance. Perhaps it was their very simplicity and gratifying finality that caught the interest and attention of scientists. Possibly the instinctivistic movement is to be interpreted as a violent reaction to the empirical tradition, just as later Watsonian behaviorism was a reaction to instinctivism. In any event, the McDougallian interpretation of human behavior and the methodology of study had the virtue of simplicity. But the question still to be solved was, let us recall, What is the relationship between the individual and society?

Instincts as the Cause of Society.—McDougall and his followers contended that society is but a resultant, not a cause, and that social phenomena are the consequence of the fact that men are born with roughly similar instinctive tendencies. Thus men, individually expressing their innate natures, act much alike; and society is the result. An instinct was, by definition, an inborn urge, drive, wish, or interest (the terms were various). Further confusing the issue, the instinctivists frequently considered an instinct to be a sort of biological goal, unperceived by the organism but attained through a series of predetermined forms of behavior.

Two types of evidence were advanced to support the instinctivistic interpretation. First, there was the argument by analogy. The

* See *An introduction to social psychology* (W. McDougall, 1908). For evaluations of McDougall's position in social psychology, see "William McDougall and his social psychology" (E. Heidbreder, 1939) and "William McDougall's doctrine of social psychology" (H. E. Jensen, 1939).

† The first major attack on the instinct hypothesis was "Are there any instincts?" (K. Dunlap, 1919). More vigorous attacks appeared later in *Behaviorism* (J. B. Watson, 1924), in *Instinct: a study in social psychology* (L. L. Bernard, 1924), and in several other articles and books.

behavior of certain insects appears to follow a specific and predetermined pattern. Ants and trap-door spiders live in accordance with predetermined adjustment techniques. They are not notably adaptable and will kill themselves in the effort to act as nature has determined that they should. Although considerable doubt has since arisen regarding the inability of insects to learn through experience, the instinctivists assumed this to be proved and proceeded to compare men to insects. If this was a good deal like arguing that the directional control of airplanes is of the same order as that of railroad trains since both are produced in factories, this fact did not discourage acceptance of the instinctivistic concept.

The second line of argument was even more disarming. It started with the observation that men do behave much alike. It can be said, for example, that in our society most men fall in love, get married, and eventually rear a child or two. From this observation certain of the instinctivists would deduce as the cause of the behavior an instinct for paternity. Others might, of course, conclude that three or more separate instincts were involved, such as sex love, the instinct for marriage, and the instinct for paternity. The permanent character of the marriage relationship under the monogamous system was commonly explained as the result of an instinct of sex jealousy. And so from the observed fact that men tend to behave so and so, this behavior would be explained as a consequence of the so-and-so instinct. Some writers held out for four or five basic instincts; others found four or five hundred. In any event, they classified the things that men do and, having given names to each classification, proclaimed that each represented an instinct. Unfortunately for the instinct theory, naming does not explain. The instinctivist explained the phenomena of social behavior in terms of themselves. Why do men get married and have families? Because nature has given them an instinct, or instincts, that lead them to do this. How do we know that they have such an instinct or instincts? Because they get married and have families.

The above was, of course, the line of argument used by Aristotle more than two thousand years ago. It results in a concept of social causation that is of small comfort to men who are dissatisfied with their society. It is sheer word magic and cannot withstand the slightest factual scrutiny. Yet it dominated our thinking for years; and, what is even more important for the development of social psychology, it gave us a break with the tradition that man is a "reasonable" animal. Instincts are not, of course, reasonable; they are "natural." The behavior resulting from them may or may not be expedient for the maintenance of life. Whether they are or are not expedient depends upon

external circumstances, since circumstances may change, although the instincts will, by definition, remain constant.

Society as a Repressor of Instincts.—McDougall had seen society as a direct consequence of the fact that all men are born with roughly similar sets of instincts. But as the theories of Sigmund Freud gained favor in the United States, the instinctivistic interpretation was modified to fit the Freudian view; and thus instinctivism entered upon its second phase.*

Freud was not primarily interested in society or, particularly, in the relation of the individual thereto. His was a problem of psychopathology, the cure of the unstable individual. But in developing a therapeutic technique he arrived at a theoretical interpretation of causation that profoundly affected the instinctivistic view of society. This was, in brief, the idea that internal mental stress or conflict led to the abnormalities that he was trying to cure and that this conflict was a result of the clash between "natural" drives and social experience.† Psychoanalysis, the technique of free verbal association by which the nature of the conflict was supposed to be located, probed into the hidden aspect of the human mind, which Freud called "the unconscious." He and his followers traced all psychological difficulties to the conflict between nature and society.

If, as Freud contended, natural drives and society can come into conflict, it follows that society is not a direct consequence of human instincts. A cause does not conflict with its effect. Certain of the instinctivists made an adroit adjustment to this new Freudian idea. They belatedly realized that, if men have instincts, those instincts are an inheritance from prehuman ancestry. Biological changes come slowly; one hundred thousand years is little in the process of biological evolution. But even so little as twenty thousand years ago men presumably were bestial, unsociable creatures. And so the instincts

* One of the first attempts by an American student to apply Freudian concepts to the interpretation of individual behavior can be seen in *The Freudian wish* (E. Holt, 1922). McDougall's *The group mind* (W. McDougall, 1920) was, however, the first systematic attempt to interpret society in Freudian terms. In *Psychoanalysis and social psychology* (W. McDougall, 1936) this interpretation is more fully and dogmatically developed. Another effort to interpret the whole of social life in terms of the Freudian concept and one that inevitably results in the setting up of a fatal opposition between the individual and society is *Individuality and social restraint* (G. R. Wells, 1929).

† An idea of the Freudian system can be obtained from *Seven psychologies* (E. Heidebreder, 1933). Psychoanalysis tempered somewhat to suit the theories of the social scientist is presented in *New ways in psychoanalysis* (K. Horney, 1939).

of modern man are probably antisocial. Unrestrained, they would cause the modern man to behave in the ways of his prehuman ancestors; he would rape and murder, pillage and despoil. Therefore, society has grown up as a system of restraints to prevent him from acting instinctively and to force him to live with his fellows in peace and good-fellowship.

In such a manner was the Aristotelian view reversed to fit the theories of the psychopathologists. Society was not an expression of human instincts but a device to repress them. How it came to be, no one seemed to know. All were certain, however, that man was a repressed and thwarted being, inevitably torn between his natural drives and necessary social restraints. For him the outlook was dark indeed. Some hope for individual happiness was offered through "sublimating" instinctive tendencies and redirecting them into socially acceptable channels. Few, however, thought to suggest that society might be modified to permit greater expression of human instincts. Even as these instincts were natural and unchangeable, so, too, by assumption was the society that had arisen to repress them.

Fatalistic Nature of the Older Views.—A curious note of pessimism runs through the entire history of presociopsychological views concerning the relationship between the individual and society. Since Plato and down to the emergence of a science of social psychology, human behavior has invariably been explained in terms of some static force. To Aristotle that force was biological; and society was but an expression of the individual's inherited modes of action, which as such could not be modified by man. The early hedonistic interpretation did not avoid an equally deterministic and static conclusion. It was, in fact, but a complex variant of the instinctivistic theory. The theological doctrine of free will, although still more involved, left man a choice between only two social alternatives, both of which were fixed by forces beyond the control of man himself. In its individual application the philosophy of empiricism was merely a revival of the theological doctrine of free will. Even the theory of individual biological evolution and racial determinism made natural forces the cause of human behavior, and from those natural forces there was no escape.* Although the extension of empiricism to the positivistic interpretation of society

* Except, perhaps, by controlled selection of desirable human stocks, a procedure advocated by the eugenists. They would have us apply stockbreeding principles to the development of a superior "race" of men who would, presumably, live in superior social ways. Aside from its underlying fallacy, there are a number of difficulties with this proposal, not the least of these being the fact that there is considerable dispute as to just who is superior to whom.

allowed social changes in accordance with evolutionary mental stages, it was every bit as fatalistic as was the theory of empiricism.

Although both the climatic interpretation of Montesquieu and the imitative concept of Tarde are free from some of the objections to the theological and empirical viewpoints, they endeavor to explain social behavior in terms of natural forces or mechanisms. Perhaps Tarde's theory is least subject to this criticism; but, if it is natural for a man imitatively to do what those about him do, then imitation is automatic and imperative. Tarde's hypothesis had the virtue of fitting fairly well the observed facts of social behavior, but it had the vice of oversimplicity. The relationship between the individual and society is by no means simple; and the cause of human behavior is not to be found in a single and unvarying force, such as imitation.

The instinctivistic interpretation, largely a type of word magic, served the purpose of counteracting the persistent tradition of empiricism. However, both the view that society is a direct outcome of man's inherited instincts and the idea that society arises to suppress his presocial instincts imply that society is largely unmodifiable.

THE CONTEMPORARY VIEW

In all this theorizing the experimental psychologists took little part. Traditional psychology, largely an outgrowth of physiology and philosophy, was interested almost wholly in the existence and structure of the individual mind. It devoted its time to general laws and cared little for the comparison of one mind with another. Its technique, introspection, was highly personal in that it could be employed only by a trained observer and only on himself. It is true that W. Wundt, its chief proponent, speculated to some extent about the minds of primitive peoples;* but this line of interest, termed "folk psychology," did not loom at all large in psychology and was gradually merged with cultural anthropology.

With the advent of the American functional psychology of James, Baldwin, Dewey, and Angell,† to mention only a few of the pioneers, a looser and less rigorous type of introspection that allowed research in the several fields of applied psychology came into vogue. With it came an interest in individual differences. French abnormal psychology and the mental-testing movement added to the growing

* See *Elements of folk psychology* (W. Wundt, 1916).

† See *Principles of psychology* (W. James, 1890); *Elements of psychology* (J. M. Baldwin, 1893); *Psychology* (J. Dewey, 1897); *Psychology* (J. R. Angell, 1908); and "Abnormal and social psychology in the life and work of William James" (H. D. Spoerl, 1942).

interest in the social aspects of man's behavior. Behaviorism put psychology squarely into the field of the social sciences, so much so in fact that Weiss's definition of psychology, "the science that studies the origin and development of those bodily movements (responses) of the individual which establish his status in the social organization of which he is a member" (A. P. Weiss, 1929, p. 144), could serve as a partial description of the aims of modern social psychology.

Gestalt psychology, which may be looked upon as a correction to some of the limitations of early behaviorism and structuralism, carried psychological study still further into the problem of the relation of the individual and society. This trend is most evident, perhaps, in the topological, or field-theory approach (K. Lewin, 1939). An attempt has been made to apply this latter approach directly to the analysis of social phenomena (J. F. Brown, 1937).

Meanwhile, the sociologists were recovering from instinctivism, were rediscovering the sociopsychological import in the writings of Cooley, and were coming to a view that did not do violence to the findings of the modern experimental psychologists.

Cooley and the Neo-Platonic View.—Plato, it will be recalled, had seen society as a system of human relationships that was devised by man and into which the individual was forced by the process of education. He had not attempted to explain how the Greek social system had come into being; but he believed that a new and more satisfactory one could be worked out and that by the training of the incoming members into the forms of action prescribed by this system it could be put into effect.* He had seen society as a summation of human behavior; but, behind that, individual behavior was a resultant of the effect of the mass upon the plastic and at birth "unhuman" individual. Two thousand years later Plato's concept was reexpressed, much refined and elaborated, by Cooley. His *Human nature and the social order* is a landmark in the historic development of contemporary social psychology.

Although Cooley broke with past tradition and provided an effective conceptual basis for the development of social psychology, he could not bridge the gap between individual psychology and the social sciences. Psychology was still struggling under ancient preconceptions. Lacking therefore a psychological explanation of the processes

* The same idea has become very popular among professional educators. They propose to speed the coming of a social utopia by educating children for the good society of the future, not the "bad" society of the present. They propose, for example, to abolish the examination system which trains the student to be competitive, since, to their minds, competition is the root of economic malfunctioning.

involved in animal learning, Cooley could but point out that, by whatever process, men do learn and that they learn mainly through experience with other men. It is this view of the relation of the individual to society that we shall endeavor to trace out in the light of later psychological and sociological findings.

But it must not be imagined that the history, *i.e.*, development, of social psychology has come to an end. The "story" we propose to tell is still in the process of unfolding; and before we can begin the telling, one more and as yet unsettled historic problem must be mentioned.

Interactionism and the Situational Approach.—Until recently, most sociopsychological attention has centered on the processes by which the individual acquires his social attributes through his experiences with other men.* The major gains in our understanding have occurred here, and the study of the social situations in which the individual learns and behaves has lagged considerably. As a result, there has been some tendency to treat the learning process without reference to the learning situation and to treat the individual without reference to the social interactions in which he operates as but one of a number of variables. Of late, there have been attempts to establish an analytical system that will permit the study of the individual in his social context. The efforts are variously known as the field, interactional, or situational approaches to social psychology.

For purposes of clarity we shall in this book first treat mainly of the ways in which social participation affects the development of the individual and determines his social attributes and only then turn our attention to the nature of the situations in which this occurs. This procedure is somewhat analogous to that of studying how the actors in a play learn their roles before attempting to analyze the interrelations of the various actors during the enactment of the play itself. The procedure is artificial; for the players and the play are but two aspects of a whole, neither aspect of which can have independent life. Without trained players to enact it, there is no play. Without a play to enact, there can be no actors. And so with real life. For analytical

* Reuter would limit the field of social psychology exclusively to this aspect of the larger problem (E. B. Reuter, 1940). Dunlap, on the other hand, would go to the other extreme and follow Thomas Hobbes in studying only the "groups *qua* group" (K. Dunlap, 1940b). For a statement of the view that the human being can never be studied apart from the social context in which he develops and behaves, see "Important developments in American social psychology during the past decade" (L. S. Cottrell and R. Gallagher, 1941). For a list, with brief comments of the various attempts that have been made to present a systematic analysis of the field of social psychology, see Appendix note 2.

purposes, however, the individual may be temporarily abstracted from his complex social context so that its effects upon him and his participations in it can be examined piece by piece. Much gain can come from this procedure, provided that sight is never for a moment lost of the fact that each of the pieces is but a fragment of an inseparable whole.

CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL BASES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

The social psychologist is concerned with human, as distinct from animal, behavior. The newborn human infant does not behave in ways that in a social sense are human; he is a human animal, not a social human being. But the organic potentialities and the psychological attributes of the human animal cannot be ignored, for it is upon the basis of these that the social human being will in the course of time be developed. The human animal is, in the main, a creature of biological forces; and nothing that may happen to him after birth can change his inherent nature. Evident is the fact that, since he was not born with wings, he can never learn to fly like a bird. Equally evident is the fact that, with rare exceptions, he comes into the world with an elaborate sound-making mechanism and can, therefore, learn to talk more fluently than can any of the other animals. Some of his organic and psychological limitations and some of his potentialities are not, however, so clearly evident.

At birth the human animal, although a most complex organism, is biologically one of the least competent. Toward the lower end of the scale of organic complexity are the single-celled amoebas—bits of almost undifferentiated protoplasm, which are nevertheless biologically equipped to make adaptations to their aqueous environment. At the other end is the multicellular and highly differentiated human animal—a marvelous complex of organic machinery with vast potentialities, but without the ability to adapt himself to any environment, even the most favorable. Left to his own devices at any time during his first few years of life, the human animal will shortly die, even though food, shelter, and the other requisites to continued life are at hand. If he is to live and grow to maturity, the human animal must to a far greater degree than any other animal be taken care of until he can be taught to be relatively self-sufficient. For ten, fifteen, or even more years, he must be fed, clothed, protected, and trained into those complex patterns of adjustment that make for survival under the particular circumstances surrounding him.

NATURE VERSUS NURTURE

That biology sets the potentialities of the human animal and that external circumstances (mainly social) develop those potentialities

might appear to be a statement of the obvious. Yet a great intellectual controversy has long raged around the respective roles of the biological and social heritages in "causing" human behaviors. At one extreme have stood the hereditarians who have seen man mainly as an integration of inherited capacities. At the other have been the environmentalists who have stressed the role of nurture to the exclusion of all else. There have been, of course, those who have accepted some intermediate position. But for many years their less raucous voices could not be heard above the clamor of the embattled hereditarians and environmentalists.

The Extreme Hereditarians.—It is an axiom that like begets like. To the uncritical observer and to an occasional geneticist this may mean that, whenever actions of father and son are seen to be similar, the label "inherited" can be affixed to those actions, and social factors can be ruled out. Immersed in their studies of man the animal, biologists have too often attributed all human accomplishments and failures to inherent nature. They have failed to see that nature's "gifts" are not finished products but are, rather, potentialities, or limits, within which social factors operate. Hereditarians have talked impressively of genes and chromosomes, as though findings concerning the inheritance of wing marking in the fruit fly apply directly to the study of human behaviors.* On the a priori assumption that practically all human achievement is a reflection of the genetic structure, they have made superficial studies of family lines to support the genetic principles that they believe underlie human heredity; they have assumed that the social circumstances—the poverty of the backwoods or the wealth of Park Avenue—under which the genetic attributes "unfold" are unimportant. To their minds, an individual born of "Kallikak" stock cannot become an Edwards or even a Harding, no matter how superior the environment in which he is reared.† Artists are born, they say, not developed in a social milieu (3). Much of the hereditarian argument has been couched in terms of instincts; some is in the language of outmoded faculty psychology, e.g., "John inherits his father's stubbornness." Statements such as "the man makes the

* Morgan, well known for his extremely illuminating work on the genetics of fruit flies, has decried the careless reasoning by which certain geneticists have applied his findings to human genetics. Cultural inheritance, although enormously important in man, is hardly worth mention in the case of the fruit fly (T. H. Morgan, 1934, p. 144). A very critical analysis of these problems can be found in *Nature and nurture* (L. Hogben, 1933). See also *You and heredity* (A. Scheinfeld and M. D. Schweitzer, 1939).

† Some years ago a colleague found a member of the "Kallikak" family in one of his classes. In spite of his "bad stock," the boy did better than average work.

times" have been catch phrases. And, unfortunately, the fact that hereditarianism has come out of an older and better established scientific discipline, biology, has carried weight with many social psychologists, particularly those recruited from psychology.*

The Extreme Environmentalists.—When the instinct as an explanatory concept was cast out of American social sciences, many sociologists and not a few psychologists leaped to the conclusion that biological factors could be ignored in the study of human behavior. All behavioral differences among human beings were, they claimed, to be explained wholly on environmental grounds. "Give me," cried Watson, father of this extreme environmental view, "a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specific world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors." (J. B. Watson, 1924, p. 82.) Actually, neither Watson nor anyone else for that matter has ever made good this claim.

The extreme environmental view has nevertheless been retained, particularly by a large number of so-called "progressive" educators who possess little or no acquaintance with scientific method and who select and advertise only those data that seem to them to prove the power of their particular brand of educational philosophy. The effect of their wild claims and of the failure of the educational programs erected upon these claims has been to hasten the downfall of the extreme environmental view. This view is, of course, quite as unsound as is the belief that the genes determine once and for all whether a given individual will or will not be a musician, artist, doctor, lawyer, rich man, poor man, etc.

The Interactional View.—In the early days of the nature-nurture controversy, the moderates, impressed by the rival claims of the extremists, quite understandably assumed that heredity and environment were independent entities that functioned in an additive fashion. The problem, so they thought, was to find what portion (or elements) of human behavior† was "caused" by heredity and what by environ-

* One need only glance at Cattell's recent *General psychology* (R. B. Cattell, 1941) to be reassured that hereditarianism in a virulent form is still with us.

† "Portion of human behavior" should not be confused with "portion of human behavior variance"—a perfectly proper phrase. For just as the variation in speed between two identically constructed Fords can be wholly due to differences in the gasoline they are using, so the variations in the behaviors of two genetically identical people can be properly attributed to differences in their environments.

ment. Behavior was thus looked upon as the result of two independent variables.

Gradually, however, it has become apparent that these two variables are not independent, but are interdependent. Thus the effect of a given biological heritage will depend upon the given social environment, and the effect of the latter will depend upon the former. In the study of the origins of behavior we are not, therefore, dealing with two separate causes that together produce an effect, but rather with two "causes" each of which affects the other. This interactional view of heredity and environment is one aspect of the shift, described in Chapter I, from one-way cause-and-effect analysis to interactional analysis.

Many of the environmental factors are subject to scientific scrutiny. We can observe, however crudely, the effects upon the child of long social isolation* and the changes in behavior resulting from marked changes in environment during the crucial period of adolescence.† No means has yet been found, however, to measure at all directly the effects of the biological heritage. Even the measurement of the so-called "hereditary" forms of feeble-mindedness cannot be handled in a direct, clean-cut manner. For first we must decide what constitutes a deficient biological heritage (*e.g.*, how many defective relatives a feeble-minded child must have before his stock is branded as defective); and this decision must of necessity be arbitrary.

So far the biological potentialities can only be adjudged from the success or failure of a given environment in producing the expected results. Finding no environmental reason for the fact that one child sang on tune while another hummed in a monotone, we once assumed that the latter lacked the biological potentialities necessary to good singing. But in this instance—and this instance has many parallels—we were later forced to alter our assumptions. Monotones, it was found, can be trained to sing and hence must possess adequate biological equipment for singing.‡

* A girl approximately five years of age was discovered in a room where she had apparently been kept since infancy. Following her removal first to a foster home and later to a school for defectives, she improved both physically and mentally. The change, however, was very slow; and she is still somewhat unsocialized (K. Davis, 1940).

† Typical of the studies that deal with abrupt changes in environment are those of the wartime evacuation of children, such as "A study of some effects of evacuation on adolescent girls" (M. D. Vernon, 1940) and "Preliminary results of Cambridge survey of evacuated children" (A. Straker and R. H. Thouless, 1940).

‡ During the past thirty or forty years pitch deafness has grown less and less common. In the early 1900's pitch deafness was considered to be sex linked (more prevalent among boys), inherited, and so incurable. Now no monotones can be found in classrooms directed by properly trained teachers.

Research Findings.*—Vast amounts of scientific effort, and some not so scientific, have been devoted to the problem of unscrambling the roles of heredity and environment. Since under present conditions it is impossible to experiment with human animals as we can with the subhuman, we are dependent upon the evidence provided by socially atypical combinations of inheritance and environment. Unquestionably the most striking and useful way to approach the problem would be to study human animals brought up by lower animals; and many are the legends of “wolf” and “baboon” children—so-called feral men, who are supposed to take over the attributes of their subhuman environment. But so far, no authenticated cases of feral men have been discovered.

Many actual studies have, however, been made of the effects of foster homes upon the I.Q.’s† of foster children. Although some educational psychologists have claimed that a child with a low I.Q. is markedly improved by removal to a better environment, the weight of evidence is that, for all practical purposes, the I.Q. is stable; *i.e.*, it is not significantly modifiable by environmental changes.

Attempts to evaluate the influence of heredity by comparing the performance of individuals with supposedly different heredities and what seem to be comparable environments have not been successful. The difficulty lies in the fact that, although environments might be held reasonably constant in a laboratory experiment, in actual life circumstances no two children are ever affected by quite the same set of external stimuli. Even within a given family, children will be accorded somewhat, and often considerably, different treatment by their parents and friends.

The effects of supposedly identical heredities and obviously different environments have been tested in a number of studies of identical twins‡ who were reared apart. The results indicate that the I.Q.’s of such identical twins vary slightly more than do those of identical twins who are reared together, but the difference is so slight as to have little sociopsychological significance.

In general, the present evidence indicates that those kinds of behavior that are measurable by intelligence tests of the Binet variety

* For the use of the interested student, a more detailed discussion of these findings is provided in Appendix note 4.

† The term “I.Q.” refers to the ratio between the child’s mental age, as determined by the score he makes on a Stanford-Binet intelligence test, and his chronological age.

‡ Identical twins are brothers or sisters developed from the same fertilized ovum.

are extremely stable and strongly resistant to change by environmental influences. But these findings have somewhat limited significance for social psychology. In the first place, the I.Q. cannot be ascertained until the individual has for some time been exposed to environmental influences. As a result, it is never certain whether I.Q. differences reflect differences in inherent potentialities or differences in early environment. To the extent that they reflect the latter, the great stability of the I.Q. would suggest the primary importance of early, as contrasted to later, environmental influences. In the second place, that aspect of behavior measured by the intelligence test (later to be discussed as overt symbolic in type) is often less important in social relations than are those aspects that are usually covered by the term "personality," aspects that are less subject to accurate measurement and appear to be much less stable,* *i.e.*, more easily affected by changes in environment, than those intellectual achievements that are measured by Binet tests of I.Q.

THE NEUROGLANDULAR BASES OF BEHAVIOR

Since behavior is, as we now understand it, the result of an interaction between biological inheritance and environmental stimuli, and, since no means has yet been found to isolate one from the other, most of our knowledge of the biological machinery involved in human behavior is necessarily inferential. Anatomists and neurologists have given us detailed descriptions of the structure of this machinery; but of its operation we know very little. As we have said, the human animal has at birth vast and little known potentialities. These potentialities are twofold: provided that circumstances are favorable, the human animal can grow physically, acquiring in time those organic attributes that distinguish the infant from the mature man; he can, at the same time, acquire specific patterns of response to specific stimuli of external or internal origin. As we shall see, these two potentialities are inter-related: maturation affects learning, and experience (including what is learned) affects maturation.

The Neuroglandular System. †—The central nervous system serves as a vehicle by means of which a rapid transmission of impulses from the sense organs (the receptors of the body) to the muscles and glands (the effectors) is made possible. Through the nervous system there is

* This instability has not deterred certain workers in applied psychology from developing a personality quotient, or P.Q., analogous to the I.Q. (H. C. Link, 1936b; W. A. Thomson, 1938; and S. Roslow, 1940).

† In view of the lack of verifiable data, it is the belief of the authors that an extremely superficial acquaintance with neurology and with the physiology of the ductless glands will suffice for the novice in social psychology. For more detailed

an opportunity for practically any receptor to be connected at some time or other with any effector.

Of the central nervous system, that division which is termed the autonomic system is of primary interest to the social psychologist. This system is concerned with the smooth muscles that function in breathing, blushing, and the like, and with the glands. Impulses over the cranial portion of the autonomic system and from that section which emerges from the tail or sacral region tend to activate the normal bodily processes of digestion, assimilation, and excretion. Impulses over the middle or sympathetic division tend to elicit changes that are associated with the preparation of the body for intense behavior.

The endocrine or ductless glands affect behavior in varying ways and to varying extents. Especially important are the adrenals, whose secretions intensify the internal "emotional" changes that are initiated through the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system. The internal sex glands are associated with certain of the secondary sex characteristics, such as the voice change in the male and the hair patterns in the pubic regions. The thyroid glands have psychological importance in that an undersecretion may be associated with those forms of low intelligence termed myxedema and cretinism, whereas oversecretion seems to be linked with emotional disturbances. A number of the other ductless glands, especially the pituitary and the endocrine portion of the liver, affect growth and energy; but as yet our knowledge of their functions is such as to make them of little more than passing interest to the social psychologist.

To the social psychologist the importance of the neuroglandular system is that it makes learning possible. Although it limits the ultimate possibilities of learning, it does not determine what shall be learned. At birth, the neuroglandular system is only tentatively organized. Thus, whether it is a snake, a pretty girl, or the idea of a ghost that stimulates the ductless glands to abnormal activity depends entirely upon how those glands have been trained to operate within the organic machinery of the particular individual.

MOTIVATION*

All organic life is dynamic. Even in the simplest of organisms life consists of a continuous cycle of biochemical occurrences. Birth is the

descriptions, see *The tides of life* (R. G. Hoskins, 1933); *Physiology of the nervous system* (J. F. Fulton, 1938); and *Endocrinology; the glands and their functions* (R. G. Hoskins, 1941).

* The sole modern text on human motivation at this time is *Motivation of behavior* (P. T. Young, 1936). See also *The fundamentals of human motivation* (L. T. Troland, 1928).

beginning of this cycle and death its end. Among the external evidences of life are tissue growth and organic adaptability. In the relatively simple organism, this adaptability takes such forms as movement through its environment, selection, and absorption of food, etc., all of which appear to be unlearned abilities. In the human animal adaptability consists in the first instance in the ability to respond to stimuli of external or internal origin. It is this ability to respond that is basic to the learning process; and, in turn, it is learning that makes most of the difference between a human infant and a social human being.

The responding may be described mechanistically as a product of an organic disequilibrium that ceases when organic equilibrium is reestablished. Certain stimuli, such as those produced internally by the distended bladder and those produced externally by the playfully pinching parent, induce a state of disequilibrium that in turn leads to some sort of activity. The forces that elicit the activity are usually termed motivational.

When a rat, bumping its nose against the sides of a maze, backs away and tries some other passage, the question may be asked, Why does it try this other passage? Why does it not lie down and rest? Motivational terms are customarily used to answer this question. It "wants," says the layman, to reach the other end of the maze, for from this point come the food odors it smells. When a human infant whimpers or a politician takes the stump and shouts himself hoarse, a motive is given as an immediate antecedent of the action. The baby may "want" a bottle, the politician, a vote. In the study of human behavior, it is the source and nature of such "motives" or "drives"* that are of primary importance. Thus it is asked, Is the profit motive natural? Is the poor man one whose economic drives are inadequate? Do all men possess similar motives?

To say that all animals want to live, that man has a will to live, is not helpful. Quite obviously, such a concept is totally inadequate either to explain or to describe the more complicated motives involved in human behavior. In view of our present knowledge a distinction can be drawn between animal drives and social motivation.

Organic Basis of Motivation.—The field of animal psychology has furnished the best data on the biological aspects of motivation (5).

* "Drive" has been defined as "the total of internal changes produced in an organism by some kind of deprivation." The characteristics of "driven" behavior include activity, rhythm, facilitation, inhibition, sensitivity, variability, and modifiability (M. H. Elliott, 1935). See "Internal and external determinants of drives" (G. H. Seward and J. P. Seward, 1937) and "The 'validation' of drives" (G. H. Seward, 1942).

Although it is dangerous to reason analogically from subhuman animals to human beings, man is biologically an animal; and all animals have roughly the same types of organic drives or tissue needs—those for food, water, urination, defecation, sex, etc. Like the subhuman animals, man has ductless glands that pour various compounds into his blood stream and so alter his metabolic level. If he is aware of these changes and the ways of relieving them, he may speak of a “desire” to do this or a “need” to do that. If he is excited, his glandular balance is altered, his metabolic level is changed, and some sort of observable activity occurs.

Numerous and sundry have been the speculations concerning the biological mechanisms that are basic to the motivation of human behavior. Instincts, prepotent reflexes,* Freudian libido or sex energy (S. Freud, 1933), Jungian archetypes,† Adlerian organic deficiencies (6), and many other mechanisms have been postulated. Although all these speculations are based upon observations of behavior, the manner in which they are knit into the problem of social motivation reflects to a great extent the social training of their proponents, who differ one from another in philosophical background and in experimental interests.

The psychoanalysts—Freud, Jung, Adler, and the rest—have undoubtedly contributed to the problem of motivation. But with missionary zeal they have stretched their theories far beyond scientific limits. In many instances they have interpreted their data in terms of loose and sometimes mysterious concepts. Withal they show the abnormalist bias; *i.e.*, they see the normal person in terms of the abnormal. Like Christian Science, psychoanalysis claims to possess both a worth-while therapy and a scientifically valid theoretical system. Both faith systems assuredly get results in many instances.‡ But their therapeutic value in no wise proves that the theoretical systems themselves are valid. That man is affected by hormones and his own hunger contractions and that he has important reflexes that are some-

* In the early 1920's when the instinct, particularly as a vitalistic principle, was being fiercely attacked, a number of rivals appeared for its place. The prepotent reflex had at least the advantage of being mechanistic and of referring only in part to innate behavior (F. Allport, 1924). However, it was regarded by some as “bringing back the instinct by the back door.” The Allport list of prepotent reflexes includes starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger reactions, sensitive-zone reactions, and sex responses.

† Jung has put forth the claim that the social experiences of earlier human beings are biologically inherited by their present-day descendants (C. G. Jung, 1917 and 1939). Suffice it to say that modern biologists do not generally hold to this Lamarckian view of heredity.

‡ See *Power of the charlatan* (G. de Francesco, 1939).

what functional shortly after birth is undisputed. But that he possesses complicated systems of inherited behavior patterns (instincts) is now generally disbelieved.

Social Aspects of Motivation.—So far as we now know, the human organism, like all other animals, is at the outset motivated only by physical stimuli. Biological “drives” serve as the basis upon which are built the complex and specific patterns of activity that are characteristic of the human being. But the activities of the social human being cannot be explained by reference to biological motives. So much that is social has happened between the time when the infant squirms because of hunger pangs and the time when the adult enters a restaurant to order dinner that it is ridiculous to explain the adult pattern of action in terms of organic hunger.* If motivational terms are to be used to explain such complex patterns, it must be clearly recognized that they do not refer to biological drives, but rather to complex social developments upon the original organic bases (7).

With even the basic biological drives, social factors are operative. An individual must control his animal drives to some extent, or he can hardly be labeled as human. Even in so-called primitive cultures this is a necessity. But it is not to controlled biological drives that the layman refers when he employs the terms “wish” and “desire.” The question, Why does John want to enter the medical instead of the legal profession? has only a remote relation to John’s organic drives. Such motivation involves so many complex social antecedents that no one can give a scientifically accurate answer. A detailed clinical study of John must be made before even a tentative answer can possibly emerge. The quack may have a ready answer, but the scientist must proceed more slowly. In a later chapter we shall return to this problem and consider it in detail.

EMOTIONS

The importance of human motivation to social psychology lies mainly in the fact that the intensity of the disequilibrium caused by any stimulus affects the intensity of the organism’s activity. On the social level this may be described as the fact that the intensity of the want that the sight of candy arouses in the child will in part determine not only what he will do but how actively he will do it. Since sheer activity is one factor in learning, socially acquired motivation is, thus, an important aspect of human achievement. Unless a man has learned to want to be wealthy (a way of describing the existence of internal

* The subhuman animals, too, have learned, or “social” drives (N. M. Locke, 1936).

disequilibrium as the result of lack of wealth), he will not make the efforts that might ultimately lead to his becoming wealthy.

There is, however, another aspect of internal disequilibrium, the role of which is by no means evident. This is the so-called "feeling-states," or, in lay language, the emotions.* These feeling-states evidently involve activity of the ductless glands, which at times affect the rate and intensity of heartbeat, respiration, and other physiological processes.

Organic Emotional Responses.—Early students of child psychology concluded that there were three innate emotional states—fear, rage, and love. It is now believed, however, that the newborn child possesses only the bare potentialities for his future emotional behavior.† Like organic motives, the natural emotional responses, whatever they may be, do no more than provide the basis upon which social responses are developed.

Socially Acquired Emotions.—Apparently the majority of feeling-states have been learned. In a subsequent chapter, considerable attention will be given to the processes involved in this learning. It will suffice to say here that there is no reason to believe that there is anything natural about the reverence we may feel during the course of an impressive religious ceremony, the fear we may have of ghosts, and the like. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the terms that we may use to indicate our own feeling-states and what we judge to be the feelings of others are never definitive. Of such a term as "love," for example, all that can be said is "I mean by love exactly what I mean by love." Although the names given to feeling-states may conceivably aid the poet, they do little but muddle the work of the social scientist.

Emotions and Learning.—Some forms of activity, specifically those that involve well-established patterns of a somewhat manual sort, do not seem to be adversely affected by intensified feeling-states. It is for this reason that school children, ship passengers, soldiers, sailors, and others who are likely to be subjected to conditions that provoke violent emotional response are drilled into patterns of behavior that may be called into operation when such conditions occur. A well-drilled school child will march down the aisle and obey the teacher's command, however frightened by the fire that is consuming the school building; a well-trained soldier will charge, when so ordered, although

* In lay usage the term "emotion" is usually employed by the individual to refer to feeling-states known only to himself. It is in this sense that we here use the term. But there are several other meanings in which it is used. See Appendix note 8.

† See "Emotional development in early infancy" (K. M. B. Bridges, 1932).

his chances of survival are almost nil. It is even possible that actions that have been well automatized are more effectively carried out when the individual's feeling-states are intensified.

Learning, on the other hand, is often affected adversely by intensified feeling-states. This is particularly true if what is to be learned calls for abilities of an intellectual sort. Most creative work is more easily carried to completion in the absence of emotion-provoking stimuli (J. R. Patrick, 1934).

LEARNING

Maturation and Learning.—The problem of the role of the organic potentialities of the human animal is further complicated by the fact that they continue to develop long after birth. The human infant must live for many months before he is organically capable of "learning" to walk, many years before he can possibly acquire complete sex behavior, etc. As a consequence, the learning process is constantly limited by the state of the organism's development. Maturation, the name given to this development of new potentialities, thus limits what can be learned at any particular time in response to a given set of environmental stimuli. The effect of such and such an experience upon a child, for example, will be quite different from the effect of a similar experience upon an adult, if for no other reason than that the child is organically less mature (9).

The Learning Process.—At birth* the child reacts more or less en masse to most stimuli. A pinch on the arm, for example, will cause movements in almost all parts of his body. Some specificity of action is present; the newborn infant will, for example, blink his eye when something moves rapidly toward it. But such unlearned reactions, often termed "reflexes," are few; and of these even fewer are perfect at birth.† In a short time, however, the infant comes to respond more and more specifically to each stimulus, until a pinch of the arm will cause a withdrawal of the arm, a prick on the foot, action in that member, etc.

Just how soon it is that the infant "learns" something, however, depends upon what definition of learning is accepted. If learning is defined as "change in the strength of an act through training procedures" (E. R. Hilgard and D. Marquis, 1940, p. 347)—and this definition seems to be approved—learning must be said to start very early

* For a description of the behavior of the newborn see K. Pratt's article "The neonate" (C. Murchison, ed., 1933).

† See "Sensori-motor responses in infants" (M. Sherman and I. C. Sherman, 1925).

indeed. For even the infant reflects in the strength of his cries the training that his mother unwittingly gives him when she rushes to his side in answer to his cries. In a remarkably short time the sound of her footsteps or the opening of the door will be sufficient to quiet the cries at least temporarily.

Types of Learning.—Although we know very little about the physiological nature of learning, we now have a considerable body of knowledge concerning the conditions of learning, the relations of learning to fatigue, age, sex, etc., and the nature of loss of memory. There are probably no fundamental differences on the physiological level between the several so-called types of learning, but descriptively certain differences seem worthy of mention.

The term "conditioning,"* loosely employed, means little more than the association of a new stimulus with an old response. There is usually assumed to be a minimum of trial-and-error fumbling involved. Thus, during the first few weeks of life the child displays many sorts of grimaces, one of which we call the smile. Just what stimuli are at first necessary to elicit this grimace we cannot ascertain. But as soon as an obviously social stimulus complex calls it forth, *e.g.*, when the infant's smile occurs in answer to the mother's smile, we say that the infant has learned to smile socially. At first the infant's smile occurred as the result of undetermined processes; in time the mother's often repeated smiling became associated with this grimace. Had the mother and the others who entered the nursery room smiled only when the infant stuck out its tongue, this latter act, rather than the smile, would have been the associated response.

Relatively undirected trial-and-error learning is quantitatively if not qualitatively somewhat different. The human or subhuman animal, driven by some strong motivating factor, tries out first this bit of previously acquired behavior, then that, then another, etc., frequently employing certain of them over and over again. After a period of failures, he may find that one of his actions leads to success, *i.e.*, to a situation in which the need is satisfied. In common-sense terms, he "wants" something and then tries out his tricks until one of them leads to his getting what he wants. If the want reappears day after day, the same process is repeated with less fumbling; the goal is reached in a progressively shorter time. Thus, in learning to ride a bicycle, the child tries out his various tricycle and walking habits, as well as many others. All these are at first inadequate. Eventually, however, he hits upon the trick of balancing on the

* For the more technical meaning of the term see *Conditioning and learning* (E. R. Hilgard and D. Marquis, 1940).

bicycle. During subsequent attempts at learning, he probably will have further tumbles but more prompt success.

Many of the acts that lead to success in the trial-and-error process are never clearly perceived by the learner. When, however, the functioning of the successful act is clearly perceived, learning is termed "insightful." Let us suppose that a rat, an ape, and a child are all placed in cages from which they must free themselves by depressing the first and third but not the second of three identical levers. Day after day the rat will scamper about, getting out in less and less time. But it will never get out immediately. Its success seems to come largely from increases in the speed of its activity. If it moves faster, the rat will accidentally hit the proper levers more speedily. The rat has no real, or at any rate no complete, insight into the situation. But the ape and the child, if sufficiently bright, will learn to solve the problem. They may never learn why the experimenter caged them, but they will identify the levers as the tools that they must use to get out of the cage.

Some of our social learning, such as the acquisition of the social smile, is more on the order of what has been termed association or conditioning. Much, however, is relatively undirected, with enormous amounts of trial and error. A portion is of the insightful sort.*

SUMMARY

Throughout our subsequent discussions it must be kept in mind that man is both an animal and a social being. In his former capacity he shares his structures and his biological needs with the higher sub-human forms. Although his potentialities, like those of all living creatures, are known to be limited by his genetic constitution, there are at present only indirect methods for investigating them. Certain human characteristics, commonly discussed under the heading of Binet intelligence, are so fixed by nature and early environmental influences that only gigantic modifications of later environment can alter them appreciably. Other characteristics, traits of personality, are far more amenable to change.

Motives, the wellsprings of behavior, arise as both the result of tissue needs and the result of social forces. With tissue needs and theories that trace back all social motives directly to them, the social psychologist is little concerned. His chief interest lies in the analysis of social motives.

* For further discussions of learning see *Psychology of learning* (R. A. Davis, 1935) and *The psychology of learning* (E. R. Guthrie, 1935).

The excitements that upset and intrigue mankind—the physiological changes and the introspective “feels”—have been termed feeling-states or emotions. When feeling-states are intensified, behavior, unless extremely automatized, tends to become disorganized. Under milder excitements, the quantity but not the quality of the activity may be enhanced.

The older notion that the child begins his life as a bundle of reflexes that are later to be conditioned is giving way to the idea of a progression from generalized or mass activity to increasing specificity of behavior. The child matures, meets stimuli, and learns. In considerable measure these stimuli are social; they are the controlled consequence of the fact that men live together in a society of some sort. Thus, much of what the child will learn is determined by the character of the society into which he is born. We must turn to the sociologist, therefore, for some understanding of the nature of human society. It is in this society that man, the animal, gradually becomes man, the socially behaving human being.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIOCULTURAL BASES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

SOCIAL DEPENDENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

In the previous chapter it was pointed out that, if left to his own devices, the newborn human infant would quite promptly die. He is born physically immature—without the organic developments that are necessary for his walking about to gather food, find shelter, and protect himself from sun, wind, rain, and the other hazards to continued life. If he is to live, he must, therefore, have food brought to him; have shelter provided, etc., until he has grown in the physical sense from an infant into a child. Such dependency during infancy exists to some degree among most of the higher animals; and in this respect the principal difference between man and the subhuman animals is that the infancy of man is considerably prolonged. The fledgling can leave the nest in a few weeks; the bear cub can wander afield in a few months. But the human infant does not reach a comparable state of development until a few years after birth.

There is, however, an even more important difference between the human infant and the fledgling or the bear cub; for the world of the human being is far more complex than is that of the bird and the bear. Whereas the latter must learn to adjust themselves to nature, the human being must learn also to live in a society.* Once the fledgling and bear cub have become capable of effective movement, they explore the world about them, learning largely by direct experience (unguided trial and error) how to maintain themselves. During this process fatalities are high, but those who survive do so because they have learned more or less by themselves to adjust to nature. Conceivably the human child could also learn by direct experience to survive in a favorable natural environment. It is inconceivable, however, that he could ever learn by this means to live in even the simplest social system, so complex are the behaviors necessary for survival in a society. By undirected trial and error a child might learn within a month or two to

* Animals have, of course, relations with members of their own species; and these relations may have in rudimentary form some of the attributes of human society. Animal "society" is, however, exceedingly simple in comparison with the societies of human beings. See Appendix note 10.

get a drink from a near-by brook; but it is doubtful whether, without being taught how to do so, he would ever hit upon the complex pattern of sounds necessary to procure a drink from the soda-fountain clerk in a city drugstore.

Thus the society that makes possible the survival of the individual through infancy and childhood also makes necessary the acquisition of social adjustments that are so complex that they can be learned only under social guidance. As the infant grows into the child and from thence on until death, society more or less effectively and always in exceedingly complex ways trains him into the social patterns of behavior necessary for survival under the particular conditions of social life. Upon the efficiency and appropriateness of this training will in the first instance depend his success as a human being—his ability to secure through the social system those physical and psychological satisfactions necessary to his well-being. If his society is such that it trains him adequately, he will want what it is possible to achieve within the confines of the system and will acquire those skills necessary for such achievement. His life will then be, to use lay terminology, one of relative happiness and contentment. If his society is such that it fails to train him adequately, he will want what cannot be obtained and will lack the skills necessary for achieving whatever is socially available to him. His life will then be one of unhappiness and discontent, if not untimely death.

But even after he has learned how to adjust himself to his society, he is not independent of it. Except for the mythical Robinson Crusoes, human adults do not by themselves secure their livelihood from nature or determine the conditions of their life. Today and to a lesser extent in all societies of the past, each individual—even the well-trained adult—is dependent upon the activities of his fellow human beings for his food, his habitation, and his security. Any breakdown of the systematic procedures by which these are provided will leave him more or less helpless. If the milkman forgets to leave the morning cream, he will have to drink his coffee black. If the economic machinery is disrupted, he may lose his fortune, his job, and his self-respect. If his country is plunged into war or if revolution sweeps the land, he will certainly lose many of his possessions; and he may lose his very life.

Individual "Freedom."—In view of these facts, it would be absurd to speak of individual freedom as though freedom were an absolute. All men are and have been dependent upon society, first for their physical support during their helpless infancy, second for their ability to find their way through the complex social world, third for the continuing existence of a society in which it is possible to maintain

themselves. The range of individual action will vary somewhat from person to person, from class to class, and from society to society. The unmarried man may ask his stenographer out to lunch, whereas the married man has lost this right. The rich may select their dinners from long and varied menus, whereas the poor must be content simply to eat. The modern American can, within some limits, work hard or not as he personally "pleases," whereas the ancient Egyptian slave could "choose" only to work or to die. But whether wide or narrow, the individual's range of action is socially determined.* The individual does not himself create such "freedom" as he may enjoy.

Today it is especially necessary to keep in mind the extent to which the individual is socially dependent. For contemporary societies are undergoing rapid change, more rapid perhaps than any that has occurred in times past. There is much speculation as to whether society as we know it can even survive this period. Certain at least is the fact that under conditions of rapid social change many individuals will be badly trained for social life, many will be harshly affected if not actually destroyed by the forces of that change, and all will be in great or small degree baffled and confused. Under such conditions the individual's dependence upon society often proves irksome, and many and varied are the efforts to break the bonds of that dependence. But these efforts, as we shall later see, are themselves a social product. They may somewhat modify the character of the individual's social dependence; they do not, however, free him from it.

The true freedom of man is collective rather than individual and long run rather than immediate. It stems from the fact that his society, which has made him into the sort of human being he is, is itself a product of human effort.

THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

The society into which the human infant is born and upon which he is dependent is a heritage from the past and is no more of his own making than is the biological heritage that determined his organic potentialities. As an individual he "willed" neither, and as an individual he can make no significant modification of either of them. But there is a vital difference between these two heritages: whereas the biological heritage is a product of natural forces, the social heritage is a consequence of human experience.

* The kind of eminence that it is possible for a person to achieve is limited by the social times (J. Schneider, 1937a). Botanists, for example, have been "allowed" to flourish at some times in some societies, but not in others (J. Schneider, 1937b).

As a Product of Human Experience.—During periods of comparative social stability, such as the early Middle Ages of western Europe and the Golden Age of China, the accepted social practices have been looked upon as the consequence of divine or natural laws. But the modern sociologist, working with the historian and anthropologist, has discovered that there is nothing “natural,” and hence nothing inevitable, about the particular social system that is utilized by a given people. It is man-made and is thus subject to being changed, just as a house is man-made and subject to remodeling. Out of ages of experience in living together, people have learned by trial and error that certain methods of adjustment to physical nature and to the presence of other human beings are effective. But there is more than one way for men to secure a livelihood and to live together. As a consequence of varied experiences different people have, by independent invention or by borrowing from other societies, worked out and passed down to their descendants very different social heritages.*

The biological heritage of an individual is fixed at conception and cannot be changed. For better or worse, it must be accepted for what it is. But the social heritage, the particular society into which he is born, has been fashioned by man to fit the exigencies of new experiences. This is not to say that the individual can in any important measure fashion his society to his personal ideas of what it should be like. The vast complex of social actions that constitutes his social heritage is the summation of the endeavors of countless people during the whole of human history; and the contribution of one person—however important he may seem to himself or to his contemporaries—is of little consequence in itself. All the people of the present, operating in terms of all that was derived from the past, will make the society of the future. To this extent man shapes his society; only to this extent is man free from his social heritage.

Functional Interdependence of Social Elements.—Most difficult perhaps for the layman to comprehend is the fact that no one of the “parts”—the specific modes of adjustment to nature or to other men—of a society can be validly considered apart from the whole. The layman is prone to evaluate a given mode of action in terms of some system of absolute or moral values. Functionally, however, no social practice has any inherent value; whether it will help or hinder human survival depends, not upon the character of the practice, but upon the

* By contrasting the social heritages of different peoples, we may gain a certain objectivity toward our own social background. That societies differ markedly is shown in *Our primitive contemporaries* (G. P. Murdock, 1934). See other titles listed in Appendix note 63.

way that the particular practice fits into—functions in relation to—all the other practices that in total constitute the society.

It is because a society is a system of interdependent parts that a change in one part disturbs the functioning of the entire social order. The introduction of the mechanical cotton picker, for example, would throw tens of thousands of people out of work, make necessary a change in present methods of cotton cultivation, modify the land-use system now existing in the South, etc. Historically, our own social system has been thrown and kept out of balance by a succession of changes comparable to the introduction, now in prospect, of the mechanical cotton picker (11).

The Individual as a Functional Part of Society.—According to the analytical problem he has in mind, the sociologist classifies the various elements of a social system in one of a number of ways. Insofar as our concern is with the relation of the individual to his society, we shall view the various aspects of society in terms of the demands they make upon a given member.

Just as the functional value of any mode of behavior depends upon the extent to which it fits into the entire social pattern, the social acceptability of any individual depends upon the extent to which all his varied behaviors fit into and are coordinated with those of the total social membership. Socially, then, no individual has a value apart from society. This means that, whatever the society—a primitive community in darkest Africa or a modern community in civilized America—and whatever his social status at birth within that society—the unwanted child of tenement-dwelling parents or the idolized offspring of a middle-aged professor—the human infant has much to learn about the particular social system before he will be accepted as a human being.

Any social system is a vast complex of variegated behaviors. Perhaps the simplest aspect is that complex of ways to behave toward physical and biological nature which is known as the technique of nature control. This includes all the skills and knowledge by which men produce the material necessities and luxuries of life, the means by which they move from place to place (whether by oxcart, sailing ship, or modern airplane), the ways by which they take care of their bodies, etc. Each individual must master some aspects of each of these techniques. Thus, although most of us need not become automotive technicians, we must know how to drive, or at least dodge, motorcars; and, although few of us become physicians, all of us must know the rudiments of modern hygiene. Each individual will ordinarily be required to master one of these techniques in detail. Thus in the

modern world the individual becomes a doctor, lawyer, stenographer, musician, housewife, etc. But even in the modern world, where technical developments have outstripped the ability of men to adjust themselves thereto, the technical skills and knowledges required of the individual are so much better understood in comparison with the social skills required of him that the social psychologist tends to take the learning of technical skills for granted and to concentrate his attention upon the complex processes by which social skills are acquired.

Although interwoven with the techniques of nature control, the social skills are conceptually distinct. They are the techniques by which a people get along with one another—their social organization. Some of these techniques must be mastered in entirety by every member of the society. Such, clearly, is true of the language, which is the *modus operandi* of social relations. Although the deaf-mute manages to survive, his social membership is necessarily limited; and, although the person who speaks a foreign language may be accepted as a tourist, he will not be accepted into full membership in the community until he can speak the language of the community. The morals of society must also be learned in total by each member. Those who deviate from them may be considered sinful and cast out or adjudged criminal and cast into prison. The infant has, of course, no morals; but before he can become an acceptable human being, he must learn the particular morals of the society. Specifically, he must learn to avoid doing all those things which those around him consider sinful, improper, in poor taste, or unkindly and to do all those things which they consider natural and normal for decent people to do.

The Social Role.—No one individual will, however, need to learn all the behaviors that are functional parts of the social organization. For the individual is assigned a more or less limited and defined social role. To be socially acceptable, he must learn the behaviors appropriate to that role, but need not, and ordinarily will not, learn to behave in terms of other than the designated role. In other words, he specializes in the part he takes in the social organization just as he does in the society's technique of nature control.*

In every society the social roles of the sexes are somewhat distinct. Thus a male learns to behave in those particular ways appropriate to

* In any rather fixed social system the role of the individual is customarily thrust upon him. Being born into a particular family, he becomes a stonemason because males in that family are traditionally stonemasons; or he becomes a priest because he is of the House of Levi. But in our highly dynamic social system he may achieve entry into a given role through one of a variety of routes. And, since we rarely take the trouble to investigate the reasons for his travel along one rather than another of these routes, we say that he "chooses" his own role.

males but need not—in fact, must not—learn to behave in the special ways appropriate to females. Each age level also has something of its own role. There is in effect a society of small boys, of boys, of youths, of mature men, and of old men. The small boy learns to behave in the ways of small boys, not of old men; conversely, the elder must remember his dignity and not relapse into childish forms of action. And within each sex-age grouping, there are roles for the leaders and other roles for the led. As the puny little boy will sadly discover, he must not endeavor to usurp the rights and privileges of the biggest boy in the neighborhood.

In addition to those for sex and age groups are the special sets of roles for each class and occupational grouping. The difference between a landlord and a tenant, an employer and an employee, or a rich man and a poor one, for example, involves much more than the ownership of land, a factory, or other wealth;* wealth is but one of the factors involved in social status. For each status position there is a more or less clearly defined set of appropriate behaviors. Each status role (12) places upon the individual some special obligations and gives to him some particular privileges. The poor man may have to address his superior as “Sir” and be humble in his presence; but he can, perhaps, eat in his shirt sleeves if he so prefers, whereas the great man who can demand obedience from his inferiors may be obliged by the duties of his station to eat his meals in uncomfortable splendor.

Becoming human and thereby socially acceptable is, therefore, at once less than and more than learning the “ways” of the society. It is less in that the individual need not learn all the social ways, more in that he must learn those specific ways that are appropriate to his special role or roles and at the same time learn not to transgress upon the ways that belong to roles other than his own. Failure to learn his role makes him a social incompetent. Failure to remain within his designated role makes him a social irritant, an “upstart,” or, at the least, an object of amusement; boys must be boys, shopgirls must not put on airs, and members of the “cultured” class must refrain from using the pungent language of the common folk.

SOCIETY AS AN ABSTRACTION

We have observed that the human being is born into a society; that he is in numerous ways dependent upon the existence of that society;

* Under some conditions status is little affected by wealth. Thus in Boston a generation or two ago the prestige attached to belonging to one of the “best” families was greater than that accorded to wealth; and in nineteenth century England, the impoverished landed gentry had greater status than did the wealthy industrialists.

that a society consists of a great complex of interdependent parts; and finally that, to gain acceptance into social membership, the individual must learn those aspects of his society that are appropriate to his particular social role. Actually, however, the individual is born, not into a society, but into the presence of "tangible" human beings; for a society is an abstraction.

The abstraction "society" and its various parts and attributes is a conception of the social scientist. The social scientist perceives that the behaviors of human beings who live together are well defined and patterned. Considered as an isolated unit, the behavior of any single human being is much like a lost piece of a complex jigsaw puzzle. It has little meaning in itself. When, however, the behavior of many people living together is examined as a system of human relationships, it, like the assembled puzzle, is found to be a picture; it has a pattern. It is that perceived pattern, not the people into whose presence the human infant is born, which we term society.

Social scientists, whether economists, sociologists, political scientists, or anthropologists, are primarily concerned with the patterns of social life. They are interested in fitting together the pieces of the social jigsaw puzzle in order that they may perceive the total picture. Each has his particular interest and therefore sees the picture through a special pair of glasses. The economist concentrates upon that part of the abstract pattern which, within the particular society, has a value in terms of material goods. From all the behavior of all the human beings who relate themselves one to another, the economist abstracts that which has to do with wealth getting and wealth using and studies the pattern that is thereby revealed. He talks of an economic system, of economic processes, and of changes in the pattern of economic life. Much of human behavior is thereby excluded. The splashing colors in a sunset, for example, may be of great human value; but, since they are of no economic worth, they are ignored by the economist. The political scientist abstracts that behavior of human beings which is related to the forms and processes of government. The sociologist and anthropologist study the rise, persistence, and change in the pattern of social life, with their attention focalized upon the functional interrelationship of the parts of the totality.

The Fallacy of Oversimplification.—Failure to realize that the term "society" refers to an abstraction rather than to a tangible and homogeneous entity underlies both a popular misinterpretation of the modern sociopsychological view and one of the attacks that have been made upon it. The extreme environmentalists, mentioned in the previous chapter, leaped at the idea that society shapes the nature of

the individual human being and promptly arrived at such oversimplifications of the facts as that crime breeds criminals, poverty poor people, wealth rich people, etc. They visualized society as a sort of mechanism that automatically shapes human beings into predetermined patterns, much as a giant press stamps out duplicate automobile fenders from sheet steel. They so oversimplified the structure and processes of society and the ways in which social participation affects the individual that they opened themselves to attack from those who believed that it is biological nature rather than society that determines human behavior. Accepting the oversimplified social interpretation at its face value, the biological determinists pointed with much reason to the fact that society does not accurately reproduce itself generation after generation. The son of a criminal may become a policeman, the daughter of a fine lady a prostitute; the successful man may have risen from poverty, the failure slid down from a family of high estate. *Ergo*, they argued, society does not determine the behavior of the individual human being.

But within the limits of the biological heritage and allowing a certain margin for chance* factors, the society of the individual—more specifically, that aspect of it represented by his kith and kin—does determine his behavior. Any individual's society is, however, exceedingly complex and does not operate in simple and readily predictable fashions. To say that a boy's father is poor is to suggest very little regarding the nature of the social stimuli that will affect the boy; for in addition to being poor, the father as a human being may be almost any assortment of a great many other characteristics. Furthermore, the poor father is but one of the very large number of human beings who constitute the society of the boy. Any one of these may be as important as or even more important than the father in the boy's development. To say that a boy's father is a stern disciplinarian, pious, or thrifty is likewise to say very little. Whether a spanking will deter repetition of a pattern of action or serve only to encourage it depends upon a multitude of factors. The stern parent may inadvertently produce a wayward child; stress upon piety may foster revolt therefrom; dwelling upon the virtues of thrift may encourage improvidence.

The Fallacy of Personification.—A somewhat different kind of oversimplification, and one that leads to mystical ideas of the relation of the individual and society, is that which was ponderously propounded by the German metaphysician Hegel (G. S. Morris, 1892). It, too, is based upon a failure to realize that the term "society" refers to an

* The term "chance" refers to the many variables not as yet subject to analysis.

abstraction. Hegel personified the many, varied, and complex behaviors of peoples that we abstractly designate society and treated the state (the apex of social organization) as though it were a single, homogeneous entity, much as a child may personify as the sand-man the complex physiological phenomena that result in his finally falling asleep each night. Hegel's verbal meanderings need not be described here. The final result was what has been called the "group-mind fallacy." It involved the mystical idea that human beings through association with one another generate a sort of collective (group) mind or spirit, which in turn directs and coordinates the behaviors of the individual members of the society. This "group mind" is presumed to secure its physical manifestation in the person of the leader of the state, who must, naturally, be obeyed without question, since he is but the representation of the will of the people. This mystic doctrine has been used in recent years as the ideological justification for the forcible unification of European peoples into "total," *i.e.*, absolute or totalitarian, states. It has at times made its appearance in somewhat dilute form in social psychology as an explanation for the fact that otherwise "rational" men will upon occasion be found running in mobs or joining fantastic social movements.*

THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS SOCIETY

The society that provides the human infant with his physical maintenance and in time trains him into social membership is, then, neither a simple mechanism nor a mystic entity. As an abstraction, society is the perceived system of behavior utilized by a people in living together. The members of a society seldom realize, however, how their own behavior dovetails into that of all the other members to make the system. Seldom do they comprehend that what they are as individual human beings is irrevocably bound up with social membership. The viewpoint of the social scientist is exceedingly sophisticated; it is a consequence of social self-consciousness. Normal social membership seems generally to be naive; it involves little recognition that the forces that make for individual behavior are largely social and that they direct the individual into practices that fit him into the social pattern. Thus, when the child asks, "Why must I do that, Mama?" the mother usually falls back upon the conventional, "Because I want you to." The act in question may be required for effective functioning

* For an example of the mystic interpretation of collective phenomena see H. Blumer's essay "Collective behavior" in *An outline of the principles of sociology* (R. E. Park, ed., 1939). For extended discussion of the group-mind fallacy, see Appendix note 13.

of the social system. But the mother will probably never see it in this light, and certainly the child will not.

A Child's-eye View of Society.—The newborn infant perceives little or nothing. In order to perceive, the organism must be capable of synthesizing light stimuli into meaningful configurations; and this ability comes only with the passing years. If we were to put ourselves into the place of the infant and analyze his society from his point of view, we should not see a technique of nature control and a system of social organization; we should not see sex groupings, age groupings, and class divisions; we should see people—a specific and tangible community of human beings.

The exact character of the people who surround the infant depends, of course, upon the particular society in which he finds himself and the peculiar "choice" of parents that he has made. He will not, of course, be aware of the many other "choices" that he might have made, the partial range of which is indicated by an imaginative comparison of the differences between the people who surround the newborn infant of a wealthy New York socialite and those who surround the infant of a lowly boatman's wife on the muddy Yangtze Kiang.

As he grows older, he will discover, not that he lives in a certain kind of society, but, rather, that the people surrounding him are fixed in their ways and have rather fixed ideas of how he should act. Among other things, they will decide when and what and how he will eat, and nothing that he can do will significantly affect their ideas of how he should be fed. He will continue to discover that the people around him do this on certain occasions and that on other occasions and that if he does one thing they will scold or spank him and if he does another they will smile and praise. Each such discovery will be, in fact, a step toward his becoming human and will bring him that much farther into membership in the society that he will probably never perceive but upon which he will be completely dependent.

SUMMARY

The sociologist keeps the social pattern in the foreground and the behavior of individual human beings in the background. He observes the behavior of the individual mainly in terms of its appropriateness for the total pattern or as a possible contribution to changes within that pattern. The social psychologist, on the other hand, keeps the behaving individual in the foreground and the social pattern in the background. His principal interest is in determining how the human animal comes to behave as a social human being. And this, as we shall see, becomes a study of the socializing processes—the processes

through which the individual is affected by the social system. These processes always operate, however, through the medium of other human beings, real or symbolized, rather than through the abstracted pattern of human behavior that we term society.

Societies differ, and consequently the behavior of human beings differs. But, whatever the patterns of human behavior, the processes by which they are passed on from generation to generation seem everywhere much the same. These are the processes that we are to examine in detail in the following part of this book. They are the processes by which the human animal is fashioned into a social human being.

PART II

The Processes of Socialization

CHAPTER IV

TYPES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

The adult human being has acquired from past experience a vast number of adjustment patterns. These are the durable products or consequences of the interactions that have occurred between him and his environment, much of which is social. They serve as his preparations to behave in subsequent situations, most of which also will be social in character. It is these adjustment patterns that constitute his human attributes and distinguish him from the ape, whom he physically resembles.

Socialization.—The subsequent chapters of this part of the book will be devoted to a discussion of the acquisition of human attributes. This is termed *socialization* to suggest that the human animal comes in this way to be a social human being. Socialization is not, however, a single process, operating in a unitary way, so much as it is a number of separate processes, each one of which may, as it were, go its independent way. It is for this reason, for example, that the physician can have been trained to give his patients excellent advice yet have learned to treat his own body with slight concern for its welfare. The distinctions between the various processes involved in socialization can best be seen in terms of the kinds, or types, of behavior that each process is responsible for.

Traditional Categories.—As was mentioned in Chapter I, medieval theological theory postulated two kinds of human behavior—good and bad. The theory held that good behavior was caused by the individual's willingness to follow the dictates of the divine Creator and that bad behavior was caused by a failure of the will of the individual which made it possible for the Devil to exercise influence over him. The church was, of course, the final authority on what constituted good and bad behavior.

The good-bad dichotomy has persisted under various names, such as "reason versus emotion." But it has no value for scientific analysis, since the criteria used in determining what is good and what is bad are entirely subjective (matters of personal evaluation) and vary, therefore, from place to place and from time to time. What was considered good by the Roman Catholic Church during the period of the Inquisi-

tion (*e.g.*, the torturing of heretics) is now considered bad by the church. What is considered foolish by Scientist Jones (*e.g.*, the consumption of alcoholic beverages) may be considered sensible by Scientist Smith.

Dismembering the behaviors of the human being and putting the pieces into categories of the good-bad order have led to interminable argument but to no advance in understanding the nature and causes of those behaviors.* Under this procedure, the category into which an act would be placed depended entirely upon the personal preferences and viewpoint of the classifier. If he approved the act, it was for him a good, or rational, one. Since no objective criteria can be used, and, since men, particularly modern men, frequently have varying if not conflicting ideas of what is good and what is bad, such classification is conducive to theological disputation rather than to scientific progress.

Functional Dissection.—In marked contrast to the dismembering of phenomena in terms of predetermined categories is that of dissecting a complex whole into its functional elements. It is this that the physiologist does when he conceptually breaks down the human organism into its functional systems and that the ecologist does when he groups into types various organisms that may on the surface appear to be unrelated.†

Every science makes some sort of dissection of the phenomena it studies. The system of dissection is not absolute, nor is it an end in itself. It is a scientific tool, a prelude to subsequent analysis. The

* Throughout the 1920's, for example, this procedure was applied in distinguishing between propaganda and education, with the result that one man's propaganda was another man's education, and vice versa (R. T. LaPiere, 1935).

† Crude classification of phenomena on the basis of superficial similarities is technically known as phenotypical; that which is made on the basis of functional similarities, usually revealed only by careful examination, is known as genotypical. To illustrate, the layman, analyzing human populations on the basis of eye color, might lump all brown-eyed persons together. His classification would be phenotypical. The geneticist, on the other hand, would divide brown-eyed people into two groups, for he knows that certain brown-eyed people can beget only brown-eyed children, whereas other brown-eyed people have both brown- and blue-eyed offspring. His dissection would thus be based on genotypical similarities.

Lewin and the topological psychologists have borrowed these genetic terms *in toto* and have used "phenotypical" to describe data arrived at by superficial dissections and "genotypical" to describe those come upon after more functional and basic work has been done (K. Lewin, 1936). The classifications of behavior that are here offered are not so completely genotypical as are the classifications of the geneticists and the plant and animal ecologists; they are, however, as genotypical as our present knowledge permits and will serve as a useful theoretical framework for subsequent discussions.

method of dissection itself changes as knowledge of the phenomena being studied increases. Physicists once broke matter down into atoms, believing them to be the smallest functional units. As their investigations have progressed, they have developed a new system of dissection, one in which tangible matter is broken down into intangible units of energy. Where they will go next, no one can foretell, least of all the physicists, who will be guided by what they find out about matter rather than by their personal preferences and preconceptions.

Dissection of the Behaviors of Man.—In terms of the present state of our knowledge regarding human behavior and in view of our purposes in this part of the book, the many and varied behaviors of man may be separated into four general types. A different system of dissection will be utilized later in the book, and it must be kept in mind throughout all the subsequent discussion that the divisions here made are neither absolute nor final and that the distinctions drawn are not ends in themselves but are only means to the more effective analysis of the nature and causes of human behavior.

OVERT VERSUS COVERT BEHAVIORS

All the behaviors of all human beings may be divided into those that have the potentiality of stimulating other persons and those that do not. This distinction has the important virtue of being objectively verifiable and the value, for reasons that will be made clear later, of facilitating the study of the processes of socialization.

All the behaviors of a human being that can be perceived directly by another human being are overt. Such behaviors are subject to verification; *i.e.*, they can be measured and recorded, and the observations of one investigator can be checked against the observations of another. Acts such as walking, sitting, spanking, eating, smiling, and untold others fall into this category. In contrast are those responses to stimuli that can be known directly only to the one who makes the response. Such knowledge, sometimes termed "introspective," is not subject to objective verification. Certain aspects of this behavior were earlier discussed under the topics of emotion and motivation, and some writers designate the entire category as "implicit" behavior. To avoid confusion, we shall use the term "covert" in referring to it.

Many scientific devices have been constructed that measure overt behaviors with almost microscopic exactitude and that supplement ordinary visual, auditory, tactual, and olfactory observation of the overt behaviors of other people. But the covert behaviors of other people can be known only by inference. Some, notably the Freudians, claim to possess a technique for investigating the inner life of man.

But their ritualistic procedures do not often yield verifiable data, however much they serve to impress the subject with the omnipotence of the analyst. Psychologists have endeavored to make instruments by means of which some of the covert behaviors could be directly ascertained and thereby rendered overt in character. The existence of internal disturbances can be verified by the measurement of changes in pulse rate, respiration, and blood pressure, or by measurement of changes in the electrical conductivity of certain areas of the body. But what these measured changes mean in terms of socially significant covert behaviors has not as yet been ascertained.*

Functions of the Overt Behaviors.—There is considerable truth in the statement that all the world is a stage and we are the actors on it. It is how we “act”—what we do and what we say—that affects others and thus directly or indirectly determines our welfare. The lover may “feel” love; but if he wishes to please his loved one, he had better act lovingly—bring her flowers, tell her that he loves her, watch her adoringly, etc. It is the overt behaviors that are the substance of human relationships, and it is through overt behaviors that fields are planted, harvests gathered, and the other work of the world accomplished. The covert behaviors of the individual, except as they indirectly affect overt acts, are of no moment to anyone except himself.

In our daily life we are constantly speculating about the covert behaviors of others. But all that we actually know about the people with whom we live is what they do and say. And this is all that, at any given moment, is really important to us. The wife might hate her husband; but this will not matter to him if she treats him lovingly all their lives and he never suspects her hate for him.

The Nature of Covert Behaviors.—To some social psychologists, and more specifically to the early Watsonian behaviorists, only overt behavior can and need be considered data for science (15). One might well wish that this were so. Since the covert behaviors can be known only by indirection, attempts to study them have often resulted in futile speculation, more revealing, perhaps, of the covert preferences of

* The advent of various physiological devices to test a person's veracity has led to all sorts of fantastic beliefs as to the effectiveness of these instruments. That the famous “lie detectors” are excellent methods of third degree is certainly true enough; but that they can infallibly detect an untruth is absurd. Keeler, the developer of what is perhaps the best known of these instruments, has given a lucid and fair statement of what takes place when “lie detection” is said to be occurring (L. Keeler, 1934).

See also “A comparison of the cardio-pneumopsychograph and association methods in the detection of lying in cases of theft among college students” (J. E. Winter, 1936) and Appendix note 14.

the investigator than of the covert behaviors of the people being investigated.

Nevertheless, any sociopsychological investigation that ignores the existence of covert behaviors and makes no attempt to examine their nature and social significance is fragmentary and incomplete. It simply does not do to dismiss the covert behaviors with a shrug and some remark to the effect that they are the province of the poet rather than the scientist. Covert behaviors may have no immediate significance for a given social interaction; but they do have great, if little understood, significance in the long run.

The Delayed Response.—The behavior of physical objects is consistent and highly predictable. Under the appropriate conditions, oxygen and hydrogen immediately and invariably combine to produce water. But the behavior of human beings is not always consistent and is never entirely predictable. The man who has seemingly been devoted to his wife for twenty years may murder her during the twenty-first; the one who has seemed “perfectly normal” during the first fifty years of his life may destroy himself on his fifty-first birthday. Obviously, there was more to the nature of these men than was directly perceived. Such apparently inexplicable acts can best be described as delayed overt responses to events of the past.

The delayed overt response is a commonplace of everyday life. We may not “get the point” and laugh at a joke until some time after hearing it; we may not answer the question or obey the request until we have finished completing some other action; we may not turn off the radio program until, as we would probably say, it has driven us to distraction. Even such minor delays in response cannot be understood without reference to the existence of some sort of internal behaviors.* A physical object may remain static, to be used or not as occasion warrants. But all psychological phenomena are processes, events that either continue or else cease to be. Thus, during the moment, the minute, the day, or the year, between the stimulus and the ultimate overt response thereto, internal processes of some sort or other must have been occurring. It is these processes that we shall consider under the term “covert behaviors.”

Inconsistency of Delayed Response.—Not only are ultimate overt responses often delayed but, when they do come, they may be inconsistent with prior and more immediate responses to the particular

* Much research has been done on the delayed responses of subhuman animals. Here covert speech is presumably absent or at least reduced to a minimum. See “Delayed response and discrimination learning by chimpanzees” (H. W. Nissen, A. H. Riesen, and V. Nowlis, 1938).

stimuli. It is this fact that more than any other makes exceedingly difficult any prediction of individual behavior. We recognize this difficulty in our person-to-person relationships and tend to proceed somewhat cautiously with the individual whom we judge to be touchy or temperamental, *i.e.*, unusually unpredictable. Such unpredictability would appear to result from the fact that the overt reaction that seems so inconsistent (the grouchy response to the cheerful greeting, for example) is really a delayed response to other stimuli that has simply been set off by the immediate situation.

Relation of Overt and Covert Behaviors.—In many instances, the overt response to a situation can be said to be parallel to the covert. This is what happens when we smilingly say, "Good morning!" and are "pleased" with the morning and the encounter that has provoked the greeting. It should be observed, however, that the "being pleased" is a separate response from the smiling and speaking.

When, as often happens, the parallel overt response to a situation is delayed, the immediate overt behavior is in contrast to as well as distinct from the covert response. The fact that at any given moment a person's covert behaviors may be out of line with his overt is a commonplace of everyday life. No one, not even a member of her audience, seriously believes that an actress "lives" the part she is playing on the stage.* She moans quite realistically, she weeps, she wrings her hands; and in the end the death rattle sounds in her throat. But it is no surprise to the members of the audience when she appears for her curtain call bowing and smiling. And should they read next morning that after the final curtain she hurried to the bed of her dying son or was rushed to a hospital for an emergency appendectomy, they would only shrug and say, "Such is the life of the theater." But such, in fact, is all of life.

The child may squirm and squall when he is pained; months later he will, perhaps, be observed in the act of "thinking" out loud. But among the many things that the adult has been taught is the art of keeping feelings and thoughts under control—which really means following socially prescribed patterns of overt behavior, regardless of

* The James-Lange theory of the emotions (C. G. Lange and W. James, 1922) holds that, whenever the actress weeps, she necessarily feels sad. Introspections from stage celebrities, however, are not in agreement on this point. It should be noted that weeping is only one of a constellation of the expressive signs of sorrow. Perhaps if all the expressive signs were present in their "proper" proportions, the actress would feel sad. But at present the most that can be said is that the covert parallel, if present at all, appears to be slight and of very short duration.

the covert responses. There are cultural differences in this respect; in ancient China people wailed and tore their hair at the death of a relative; in ancient Japan no sign of anguish was permissible. There are also individual differences within a given culture. The strong, silent man may be so silent as to raise doubts that he ever feels or thinks; the gushing, gesticulating adolescent may express so much that it would seem improbable that any human being could feel so intently about last night's party, the new "boy friend," or the latest hair-do.

In general, society teaches us to keep secret all those feelings and thoughts that are unconventional or fantastic; and we usually learn to keep to ourselves those feelings and thoughts which, if expressed, might offend others. Thus, people rarely describe their so-called innermost hopes and ambitions; they infrequently reveal the nature of their day-dreams; and they are seldom so inconsiderate of the feelings of others as to inform them that their breath is bad, that they are very dull company, or that the gift of a tie was very thoughtful but the tie itself unwearable. Frequently, of course, it is to one's own advantage to say other than one thinks. A man may think that what his employer has ordered him to do is foolish; but for his own best interests he had better say, "Yes, sir," in an eager and energetic tone.

Since there is no necessary relation between covert behaviors and overt behaviors, there can be no certainty that what a human being does overtly is a reflection of how he is feeling and what he is thinking. The smile and the pleasant word of greeting may be indicative of pleasure at the meeting; the air of self-assurance may reflect self-confidence; and weeping may be a manifestation of sorrow. But there is nothing to assure that such relationships exist.

The distinction between overt and covert behaviors is a reflection of the fact that the processes by which the individual learns the former are significantly different from those by which he acquires the latter. The child may be taught the outward manifestations of loyalty to his country, affection for his parents, and consideration for his inferiors, without necessarily acquiring the covert thought and feeling behaviors that these acts imply. In time, and particularly in the face of new situations, this lack of covert training may become evident in his overt behaviors. Thus, as a schoolboy he may have pledged allegiance to his country, fervently saluted his country's flag, and marched bravely with a wooden gun. But unless he has somehow acquired those complex covert patterns that we term loyalty, courage, and self-sacrifice, he may as a man turn out to be a Quisling or a deserter from the field of battle.

SYMBOLIC VERSUS NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIORS

The overt-covert distinction cuts through the totality of human behaviors along one axis, giving us two large and general categories. There is another direction, or way, in which the totality of these behaviors may be dissected. This distinction is independent of the first, although the reason for making it is much the same, *i.e.*, to facilitate the study of the processes of socialization.

Many human actions, both overt and covert, are primarily significant in that they are representative of some other action or of some object. These may be designated as symbolic, as opposed to those actions that are significant in and of themselves. The symbolic act secures its effect only because it has been given socially designated meaning and has, therefore, some relatively specific "reaction value" to the user and to others. Nonsymbolic behavior, on the other hand, secures its effect directly and in terms of itself. The threat of a spanking, whether it be made by words, by brandishing a slipper, or by the lifting of an eyebrow, is symbolic. The application of the slipper to the child belongs, in contrast, in the nonsymbolic category.

For purposes of illustration, we may contrast the symbolic behavior of an actor going through the motions of hoeing a row of corn on the stage and the nonsymbolic behavior of a farmer hoeing corn in his fields. The actions are somewhat alike. Both men lift their hoes, swing them down to a point slightly ahead of their feet, lift them again, step forward, and repeat the series of motions. But the first man, we would say, is only "acting," whereas the second works. This distinction arises from the fact that the behavior of the first is significant only if an audience of other human beings is present, either in reality or in imagination, to interpret or react to his actions; in the case of the second man his behavior has its effect directly upon physical nature. The distinction between symbolic and nonsymbolic behavior must not, however, be thought of as based upon the contrast between productive and unproductive actions. The actor may be providing his audience with relaxation and amusement, whereas the farmer's hoe may chop down corn plants rather than weeds.

Since almost everything that a human being does has some symbolic implication for others, it is often impossible to classify any given action as entirely symbolic or completely nonsymbolic. These categories are not mutually exclusive; many behaviors are of mixed character; and in some instances the classification made will depend in part upon the point of view of the classifier. Nevertheless, most human actions, particularly those that are overt, can be placed in one category or the

other on the basis of objective criteria. It may at times be a matter of personal opinion whether the wearing of a fraternity pin is of primary significance to the wearer as the means of informing others of membership in a fraternity or as the thing that binds parts of the dress together. But there can be no question that the word "Henry" is significant only as the symbol of a person or that taking a bath removes dirt from the surface of the body, whether others are present or not.*

Symbolic Behavior as the Modus Operandi of Social Life.—Practically everything that human beings do and every object that they use has its symbolic counterpart or verbal term. Much of social life consists in the use and manipulation of these symbols. They are the means through which most person-to-person adjustments are effected. By symbolic acts we communicate with others, telling those around us what we intend to do or wish to do, and thus enabling them to plan their behavior accordingly.† Through symbols, nonsymbolic behavior is controlled; and by them, individual acts are directed to the end that they fit into the social pattern discussed in the preceding chapter. Only in disciplining children and in periods of acute social disorder—during wars and revolutions—is there any marked use of nonsymbolic behavior as a means of controlling individual behavior.

The role of symbolic behaviors in person-to-person relationships is clearly illustrated in the life of a campus community. The majority in the sorority and fraternity control the minority by talking them into doing what is required; or, if this does not work, by sneering at refractory members; or, as a final resort, by subjecting them to social ostracism. The administration may keep the faculty in line by the possibility of a symbolic "regret that your services are no longer required." The teacher may maintain some degree of regularity in classroom attendance and some measure of attention to his lectures and to the work he assigns, by the threat and punishment of failing grades. Even the campus traffic policeman uses symbolic behavior in controlling local motorcar traffic. His very presence at an intersec-

* It should, however, be observed that little Henry's bathing may be more symbolic than dirt removing unless his mother has him under surveillance.

† Possibly the best single discussion of the role of communication in social life is to be found in *Social organization* (C. H. Cooley, 1923, Part II). A brief and modern version of the same analysis appears in *Introductory sociology* (C. H. Cooley, R. C. Angell, and L. J. Carr, 1933, Chap. III). The following references will also prove useful for a more detailed analysis of symbolic behavior than that made in the text: *The symbolic process and its integration in children* (J. F. Markey, 1928); *The child's conception of the world* (J. Piaget, 1929); *The meaning of meaning* (C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, 1930); "The social and psychological significance of gestures" (M. H. Krout, 1935a); and "Autistic gestures" (M. H. Krout, 1935b).

tion is generally sufficient to assure compliance with the letter of the law.

Most of the control of life on a campus is, thus, accomplished through symbolic means. Much of the action which that control effects is, like the medium of control, but symbolic behavior. The contents of a book symbolize something. The student at study is reacting symbolically to symbols of things, ideas, and actions. Most of the behavior of the teacher in the classroom is symbolic. He writes symbols of things, ideas, and actions on the blackboard; and his lecture consists of actions that are signs of things rather than the things themselves. The student listening to the lecture reacts symbolically. He behaves symbolically also when he writes a brief history of World War I for an examination in history. The grade he gets is a symbol representing the behavior, mainly symbolic, of the instructor who reads his paper.

Nonsymbolic Action as the Substance of Social Life.—But unless symbolic controls operated ultimately to obtain nonsymbolic actions, there could be no living human beings and hence no society. Someone must till the field, draw the water, fabricate the house, tend the baby, etc. Symbolic behavior is thus but the means; the end is adjustment of person to person and of person to nature. It is by nonsymbolic action that man maintains himself. The complexity of contemporary society and the large role that symbolic behaviors play therein often confuse this fact. But the lone castaway will quickly discover that symbolic behaviors will not of themselves maintain his life. However diligently he thinks ways out of his predicament, however noisily he assures himself that he will have a habitation to protect him from the elements, food in the pantry, and water in the well, he will soon die unless he actually builds himself a shelter, gathers food, digs a well, or locates a spring.

Why the Symbolic-nonsymbolic Distinction Is Necessary—Not only are the functions of symbolic and nonsymbolic action quite different, but there is no necessary and automatic relation between the two. This latter point is a matter of common recognition. People frequently doubt that a promise will be fulfilled; doctors and priests sometimes urge others to "do as I say, not as I do," "realistic" politicians evaluate treaties and other international agreements as worth their weight in paper, etc. The social psychologist would frequently be misled if he were to assume that what people say is a certain indication of what they will do.* The lack of necessary rela-

* Altogether too many social psychologists have been so misled, as is evidenced by their reliance on such paper-and-pencil methods of investigating human

tionship between symbolic and nonsymbolic behaviors reflects the fact that these two kinds of behavior are learned by significantly different processes.

THE FOURFOLD CHARACTER OF BEHAVIOR

We have, for purposes of clarity of analysis, dissected the totality of human behaviors along two different axes: overt-covert and symbolic-nonsymbolic. When these two axes are considered together, behavior is seen to fall into four functional types. Each type of behavior is acquired by a somewhat distinct process; and no one of them is, therefore, of necessity directly correlated with any or all the others.

The behaviors of an individual that are significant not in themselves but in their socially designated meanings for others are overt symbolic. Included in this category are all speech, gesture, and representations thereof, such as writing, telegraphing, pictorial drawing, and the like. All other behaviors that are capable of stimulating others but are not dependent for their effect upon their meaning to others are overt nonsymbolic. Such acts as driving a car, digging a ditch, cooking a meal, and the like, belong to this category.

Logically, the covert behaviors, like those which are overt, might be divided into symbolic and nonsymbolic. It is probable that some covert behavior is mainly, if not entirely, symbolic in character. These are the covert processes that make up most if not all of what is called thinking or inner speech. It is not certain, however, that after the period of infancy there are any covert reactions that are entirely free from symbolic elements. Certainly the internal responses that occur when one is awakened at night and is "frightened of the dark" are a mixture of symbolic and nonsymbolic elements, *e.g.*, the idea of a burglar and the feeling that accompanies the disequilibrium of the neuroglandular system. But it should be noted that, although certain covert behaviors are well verbalized, much covert behavior is not—a fact that has led to the notion of an unconscious.

Admixture of Types of Behavior.—In some instances the behavior of an individual may for a brief period be wholly of one order. Dreaming occasionally seems to take the form of simply talking to oneself. If, then, the dreamer is not muttering aloud as well as talking to himself, his behavior is essentially covert symbolic.

But during most of their waking and some of their sleeping hours human beings behave simultaneously in two, three, or all four of the

behavior as the attitude or opinion scales and questionnaires—techniques that are discussed in Appendix note 16.

categories. Thus the relatively passive act of reading a novel certainly involves two and possibly all four. The reader moves his eyes along the line of type, turns pages, shifts his position, and perhaps smokes. These behaviors are essentially overt nonsymbolic. Meanwhile he is responding to (reading) the words that his eyes see. He may at the same time be running ahead of the story, taking brief side trips, converting words into pictures, etc. All this is covert symbolic. He may also, and the author of the book certainly hopes he will, be experiencing mood changes provoked by the symbolic manipulation. If not, he may soon throw down the book in disgust, for the pleasure in reading fiction is apparently derived in large measure from its effects upon the feeling-states. These, whether they be pleasurable or otherwise, are primarily covert nonsymbolic. Should the reader smile, frown, chuckle, or draw in his breath, he would be behaving also in overt symbolic and, thus, in all four ways.

Normally, then, the behavior of a human being is a mixture of overt symbolic, overt nonsymbolic, covert symbolic, and covert nonsymbolic behaviors. These behaviors may at a given moment parallel one another. Such is the case if the ardent lover feels and thinks lovingly while he acts and talks lovingly. But the various aspects of the totality of the individual's behavior do not necessarily run parallel; indeed, they may run counter one to another. Such is the case when a man, hurrying to catch a train that he calculates he will just make, slows down out of consideration for a shorter legged companion, whom he smilingly assures that there is ample time. Such a mixture of contrasting elements is possible because, as we have already pointed out, somewhat different processes are responsible for the development of behaviors belonging to the various categories.

In the subsequent chapters of this part of the book, these different processes will for the sake of clarity be considered one by one.

CHAPTER V

OVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR

All overt symbolic behavior (17) may be roughly divided into that which involves the complex mechanism of speech and that which does not.* We indicate the former by such terms as talking and writing; the latter, by "looking" and "acting" surprised, happy, puzzled, annoyed, etc. In both a twofold problem is involved: how does the individual acquire the ability to react in the socially specified way to the symbol? and how does he acquire the ability to express himself through the medium of this symbol? (18).

GESTURE AND ITS FUNCTIONS

The term "gesture" will be used hereafter to designate all overt symbolic behavior other than words or symbols of words.† Gestures are not so fully conventionalized and are therefore not so accurate in conveying meanings as are words; we may, nevertheless, consider them as constituting a language that is useful as such within any society. This is the nonverbal language of a people, including all the humanly meaningful actions of the individual except what he says or writes.

Ordinarily we do not realize the extent to which we use gesture. Whereas the actor and actress must make a careful study of the gesture language of the theater and use it self-consciously, we are seldom aware of our response to the gestures of others or of the extent to which we

* At least since the time of Coover's classical monograph on telepathy (J. E. Coover, 1917), the scientific world has assumed that all communication must occur through sensory means. In recent years, however, this thesis has been attacked by Rhine of the Department of Parapsychology of Duke University. Rhine and his followers have published several books (J. B. Rhine *et al.*, 1940) and many articles (largely in the *Journal of Parapsychology*) in an attempt to establish the validity of telepathic communication. Up to the present, however, their data have not been accepted by any appreciable number of scientists. Suffice it to say that their alleged telepathic phenomena tend to evaporate as their experiments become more rigidly controlled (J. L. Kennedy, 1939; and L. D. Goodfellow, 1938). We can assume, therefore, that all communications are received through the known sense organs. See also "The human element in probability" (L. D. Goodfellow, 1940).

† See *The language of gesture* (M. Critchley, 1939); "The social and psychological significance of gestures" (M. H. Krout, 1935a); and *Gesture and environment* (D. Efron, 1941).

express ourselves by gesture symbols. Only when something interferes with the normal use of gestures in effecting person-to-person adjustments are we at all likely to observe our dependence upon them. Thus it was that the pioneers in the field of radio broadcasting soon discovered that there is normally more to a speech and a song than vocal sounds. Radio depends entirely upon auditory stimulation for its effect; only the sounds made by a lecturer, singer, or actor reach the radio audience (19). Consequently, many platform and stage celebrities, unable to communicate with their radio publics by nonverbal, meaningful motions, especially the facial expressions, had little appeal. Many a singer who was entertaining to an audience that could see her, was dull and uninteresting to a public that could only hear her voice. To be successful in radio, one must have a good "vocal personality." The vocal personality is a voice enriched by the use of vocal tricks, which in some measure "tell" the hearer what the singer or speaker looks like. The fact that there need be no relationship between what is so conveyed and the actuality is obvious.

As a Subtle Language.—Under ordinary circumstances gestures are a supplement to words, enriching them and giving the hearer something to look at while he listens.* They may even change the communication value of words or phrases—a fact that is reflected in the common admonition, "Smile when you say that!" Although not so definitive for interhuman communication as are written or spoken words, gestures are occasionally far more effective. Supplementing (20) and often modifying the effects of the spoken word, they provide a much more subtle means of communication than does speech. The effects of gestures are, however, somewhat intangible and difficult to study.

Our first impression of a person is often a rapid reaction to his physiognomy and gestures. This is especially noticeable in the case of very young children who, incapable of understanding what a stranger says, watch the stranger's face and respond not to his words but to his expression. The child apparently studies the stranger's behavior, trying to "read" from it what sort of person he is.† An adult may

* At one time, the overflow from a class in one of our larger universities was put into a well-proctored second room, which was equipped for radio reception. While the instructor lectured directly to the students of the original classroom, only his voice via microphone came to those in the second room. These overflow students could hear almost perfectly, but they had no speaker on whom to fix attention. They seemed ill at ease; the predominant posture soon adopted was that of resting the head upon the hand. The grades received by this overflow group averaged lower than those received by the students who both heard and saw the instructor.

† Even caricatures yield meaningful gestural stimuli. Otherwise the incomplete sketches of the cartoon would not be understood (M. R. Samuels, 1939).

do much the same sort of thing. He probably gains his impression quickly, perhaps without any realization of what he is doing. The response that we frequently describe as character reading is primarily an unrealized reaction to gestures (21).

Unintentional Use.—Communication by gestures of which both the initiator of the symbols and the responder thereto are unaware explains many of the common mysteries of human behavior. Although careful of what they say and of what they do, people may convey undesired impressions through unintentional gestures. Perhaps they smile pleasantly upon being introduced and say the proper things in the proper ways; yet some unrealized movement of the eyebrow, some unintentional but effective detail about their posture, or the action of a hand or finger may result in an unfortunate first impression. Since gestures may effectively offset words without either the speaker or the listener being aware of them, the professional lecturer must avoid developing platform mannerisms that will unduly distract his audience or that will cause them to feel that he is hesitant and uncertain or to think that he is insincere. Some people cannot tell lies successfully, even the so-called "white lies," because their manner or expression gives them away. Others cannot tell the truth without arousing the suspicion of being deceitful. They "look" as though they were trying to convey a false impression. Just what it is that makes them look this way is seldom susceptible to analysis.*

Although many of our snap judgments about the people we meet are made on the basis of stereotyped reactions to their gestures, the growth of intimate acquaintanceship is, of course, invariably accompanied by the gradual establishment of more effective and more accurate understanding of their gesture symbols. It is, in part, by learning the true significance of a person's gestures† that we gain insight into and understanding of him. Most of this learning comes about without our being aware of it.

Pantomime.—Gesture can, however, be used with deliberate effort to influence others. Some of the most spectacular public speakers depend almost as much upon posture, movement of hands, and facial expression as upon speech to obtain their effects. Some, in fact, seem to depend almost wholly upon gesture.

* Because gestures are indefinable and ability to use the right ones is such a large part of what is commonly called a "pleasing personality," books on personality "improvement" and schools of "charm" cannot possibly make good on their promises.

† High retest reliabilities ($r = .765$) indicate that single habits of gesture are very stable characteristics (P. Eisenberg, 1937a).

The art of communication by gesture alone is called pantomime. The silent motion pictures depended for their effectiveness to an enormous extent upon the power of gestures to convey ideas to the members of the audience. Because the actors lacked skill and because the audience was untrained in response to the subtleties of motion-picture pantomime, the action in early motion pictures was exaggerated.* When the hero wanted to convey a fear that the heroine might have suffered some harm, he staggered, beat his breast, tore his hair, and screwed up his face. To indicate her love, the heroine flung her arms wide and jumped into the hero's arms. When actors became more skilled in the use of gesture and when audiences became more responsive to it, an almost imperceptible change of facial expression was sufficient to communicate with the audience.

The use of pantomime is not restricted to the motion pictures. The Chinese dramatists have long depended upon stereotyped gestures to convey ideas, *e.g.*, a slight spreading of the hands to indicate the opening of a door. By turning "thumbs down," a gesture that still signifies contempt or finality, Caesar gave his victorious gladiators the right to partake of the glories of victory and to kill their victims. The American Indians of different linguistic groups are reputed to have been able to communicate with one another by a universal sign language that consisted entirely of gestures. The traveler in a foreign land may be forced to resort to gestures; it is indeed surprising how effectively one can converse in pantomime. Deaf-mutes use a highly conventionalized gesture language; it is, however, based upon the spoken language and substitutes gestures for the letters of words (R. Paget, 1936). Soldiers are often trained in a formalized gesture language for use when the noise of battle prevents communication by sound.

The obvious uses to which gestures are put are many, but the subtle and frequently unintentional communication by gesture is of far greater significance for social life. This communication may be difficult to analyze, but it must not be ignored. Much that is other-

* An interesting point and one worthy of mention is that normal human behavior is not effective on the stage or the screen. To seem natural on the stage or before the camera, one must act unnaturally. Because of the distance between actor and audience, all speech must be sharpened and all gestures exaggerated. The magnification of human figures that occurs in the motion-picture reproduction, on the other hand, tends to exaggerate all gestures. To have the picture give the illusion of reality, screen actors must restrain their gestures and be less spirited and aggressive than is normal. By failing to realize this necessity and by carrying over stage techniques to the screen, actors contributed as much as did technical flaws toward making the early motion pictures crude and unrealistic.

wise inexplicable in human behavior will be found to result from response to subtle but nonetheless effective gestures (22).

THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF GESTURE SYMBOLS

Lack of Natural Gestures.—Fond parents and relatives frequently claim that they can tell how an infant is feeling or what he is thinking by the way he looks or acts, but their doing so is probably an indication of their desire rather than their ability to communicate with the infant. Such evidence as we have indicates that the infant who “looks” hungry according to the mother is just as likely to need a change of diapers as a bottle of milk.*

John B. Watson endeavored some years ago to find the exact number of congenital emotional expressions. He concluded that there are three—fear, rage, and love. But it is probable that he was doing only what the fond mother does when she says, “Baby loves me.” Like the mother, he was judging from his knowledge of the conventional relationship between gestures and body states rather than from a careful analysis of the child’s behavior. If he falls suddenly, an adult is “frightened” and indicates his fear by the “fear expression.” But to argue that, when his face assumes something akin to the “fear expression” the newborn infant is afraid is as unjustified as to conclude that falling causes him to become afraid.

Apparently few modes of self-expression are congenital.† The majority do not appear until some time after birth. The uncomfortable infant moves arms, legs, body, and facial muscles; but about all that is known regarding the congenital basis of self-expression is that discomfort, of whatever origin, causes or tends to cause bodily activity. Although it is the basis for learning, such movement is not gesture; *i.e.*, it is not meaningful behavior.

Differences in Gesture Languages.—Gesture is one form of symbolic behavior; thus, the meaning of gesture symbols is of social rather than

* Infants below twelve days of age were subjected by one experimenter to four stimulating conditions—lack of food, lack of physical support, restraint, and mild pain. Just after being stimulated, the infants (or motion pictures of them) were shown to nurses, medical students, and psychology students. There was little agreement as to what emotions the infants were experiencing and what the probable stimuli were. Typical are the responses of ten student nurses to the emotion the infants were experiencing after they had been dropped a short distance: two nurses classified the behavior as hunger; two mentioned fear as a probable cause; two thought colic was responsible; one regarded the children as angry, two as uncomfortable, and one as in pain (M. Sherman, 1927).

† Few if any definite defensive or other particularized responses characterize the infant at birth. His behavior is, in the main, generalized and diffuse, becoming particularized only with the passage of time (K. C. Pratt, 1933).

natural origin (D. Efron and J. P. Foley, Jr., 1937). The human infant is incapable of communicating with the human beings around him because he has not learned to use their symbols; he cannot be communicated with because he has not learned to respond to those symbols.

Each society has more or less its own gesture "language," which must be learned by the infant born into the society as well as by the adult stranger from some other society. When we speak of the "emotional" Latin and the "impassive" Chinese, we are merely indicating our ignorance of these peoples. The Chinese may seem curiously uncommunicative to the American. To another Chinese his expressions and mannerisms are probably quite understandable. We Americans tend to use gestures that are more vigorous and more apparent than those generally used by the Chinese. To us, the Mexicans, French, and Italians are extreme in their use of gestures (E. C. Dickey and F. H. Knower, 1941).

Differences in the gesture languages of societies are indicated in an exaggerated way by the fact that certain stereotyped gesture usages are associated in dramatic characterization with the members of various groups. The Italian is generally portrayed as one who shrugs and gesticulates wildly; the Chinese, on the other hand, as one who maintains a calm, cool manner, whatever the circumstances. There is certainly an element of truth behind these stereotypes. The Italians may not be more "expressive," but they do tend to express themselves by gestures more obvious and the Chinese by gestures less obvious than those that we use.

ACQUISITION OF GESTURAL BEHAVIOR

The language of gesture, being social, must be acquired out of social experience just as surely as must the language of speech. How does the human infant learn to express himself through the gesture language to which those of his society respond? Equally important and quite distinct, how does he learn to respond to the gesture language that those about him use?

Learning Not Imitative.—The easy answer to these questions would be that the child learns by "imitation"; *i.e.*, he comes to smile because those around him smile, and he comes to understand the meaning of a smile because those around him have such understanding. But the easy answer is not the valid one. Actually, the child learns to smile because those around him respond to smiles and learns to respond to smiles because those around him smile.

Response to Gestures.—Children are often more dependent upon gestures than are adults. The mother may without intent “tell” her child by gestures that the medicine that she says is nice is really quite distasteful. By gestures she may convey her personal distaste for spinach, her dislike for the woman who lives next door, or even her suspicions about her husband, although she dutifully eats spinach “to set a good example,” always speaks of the neighbor in complimentary ways, and does her best to hide even from herself questions of her husband’s loyalty. How does the child come to recognize the meaning of the mother’s gestures? How does he learn to read gestures that parents themselves often do not realize they are making?

The development of response to gestures is one aspect of the complex and little understood problem of learning. We know that learning is a consequence of experience—in this instance, of experience with human beings who use gesture symbols. The early stages in the gesture experience of the child are reasonably easy to perceive; but, as subsequent shifts are made, it becomes quite impossible to discern the specific experiences that are involved in the development of responses to specific gestures. We can therefore indicate only the nature of the process involved.

The underlying process would seem to be the gradual substitution of visual stimuli—gestures—for other stimuli, such as food, fondling, bathing, and the like. The mother* tends to express herself in gestures as she cares for and plays with the infant. Different aspects of her treatment of the infant are more or less consistently accompanied by different gestures. Thus, she may smile while feeding him, frown while changing his diapers. At the outset her gestures have no effect upon the child, but her overt nonsymbolic behaviors do. In time, then, the sight of her smile may become associated with the feelings evoked by being fed and the sight of her frown with the feelings of “being changed.” If the mother never smiled and never frowned, this particular order of association would not develop; and the infant’s training in response to gesture would be delayed. But it is a rare mother who can refrain from expressing herself in the gestures of her

* The term “mother” is used throughout the text to mean the sociological mother. The sociological mother is the predominant person in the child’s life, whether that person be the biological mother, a nurse, the grandmother, an elder sister, the attendants in an orphanage, or, more rarely, the father. Particularly in our society, the biological mother may have little if any social significance for the development of the child’s social behavior. Not infrequently, of course, a playmate is of far more significance for the social development of a child than are its parents. Such is the disorder of contemporary life that for no two children in our society will biological relationships have quite the same social significance.

society while tending her infant. Such gestures are, at the outset, a smiling and frowning to herself, since they do not affect the infant. But because she does smile and frown as she nonsymbolically ministers to her child, the child comes in time to respond to her smile and her frown as he originally responded to her ministrations. From such crude beginnings he gradually learns those subtle gesture discriminations that are conventional for the adults of his society.*

Self-expression through Gestures.—The development of an understanding of gestures is only a part of the problem of gesture communication; as regards sociopsychological analysis, it is the simplest. The development of ability to communicate by means of gestures is more complex, and the processes involved are somewhat more subtle. Since we no longer believe that the human infant is born with innate neural linkages that cause his eyes to twinkle when he is amused or his lips to smile when he is pleased, the explanation must be found in the experience of the child.†

The problem of self-expression through gestures divides itself into two distinct and separate ones: how does the human being come to express discomfort and all its variants by the gestures that are conventional signs of these feelings within the society to which he has been born? and, second, how does he come to express "pleasure" by another set of such gestures? This separation arises from the fact that there appears to be some native basis for the expression of the former but little or none for the latter.

Gestures of Pain or Discomfort.—Although we are by no means certain, it does at present seem that the "crying expression" of the newborn infant is a natural consequence or expression of body disequilibrium. Like that of laughter, which appears much later in the infant's development, this expression consists of the play of certain facial muscles. When a newborn infant is deliberately pained, as when he is stuck with a sharp instrument, he generally screws up his face. Somewhat similar is the body movement, likewise present at birth, which we term "squirming."

For our purposes, we may tentatively assume that these bodily movements are outward evidences of body disturbance. They are not

* Gates, experimenting with photographs of actors and actresses staging various "emotions," found that children's ability to identify the more complex and subtle expressions improves with age (G. S. Gates, 1923). See also "An experiment in learning to read facial expression" (J. P. Guilford, 1929).

† Three-months-old children are much more apt to laugh than to cry when vociferously scolded, so meager are their experiences with the world (C. Bühler, 1930).

symbolic behaviors but are only the generalized consequence of a wide range of different internal states. The crying expression and the squirming mean only that the infant is disturbed; they do not indicate the specific nature of that disturbance.

Because the mother has herself learned to respond to gestures, however, the infant comes in time to acquire the ability to express himself specifically through gestures. When her infant cries, the mother's response tends to be selective. That is to say, she "reads into" the child's nonsymbolic behavior, including facial and body movement, such significance as is determined by the symbols to which she herself has been trained to respond. The child's perceptible behavior is in the nature of unpredictable movements and has at the outset no symbolic significance. But the mother treats him "as if" he could express body discomfort with the gesture symbols of her society. She consistently treats the child one way when he "acts as though" he were hungry, another when he acts as though he were thirsty, and another when he acts as though he were too warm. Thus the child apparently comes to associate certain specific actions on his part with distinctive responses on the part of the mother. Because she is relatively consistent in these responses, he gradually learns to use the conventional gestures of discomfort when his body states are such as may be corrected by the mother's response.

In the beginning, the mother is ordinarily rather liberal in her interpretation of the various aspects of the crying expression. She experiments and explores in trying to find out just what the infant is endeavoring "to say." In the course of time she becomes more demanding and less patient. Thus the child is forced to conform more and more exactly to the social standards of gesture expression. It is, of course, upon the degree to which those who care for the child respond to gestures of discomfort that the child's ability so to express himself largely depends. The unresponsive mother may tend to have an unexpressive child, and the very responsive mother may tend to have an expressive one.

Gestures of "Pleasure."—The development of ability to express "pleasure" also arises from the fact that the mother responds selectively to the infant's nonsymbolic behavior. Such ability comes more slowly than the ability to express discomfort, since the infant less commonly makes violent movements when his body is equilibrated. While the newborn infant is happy and contented, he is relatively quiet. It is an unusual mother, though, who does not claim that her child smiled at her a week or two after he was born. Such impressions indicate only that the mother is prepared to recognize and encourage a

"smile expression" when and for whatever reason it does occur. It may be many weeks before this happens and still more before it is a true mode of symbolic behavior.*

It is evidently because the mother recognizes and encourages the smile that in the course of time the child learns to express pleasure by smiling. That encouragement takes nonsymbolic forms of action on the part of the mother. She is pleased because her infant looks pleased, and so she fondles and otherwise pleases him. It is not always necessary for the mother actually to give pleasure to the child through nonsymbolic behavior. Once the child has become responsive to verbal symbols, the mother's exclamation of pleasure at the "smile" may be sufficient to arouse mild pleasure in the child and thus to encourage an association of pleasure with the muscular sets involved in the smile.

Limitations of Gesture.—Although it is a far more important means of communication than we commonly realize, gesture has distinct practical limitations. To be effective, gestures must be seen. The gestures of the speaker in the next room can have no direct effect upon us. In the thick of a San Francisco fog the policeman finds it very difficult to give his questioner directions. Pointing is of no use. He must tell which way to go, since he cannot demonstrate by gesture symbols. Thus the fact that gestures are effective only under physical conditions of adequate light and short range is the primary limitation upon their use.

A similar limitation may appear under entirely different conditions, as when the policeman is holding back the traffic by outstretched arms. He cannot then demonstrate which direction is south because his arms are already employed. This secondary limitation to the use of gesture is more important than might be supposed. Not infrequently we wish to communicate with others while we are at work or at play; to do so by means of gestures might necessitate stopping whatever we are doing.

Abstract Ideas.—By far the most significant limitation upon gestures as a means of communication, however, is the fact that they are not easily susceptible to combination and synthesis. It is true that the

* The first smile appears on the average about the fifty-eighth day after birth (M. C. Jones, 1926). See also "Laughing and crying of preschool children" (C. W. Brackett, 1934); "An experimental test of two theories of social smiling in infants" (W. Dennis, 1935); "La psychologie génétique du rire" (C. W. Valentine, 1936); "Tickling and laughter: two genetic studies" (C. Leuba, 1941); and "Development of facial expression of emotion in blind and seeing children" (J. Thompson, 1941).

pantomimist may "tell" a story, the pattern of which is unique. But in so doing, he must use those gestures whose meanings are already known to the members of his audience. He cannot establish those meanings. God may be symbolized by a lifting of the face to the heavens; but the idea "God" is for the members of his audience a synthesis of many experiences involving tangible persons or things. It would be exceedingly difficult to develop this idea by gesture communication alone. Possibly we can see the distinction here involved if we compare the child's response to the mother's frown and his response to the idea "grandfather," who has never appeared as a person. The frown is a gesture symbol of, perhaps, a spanking. Although the spanking is potential, it is tangible and simple. But if the idea "grandfather" has any meaning to the child, that meaning is a synthesis of the many things that the child has been told about "grandfather." When the mother influences the child's behavior by saying, "Darling, your dear, dead grandfather would not have liked that," she is appealing to an abstraction. It is a psychological but nonmaterial reality. Although derived from experiences with reality, the abstraction as a synthesis of those experiences has no external manifestation. The synthesizing of many experiences into an idea or concept is vital to society; much of social life revolves around such abstractions as liberty, God, our ancestors, etc.

Once such abstractions have been developed, they might be easily symbolized by gestures; but their development through this medium of communication is difficult and is perhaps seldom accomplished. The synthesis of an idea, such as that of God, is more likely to be accomplished by other means—probably speech, the second and by far the most important form of overt symbolic behavior.

VERBAL SYMBOLIZATION

Speech as a System of Symbolic Behaviors.—Speech consists of highly conventionalized verbal sound patterns. It is much more than vocal sound; it is controlled sound, having definite meaning or value to others as well as to the speaker. It differs sociopsychologically from gesture, not only in that it is auditory rather than visual but also in that it utilizes a restricted and specialized aspect of the organism, the vocal folds.*

The human infant, in common with many animals, is capable of making noises. There is the cry by which he usually announces his arrival into this world and the wail with which he will irritate the

* The major linguistic organs of deaf-mutes are the fingers, parts that also function in writing.

neighbors for some months thereafter. The cry is uncontrolled sound. It is a generalized response to a wide variety of stimuli and therefore lacks any specific meaning. It is a relatively uncoordinated playing upon the pipes of the vocal organ. It is not speech any more than the discordance that would follow the turning loose of a small boy on the keys, stops, and pedals of a church organ is music.

Speech, like music, is a social rather than a natural thing. In both cases the tonal attributes—pitch, intensity, etc.—are a consequence of natural factors; but the patterns formed by these, and thus their meanings, are entirely social. Vocal sound patterns have no natural meaning or reaction value. Although some students have considered a few words—such as tinkle, splash, and squawk—onomatopoeic (23), it is generally recognized that the meaning we find in words is a consequence of social training rather than of some quality that the words possess.* If the word “stink” is distasteful and the word “idyllic” is pleasing to us, it is only because these vocal patterns have become associated respectively with distasteful and pleasing things. The same is true, too, of reaction to vocal qualities. The “harsh, nasal twang” of the Vermonter, which grates upon ears accustomed to the more “melodious and soft” accents of the southerner, sounds sweet and pleasing to the Vermont ear, which may, in turn, find the southern manner of speech saccharine in quality.

The Elements of Speech.—The human vocal mechanism is capable of a remarkable variety of sounds. From all the possible combination of tone qualities, pitch relationships, etc., each society has utilized a few specific patterns and has given to each pattern a separate meaning or a number of meanings. These combinations and their associated meanings, then, form the verbal language of that society. Although a language contains some thousands of words, which may be run together in many different grammatical forms, the natural capacities of the mechanism are barely tapped. Speaking a language is much like playing a simple tune on a vastly complex organ.

Verbal sound patterns are a consequence of a control that is little short of miraculous. As in music, the patterns of verbal sound are constructed by the controlled use of a number of distinct elements. Absolute pitch is seldom important. A word or phrase can be “played” in any key. Relative pitch, however, is a considerable

* In the construction of artificial words it makes little difference what sounds are employed; no more pleasantness is given to the artificial constructions when sounds from pleasant words are used than when sounds from unpleasant words are used (E. L. Thorndike, 1934). See also “The affective value of first names” (W. E. Walton, 1937).

element in vocal symbolism;* monotone, speech from which pitch changes, or inflections, are partially eliminated, is quite wearing to the listener and is soporific, if not actually uncommunicative.† All languages use inflection, although some do more than others. The Romanic language group depends upon it to a greater extent than does English. The importance of even slight differences in inflection is indicated by the fact that Americans are often amused to hear the English end their sentences and phrases by a rising rather than a falling pitch. So extensive is the use of inflection by the dialect-speaking Chinese from the region around Canton that a conversation sounds to Western ears like a "group sing" or singsong.

Inflection is only one of the elements from which vocal patterns are devised. Placement, or tonal quality, shifts constantly in speech and contributes to the fashioning of speech patterns. German and French placements are quite different, although in both languages a wide range of tonal qualities is involved. Every language uses shifts in tonal quality so subtle that, as a rule, only those who speak it as the mother tongue can escape a foreign-tonal accent. It is said, for example, that no white man ever completely masters the "click" of the Bantus, a percussive sound produced by tongue and soft palate.

Percussive sounds, made by smacking the lips, sucking the tongue away from the roof of the mouth, etc., are not frequent in the European languages. Variations in intensity, however, provide a kind of explosive sound that is used in forming rhythm patterns. Rhythm is also produced by the slight and quick shifts in pitch, which we have already mentioned, and by relative shifts in timing. Even the gossip whose "tongue rattles on unmercifully" does vary the minute but significant pauses between the sounds she emits. These pauses form a rhythm pattern that contributes to the meaning of the sounds. In speech, even silence has its meaning.

We take our language and our usage of it very much for granted. Not until we attempt to learn a second language do the complexities of speech control impress us; and, even then, we see them only in terms

* In north China, for example, there is a sound combination, "ma," which when spoken with a low rising pitch means "house," with a high rising pitch "hemp," with a high level pitch "mother," and with a low falling pitch "scold" (L. Bloomfield, 1933).

† Formerly, deaf-mutes who were taught to speak lacked the usual speech melodies. But it has been found that the speech inflections of deaf-mutes can be improved if they are allowed to compare their speech records with those of normal speakers. Instruments are employed by which the sound patterns are converted into moving visual lines. The subject observes the "picture" of a normal speech melody and attempts to imitate it (M. F. Meyer, 1934).

of a difficulty.* It is this very complexity of verbal control, however, that makes speech a more flexible and extensive means of communication than gesture.

The Functions of Speech.—Without doubt words, spoken and written, constitute the greatest single tool that man has yet devised.† Through them is exercised much of the control necessary for the maintenance of social life. By speech a mother lulls her infant to sleep; by it great political leaders have aroused nations from apathy. Through it men devise, perpetuate, and destroy the complex patterns of non-symbolic behavior by which they live or perish.

The lower animals, especially the apes, may live together. But their ways of living do not have the cumulative characteristic and adaptive quality that make man the dominant organism. The ape does have many of the anatomical attributes of man. But his most serious inadequacy lies in the limitations of his speech behavior. He can, like other animals, learn to respond to the spoken word. One or two have allegedly learned to speak two or three words. But the ape has failed to learn a well-differentiated language; and so the development of human ways of behavior has been denied to him (24).

The "Meaning" of a Word.—The spoken word is a verbal symbol. Words may symbolize concrete objects (such as dog, cat, ball, and milk), spatial relationships thereof, and abstractions therefrom. Words may also symbolize bodily states, such as love, pain, pleasure, fear, and apprehension. For each word in a language there is a corresponding meaning or counterpart—in some cases two or more such meanings, the particular one being indicated by the mode of usage. These are the conventionally specified, *i.e.*, the dictionary or denotative, meanings of words. Exact and refined communication is possible when words are used in their denotative values. By such usage the scientist describes his discoveries and the teacher endeavors to convey his ideas to his students. Teachers and scientists are endeavoring to obtain highly refined responses and to secure rigidly controlled communication. Unfortunate for the student, perhaps, is the fact that

* A major difficulty often encountered in using a foreign tongue is the finding of permissible literary descriptions. While we look "drawn and haggard" when worried, the Chinese "clap the hands." Anger for us is often described in terms of "hectic flush and narrowed eyes." But for the Chinese, anger is associated with "round eyes and a chilly smile" (O. Klineberg, 1938a).

† It is quite evident that during the course of a war the word (treaties, threats, promises, and the like) is not so mighty as the sword (guns, tanks, combat planes). But it is words that have made possible the development, manufacture, and use of the swords of physical conflict.

when words are used at their denotative values, they are often relatively impotent.

Supplementing and sometimes modifying the dictionary meaning of each word is a wealth of subtle implications that are conveyed through unconventional and conventional inflection, accent, stress, or other variations from the normal pattern, frequently spoken of as verbal gestures. These variations in usage provide the overtones, without which speech is flat and soporific. The word "love" is defined as strong personal attachment or ardent affection; yet in speech it may mean anything from adoration to sadism.* Dictionary meaning is thus but the starting point. It provides a medium of denotative communication. Inflection, context, and variations of usage round out the language, give it richness, and make it a stimulating and highly connotative (25) means of communication.†

It is therefore not only what words one uses but how one uses them that is important in ordinary conversation, in lecturing, etc. Flattering words may be made insulting, provocative words made pleasing. The most startling scientific discovery may be made dull and unimportant when presented to the laymen by the scientist who uses words at their specific values. In contrast, the most unimportant observation, when artfully handled, may become the basis for a stimulating, startling lecture. The professor's joke may be original and leave his audience "cold"; the radio comedian may "carry" his hearers with timeworn gags. Because word values can be controlled by the user, a brilliant conversationalist need have little to say. He may depend for his effects entirely on the manner of the saying.

Word Combination and the Synthesis of Reactions.—The flexibility of verbal behavior does not end, however, with the fact that words may have many meanings. Unlike gestures, words are susceptible to synthesis—to being combined into a multitude of patterns. Ten words may be combined into a hundred different meanings, each of which may be given a number of separate values by the manner of expression. Words are like building blocks: a number of words, each with its definite meaning, may be combined and recombined to evoke almost any desired response. It is through this recombination of well-known words that an abstract idea, such as God, is synthesized.

* "Sadism" refers to perverted behavior in which pleasure or sex satisfaction is obtained from the infliction of pain upon others.

† The poet, the politician, and the song writer almost never use words in their denotative meanings; thus they say "his heart was singing," "I consecrate my life to the welfare of the people," etc.

Although the child may never leave his birthplace, he may through words gain a comprehension of the world external to his own experience. Our ideas about the universe are, in fact, far more a product of word communication than of direct experience.* By verbal synthesis of experienced elements we build up a concept of the unexperienced, be it China, Africa, or South America. The concept is, of course, entirely symbolic and may be extremely unrealistic; but we may act non-symbolically upon the basis of it. Few of the pioneers in California had been to China; but since many had the idea that China was a land of heathens and barbarians, they often treated the Chinese immigrants accordingly. And it is by verbal synthesis that much of the social heritage is passed down from generation to generation. We know of the past through words and convey many of our experiences to future generations through words. Indeed, without words there could hardly be a social heritage. It is mainly through the medium of words that we are prepared for future nonsymbolic adjustments. This is "education," the development of adjustment techniques before the occasion for their use has arisen. The value of words to us cannot therefore be overestimated, although it may, as we shall see, be misunderstood.

Limitations of Speech.—Speech, like gesture, has distinct limitations. The range of the unaided human voice is to be measured in rods rather than in miles. Except for simple vocal symbols, such as calls, the effectiveness is often a matter of feet. We cannot, therefore, communicate through any considerable distance by speech. Radio,† of course, makes it possible to transcend this limitation. The President can now speak to millions scattered over the American continent. But these millions cannot talk back. Although the telephone permits two-way distance communication, its use is limited. It is, for example, difficult to hold conferences over the telephone when more than two people are involved. By extending the effective range of verbal behavior these artificial aids to verbal communication are, no doubt, bringing about modes of social life otherwise quite impossible. But they have come about only in the last few decades, and their consequences are not yet fully apparent.

* The child's concept of the world varies from society to society (W. Dennis and R. W. Russell, 1940). Small French-Swiss children, for example, tend to regard all things as alive; such animistic notions are not found among young Melanesian children but are held by older Melanesian children as a result of the teachings of those older and "wiser" (J. Piaget, 1929; M. Mead, 1932).

† Three of the more important references on radio communication are *The psychology of radio* (H. Cantril and G. W. Allport, 1935); *Radio and the printed page* (P. F. Lazarsfeld, 1940b); and *Radio research 1941* (P. F. Lazarsfeld and F. N. Stanton, 1941).

By the drum language, a type of long-distance auditory but non-verbal communication, the Africans were able partially to transcend the distance limitations of verbal communication.* By the telephone, telegraph, and radio we are more efficiently accomplishing the same ends. Yet none of these means gives permanency to the verbal symbol. The spoken word "dies a-borning." Generally its effect must be immediate, although by relating it verbally from generation to generation, experiences of the past may be preserved for the future. Such communication is, however, imperfect, inaccurate, and subject to gross distortion. The primitives, dependent upon it, have but the vaguest record of their ancestral history; and such as they have is probably mythological. For accurate and detailed communication through time we are dependent upon resymbolization of verbal symbols.

RESYMBOLIZATION OF VERBAL SYMBOLS

The Written Word.—Many methods have been worked out for the permanent recording of symbolic behavior. In the earlier forms, pictures representing acts or things were often used. The limitations of such a method are self-evident. A more flexible method is that of assigning word meaning to written characters. The Chinese still use this method. Although it permits a flexibility and accuracy almost equal to that of speech, it is cumbersome and difficult. Since a separate character is required for each word in the language, the total number of characters, the meanings of which must be remembered, runs into many thousands. Simpler is the system we use of symbolizing the basic sound patterns of the language and building up our words from these.

The written word, permitting as it does a permanent recording of symbolic behavior, could not become available as a means of com-

* Although broken up into many linguistic groups, the African primitives long had a universal language of the drums, by which messages could be relayed from village to village over the entire length of the continent. So effective was this language that the whites of South Africa were notified of the death of Queen Victoria by the natives several days before telegraphic reports came through. Because it was exceedingly complex, this drum language was almost as definitive and flexible as speech. As many as six drums, each with its own shifting rhythm, contributed to the complex sound patterns by which drum "words" were made. The words were not spelled out in letters, as with our telegraph, but were "spoken." The technical skill that was required to understand this language would appear to be equal to that necessary to understand vocal symbols, and the skill that was involved in beating out the sound patterns would put to shame our most dexterous trap drummers (R. T. Clarke, 1934).

municaton for the masses, however, until the development of printing techniques made possible cheap reproduction of what had been written. Today most of the adults in the United States can—and most of them do—read, although what they read is quite another matter. Whereas the child depends upon the spoken word for much of his knowledge of the outside world, adults can now obtain this knowledge through the symbols of the spoken word. The symbolic behavior of men in New York City is made available to men in San Francisco by the newspaper. Travel books, descriptive works, and statistical and scientific treatises on almost every region and people in the world permanently symbolize the past and present. We can “hear” Plato speak through *The republic* and “see” Roman society disintegrate through Gibbon’s *Decline and fall of the Roman Empire*. In symbols of symbolic behavior much of the past is available to the present, and much of the present will be recorded for the future. The effect upon the individual of this “symbolized” symbolic behavior is pronounced and will be discussed at length in Chapter VII.

Writing and Speaking Contrasted.—The written word, however, suffers certain disabilities. It lacks the shadings and variations of meaning that unconventional inflection, etc., can give to the spoken word; and it cannot be accompanied by gesture. Effective writing and speaking require, therefore, rather different techniques. The skilled lecturer may write ineffectively; the literary genius may be a very dull speaker. The written presentation of a subject may read well but sound tedious when read aloud. By his method of reading, the clever reader can make the ineffectively written passage sound dramatic; the poor reader can dull the sparkle of a literary gem.

When speech is transcribed directly to writing, it may sound highly artificial and often seem involved and verbose. The speaker obtains many of his effects by vocal tricks and by gestures which, shorn from the written word, reduce its effectiveness. Although in the lecture an idea is commonly presented less logically and in much less coherent terms than in the textbook, the lecture may be far more stimulating, effective, and even more accurate as communication than the textbook. Punctuation marks are not a very satisfactory substitute for tonal inflections, vocal stress, and gestures—all of which the written word must do without.

ACQUISITION OF VERBAL BEHAVIOR

Although a great deal of conscious effort goes into speech development, the process by which the human infant acquires the ability to use and to respond to verbal symbols is little understood. The prob-

lem is similar to, and has the same two major aspects as, the development of gesture techniques.

Response to Verbal Symbols.—We may start as we did when considering response to gestures with the statement that, if those around the human infant did not express themselves through symbols, the infant would not become responsive to symbols. This is but a way of saying that verbal behavior is entirely social. Apparently it is through experience that is directed—intentionally or otherwise—by the people about him that the child comes to associate certain sound patterns with the nonsymbolic behaviors of those people. These sound patterns then have the meaning for the child that the nonsymbolic behavior originally had. Because the verbal symbols that the mother uses to express herself are the conventional ones, the associations that the child develops between verbal sound patterns and body reactions tend to be those of his society.

Words Having Pleasure Value.—Music may lull the savage beast, provided that he likes music. But lullabies have no proved soporific value to the newborn human infant. If he squirms restlessly in the crib, only release from physical irritants will be likely to soothe his little "mind" and set him off to sleep. But when, with the passing weeks, the time comes to change his feeding schedule, a lullaby may stop the midnight squall and soothe his disappointed stomach for a time. In the course of his short life experience, he has learned to associate being fed with certain of his mother's vocal sounds. These sounds have gained a vague symbolic meaning. They have a "pleasure" value; they are the small beginnings of a rapidly developing series of increasingly specific "pleasure" responses to verbal symbols. Much of this development comes about without intent on the part of the mother, for she is accustomed to accompanying her nonsymbolic acts with a flow of symbolic behavior, verbal as well as gestural. The basic process involved is aptly summed up in the contention that it is possible to train even the family cat, provided that you wait until it is doing what you want it to before issuing the command.

This process is, in effect, what occurs when the mother feeds her child to the accompaniment, in whatever language, of a steady stream of verbal sound. "Do's 'ou darling wants 'ou's milk?" is hardly enlightening to the infant and may later be actually embarrassing. But the fact that the mother coos as she cares for her infant is probably the reason why, in time, her happy tones come to have a pleasing value for the infant. Because feeding and other nonsymbolic care are frequently accompanied by certain recurrent forms of maternal verbal behavior, the latter gradually come to serve as partial substitutes for the former.

Words Having "Pain" Value.—In the case of words of restraint and prohibition, as with those of encouragement and pleasure, the "meaning" is evidently first aroused by doing and not by saying. Only when the doing and the saying have occurred together over and over is it possible for those words to have the meaning of the actions. Apparently the fact that the infant is told, "Don't" and then is nonsymbolically restrained from continuing the disapproved act or is physically punished for doing it eventually gives the word a "pain" or inhibiting value. Although she may fully realize that the infant cannot understand her words of reproof or restraint, the average mother seldom refrains from involuntary use of them while she is taking direct and effective measures of control. It is the simultaneous occurrence of these words and reaction-invoking nonsymbolic behavior that accounts for the fact that these words in time gain symbolic meaning to the child. When, therefore, the mother is inconsistent in what she says and what she does, the child may not develop the desired response to words. This failure is particularly noticeable in the case of words of restraint and prohibition, apparently because parents are seldom consistent in the punishment that they administer to children. They say, "No!" and then permit, or else punish and promptly "make up." Thus "No!" may on occasion have almost as much "do" value as "don't" value.

Response to Tonal Qualities.—In the early stages of the development of verbal response it is probably tonal qualities, such as speech melody, rather than the verbal patterns that gain meaning for the child. Thus the mother can obtain the same response from her young child by saying, "Naughty baby, now I'm going to spank you!" as by, "Nice baby, see the pretty milk bottle?" if she says it with similar speech melody, timbre, and intensity. Words, as such, do not become distinguishable for months; and even then only a few of the more simple word patterns will have specific meaning to the child. The distinction between response to words and that to melody, timbre, and intensity is often overlooked by the fond parent; but it is a vital one, since the early and generalized reactions to voice quality are not susceptible to that synthesis which is the prime value of word usage. Thus it is probably because the dog never gets far beyond this first stage that we cannot "tell" or explain to him how to do new things.*

* Although dogs ordinarily respond to differences in speech melody and intensity rather than to words per se, one four- to five-year-old German shepherd dog is reported to have been so well trained by his owner that "there seems to be no doubt that scores of associations between verbal stimuli and definite responses have been

Refinement of response is encouraged because the mother ordinarily makes a deliberate effort to teach her child the meaning of words. As he becomes more and more responsive to vocal sounds, she will become more and more inclined to stress by repetition those word symbols representing persons and objects important to the child's welfare. Yet specific responsiveness to words is no more than a beginning in the speech training of the human being. Patterns of words—phrases and sentences—must come to have meaning as such. Having learned a definite response to each of ten words, the child must then learn to synthesize these responses for various combinations of the ten words. The patterns are, like the words, highly conventionalized; and in time the child learns to recognize those patterns, as distinct from the words with which they are formed.

The average child will employ few words until about the sixteenth month, at which time an acceleration in the use of words takes place. But his understanding of words, as distinct from his ability to use them, appears somewhat earlier. This responsiveness to words is, of course, dependent upon the verbal behaviors of those around him; a child reared solely by deaf-mutes will have no understanding of the spoken word. Quite obviously, if those surrounding the child talk relatively little, the child will more than likely lag behind his fellows in responsiveness to speech sounds.

Self-expression through Verbal Behavior.—Response to the spoken word involves the auditory mechanism;* whereas expression through words is achieved by control of the vocal folds, lungs, throat, and mouth. The production of a verbal symbol necessitates delicate and accurate adjustment of many muscles. In view of the fact that each sound requires its own muscular coordination and that speech is a series of rapid shifts, it is obvious that learning to speak involves a tremendous amount of trial and error. The child in learning to use new

fixed" (C. J. Warden and L. H. Warner, 1928). See also *Working dogs* (E. Humphrey and L. H. Warner, 1934).

* Most mutes are without ability to speak because of auditory defects. Being unable to hear those about them, they lack the ordinary mechanism for that association between sound and object or function termed language. In teaching them to speak (and many of them really learn to talk surprisingly well), visual, kinesthetic, or tactual cues, or some combination of these must be substituted for the auditory. Some can visually perceive the lip-and-tongue movements; others perceive the air vibrations through the skin of the hand (R. H. Gault, 1933). Blind, as well as deaf and mute, the noted Helen Keller learned to "feel" manually the changing shapes of the mouth opening and the vibrations in the head, especially the throat.

words and to make inflection and accent variations must "feel out" each one, much as the beginner on a trombone feels out his notes. But, whereas the latter has only three variables (lip tension, breath pressure, and slide position), the child learning to speak has a large number with which to deal—and the range of each is great. The mistakes that can be made are many, and only persistent trial and error will lead to eventual success.

Although trial and error is a large element in the development of verbal behavior, it could never by itself result in the acquisition of a language. Social direction, social selection and correction, are necessary if the child is to learn to express himself in the verbal symbols that are conventional in his society (26). Some of this training is unintentional; more of it is deliberate.

The Acquisition of Speech.—The cries, gurgles, coos, and other vocalizations that issue from the infant in distress or in comfort constitute the starting point for the development of speech. In the course of time, those in the infant's immediate vicinity may narrow the range of the babblings to which they will react. If the mother thinks her child has said "drink" and responds accordingly, she apparently thereby encourages the child to use this sound pattern. As time passes, she will tend to ignore relatively more of the sounds he makes that are unlike those of her own tongue and repeat after him those that resemble her language sounds. She is likely to imagine that the child is trying to say "Daddy" or that he says that he "wants to go to Mamma" and to tell him how to say these things. In time he becomes able to repeat what he hears, parroting the words of others (27).

True verbal behavior cannot be said to be acquired, however, until the child associates a specific sound combination with some object or occurrence in his environment. The sound combination need not be a proper one; in fact, baby talk satisfies all the requirements of a language. Thus, if the child says "Bo" when and only when he quite obviously awaits or sees his milk, he is using language—not, it is true, the language of his society, but language nevertheless. The symbol has meaning, if only to him. Upon the responsiveness, both symbolic and nonsymbolic, of those around him will depend in large measure the rapidity with which the child abandons baby talk and acquires the language of adults.* Many of the individual abnormalities of speech development and usage would seem to be a consequence of the fact

* The *lipping* adult may *lip* because of a split palate or other physical abnormality. Many *lipping* adults are, however, simply people who failed to grow up linguistically. Probably their parents thought that infantile speech was "cute" and encouraged rather than discouraged it.

that those around the child either responded insufficiently to his voice and thus discouraged speech, or else responded so efficiently to his baby talk that he did not need to speak in the words of the mother tongue (28).

VERBALIZATION

As was indicated in the previous chapter, there is no necessary relation between an individual's overt symbolic behavior and the other aspects of his behavior. When his training in overt symbolic behavior outruns or takes a different course from his training in overt nonsymbolic behavior, a spread or contrast appears between the two. He then tends to verbalize in one realm and act in another. The phenomenon may for convenience be termed "verbalization." Usually the spread is between speech and action, although occasionally gesture is involved, as it is in the case of the little boy who facially as well as vocally refuses to eat spinach while he is eating it.

Verbalization involves the use of verbalisms—words that have little or no meaning for the user. The child can be taught to use words of which the conventional meanings are quite beyond his capacity to understand. He parrots those words and they have no more vital significance for him than they would for a parrot. "I'm a bad boy, Mummy," the child will announce happily. In adult social life verbalization takes somewhat more complex forms and may have grievous individual or collective consequences, as is the case with impractical personal promises, sanctimonious political-party platforms, and idealistic international agreements.

Contemporary society fosters, by means of formal education and other factors, more rapid and adequate development of overt symbolic than of overt nonsymbolic behaviors. We are trained to talk like adults long before we learn to act like adults. We are trained, in school and out, to respond to the symbols of things rather than to the things those symbols represent. As a result, we are likely to be what the layman would probably term more intellectual than practical. The consequence is a social system that has marked elements of superficiality, that has many contrasts between what is "said" to be and what actually is.

Parroting one set of social precepts while behaving nonsymbolically on the basis of another makes an unintentional hypocrite. Pious men are sometimes victims of this spread between what they do and what they say that they do. The medieval priesthood was, for illustration, noted for its verbal adherence to Biblical ethics and its nonsymbolic indulgence in "sin." The impractical professor, the drawing-room

radical, the sophisticated preadolescent, the pious crook, the doctor who gives excellent advice but never takes it himself—these are people whose overt symbolic and overt nonsymbolic behaviors do not run parallel. They are but extreme illustrations of a commonplace fact—that there is no automatic relationship between the symbolic and the nonsymbolic aspects of overt behavior.

CHAPTER VI

OVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR: I

The human infant, it will be recalled, comes into the world equipped with a complex vocal mechanism that is capable of producing noise and a set of facial muscles that are capable of considerable movement. The previous chapter discussed the processes by which these organic potentialities are so developed that the adult human being is able to speak and to respond to the language of those around him and to use and to respond to their gestures.

In this and the subsequent chapter attention will be directed toward the processes by which the infant learns the overt nonsymbolic behaviors by which as an adult he will make his way around the house and through the countryside or city, don his clothing, farm his land, build his airplanes, operate upon his patients, care for his aged mother, make love to his wife, spank his children, etc. Nature has provided him with a remarkably complex body. He has, for example, the opposed thumb, which gives to his hands potentialities possessed by no other creature. But he must develop the potentialities of his body—he must learn to use his legs, his arms, his hands, etc., in the particular ways that are appropriate to his society and to his special roles therein.

Within any society the patterns of overt adjustment, like the symbols of communication, are highly conventionalized. The very nature of social life does not permit the human child to work out many of these adjustments for himself. Specific modes of conduct, detailed forms of actions, are prescribed by the social heritage and are brought to him through the medium of parents, playmates, neighbors, and verbal myths and legends, and in literate societies by written history, biography, fiction, etc.

Learning by Experience.—The crudest but in some respects most effective means by which an animal, human or otherwise, can be taught to behave in a predetermined mode is to “let nature take its course” and so to arrange things that the animal will be rewarded when it does what is desired and punished when it does that which does not fit the required pattern. To a considerable extent society does just this to

the child. The result is socially, as contrasted to naturally, selected trial and error; what constitutes success and failure is here determined by human beings rather than by nature. Socially selected trial and error is, as we have suggested, one of the processes involved in the child's development of overt symbolic behaviors; and it is probable that a good deal of overt nonsymbolic behavior is acquired through different manifestations of the same process. The arrangement and operation of social rewards and punishments are, however, so complex and their effects are so subtle that the trial-and-error aspect of human learning is easily lost sight of.

When a mother threatens her child and when the father, returning from his daily work, administers the punishment, both father and mother are endeavoring to make a "failure" out of some action of the child. When the mother expresses approval and the father brings home a bar of candy, they are trying to make some one of the child's actions a "success." In the former instance, the purpose is to discourage repetition; in the latter case, to encourage it.* To the small child life must seem to consist mainly of "don't's," since so much of what he does comes into conflict with the behavior of those around him. These "don't's" are analogous to the walls of a rat maze; by bumping against the walls, the rat eventually learns what not to do in the effort to reach enticing food. The developing child, and the adult as well, blunders through the complex maze of social restraints, learning by experience to avoid this turning and to take that. Upon the character of his society will, of course, depend the nature of the "don't's" and "do's." But the problem still remains: how do the actions first arise from which socially determined successes are selected? why does the growing child attempt to do so very many things, most of which will be discouraged and a few of which will be encouraged so that they are learned and become an established part of his personality?

LEARNING BY HUMAN EXAMPLE

When a child has developed specific responses to a number of gestural and verbal symbols, these may then, of course, be combined to evoke a synthesized and thus new response from him. This is what the parent attempts when he explains, argues, and pleads. This method of teaching new modes of overt nonsymbolic behavior is effec-

* We may unwittingly encourage the child to proceed with acts that we wish him to discontinue. Thus we may, out of sympathy for his hurts, cuddle and otherwise baby him when he has behaved so clumsily as to harm himself. In certain other cultures, however, great effort is made to discourage clumsiness (M. Mead, 1930).

tive to a limited degree.* But it often happens that pleas, explanations, and even physical punishment will not discourage the child from acting like the idolized boy next door. The boy next door sets an example by his behavior, demonstrating how to achieve a given end; and that example may have at times more effect upon little Johnny or Mary than mother's pleas or father's spankings.

The action that sets an example may be either nonsymbolic or symbolic. A boy throwing stones at the windows of an empty house may be a fine, *i.e.*, effective, example for other boys; here the action is in the main nonsymbolic. A Robin Hood, robbing the rich and succoring the poor, may also be a real example for the same boys, although his action is brought to them only through the means of verbal symbols.

In this chapter, we shall consider in some detail how the overt nonsymbolic actions of those around the growing child tend to set examples for him.

Imitation.—The power of example is tremendous, but it is as unnecessary as it would be trying for adults to set a good example for very young children. The small child can no more copy the behavior of his parents than the dog can copy that of his master. Although many of our sporadic waves of moral reform are based upon the belief that man is an imitative animal and that imitation is an instinctive, automatic process, the truth seems to be quite the opposite. The child may learn much on the basis of examples set by others. He does not, however, become a carbon copy of them; for the process of learning by example is exceedingly complex and has definite limitations.

Tarde succeeded many years ago in effectively describing the fact that men take over modes of behavior from one another. He used the term "imitation,"† a name for the observed fact (29). Unfortunately

* Analysis of fifty detailed case studies led Sears to the conclusion that control of the child through persuasion and argument is greater than that which can be achieved through physical punishment (L. Sears, 1932). His study did not, however, include the effect of example on the child's behavior. A later study by Johnson, which did, shows that verbal efforts will be effective only when they are part of a complex of other controls, including example (M. W. Johnson, 1939).

† The term "imitation" was originally used in *Laws of imitation* (G. Tarde, 1903) as an explanatory device. It was established in American sociological literature through the work of Ross, especially his *Social psychology* (E. A. Ross, 1908), only to be dislodged by the term and concept "instinct." In 1926 Bernard revived and redeveloped the term "imitation," making it descriptive rather than explanatory (L. L. Bernard, 1926). More recently, Miller and Dollard have examined the imitative process in great detail and with special attention to what they call the reward factor—another way of saying that motivation is necessary before imitation will occur (N. E. Miller and J. Dollard, 1941). For a

he and many since him thought that naming explains. Men do imitate each other, but this statement does not tell us how or why they do so. Nor does it indicate how uncertain and varied is the occurrence of imitation. A man may remain honest in the presence of crooks or become a thief even though his associates be models of integrity. In the midst of ignorance one man may grow wise; in an atmosphere of intelligent, kindly men another may develop essential stupidity and gross selfishness. If imitation were automatic, these things could not be.

Used to cover a number of complex and exceedingly subtle socio-psychological processes, the term "imitation" so often becomes a cloak for ignorance and thus a contribution thereto that we shall refrain from using it. As a descriptive symbol, it might be useful; but since it so commonly connotes explanation, we prefer to use the more cumbersome but unmistakably descriptive phrase "learning by human example."

A Trial-and-error Short Cut.—The value of having an example upon which to base trial-and-error learning is self-evident. Some overt behaviors, such as riding a bicycle and swimming, although involving delicate, dynamic muscular patterns, must be learned by trial and error with little assistance from the direction of others. It is possible to show a novice how to sit upon the seat of a bicycle, where to put his feet, and the method of using handle bars. These things can be demonstrated for him. Yet he cannot be saved the many falls that every beginner has in learning how to ride. Those falls are but the failures in trial-and-error learning.

Most overt behaviors, however, could never be learned by unguided (not to be confused with socially unselected) trial and error. Left to himself in the watchmaker's shop, the apprentice might experiment indefinitely without learning how to assemble the parts of a watch. There are so many ways not to assemble a watch that he might devote a number of lifetimes to these before hitting upon the way or ways it can be done. He needs, therefore, to be shown the steps required; he must have them demonstrated to him—over and over perhaps. He will learn, if at all, by trial and error that is guided by the master craftsman. The example of the craftsman does not preclude failures; it serves, though, to limit the range of experimentation and thus to increase the chances of success.

Some overt symbolic, and probably the vast majority of overt nonsymbolic, behavior is acquired by trial-and-error "learning by
 brief history of the term and its usages see "Imitation" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 7, 586-587). See also "The concept of imitation" (E. Faris, 1926a).

human example." Frequently the human being who serves as an example for the developing child is unaware that he is doing so. And the child who is trying "to be like mother" or "to act like the football coach," does not, of course, realize that such endeavor is an important part of his socialization. Yet to this process of learning by example we can trace the growth of many of those specific patterns of behavior that within any given society constitute being human.

THE HUMAN MODEL

The Concept of a Model.—The person whose behavior provides the example for learning has been aptly termed a "model."* To the model the fact that another is learning by his example may be a cause for joy or sorrow. Mothers are often delighted by the fact that their children "love" them so much that they want to do just what they are doing. In time this demand may become so insistent as to be annoying and may lead to a pathological condition. The ability to set the example for other children is what makes the position of play-gang leader valuable. But the college student may find himself only angered when he is aped too crudely by the callow high-school youth.

The use of a human model in the guidance of trial-and-error learning is analogous to the commercial illustrator's use of a model or models when he makes copy for a magazine cover or advertising page. The illustrator is a reproducer, converting to lines and color on paper what he sees arranged before his easel. But the illustrator must have certain kinds of skills before he can use a model; he must be trained to draw, to reproduce colors, etc. These skills consist of habits of action previously learned and are the elements that make the pattern of action that produces the picture of the girl in the bathing suit. That pattern of action is but a new integration of old elements, a specific synthesis of what was already there.† But the synthesizing of old elements

* The term "model" was first used by Bernard to describe the fact that children usually fixate somewhat upon one person at a time in the process of learning by human example (L. L. Bernard, 1926). In his analysis Bernard tends, however, to an oversimplification of reality in describing the successive models (mother, father, etc.) which the average child uses. So disordered is our society that there is little system or uniformity in the process of growing up. Bernard's description would no doubt be more appropriate for conditions a generation or more ago than for those of the present.

† Although the layman frequently thinks that the inventor is one who creates something unique, anthropologists and sociologists have found that to understand any invention it is often more fruitful to study the cultural medium in which the new makes its appearance than the individual responsible for it. All originality appears to consist primarily in arranging old cultural elements into a unique pattern.

involves trial and error. In employing a model, the illustrator limits the range of trial and error, saving himself many errors.

The Selection of Models.—The illustrator must have a commission or the expectation of one before he will attempt to paint the picture. He wants to do this thing; from it he expects to obtain some satisfaction. Just so, the child must have come, through prior experience, to the stage at which some sort of satisfaction can be gained from the pattern of behavior demonstrated by another; or he will not attempt to learn by the example of that potential model. When the child selects the mother as a model, he does so because most of his satisfactions have so far come through the mother. "Being" mother will therefore extend those satisfactions.

Having a model and wanting to copy it are not, of course, sufficient to ensure learning by example. The small boy may very much want to be an aviator and may have a model for this in the person of the aviator who lives next door. Yet, until the small boy has become a grown man and has in the process learned how to do a thousand and one things, he cannot learn to be an aviator. Learning by example is the process of synthesizing in a specific way a number of previously acquired habits of action. The model provides a pattern for the specific synthesis but not the elements of behavior that are to be synthesized. Just as the illustrator must have certain types of skill before he can effectively use a model for the painting of a picture, so the child must have the elements of behavior before he can put them together in the pattern of his father and so be "just like daddy." Therefore, it is probably not necessary for the father to set a "good example" for his son until that son has learned to walk and talk and do the many things which, combined in a certain manner, may constitute "acting like father."*

A human being can serve as a model for the behavior of another human being only when the life experience of the user has been of such character that the behavior of the model is both usable and useful as a pattern of adjustment. The individual selects his models in terms of short-time results—getting attention, a piece of candy, a new dress—and these may or may not be of adjustment value in the long run. The child, therefore, needs guidance in the selection of models if he is to become an effective member of society. One attribute of the function-

* It can be said, of course, that a motion-picture gunman served as a model to the highly moral child who, after viewing a motion-picture in which the villain shot the hero, playfully shot but killed his playmate. The motion-picture gunman did not, however, serve as a criminal model in any strict sense; he served as a temporary play model, and the gun was unfortunately not a play tool.

ing social system is that it prepares the child for the use of and provides him with socially appropriate models.

The Primary Model.—The first important model in a child's development may be spoken of as the primary model. From this model the child will obtain some of the basic patterns of behavior, patterns that will have much to do with the direction of later development.

In our ancient and now disrupted family system circumstances were such that the children tended to use rather exclusively the biological mother as a model for the first two or three years of life.* She was conventionally the child's primary model. The child, therefore, became patterned upon the mother, who was presumably a desirable representative of the social system and thus set a good example for the acquisition of modes of behavior basic to all members of society. In contemporary society the biological mother may mean much or almost nothing to the child. Under some circumstances she may be the primary model; but, under different circumstances, the father, an aunt, a nurse, or an elder brother or sister may be the primary model. There is in our society no systematic sequence of model usage, no specific and universal pattern for childhood. This fact complicates the analysis of the social psychologist but probably improves the modern child's preparation for our unsystematic society.

Where and when the mother is the primary model, the child will be found tagging the mother around the house from morning until night. "Let me do that, Mamma!" But it should not be supposed from the fact that a child uses his mother as a basic model that the child necessarily will become a small replica of her. Many factors enter into determining the extent to which the mother is effective as a model. For example, the mother may by punishment discourage the child's doing some of the things which she herself does; although the mother spends much time at her dressing table, the child may avoid it like a plague. Powder on the floor and lipstick on clean dresses may result not in the joys of "being like mother" but in the "seat-ache" of a spanking.

* For a history and description of the old family system see *A history of the family as a social and educational institution* (W. Goodsell, 1915). The modern family is a changing, dynamic, loosely knit, and irregular pattern of interaction. Since the student is likely to think of "The Family" in terms of his own family background and thereby to generalize from the particular and possibly unique, he might profitably consult one or more of the following: *The young child and his parents* (J. E. Anderson and J. C. Foster, 1927); *The behavior of young children of the same family* (B. C. Weill, 1928); *The family* (E. B. Reuter and J. R. Runner, 1931); *Children and their parents* (M. E. Watson, 1932); *Problems of the family* (W. Goodsell, 1936); and *The psychology of parent-child relationships* (P. M. Symonds, 1939).

Model Fixation.—When the mother excessively encourages her child to use her as a model, she may be laying the basis for a fixation. Mother fixations are particularly common in contemporary society, in part because of the decline in family size, the decline in domestic activities, and the anonymity of life in modern urban communities.* With insufficient work to do and with few external activities to engross her attention, the mother may be as psychologically dependent upon her child as the child is physically dependent upon her. Encouraged to do so by the mother, the child may “fixate” upon the mother. The mother may “cling” to the child, discouraging any tendency of the child to drift away from her. The consequences may be quite unfortunate. Though the mother may be a most useful example for the child in many ways, she cannot by her example alone teach the child to make a normally effective adjustment to society. In the first place, the behavior of the mother may be in some regards inexpedient for the child. This is obvious in the case of a boy. Less obvious, perhaps, is the fact that the mother cannot provide the girl with a full complement of adequate adjustment patterns. The mother is not a little girl; she is a woman, married, and with a child. It is as a child with a father and mother that the girl must make her adjustments. Furthermore, the mother’s behavior as a woman may even be quite inexpedient for the girl when she becomes a woman, especially in our dynamic society in which people change with the times.

Freudians have thought that there is a natural basis for such fixations and the consequences that grow out of them. They have been particularly interested in the boy-mother (Oedipus complex) and the girl-father (Electra complex) fixations.† The results of such fixations are often tragic, but there is no reason to believe that they are due to

* How these and other aspects of contemporary disorganization operate to malprepare a good many individuals for adult life will be discussed in some detail later (Part IV).

† Our typical family situation seems to be one in which both boys and girls prefer the mother to the father, from age five through age seventeen. From age five to age ten, and perhaps for some time longer, the preference for the mother over the father tends to increase. The smaller the family, the closer to the parents the children feel themselves to be. See “Parent preferences of young children” (M. Simpson, 1935); “Mother-father preference” (S. M. Mott, 1937); “Child-parent social distance” (E. DuVall, 1937); “Measuring children’s attitudes toward their parents” (R. Stagner and N. Drought, 1935); “Children’s attitudes to parents” (H. Meltzer, 1935); and “Survey of experiments on children’s attitudes towards parents: 1894-1936” (R. M. Stogdill, 1937).

Studies of young college women show that the “husband ideal” tends to resemble the current “boy friend” rather than the father or any other male member of the family (A. H. Mangus, 1936).

natural drives. There is no reason to impute an instinctive basis to the fact that in our society some girls fixate upon the father and that some boys fixate upon the mother. Examination of family backgrounds will indicate that, where such fixations exist, conditions within the family setting were responsible. A woman may, for example, find her husband an unsatisfactory companion; and so she may seek in her son what she does not get from her husband and thus mother the son into incompetence. A man may see in his daughter what he fails to find in his wife and encourage an attachment that may end disastrously. It often happens that, in a family having both a son and a daughter, the father will favor the girl, the mother the boy. But all this is quite understandable in purely social terms. The father has never been a girl and may, therefore, tend to be less realistic in his demands upon his daughter than upon his son, from whom because of comparable experience he expects much more. The reverse may be true of the mother. Case studies of the social antecedents of fixation in our society provide ample evidence that no instinctive explanation is required. Anthropological studies of the parent-child relationship in other societies confirm the view that the social setting determines the nature and extent to which children will identify themselves with adults.*

MODEL SHIFTING

The Secondary Model.—Given the opportunity for obtaining secondary models, no child will fixate indefinitely upon the mother or any other model. He will learn what he can and what he finds useful from the mother, and then shift his attention for a time to his father, elder brother, uncle, or someone else. It is, in part, through such

* Mead finds little evidence of parental fixations among the children of Samoa (M. Mead, 1928). There the looseness of family ties permits every child to roam from household to household, to live with aunts and uncles if they are more congenial than parents, and totally to disregard the parents for months on end. Among the Manus of New Guinea she finds that women are never used as models by children (M. Mead, 1930). The father is a model for both sons and daughters soon after they are weaned and for a year or two is a constant and eagerly sought companion. But even here no fixations result; for, as soon as boys and girls are able to swim and handle a boat, they are diverted from the father model to join the play of other children and to live a life almost apart from adults.

The child-parent fixations so common in our society seem quite rare among the Chinese also. With them the family is seldom a small parent-child unit but is rather a small commune, comprising grandfather, grandmother, uncles, aunts, and paternal cousins, as well as parents and brothers and sisters. Under these circumstances, no single adult is of such predominance in the life of a developing child that the child uses him or her exclusively as a model.

See *Sex and repression in savage society* (B. Malinowski, 1927).

shifting from model to model that he grows psychologically from the child into the youth and from the youth into the adult.

The socially isolated child will be underdeveloped, if for no other reason than that he lacks an adequate variety of people to draw upon. A few generations ago social isolation was a spatial matter; the farm-bred child, for example, was often prevented by distance from associating with any people other than the members of his family. Today social isolation is more likely to occur in the presence of many people and to arise out of peculiarities of parental status, the parents' way of life, or the like. Thus the apartment-dwelling child of busy parents may be restricted in his "choice" of models to the maid, the elevator operator, and the friendly old lady who lives down the hall. All these will have very limited value for him; and unless and until he can extend his range of action and thus enlarge his opportunities for obtaining models, his development will be restricted. Under the conditions of contemporary life it frequently happens that the models that are available to the child do not suffice for his needs.

The need for secondary models is twofold. In the first place, life adjustment is expansive; no set pattern will be adequate for long. As the child grows older, his social status changes. Thus what is expected of the child of five will be quite different, quantitatively and qualitatively, from that which was expected of him when he was four. Whereas he might obtain quick attentive response at four by climbing up on parental knees, he may, at the age of five, be required to do something more complicated to get that same response. To maintain his station among others, the child from time to time will be required to develop new adjustment techniques. This often means shifting attention from one model to another. At five he can, perhaps, win father's approval by sewing "like mama." At ten he must be able to do manly things "like father," or father will consider him a "sissy."

The second element that makes secondary models necessary to the growing child is the fact that under normal circumstances the child endeavors not only to maintain his status but to enlarge upon it. New wants constantly develop; and, although these are a consequence of social experience, they provide motivation for new social experiences.

Not always, however, can the child's shift from one basic model to another be explained either as externally demanded in the need to retain old satisfactions or as a consequence of the desire to satisfy new wants. To all outward appearances the child may simply get "fed up" with the primary model. The healthy child is active and so gradually exhausts the possibilities and novelties around him. The learning of simple action patterns can provide an adequate outlet for

his physical energies during the first few years of life. To the child who has learned to walk there is opening out a whole new world of activities within the home, activities for which the mother model might provide a satisfactory basis. But once an activity pattern, such as sweeping the porch, has been learned, it can be performed with a minimum of energy. That action is not, then, a very satisfactory outlet. Ultimately the child can do in an hour or two all the things that he has learned through the mother. He then becomes tired of these things without being physically fatigued. Prevented from finding new outlets, the child may become cranky and irritable. The need for new activities, as distinct from new "wants," and the search for them is a commonplace of everyday life. With adults it may take such manifestations as going to a party after a hard day's work. With children it frequently leads to a shifting in models.

Social Control of Model Shifting.—In some social systems effort is made to prevent the child either from fixating on one model or from shifting to a model that is not socially adequate. From the child's point of view any person who shows him how to do new things, things that can be done without too great effort on his part, will be satisfactory as a model. From the social standpoint adequate models will be those that contribute to the child's eventual adjustment to society. The systematic presentation to the developing child of socially adequate models—desirable in terms of future life and graduated according to the child's ability—was an integral part of our old patriarchal family, of many primitive social systems, and, most noticeably perhaps, of the Chinese organization. In any intimate large-family or village community socially adequate models will be available to the developing child; and their selection can be encouraged, unintentionally perhaps, by adults.*

The Chinese especially had great respect for the power of example. Under the old and now disintegrating system the young children of the family, all the sons and daughters of the sons of the patriarch, played together. Since there was generally a matriarch to "ride herd" on the mothers, there was little chance that they could overindulge their children. But, as a child developed, he was forced to select models in keeping with his capabilities and his future position in society. For a

* Among the Samoan Islanders small children become attached to their older brothers, sisters, and cousins, who are held responsible by adults for the welfare of the younger children. The older children, in turn, have the youths of the village to idolize and, to the extent of their abilities, to emulate. As they reach maturity, youths are, however, freed from child-care duties and encouraged to follow actively in the footsteps of the unmarried men and women of the community. Thus a gradual induction into adult social life is made possible by the use of a hierarchy of graduated models (M. Mead, 1928).

girl these were usually older girls or younger women within the family through whom she could learn the domestic techniques.* A boy might follow in the footsteps of his elder brother, his uncles, or his father. Outside the home he would find companionship and youthful models from those boys of the community who met with parental approval.

Lack of System in Contemporary Society.—In our dynamic and disordered society, however, there can be little system, little order, and less social effectiveness in the models to which children turn. It is perhaps symbolic of our situation that every boy should be “destined” to become President someday and that many girls should feel, at one time or another, that Hollywood is the only desirable goal. The family seldom contains, within itself, a sufficient variety of models; and those that it does contain may be anything but adequate.† A trivial but interesting consequence of this circumstance is the types of models to which boys and girls of even the best of our families often turn. The child of three or four who plays that he is a railroad train and romps around the house “choo-chooing” is using an inanimate object for a model. When he hitches himself to a play wagon, he is “being” a horse. This is his way of surmounting a lack of interesting human models. It is not at all unusual to find children who are isolated from other children and are without adequate adult associations using the family dog as a model. The results are such as to indicate the urgent need for socially satisfactory human models.

Types of Secondary Adult Models.—Few things so clearly reveal the disorder of contemporary society as do the types of secondary adult models to which modern children commonly resort. It is almost conventional for children in our society to become, at some time or other, enamored of the postman, the policeman, the fireman, and the garbage man. These are often the only interesting adults whom the child of six or seven knows, since the mother may for the moment be exhausted as a model and the father far too busy to make himself available.

Toys.—The extensive use of toys to assist the child in “learning to be” is somewhat peculiar to our society; and it, too, is indicative of the character of our milieu. A stroll through a toyshop before the Christmas holidays leaves a vivid impression of the types of adult activities

* *Life in Lesu* (H. Powdermaker, 1933) gives an excellent description of the use, among a primitive people, of the power of learning by human example, particularly in regard to the process by which the young girl acquires from older girls and women an orderly introduction to the techniques of domestic life.

† When no adequate models are available the child often seizes upon imaginary companions. In a study of unselected children 13 per cent reported “vivid and sustained” fantasies concerning companions (M. Svendsen, 1934). See also “Some imaginary companions of older subjects” (P. L. Harriman, 1937).

that children find interesting. There are, of course, domestic toys—dolls, miniature household furniture and tools, and elaborate play-houses. But adult nondomestic equipment is also featured. The police uniforms, small trucks, elaborate electric railroad systems, complicated mechanical sets, cardboard grocery stores, and, during wartimes, tanks, dive bombers, and the like, all reflect the types of models upon which young boys and girls most often fasten when the people within the family and immediate neighborhood have ceased to be interesting and exciting persons.

Toys such as these are more than just playthings. A big, inflated rubber ball is a true plaything. The child bounces it, kicks it, and throws it around. In the process the child may learn many useful muscular coordinations (30). But in such play he is not presumably “being” someone else, as is the youngster in headgear with a toy football under his arm who plunges an imaginary line in the back yard, calls signals to himself, and finally wins the imaginary game. The latter has, no doubt, taken as a model—perhaps only for the day—some football player. He is “being” that person to the best of his abilities. The headgear and football assist in the make-believe. The extraordinary use that modern children make of miniature adult equipment is mute testimony to their frequent lack of playmates.

PLAY MODELS

Limited Value of Adult Models.—Exclusive dependence upon adult models can have unfortunate consequences. Almost characteristic is the plight of the child who is without brothers or sisters and is isolated because of the social setting from other children. Under such circumstances the child must depend in large part upon adult models, who may be satisfactory up to a point but are incapable of providing the child with those social adjustment techniques that are summed up in the term “good fellow.” Strive as they will, the best of parents cannot be good playmates for their children.* When the adult plays with the child, the relationship is never that of equals in stature; either the adult bends down, or the child looks up. In the latter case, the child may get some exercise; but he cannot acquire much in the way of new adjustment patterns. In the former case, when the playing adult gets down on hands and knees to romp with a child, he may amuse himself. About all the child can learn from this, however, is some elementary points for getting along with playful elders.

* By the very nature of things parents' attitudes toward children are quite different from children's attitudes toward other children. See “Experiments in the measurement of attitudes toward children” (R. M. Stogdill, 1936).

It is, therefore, mainly through association with other children that the child can acquire those complex, subtle, and necessary modes of behavior involved in the give and take of social life. Play is more than exercise; it is a process of socialization. In most social systems provision is made for child-play activities. The children of primitives are noted for their happy-go-lucky play life, which is little interfered with by adult regulation. They do not need toy soldiers, dolls, or other miniature adult equipment; for they are not forced by circumstances to play grown up. Young children tag those who are older, run with the pack, learn to do those things that the older already know how to do, learn to play the part of humble subordinates, and gradually rise, as those who are older go on to more adult pastimes and occupations, to places of leadership.

Except upon isolated farms the play gang was a major aspect of child life in America a generation ago. Today we are just beginning to overcome, through the establishment of community playgrounds and the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and other children's organizations, the physical and social limitations that have since arisen.* There is some doubt whether these organizations can serve the same function as does the undirected play gang, but they are certainly of increasing importance to the social development of the average child.

Sex Divergence.—It is largely through the social selection of secondary models that sex differences in personality get their inception. In most primitive societies there is little sex segregation; girls and boys are permitted to play together. However, in those systems where the sex division of labor has made of woman an essentially domestic creature, boys have been given more play-gang freedom than have girls. As a result, the male learns forms of behavior that the female does not learn. Gang play is an effective means of developing techniques of cooperation, of group cohesion, and of effective group activity. It inculcates those attitudes, loyalties, concepts of communal values, and objectives that are so useful in warfare, in teamwork, or in any activity that demands the subordination of the individual to the totality.†

* An increasingly common phenomenon of contemporary life is the nursery school with its gatherings of youngsters of nearly equal age who might otherwise be more or less isolated from their kind. As the number of nursery schools increases, we should expect to find that personality differences between only and non-only children will practically vanish. Even now no very significant differences in personality adjustments distinguish groups of only children from their fellows. See *Nursery education; theory and practice* (W. E. Blatz, D. Millichamp, and M. Fletcher, 1935) and *A bibliography of nursery education* (D. E. Bradbury and E. L. Skeels, 1939).

† The terms "attitudes," "loyalties," etc., refer to the covert aspects of overt

The work of women in the home is seldom communal; it is either individualistic, as when a woman weaves, sews, or cooks, or subservient, as when she assists her mother-in-law or sister-in-law. Such work is of a quite different order from work "with" others. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the female of the species is innately incapable of acquiring those give-and-take modes of behavior that are developed in gang play and the nature of which is suggested by such terms as "cooperative," "good sport," "considerate," and the like.* But the belief that women are "naturally" vain and selfish, like the idea that woman's place is in the home because she is "naturally" inferior, still persists.

In our own society, where the distinction between the activities of men and of women are gradually breaking down, the socializing processes have not kept pace with these changes. It is certainly the failure of many girls to receive as much play-gang training as do boys that is responsible for a part of the friction between the sexes. Many divorces are laid to the fact that the woman is a "poor sport" or the fact that the man is "too good a fellow." Much of the antagonism toward women in positions of business administration is explained by the charge that they do not "play the game" according to masculine rules. The wife who will not make the best of an unfortunate situation may consider her amicable husband quite unjustified in calling her a poor sport. He has probably learned through gang play what she has not—certain principles, codes, or mores of conduct. These make him seem to her unreasonably tolerant of the conduct of others. Thus she does not understand his shrinking from "letting the party down" although it is long past the time to go home. If she will let him, he will stick with the "gang," although his feet are tired, his head aches, and some of the party have become disgustingly maudlin. That kind of loyalty he learned in gang play. Her failure to understand his point of view is often traceable to the fact that as a child she did not participate in gang play.

The Child Society.—When given the opportunity, children have something of their own society—a fact that adults tend to overlook. It consists of local myths, legends, games, and modes of conduct, local child "heroes"—not the least of which is the bully—and local objects of unveiled contempt—the "fair-haired boy" or the sissy of the neigh-

forms of group cooperative activities. The nature, function, and development of covert behaviors will be discussed in a later chapter.

* Among the Tchambuli, a Melanesian group, the women work communally and possess the "good sport" personalities traditionally expected of men (M. Mead, 1935).

borhood. Some of the myths and legends and some of the games and tricks have persisted through the years; some are almost universal. Associated with these cultural elements of child society are the loyalties, the mores, and the practices that arise from gang play and often contrast sharply with adult standards.

Children have a power of control over other children that frequently exceeds that of adults. The child can, for example, often select a much more effective mode of punishment for another child than can the adult. The sneer, the taunt, and the pummeling of a boy are usually far more to be feared by another boy than are the pleas, the tongue-lashing, and the spanking by his parents. Thus a child of ten is frequently the most efficient teacher for a child of eight or nine.

Because the power of child over child is greater, the child who is inducted into the gang will often adhere to gang values rather than to those of his family (W. F. Whyte, 1941). Neat and clean, he is sent out to play; dirty and bruised, but proud and happy, he comes home. He may become secretive, act "tough," pick up words that shock his parents, and swear by ideals that baffle them. He may lie about the broken window and take a thrashing at home rather than betray the gang.

The Antisocial Gang.—Gang play frequently takes directions that are irritating and otherwise disturbing to adults. Under certain conditions, it can hardly fail to take distinctly antisocial directions. It is almost impossible for the boys of a city slum to avoid doing something that brings them into conflict with adult society.* When the only place to play is in the streets, even a game of baseball may result in broken windows and eventual friction with the policeman on the beat. Inadequate play space, therefore, may of itself cause youthful activities, otherwise entirely harmless, to result in unfortunate social consequences. The "cop," defender of adult standards and protector of property, may come in time to stand for all that prevents gang play. He is then opposed in the minds of the gang to all that is interesting, all that is desirable, and all that is worth while. It is but a matter of time until the gang play of children develops into adult gangsterism.

In antisocial gang play it is inevitable that the toughest, the most fearless, and the least socially desirable youngster in the neighborhood should rise to leadership. He can show the others the way to "beat the racket," the way to get away from policemen, and the way to steal, to

* The gradual realization of this fact has led to the recent playground movement in the United States, the organization of play activities through such agencies as the Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, the Y.M.C.A., and other adult-directed groups. See *The gang* (F. M. Thrasher, 1936) and *Americans at play* (J. F. Steiner, 1933).

destroy, and to escape punishment for these activities. Thus he tends to set an example for the others; his behavior lays the pattern for the gang. In a later chapter we shall observe how professional criminals are trained by gang life for a career of crime. For the present it should be noted that antisocial gang play can be a consequence of unsatisfactory play opportunities, of antisocial leadership, or of both.

Induction into Adult Patterns.—In anticipation of our subsequent discussion of the role and acquisition of covert behaviors, it should be noted here that the fact that play-gang activities invariably develop the child in ways that set him to some extent at odds with adult standards does not of itself mean that the traits acquired from such play are not contributions to later adjustments. The blind loyalty to the gang may be transferred into equally blind, but socially satisfactory, loyalty to wife and children, to some business organization, or to the community at large. Except for the danger of antisocial gang play, the only danger of gang play is that it may be perpetuated through childhood into adult life. Children must in the course of time grow up socially and come to take their parts and places as adults.

It seems necessary for mental stability that the individual be inducted gradually, through small and progressive steps, into those patterns of behavior that society requires. The play gang can be one of these steps, and the child who misses it may become a less effectively adjusted adult than would otherwise have been the case. The child who does have gang play must in time, however, shift his attention from the gang leader to someone whose behavior is a little more complex and thence to still more complicated models. Unless there is progression in the models he uses, he may face adult status entirely unprepared for it. If the transition is too abrupt and too great, he may never succeed in making it; he may break under the strain of being treated as an adult when he is prepared only to act like a child. The consequences are somewhat comparable to what would happen were a high-school student suddenly forced to take on the work and responsibilities of a university professor.

In our society the lack of gradual and effective training for adult life is an important factor in the difficulties, to be discussed in detail in a later chapter, that youth faces today. On the one extreme we have the child who is forced to depend for examples mainly upon adult models; he may fail to learn those techniques of social give and take demanded in later life. At the other extreme stands the child whose play is too long continued; he may fail to acquire those responsibilities and capabilities that adult status will impose. Formal education is supposed to bridge the obvious gap between childhood and adult social

life. But formal education develops, as we shall see, behaviors that are mainly of the overt symbolic sort. It does not provide a substitute for adequate models, models necessary if the child is to grow into an adult on the overt nonsymbolic levels.

AMBITION AND MODELS IN ADULT LIFE

During the course of growing up the child will ordinarily utilize a good many models, learning from each that which is appropriate to the given stage of his development. From the mother, some adjustment techniques are secured; from the father, others; from the gang leader, still others. The models that the child selects and the extent to which he uses them depend in part upon the supply available and in part upon what appears to be their value to him.

In a stable social system, where the behaviors appropriate to each social role were well defined and where most individuals were well trained for their roles, there was relatively little striving to better one's position. The unmarried man wanted, of course, to become a husband and father; the apprentice probably wanted to become a master craftsman; and the middle-aged man wanted to become in the course of time a respected elder. As he grew older and moved progressively through his various social roles, the individual probably relied to some extent upon the example of those older than himself. This he did in the attempt to behave in the ways expected of him. Only an occasional individual aspired to do more than was expected of him; rare was the peasant who aspired to become a townsman, the merchant who aspired to become a scholar, the bandit who aspired to become a king.

Neither lack of models adequate in terms of her station in life nor socially inappropriate ambitions drove the girl of a Chinese peasant family to aspire to be like the daughter or wife of the local magistrate. She was, in fact, encouraged to keep her place and to aspire to be like her elder sister or an admired aunt and, later on, like her grandmother. Boys likewise were discouraged from using as models persons whose behavior would not be in keeping with the station of the boy, which under a stable social system was determined largely by the status of his father. The mothers and fathers of old China did not expect their sons to become emperors. They preferred that they should become satisfactory, however humble, members of society.

But under the conditions of social disorganization that are characteristic of the modern world, many children acquire, by example and otherwise, ambitions to do better than their parents did—to become wealthier, more famous, or more notorious. Such ambitions are, in fact, the individual aspects of the forces that make for further social

change. The shopgirl may acquire the ambition to become a motion-picture actress, the farm boy a scholar, the faculty son a politician, etc. (31). In the endeavor to become whatever it is that they want to become, they will unwittingly pattern their behavior on some person or persons whose behavior provides, or seems to provide, the way to success. Thus the bank clerk may come to act like the cashier whose job he covets, even to the point of wearing shirts of the same color. The cashier may pattern himself upon the first vice-president, who in turn patterns himself upon the president. In the modern world, where few of us are entirely content with our lot and most of us aspire to be "better" than we are, it is common for adults to use their "superiors" as models, since it is in part by this means that success can be achieved. Thus the social climber apes the leader of the local four hundred, the petty crook apes the local "big shot," and the would-be political leader apes the contemporary Hitlers, Stalins, Churchills, and Roosevelts.*

Looking Like versus Being Like.—But being a certain kind of person is more than simply "acting like" that person. When an overly ambitious person uses a model that is far beyond his capacities to understand, what is learned from that model may be only how to "act like" and not how to "be like." The latter involves many attributes that cannot be acquired through the learning-by-example process, *i.e.*, the covert elements of the model's personality.

The child must, of necessity, learn by example many forms of overt action, the covert implications of which he cannot understand. When this spread between overt learning and covert development continues into adulthood, the result may be the sort of man who wears a silk hat, a frock coat, and pince-nez but who knows nothing about banking, diplomacy, or science. He may be only "acting like" a banker, a diplomat, or a man of science. Being, as distinguished from looking like, a scientist, for example, includes a great deal of knowledge that is derived from experience and does not show upon the surface. Such cannot of course be secured by simply using the scientist as a model.

* An extreme form of the patterning of behavior upon models appears among the insane. Every institution has its quota of Napoleons, Caesars, and Jeanne d'Arcs. Occasionally a patient chooses another inmate, an orderly, or a physician as his model. In one hospital, this patterning proceeded so far that almost every movement of the model was copied. The patient continually followed and aped the model. Whenever the model seated himself on a chair, the patient would look around for another; if none was at hand, he would literally sit on the air in a most awkward position for a surprising length of time.

CHAPTER VII

OVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR: II. SYMBOLIC SOURCES

THE SYMBOLIC ENVIRONMENT

Symbolic Environment as Peculiar to Man.—That man is a consequence of special creation and therefore does not belong to the same class of things as do the animals was an axiom of early Christian theology. Since the time of Darwin, however, and to some extent before this, biologists have come to minimize the difference between man and animal and to fit all organic creatures into a scale in which they differ from one another in degree but not in kind. Accordingly, man is considered as differing from the apes less than they, in turn, differ from, say, goats or horses. Elaborating this concept, psychologists have gone to considerable pains to show that the methods by which apes learn do not vary greatly from those utilized by human beings.* The essential difference would seem to be in what is learned rather than in how the learning takes place. Like the human mother, the ape mother can teach her offspring those adjustments to the external world that she has learned; she does this both by punishing it and by rewarding it with food and fondling. And the ape mother, like the human mother, can administer rewards and punishments symbolically. The ape child can even learn by example; it can integrate patterns of behavior on the basis of ape models, just as the human child can on the basis of human models.

The fact remains, though, that apes do not become human; and they apparently have not developed a social heritage. There is thus a fundamental difference between the ape as an animal and the human being as an animal—a difference of degree, perhaps, but of such great degree that, for all practical purposes, the difference becomes one of kind. As was intimated in Chapter V, apes are unable to go far in the development of symbolic behavior and consequently are restricted to

* At least for a time the young child and the ape learn in quite similar fashion, the ape at a slightly faster rate. But as soon as the child begins to speak, his speed of learning begins to outstrip that of the ape. See *The mentality of apes* (W. Köhler, 1925); *Almost human* (R. M. Yerkes, 1925); *The ape and the child* (W. N. Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg, 1933); "The social psychology of vertebrates" (M. P. Crawford, 1939); and various articles from the primate laboratories of Yale University.

learning from experience with the present only. Learning by parentally controlled trial and error and by the use of parental models may explain why the child, ape or human, comes to behave in ways like those of the parents. But the human child, unlike the ape, can extend this learning by using as models people who are dead. These "people" who have lived in the past and from whose experiences the child may profit are brought to the child through the medium of verbal symbols. From these symbolized people he may learn patterns of adjustment. Thus because his great-grandfather was a sea captain, the boy may in a social sense "inherit" some interest in the sea.

In this chapter our concern is with the processes by which human beings obtain some of their patterns of behavior from symbolized people. If John's great-grandfather's maritime life had been continued by his son and in turn by his son's son, the forms of learning we have already considered would serve to account for the fact that John "took" to the sea. It is a commonplace experience of modern life, though, that people frequently strive to be different from those about them. The son of a banker may display, as did his great-grandfather, a love of the sea; or an insignificant Austrian may drive himself into fury and the whole world into war by trying to be a Napoleon. Men do such things because the overt symbolic behavior of those around them has brought to them as a heritage the overt nonsymbolic behavior of men long dead. Man is in a sense a dreamer, and sometimes his dreams come true. The materials for his dreams may be drawn from many sources besides his direct experience—from myths, legends, history, biography, and fiction. When man converts his dream into successful action, that action may be patterned on a model constructed out of words. The legendary hero may be the model for the primitive child; the Biblical Jesus, the inspiration for the Christian man; the idealized Rothschild, the example for the ghetto boy. In each case the example is brought to the user through the medium of verbal symbols.

SYMBOLIC MODELS

Verbal symbols may influence the development of overt nonsymbolic patterns of behavior in any one of a number of ways. It is in the establishment of symbolic models, however, that the verbal symbols most subtly and powerfully affect the development of patterns of overt nonsymbolic behavior in the growing child and in the mature man.

Symbolic models are either imagined or visualized persons. We may say that they are visualized when the elements from which they have been constructed are drawn from or at least imputed to an actual

person. Thus grandfather—long dead, but living through what the child's mother and other relatives say about him—would be a visualized person, whom the child may manfully strive to emulate. In almost every household, primitive or civilized, there will be a number of personalities who are frequently talked about but are never seen. The mother says, "When I was a little girl, your grandmother told me that good little girls always obey their mothers." She talks about grandmother not only to her daughter but to her husband; she comments upon grandmother to relatives and neighbors; and she constantly recalls the nice things grandmother did, ignoring the unpleasant aspects of grandmother's character. It is, perhaps, this last factor—that the dead or distant can be made such good examples—that accounts in some degree for their popularity with those responsible for the training of children. The uncle who occasionally drops in for a visit may exhibit traits that are not to be desired for the son of the family. But the uncle who lives at a distance or is dead can be given any number of ideal traits.

From all that he hears about grandfather, grandmother, or uncle, the child may construct a symbolic concept of that person and use this as a model in the formation of his own behavior.* Such visualized models are especially necessary and useful when the supply of actual persons is inadequate or when their behavior is undesirable. Decadent families are likely to stress the glories of their ancestors. This is, perhaps, a form of compensation, a sort of living in the past. But it may serve to provide the growing child in such a family with models for his own behavior. Endeavoring to "be like" the person whose memory the surrounding adults so obviously revere is for the child, and even for the adult, one means of securing that admiration for himself.

The Story as a Source of Symbolic Models.—Imagined persons, as contrasted to visualized persons, are made up from many and often entirely fictitious elements. The greatest significance of the verbal story, except for its recreational value, is its contribution to the formation of such imagined persons. From verbal stories children, especially, may secure potent symbolic models. The art of deliberately using this sort of symbolic model as a power over the behavior of children has been rather lost in the Western world, but primitive peoples often use legendary and mythological figures with what

* The ideas about such a person are, of course, covert. But we are for the moment concerned with the development of overt behaviors; and the same learning processes are involved whether the model is symbolic and only "within the mind's eye," or is an actual person known through visual, auditory, and other means.

appears to be a recognition of their inspirational value for the young. Most primitives have a considerable fund of dramatic stories about former heroes and noted villains, which they tell for both entertainment and moral values. The Chinese, too, have made storytelling an art; and the stories told are so much conventionalized and so obviously in keeping with social morality that their use must often be deliberate.*

The Dramatic Pattern.—All children's stories—primitive, Oriental, and Occidental—follow a well-defined pattern. Suspense is maintained by the setting up of a conflict. This is a most effective means, since conflict is an element in the experience of all human beings: the child asks for candy, and the adult refuses him; the child does not want to take a bath, and the adult says he must do so; etc. In the story the basis for the conflict will be some opposition between two human beings or between a human being and nature.† The resolution of the conflict is always postponed so that the story may hold interest to the very end. Dramatic value is enhanced both by repetition (*e.g.*, he walked and walked and walked) and by sudden contrasts (*e.g.*, and then the wind came and blew the dark clouds away). For vividness and clarity everything is set in absolutes; nothing is relative. The night is dark, not dim. The boy is brave, not both brave and afraid. The hero is all hero. The villain is all villain; he beats his wife and mother as well as his tenants. The villain may, of course, be nature—drought, flood, or sterile soil. Adhering to these basic principles, the story unfolds to prove that virtue (in terms of the particular culture) is invariably rewarded and that vice is always punished. The hero and heroine represent virtue; the villain is personified vice. To make this moral a bit more palatable and the reward for virtue somewhat more certain than it is in real life, resort is had to magic forces. When all the hero's virtuous strivings seem about to fail and sin seems about to win, the "spirits" enter to take the side of virtue. There is in this itself something of a moral: trying to be a hero may at times be discouraging; but, in the end, it will prove to be worth while.‡

* Storytelling was a recreational activity for adult Chinese. At neighborhood and family gatherings someone especially noted for his dramatic abilities would regale the group with oft-told tales not unlike *The Arabian nights* in their interest value, but different in that they invariably contained pointed morals. The moral was for the children who were listening wide-eyed at their elders' feet.

† Frequently in the Chinese stories the conflict is between the mother and the paternal grandmother, between the father and the hardhearted merchant or landlord, or between the child's desire to see the mother happy and that which makes her unhappy.

‡ The following is one of thousands of Chinese stories used to demonstrate the desirability of filial piety. Note that nature is the villain, the mother the heroine,

Our brief analysis of the dramatic elements and pattern of the children's story may seem a bit irrelevant. The same principles, however, underlie the adult story, the written novel, the play, and the motion picture; and, as will be made apparent in Chapter XX, the political speech, the commercial advertisement, the "issues" of a war, and the platform of a revolutionary party. Perhaps the moral is toned down, perhaps the villain becomes something of a lovable character, and perhaps the operation of magical forces is not so apparent; but the basic pattern is the same as that of children's stories, ancient and modern.

Whereas the effect of the story upon the adult may be negligible, its effects upon the child may be quite remarkable. Relative to the adult, the child is in the process of rapid development. Constantly shifting adjustment demands are being made of him, and new wants are demanding satisfaction; and so he needs new models by which to learn new modes of conduct. When the actual human beings around him and the visualized persons that have been provided him are for some reason inadequate, the symbolic models brought to him through the medium of the story may be of enormous value, that is, of course, if the models are of a sort that he can utilize.

Symbolic versus Actual Models.—The conditions that encourage the use of symbolic models are numerous and are always complex. The behavior of the symbolic model is vague; it does not show in detail how to do a certain thing; it is not insistent, as the constant presence of an actual person may be; and it does not encourage the user, as actual people often will. Thus, when an actual person can be relied upon, a symbolic model probably will be resorted to rather infrequently.* If the child or adult wants something he cannot get by following the example of those around him, the story person may suggest, in general outlines, some new mode of behavior by which this objective can be reached. The boy who has not tried to gain the admiration of his gang

and the boy the hero. In brief, the story runs as follows: A boy's mother is dying and can be saved only by eating a rice fish. But it is winter, and the rice paddies are frozen. The boy wanders throughout the land searching for one of the necessary fish. At last, exhausted by the privation that he has undergone, he lies down by the banks of an icy stream and drops to sleep. In his dreams the river god appears and, in admiration of such a display of filial piety, brings the boy a fish. He takes it to his mother, who thereupon recovers; the boy is showered with the admiration of all the neighborhood. Even the magistrate calls to show the youthful hero homage.

* This fact is frequently overlooked by those who urge strict censorship of literature, drama, objects of art, music, and the motion pictures. See Appendix note 32.

by becoming Robin Hood, one of the Rover Boys, the Lone Ranger, or Superman has never really been a boy. If he has not tried to escape punishment for some taboo act by emulating George Washington's cherry-tree performance, he does not know his American mythology—and he has saved himself grave disappointment.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE RESORT TO SYMBOLIC MODELS

Declining Value of Actual Persons.—Modern children not only utilize symbolic models but, because of the dynamic character of our society, are exceptionally dependent upon them. Although legendary heroes may prove something of an inspiration, the child of a primitive society has relatively little need for such models. Here the range of adjustment techniques is limited, and actual persons are available as models for the working out of those techniques that are required. The need for symbolic models is not great even in the civilized societies as long as the social system remains stable. Thus, some years ago, when China was more stable than it is now, the Chinese child could learn almost all that was required of him from actual persons.

In contemporary societies, however, adjustment patterns are not standardized; and the conditions to which adjustment must be made are constantly changing. The actual persons available as models to the child are therefore of decreasing value and are often restricted in number. The farmer, for example, has definite limitations as a model for the son who wants to become a city businessman; the mother can hardly demonstrate to her daughter how a woman should "get along" with her husband, since the fashion in family relationships is changing so rapidly that the girl who tries to use the techniques her mother used might soon become a grass widow. The dynamic character of the modern world thus leads the individual to rely, in ever-increasing degree, on symbolic models.

The sources of such models are many and varied. With the possible exception of that sort typified by Cinderella, fairy stories can possess comparatively little adjustment value for modern children. They are essentially recreational. They may amuse, but they cannot teach. Certainly, too, the heroes of the Bible have long since lost most adjustment significance for people who must live in a bitterly competitive world; and, times having changed, the utility of history's somewhat mythical Washingtons and Lincolns is decidedly limited. But the modern child is literate, and his world of verbal symbols has historically expanded as his need for symbolic models has increased.* From the

* The relation between a society's techniques of communication and the availability to the growing child of symbolic models is obvious. The diversity of

old dime novel, from the less exciting but more respectable children's books, from adult fiction, biography, and history, and even from the newspaper, motion picture, and radio, the child can often secure symbolic persons to use as models when the need for them arises.

Limits to Use of Symbolic Models.—It is mainly through the establishment of symbolic models that the verbal environment of the child—and of the adult—affects overt nonsymbolic behavior. But symbolic models are abstractions, and, at the most, such models can provide only a vague and general pattern for the child to use in synthesizing established habits into a new pattern.

Learning by the example of symbolic models is subject not only to the same restrictions as those involved in the use of actual persons but to some others as well. It does not follow that the child who is told a story, who reads a story, or who sees a motion picture in which the hero is not all that conventional morality might desire will promptly pattern himself upon the behavior of that hero. It is true that the old dime novel, with its idolization of two-gun men "quick on the draw," stimulated countless American boys to robbing stagecoaches and shooting down sheriffs and Indians with a bold disregard of consequences. But what they did was only play. Since they were without guns, without stagecoaches to rob, and without Indians to shoot and since they lacked the basic behavior patterns which, had these things been present, could have been integrated to form the actions of Deadwood Dick, his example could not lead to the development of stagecoach robbers or Indian killers. If these things had been present, the example would not have been necessary; only a little more trial and error would have been required in order to achieve the same results. Likewise, the example of modern gangster heroes, such as the now legendary Al Capone, may help a few potential gangsters to become actual criminals; but it cannot make gangsters out of law-abiding youths.

The power of the symbolic environment can be and often is exaggerated. The poetic record of a man's reaction to the beauties of dawn may be learned by heart without its encouraging early rising. The child can be told that the colors of a sunset are "beautiful, inspiring, impressive beyond the power of words to convey" and may dutifully repeat these words without their increasing his awareness of actual sunsets. Unfortunately, in view of the character of our educational system, what is true of dawns and sunsets is equally true of many of

modern communications, and hence of the models they make available, is in considerable measure responsible for the diversity in the personalities of the members of modern society. For the story of the development of communication techniques see *Communication* (D. O. Woodbury, 1931).

the facts of life as brought to the child through the medium of words. By this means the child may be made symbolically proficient, but it does not automatically follow that he will also become nonsymbolically efficient.*

FORMAL EDUCATION AND OVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR

Our system of formal education was originally erected upon the assumption that man is a "reasonable" animal, one whose behavior is a logical response to the known facts of the world external to him. Abandoned by psychologists long ago, this concept of the origin of human behavior is implicit in the conventional practice of stuffing the incoming members of our society with "facts." This has been done upon the assumption that, if a human being knows the nature of the world to which he must make adjustments, those adjustments will follow automatically as a consequence of human "logic."

The Classical Tradition.—When we break down the older process of formal education we find it consists of three distinct elements: training in certain techniques, the provision of certain adult models, and the inculcation of certain verbal "facts." Some of these "facts" symbolize external reality; others are but conventional fictions; and few have the effect upon the overt nonsymbolic behavior of the student that the layman has been led to expect.

Training in the techniques of reading, writing, and computing constituted a considerable part of former educational effort and probably contributed to the welfare of the student. These techniques are a part of the equipment for social life which almost every individual in the modern world must have. The need for these techniques is so pressing and so obvious that, under ordinary circumstances, it will be fulfilled. Some educators feel, however, that even now the procedures used for developing these techniques are so crude and inefficient that experiments must be undertaken for the development of new methods. Most children do in time learn to read, to write, and to do simple calculations, all of which are quite important if they are to live in a world given to these usages. Whether this learning comes with the aid of or in spite of our present educational methods, however, one cannot always say.

* Parents have often worried unduly over the dangers supposed to be inherent in symbolic training. Conservative parents have feared that the antitariff verbalizations taught in college courses in economics might pollute their young. But there is little evidence that such symbolic training leads to important nonsymbolic results (K. N. Lind, 1936). The college student can receive a high grade in his economics course and then help elect that congressman who cries loudest that he will strive to put across the highest of tariffs.

In any event it has been conventional until recently for educators to depreciate the importance of practical arts in the school and to concentrate on classical subjects. Years ago it was, for illustration, a favorite argument that training in higher mathematics was a developer of certain of the "higher mental faculties" (33) and was advantageous for this reason alone.* Even then it was quite evident that few school children would ever use higher mathematics; and now the impression is abroad that, aside from those who are going into some occupation requiring mathematical abilities, training in anything more than simple arithmetic is little more than mental calisthenics. Chess, bridge, and even poker would do quite as well in training the "higher mental faculties" and probably would be better, since such games do involve social adjustments of the give-and-take order.

The Teacher as a Model.—The second aspect of formal education is a by-product. It results from the fact that so far it has been impossible to dispense with the teacher, a human being who may serve as an actual model for the student.† As a teacher, the teacher deals with verbal "facts"; as a human being, he or she will act in overt non-symbolic ways as well and thus may provide the student with an example for the development of his own overt nonsymbolic actions. It is perhaps because of this latter possibility that schoolteachers have long been required to act as models of propriety and have been expected to set good examples for the children of the community.

The extent to which the schoolteacher will become a model for students depends upon his value to them as an example. The sanctimonious or overly pious man could have little effect upon the behavior of a class of hardy mountain boys; the rough-and-ready man could hardly serve the students of Groton as a model. Probably most of us during our course through school found some teacher, man or woman, whom we admired and upon whom we tried to pattern our behavior. The majority of the mathematics, history, spelling, or whatever it was he taught may never have been put to use and may long since have

* A modern version of this peculiar doctrine is to be found in the views of Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago. In brief, he believes that the philosophers of antiquity discovered virtually all that was worth knowing and that the "higher mental faculties" of the students of today should be developed by a diet consisting mainly of the classics. See *The higher learning in America* (R. M. Hutchins, 1936).

† One effect of teacher models can be found in "The emotional stability of teachers and pupils" (P. L. Boynton, H. Dugger, and M. Turner, 1934). Pupils of teachers who were judged to have good mental health were themselves judged to have better mental health than were the pupils of teachers with poorer emotional balance.

been forgotten. But the way he walked, dressed, held his head, or acted in the presence of the principal may have had definite bearing on the way we do somewhat similar things.*

The school, like the home or any other social agency, sets up and enforces certain standards of conduct, which the child may take over as his own standards. Although enforced mainly through symbolic means, these standards may profoundly affect the child's overt non-symbolic behavior. The older conventional school system emphasized few if any of these elements, excepting perhaps deportment; it too commonly failed to build child character and frequently did away with whatever enthusiasm for school life the child may originally have brought with him from the home. Every effort was made to minimize the importance of the teacher, to make the school impersonal, and to stress the value of symbolized "facts." Teachers are still selected mainly on the basis of their proficiency in these facts, little consideration being given to their exemplary value for the students as behaving human beings. Thus during recent decades it has come about that the athletic director, the manual training teacher, and other teachers of nonacademic subjects in the high school are often more significant to students as human beings than are the majority of the teachers of academic subjects.

The Role of Science.—The adjustment value of verbal knowledge of the facts of physical nature is far less than has been claimed for it. What counts is not so much what we know as what we do. Drill in the facts of chemistry, elementary physiology, and hygiene has been a regular part of our public-school curriculum for some years now. Theoretically, these facts should have resulted in the abandonment of many forms of conventional behavior and in the development of new modes of conduct. Man is not, however, a "logical" creature. He does as he has been taught by experience to do, and the verbal knowledge that his behavior is inexpedient does not go far to change it. The recognized fact that carrots are good for us cannot of itself make all of us like and eat them, although we presumably desire to live as long

* This use of the teacher as a model is not without some academic significance, for there is a close relationship between liking the teacher and liking the subject he teaches (S. M. Corey and G. S. Beery, 1938). The patterning of behavior on teacher models is especially obvious among adolescents. One of the biggest objections to the private girls' school is its lack of adequate models. Here the spinster teacher is often the only older model available, and she is frequently a poorly adjusted individual. The girl may thus tend to prolong her attachments to girls of her own age, with the possible result of homosexuality. A somewhat comparable situation exists in certain of the preparatory schools for boys, although the male teachers are as a rule better adjusted and are thus more adequate models.

and as comfortably as possible. The market for impotent or dangerous medical nostrums has not been decreased by formal education to the extent that we might anticipate. The abuse to which we habitually subject our bodies has perhaps been discouraged a trifle by the dissemination through the schools of facts regarding our bodies, but the abuse still flourishes. In recent years students of education have been trying to discover a method by which the "meaning" of the facts of nature could be taught to the student. But it has been found to be much easier to train students to parrot the facts than to utilize them in the working out of nonsymbolic adjustments to nature.*

The School as an "Ideal" World.—The problem of teaching the "meaning" of social facts is an even more difficult one. It would appear that here the failure of verbal behavior to result automatically in nonsymbolic adjustments has, however, been somewhat fortunate. By and large, the school has offered a highly artificial environment. The teacher is traditionally and often in actuality an idealist. He has tended to glorify the social life about him, if not to himself, at least to his students. Furthermore, the older books of history, civics, etc., that were used in the classroom did not describe the realities of social existence. They, like the teacher, emphasized the pleasant aspects and avoided direct reference to the difficulties of living in a chaotic social system. The result was that the school attempted to inculcate ideals of the highest order,† although, when the student became an adult, he had to live in a world that was real and not ideal. Had he,

* This is not to depreciate the role of the natural sciences in the development of technology. The point is that it is not the layman but, rather, the technician (physician, biologist, engineer, or the like) who converts scientific discoveries into actions. Science made the radio possible; but few of those who profit by this development know, or need know, anything about electronics.

† The unrealistic point of view presented to students below college level by textbooks in social science must be looked upon as one of the means utilized by vested interests to prevent the rise of severe criticism. The public-school system represents these interests; and it is not surprising that textbooks revealing the conflict between minority and majority groups are seldom written and, when written, are shouldered aside by those that are "sound." The bitter denouncement and subsequent abandonment of a notably restrained study of social change which was prepared by W. F. Ogburn for use in the CCC Camps in 1934 is an illustration in point.

For an analysis of the practical difficulties of securing acceptance of unbiased textbooks in history and social studies, see "Politicians, teachers, and schoolbooks" (P. A. Knowlton, 1934). For a somewhat intemperate but essentially sound attack upon textbook social science see *Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens* (L. Steffens, 1931). An insider's reflections on the problem will be found in "Forces that control the schools" (H. K. Beale, 1934).

therefore, actually learned to apply these ideals of social behavior, he would have been definitely misfit for life external to the school. He would have left the school a naive and trusting youth, only to be devoured promptly by the ruthless realities of contemporary society.

As a matter of fact, the obvious impotence of old pedagogical techniques has tended to prevent the unrealistic character of the world as presented by the school from greatly accentuating the individual's problems of social adjustment. The ideals of the schoolroom have in the main been verbal idealisms—copybook precepts to be memorized and then disregarded. And so, whereas the history and the “social studies” of the grammar and high school have been anything but realistic, the manner by which they have been taught has prevented them from doing much positive harm to the students. The fact remains, however, that true social science has not been applied by the public schools to the fitting of the growing child for social life.

We have the factual records of the causes and the socially disastrous consequences of international strife. We have the records of many bursting economic bubbles. But a knowledge of the facts of war seems to have had no effect upon the human forces making for further wars; and the available information regarding the exploded economic myths of the past does not discourage men from investing in still newer get-rich-quick schemes or from turning, when they are distressed, to the most absurd of panaceas. Man's behavior is a consequence of experience; and that experience is with much more than the dry, dull verbal “facts” of history, civics, and economics.

A distinction is frequently made between the use of verbal symbols for purposes of education and for purposes of propaganda. It is assumed that, in the former instance, the symbols represent some external reality and are presented in a logical manner to appeal to intelligence rather than to emotion. In propaganda, on the other hand, it is assumed that the symbols are empty, and that the presentation is calculated to appeal to human emotion rather than to reason. We shall discuss this distinction later. But in the present connection it might be well to note that, if the distinction means anything at all, it is that in education as it has existed in the past there has been an ineffectual use of verbal symbols, whereas in propaganda there has been an effectual use of them. Much as educators may regret it, the fact is that commercial advertising, the yellow journal, popular and prejudiced literature, political speeches, and radio addresses contribute far more to the molding of behavior in contemporary society than do the natural science, history, and civics that have been taught to school children.

The Sociopsychological Function of the School.—A formal educational system is intended to provide a partial substitute for the educational activities of the home, the field, and the shop. Its failure adequately to do so has not gone unrecognized, and the last few decades have witnessed great changes in our views regarding the function of the school. No longer do schoolmen consider that a smattering of Greek and Latin, a bit of mathematics and literature, and some doubtful history provide the growing child with adequate equipment for living in a troubled social world.

At the opening of this century John Dewey inaugurated a movement for the reform of our educational system.* He realized that the schools were not teaching children how to live the "good life" and that what they were unwittingly aiming toward were highly standardized human products, who must live in a society that is anything but standardized. He pointed to the fact that at present there is no single mode of behavior that will serve all members of society at all times and that we must, therefore, learn by trial and error as we go along to adjust to specific circumstances. It is this point of view that now leads the more enlightened teachers to stress independent thought rather than routine educational drill.

Many of Dewey's followers, however, came to question the value not only of verbal drill but also of adult guidance. These extremists appealed to fond parents who imagined that their offspring had within them some urge to "express themselves." As a matter of fact, when small children were permitted to express their inner urges, the result was behavior more fitting to monkeys than to human beings—a fact that somewhat discredited this theory, although it still flourishes.

At present there is, however, a growing realization on the part of professional educators that somehow less emphasis must be placed upon purely verbal learning. As a start, the so-called "project method" has been introduced experimentally into some elementary schools. It consists of setting a problem, manual or verbal, and of assisting the child toward the solution of this problem. In effect this is an attempt to teach by example rather than by verbal drill in symbolized facts.

It is a peculiar commentary upon the formal education of the preuniversity level that social psychologists have apparently felt no

* The educational reforms urged by Dewey are expressed in *The school and society* (J. Dewey, 1899). Eldridge in "Textbooks, teachers, and students" (S. Eldridge, 1935) expresses the view of many sociologists when he urges that teachers come down from the realm of abstract symbols and teach in terms of student realities.

need to analyze the school in an effort to trace the relationship between contemporary society and individual behavior. Their writings would leave one with the impression that formal education is totally unknown to our society, a reflection no doubt of the fact that the school has played a remarkably small part in the molding of human behavior.

Through teaching the child to read and by providing him with books of history and literature, the school has, of course, made some symbolic models available. These will be used when and if they seem to offer adjustment value. But the figures of history are rather dulled in outline when presented by the textbook method, and their practical utility is slight.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE COMPOSITE MODEL

Legendary or historic heroes may have real value as symbolic models for those who live in societies that are comparable to those in which the models rose to fame and power.* But in a society as dynamic as our own, social changes tend to make the behavior of the outstanding men of yesterday ineffectual for those living in the present.† As a consequence, the modern person is often forced to "make up" a model, a synthesis of those elements of the behavior of people, both actual and symbolized, that seem to fit his peculiar adjustment problems. This vague and synthetic person is a compound of all the people, actual and symbolized, whom he has admired and whom he has found, in some regard or other, useful as models. That "person" is, therefore, a sort of "composite" model.‡

The use of composite models as the basis for learning by example is made necessary by the character of our milieu. No single person or single symbolic model can be adequate for the adjustment needs of the individual. Under an integrated and established social system, such

* Possibly one of the best means by which we can gain an insight into the fundamental aspirations and ideals of the people of any place and age is through study of the characters of their heroes. See "Hero worship" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 7, 336-338). An excellent bibliography on hero worship is included in this article.

† The practice of rewriting the biographies of the great figures of the past is necessitated by the fact that what is significant for one period may be quite incomprehensible in another. Heroes must be up to date; and it is to modernize such men as Napoleon that biographies are rewritten every few decades. An illustration of this effort to make older characters fit contemporary conditions is the attempt to make Christ intelligible to the American businessman. See *The Man nobody knows; a discovery of the real Jesus* (B. Barton, 1925).

‡ Stressing the covert aspects of the process, some social psychologists prefer such terms as "ideal self" and "projected self." The term "composite model" is here used to indicate that the elements are derived from experience with persons or symbolizations thereof and are used as the basis for learning by example.

as China possessed some years ago, the course of the social development of the individual was definitely laid out for him. Choice, or, more exactly, undirected trial and error, entered into it but little. Because the daughter usually followed in the footsteps of her mother, aunts, and grandmother, and the son in those of his father, uncles, and grandfather, each could use these relatives as effective models for his or her own behavior. When, for whatever reason, the youth's ambitions exceeded the achievements of his father, uncle, grandfather, or all other available persons, he could resort to some symbolic model, some legendary hero. The use of such a traditional model might assist the individual in his progress toward his life goal. In our society, however, constant social changes make following in the father's or mother's footsteps not only improbable but often quite impossible. Furthermore, the breakdown of social stability has encouraged the development in the individual of life ambitions often far in excess of the status of the parents. Few sons of ditchdiggers are today content to be ditchdiggers. They have been taught to want to become "better." Even as the life-achievement value of the father or mother model has declined, so, too, and for the same reason, has the value of symbolic models.

Neither actual nor symbolized persons can, of themselves, be adequate models for the ambitious modern youth. If he wants to become a physician, he must build from his experience a concept of the Physician, compare his own behavior with the behavior of this vague but often significant model, and try to shape himself into the pattern of that model. The Physician is a personification of many elements. If the youth's father is a physician, certain elements will be drawn from this source, but by no means all. In our dynamic society it is the exceptional man who can keep abreast of all the important new developments in medicine and maintain a practice at the same time; and the Physician is, of course, right up to the minute. He will be part Pasteur, part Hartley, part the various physicians whom the youth has known and admired, part the teachers he has met in medical school, and, of course, part sheer fiction.

Stereotyped Composite Models.—Sometimes these idealized persons are provided ready-made for ambitious youths. Moreover, the style in ready-made composite models changes from time to time. Sixty years ago the financial buccaneer was a heroic figure in America. Novelists stereotyped his characteristics; dramatists made him the hero of many plays. No doubt some youths did use this stereotype as a model. But it went out of fashion and was replaced by the Great Engineer, who conquered the jungle with his brain and brawn, built

bridges, opened mines, and laid railroads. Richard Harding Davis was his eulogist, and many were the young men in America who entered engineering schools with dreams of conquest and the Davis-made model in their minds. In time the supply of engineers outran the demand for them and discouraged this ambition. In recent years we have witnessed the rise and decline of the Executive, the Banker, and the New Deal reformer—stereotyped personifications of the behavior of many men, real and fictitious. Women, too, have had their success types: the Suffragette, the Businesswoman, the Flapper, and, more recently, the New Woman.

Some stereotyped models are hardy perennials that come and go with the tide of historical events but are little changed through the centuries. During periods of warfare the ideal of the military man is brought out from the archives, to be returned to storage when peace finally comes again. During the progress of internal revolt, violent or otherwise, the radical, builder-of-utopia ideal is popular; when the reaction to revolution comes, a new and contrasting ideal appears. For no two individuals will any of these stereotyped composite models be quite the same. For most, they are but vague projections of what the individual from his specific experience has come to believe is the way to attain his chosen goal in life. Composite models may, however, prove quite useful to the modern youth, who must so frequently adapt himself to a world that changes almost as rapidly as he learns new adjustments and that no longer provides well-defined paths for the "good life." Composite models cannot show the way—they are too vague and indefinite—but they can be and often are a help in working out adjustment problems. In a stable social system they are unnecessary; actual people and perhaps a few symbolic models are sufficient. But ours is not a stable system, and the models that we use must be both vague and flexible.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COVERT BEHAVIORS

By definition covert behaviors are not open to direct observation, and most attempts to study them have led only to debate about them. But, as was said earlier, their existence cannot be ignored; an adequate science of human behavior cannot be developed on the basis of overt behaviors alone. For an understanding of the factors that affect the overt behaviors of the individual, it is often necessary to probe into his covert behaviors, since the latter may be the source of the former. This is presumably the case when marked and otherwise inexplicable changes in overt behavior occur.

When the child who has been romping gaily with his dog turns to acting pained and otherwise distressed, the sting of a bee, a bump on the head, or some other observable antecedent event may have been responsible. But if parental investigation reveals no evidence of such external happening, the parent would be foolish to ignore the possibility that an event of internal origin—a malfunctioning stomach, for example—is responsible for the change in the child's overt behavior. Just so, when the man who has long behaved in friendly ways toward another abruptly murders that friend, the student of human behavior should first seek an explanation for this act in external, immediately observable events. If the murderer is a hardened criminal, it may be that he was in great need of money and that the only way to secure it that seemed feasible to him was through the murder of his friend. Such circumstances being involved, the study of the antecedents of the act of murder would, for a time at least, follow along an obviously related chain of immediately observable events. But if the murderer is clearly a mild person who has previously obeyed the laws of the land, it would be necessary to explore the possibility that the act was a long-delayed response to distant, and on the surface unrelated, events. In the former instance a relatively short* sequence of covert behaviors is, presumably, involved. But in the latter case a long sequence of covert phenomena must have been occurring between the chain of events that

* Actually everything that has happened to the murderer since birth will have been in some way and to some degree a part of the complex of events that caused the act of murder. But for practical purposes we mark off a portion of the series, the supposedly more significant events.

"began" the murder and the murder itself. Perhaps during their long apparent friendship, the murderer, starting with some small event, has gradually built up attitudes of resentment that finally terminated in this overt act.

Life History.—The covert factors that precede a long-delayed overt response and their causes are exceedingly difficult to ascertain. Many methods have been tried—dream analysis, free and directed association tests (34), and the like. In the Freudian technique the "unconscious" is patiently probed for words whose meanings are taken to be entirely unlike those normally assigned to them. But since Freudianism flourishes more as a therapeutic cult than as a scientific discipline, the "findings" of the analysts need not concern us.

In recent years many useful data have been coming from the work of clinicians who endeavor to secure, from every available source, a factual life history of the individual being studied (35). From such a history inferences concerning covert elements are drawn. Unlike the Freudian, the clinician does not attempt to pull his evidences by verbal magic from a postulated unconscious. The clinician is a sort of sociopsychological detective; he studies the family background, the early associations and experiences, the schooling, etc., of his subject and draws his inferences from a great body of facts rather than, as with the Freudian, from a few selected and biased observations. The clinical life history is never so complete as we might like, and the clinical method is exceedingly laborious. Furthermore, the validity of the inferences drawn depends in the end upon the skill and the insight of the investigator. But the life-history method of the clinician is by far the most promising so far developed for the study of delayed-response sorts of behavior.

The following general analysis of covert behaviors and of their functions, origins, and relations to overt behaviors represents, in condensed form, our present understanding of these matters. Further clinical study will no doubt refine, correct, and augment what we now have to say.

COVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR

Kinds of Covert Symbols.—There would appear to be many forms of covert symbolic behavior, and it is probable that each form may involve several kinds of covert symbols. Probably the most characteristic kind of symbol is the verbal. Just as the small child may go about talking aloud to himself, adults seem to make more or less constant subvocal verbal comments to themselves concerning the things that are happening to them.

With literate peoples, this covert use of the spoken word can be supplemented by use of covert visual-verbal symbols, *i.e.*, "mental pictures" of the written word. The process is apparently derived from ability to read; and individuals seem to vary considerably in their ability to "read" what is in their "mind's eye" (an element, presumably, in the art of effective writing) just as they do in their skill at reading a printed page. Artists, architects, and many others may also use covert symbols of a visual order—"mental pictures" of objects, color combinations, etc. When we visualize—if we actually do—a person or thing, the mental picture is a symbol and may be manipulated as such.

Musicians and others who deal much with sound are evidently skilled at using still another type of covert symbol—"mental sounds." Composers frequently write out on paper rather than work out on the piano or other instruments the compositions that they hear in their "mind's ear."

Finally, it is possible that kinesthetic sensations produced by slight, covert muscular movements may at times serve as symbols, as is the case when we "feel out" the spelling of a word. Such symbolization is, however, so ill defined that it borders on the category of covert non-symbolic behavior.

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF COVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR

The various types of covert symbolic behavior all have, presumably, their individual significance. Not all, however, are of interest to the social psychologist. The running comments that people make to themselves as they overtly adjust to other people and to objects may have no more than personal importance. Random reverie, a fragmentary and often fantastic series of covert responses, would seem to be little more than self-amusement and to have few, if any, long-run consequences.

Directed Daydreaming.—When, however, covert symbols are directed and controlled to the end that they "tell" their user a story, the process may be quite significant. In such fantasy, the storyteller may be either the hero or the heroine. Through the story he symbolically gets what he wants, or she is won by the one she wants to win her. The fact that a person does such things on a covert level rather than on an overt one suggests that he wants events to go the way of the daydream but often cannot in actuality make them go that way.* Daydreaming, although common to all, is therefore symptomatic of

* Covert planning differs from directed daydreaming in that the planner expects or at least hopes to gain his wish in real life, not in the world of fantasy.

minor and sometimes major personal maladjustment. We shall later see that it is one of the commonplace compensatory devices.

In contrast to daydreaming are the covert aspects of the process of learning on the basis of ideas of persons that was discussed in the previous chapter. Ideas of persons are, obviously, complex covert symbolic constructions. When used as a guide in the working out of overt modes of conduct, ideas of persons facilitate adjustment to the external world. Daydreaming, on the other hand, is a substitute for such overt adjustments. Although it is a mode of adjustment, it never "gets us anywhere."

Memory.*—All acquired patterns of adjustment, all habits, are from one point of view records of past experience. Because he uses verbal symbols to such a great extent, man is capable of preserving many of his past experiences in symbolic form. Much of this preserved "knowledge" is subject to ready recall, and it is this symbolic remembrance of the past that constitutes the symbolic environment of the individual that was discussed in the previous chapter. Out of the memories of parents and others, the child secures many of his ideas of people and much of his understanding of the nature of his social and physical world. In symbolic form he preserves for future use many of the precepts that are provided him in anticipation of future needs (*e.g.*, what he should say if a hostess offers him a second piece of cake). From his memories he draws the symbolic materials that he uses when he thinks out a solution to an unprecedented adjustment problem. Memory is, therefore, a prerequisite to social life; and some of the more important differences between individuals can be traced to variations in what and how much they remember.

Thought.—Although the term "thought" is sometimes used to refer to any form of covert symbolic behavior, it is here used to mean covert symbolic trial and error. The ability to think out a solution to a problem rather than having to work it out on the basis of overt trial and error is one of man's most precious possessions. This ability makes possible his engaging in trial and error without suffering the consequences of his errors, an ability that the lower animals do not have to as significant a degree.

When one of the lower animals is faced with a situation different from any he has previously experienced and for which he has not by

* Memory should be thought of not as an entity, a box in which the individual stores ideas, but rather as a process; and the term "remembering" would be preferable were it not so cumbersome. It might then be more clearly evident that we are referring to the ability to react to present stimuli with the aid of symbolic tools—"mental" images of various sorts that symbolize past experiences.

training been prepared, he usually resorts to trying out the various things that he can do. Thus the dog who is trying to solve a getting-across-the-stream problem will try out his various tricks. He may bark, run up and down the bank, step gingerly into the water, and circle back and forth. These actions being unavailing, he may finally try swimming. The try may be a success or a failure, depending both upon the ability of the dog and the nature of the stream. If the try happens, however, to be just one more unsuccessful attempt, the consequence may be death.

Many of the adjustment problems with which man is faced are of such a character that an attempt to solve them by overt trial and error would be hazardous; and error might preclude further attempts. Such is the case when an individual must treat an unprecedented illness, when he and a train are approaching an intersection, or when on the field of battle he is caught by the enemy in an unfamiliar situation. In other situations a trial that proves to be an error may not result in death. It may result in hunger, as when he plants his crops at the wrong times; unhappiness, as when he selects the wrong girl as his wife; sickness, as when he eats the wrong food; or the like.

But man can conduct his experimentation on the covert symbolic level; and when he does this, his errors may be painlessly discarded. By covert trial and error he may calculate whether he can get across the intersection before the oncoming train, he may decide upon the feasibility of trying to fight his way out of the shell hole in which he is entrapped, etc. The process seems to consist of symbolizing the situation, probably in terms of prior experience with elements of the new problem, and trying out a variety of possible acts that have also been reduced to symbolic form.* When a satisfactory solution has been found on the symbolic level, that solution can then be translated into overt action.

It does not follow, however, that the thought-out solution will necessarily be a successful resolution of the problem. Whether it is or not will depend upon the validity of the symbols used and the judgment involved in distinguishing between trials that are failures and the one that is a success, *i.e.*, the one that leads to expedient results.

Logic.—Philosophers have long held that there is one valid procedure to be used in arriving at a sound symbolic solution to a problem. This process is termed “logic,” and the Aristotelian version has been believed to be the basis for the development of modern science. Perhaps it is, but there is certainly nothing universal about the principles agreed upon as sound. For what is sound reasoning seems to depend

* For a detailed illustration of this process see Appendix note 36.

entirely upon the society that sets the values that are used in determining whether a given solution is a success or a failure.* To most of the members of one society and to some individuals in other societies, it may appear entirely logical to resolve a given situation by self-inflicted death. Others will consider reasoning that leads to this conclusion as completely illogical. Only when there is agreement on objectives can there be agreement on the validity of thought procedures.

Validity of Symbols. †—The soundness of thinking within any given system of logic depends upon the validity of the symbols that are used. If the motorcar driver calculates that he is closer to the intersection and is going as fast as the train when he is actually farther away and going slower, his solution to the problem may be fatal because the symbols used were not valid. Many of the values or meanings of symbols are derived from limited personal experience, and that experience may be very misleading. Limited experience with tomatoes, for example, led our forefathers into the error of thinking this vegetable poisonous. Some symbols derive their meanings from association with other symbols, as is invariably the case with an abstraction, such as "God," and is usually the case with ideas about places and events that are beyond our direct observation. Such symbols may have significant cultural validity without having any necessary value for the solution of individual adjustment problems. The idea of God is basic to religion; and religion in turn may, as we shall later see, be of great adjustment value to the individual. But the starving man who assures himself that "the Lord will provide" and does not, therefore, endeavor to find himself food will have made a fatal miscalculation.

In every society the individual is trained to behave in terms of some symbols that have no nonsymbolic counterpart. The word "ghost" appears in all languages, and many people believe in the reality of ghosts. They then act at times as though there were ghosts, although scientists have never been able to verify this belief. The ideas of the primitive and the premodern concerning the nature of the physical world, the causes of physical phenomena, and the like have mostly been unfounded beliefs. Modern people, or at least the scientists and

* The study of the social determination of logical systems of thought is developing around the term "sociology of knowledge." For a brief résumé and a good bibliography on the subject see "Language, logic, and culture" (C. W. Mills, 1939). See also *Ideology and utopia* (K. Mannheim, 1936).

† The study of the processes by which symbols secure their meanings is known as "semantics." The pioneer work in this field is *The meaning of meaning* (C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, 1930). A superficial but nevertheless suggestive examination of some of the words to which we commonly give false meanings is *The tyranny of words* (S. Chase, 1938).

technicians of the modern world, have at their command a great many validated symbols representing the nature of the physical and biological world. It is for this reason that they are so eminently successful in solving problems of nature control.

Such is not the case, however, with many of the symbols that constitute our ideas of the nature of our society and our roles therein. Some of these symbols have been rendered invalid by social change. They may mean to us just what they meant to our forefathers; but, since the days of our forefathers, the "realities" that the symbols once represented have so changed that the validity of the symbols is destroyed. Thus the word "family" may still mean the system of neopatriarchal social relations that was common to the people of America a hundred years ago, although that system has become archaic, and new, ill-defined, and varied marital and child-parent relationships have come into existence. The young man who thinks of settling down and becoming a "family" man may, therefore, be thinking in terms of former realities but present impossibilities.

Other symbolizations of society are invalid because they represent something that does not yet exist and may never come into being. "Manifest destiny" is one such phrase (A. K. Weinberg, 1935). It has played its role in the development of nationalism, but it is only the symbolization of a hope, not a fact. Those whose personal calculations involved the assumption that their nation must inevitably rise to greatness must have been bitterly disappointed when the manifest destiny did not become manifest.

ACQUISITION OF COVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIORS

Although educators have proceeded upon various assumptions, such as that mathematical training develops certain of the mental faculties, the processes by which men learn to think are largely unknown. All that can be said is that learning to think is fostered by certain kinds of social experience and discouraged by others. Under conditions of relative social stability few men are creative thinkers.* Their society has provided them with ready-made solutions to so many of their

* Much of what may pass for creative thought is no more than paraphrasing. When the philosopher "thinks" up new justifications for old solutions to the problems of social life, he is only rationalizing. When a man "thinks" up reasons to explain why he has bought a new car, he is not, of course, solving the problem, "Should I buy a new car?" That problem has already been solved. Many of the established patterns of social life will have their ideological explanations—complex and systematic verbal justifications. The repetition of such ideologies is not thinking.

adjustment problems that thought is seldom necessary and learning to think is discouraged.

But under conditions of social instability many new, unprepared-for problems arise; and at the same time many individuals are inadequately trained into acceptance of the socially established solutions to such recurrent problems as birth, marriage, and death. Such individuals will, then, tend to resort to trial and error in the working out of better adjustments either to nature or to their fellows. Much of this trial and error will be covert in character. Changes in the social economy of medieval Spain made it desirable to find a better solution to the problem of getting spices from the East. Columbus had, for some reason, been inadequately trained into the belief that the world was flat. He came at length to the conclusion that the world was round and that the East could be reached more quickly by going west than by traveling east. What happened when he endeavored to put this conclusion into effect is now history.

Society, then, either facilitates or inhibits the development of skill at thinking. Society also provides most of the symbols that will be used in thinking. Without social training in overt symbolic behavior, more particularly of the verbal sort, it is inconceivable that the individual could develop to any large degree the ability to think.

We may say, therefore, that the necessary biological equipment being present, learning to solve problems by means of covert trial and error is dependent upon social training in complex overt symbolic behaviors, the existence of problems to be solved, and a degree of liberation from the ready-made solutions of the social heritage. These conditions being present, learning to think seems to be a matter of practice.* The child who is meticulously trained in correct social usages and protected from the harsh realities of life will have no opportunity or occasion to work out adjustment problems for himself and little chance to learn to think, however complete his overt symbolic training may be. Later we shall have occasion to see that even in our disordered social system many children are so guarded and protected that they do not learn how to think, although they will most certainly be called upon to do so in later life. Under conditions of social disorganization, willingness and ability to experiment in matters of social relationships is one attribute of the well-adjusted personality. The child who has never been allowed to think for himself will lack what is

* Obviously, biological equipment for thinking varies among individuals; hence, the effectiveness of any given amount of practice will vary. We are here, as elsewhere, dealing with multiple variables.

usually described as self-reliance and will be unable to work out problems for himself when the occasion arises.

Educational "Drill" and Thinking.—In general, formal education has consisted of drill in overt symbolic responses rather than practice in covert symbolic trial and error. By and large, the student who has acquired during school hours some skill at thinking has done so in spite of rather than because of his schooling. At least prior to the college level, and far too commonly even here, "education" has consisted of learning to give the right answers to stock questions. Text and teacher have determined what is the right answer; all the student has had to do is to associate answer and question. What is commonly called a good memory is a prerequisite to thinking about certain kinds of problems. It is not, however, a significant end in itself. Some of the techniques now being experimented with, such as the project method, are attempts to make the school functionally more important for the student by providing him with circumstances conducive to the development of skill in thinking.

THOUGHT AND OVERT BEHAVIORS

Fantasy, daydreaming, and much recalling in symbolic form of experiences from the past are ends in themselves. They are modes of self-entertainment. But thinking is a means to an end. It is an attempt to solve adjustment problems. The end is the adjustment act—making a faster airplane, winning a wife, earning an honest dollar, or the like. It does not, however, follow that the thought-out solution to a problem will necessarily be converted into overt action any more than the thought-out solution is necessarily an expedient one. Just as we can act without also thinking, we can think without necessarily acting overtly.

There is probably a stronger tendency to convert the consequences of thinking into overt symbolic than into overt nonsymbolic behaviors. The man who talks, and presumably thinks, in terms of the verified facts of organic life may nevertheless treat his own body in ways which he "knows" are contrary to its welfare; the motorist who decides that he can beat the train to the crossing may boast that he can do so yet automatically bring his car to a stop.

Since the processes by which we acquire our overt nonsymbolic behaviors are different from those by which we learn to think, it is always possible that the circumstances of our training have taught us to behave one way on the one level and another on the other. In view of the invalidity of many of the symbols of social life with which the modern man thinks, if he does think, this lack of relation between

thought and action is perhaps fortunate.* Few people actually commit murder, although many of us have at some time or another decided that the solution to a predicament was to murder some one or many of our fellow men.

COVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIORS

Social workers and others who deal with what are often called the "underprivileged" are constantly hampered by the fact that so many of those that they would help do not make any great effort to help themselves. During the early 1930's, for example, the zealous New Dealers came up against the discouraging discovery that in large measure the effort expended on the underprivileged (WPA, Rural Resettlement, etc.) did not elevate the socioeconomic status of these people but only made it possible for them to maintain their former status with less effort.† The fact that under comparable circumstances one man sits comfortably in the shade while another labors to procure the largest possible crop from his land is usually described in terms of ambition, desires, wants, and other presumed covert forces.

Descriptive Use of Subjective Terms.—Every language contains many terms that are used to indicate that overt behavior is a consequence of some particular inner "force" or some specific feeling-state. The "forces" are symbolized as the motives behind actions. Thus we assume the existence of an inner "force" and give it a motivational name when we say of a person, "He wanted to make a good impression on his boss." We imply knowledge of the specific motivational antecedents of a complex of actions in saying, briefly, "He married her for her money." Actually, however, such use of motivational terms is only a quick—a literary or poetic—description of observed behaviors. By saying, "He married her for her money," we suggest some significant phase of his complex behavior toward her, *e.g.*, that after their marriage he was attentive to her money but tended to ignore her.

Comparable is the practice of describing the complex actions that are produced by this or that object or event by reference to this or that specific emotional state.‡ Thus we may say of a person, "He fell in

* At one time (1936) the Japanese government endeavored to establish what they called "thought control." Unloyal thoughts were made punishable by death. This was, of course, a bit of verbal nonsense.

† A literary description of the way some of the people the government was trying to help during this period became passive wards of the government is given in *Men working* (J. Faulkner, 1941).

‡ Particularly in lay usage confusion often arises from the fact that the terms used are partly at least a function of the situation, and different people may define the situation in different ways. If we were to see a man running away from

love with her at first sight." But such a statement is at best only a more or less artful suggestion of the observed fact that he was attentive to her during their first meeting, that he arranged for subsequent meetings with her, etc., until they did, or did not, get married.

The use of subjective terms simply as a means of short-cutting descriptions of observed behaviors has certain advantages in science as well as in lay life. To describe in detail the antics of a rat in a maze, for example, makes laborious and quite often dull reading. The character of these antics may be indicated by briefly describing them as aiming to secure the reward for successful running of the maze. We have further abbreviated this description when we say that the rat "wants," or "desires," to get through the maze. This procedure is even more expedient in the case of human behavior, which is far more complex than that of the rat. Indeed, it is difficult to describe human actions without using subjective terms. We are so much habituated to this usage that to think and speak of behavior in any other way may seem exceedingly artificial. It is at least as communicative to say of the child that he wanted the candy as it is to say, objectively, that he raised the right arm, glanced toward the table, clutched the chair with the left hand, and rose upon his toes. The latter statements omit reference to the child's past experiences, which the motivational term "wanted" implies, since, if the child wants candy, he must have had previous experience with sweet food.*

a wounded bear, we would probably say that he did so because he was afraid. Should this same man see a stranger beating a horse and approach and force the stranger to desist, we would probably say that he was angry. Possibly the man could differentiate his emotions, although of this we cannot be certain. He might not be able to give his felt emotion a name, or he might maintain that fear as well as anger was present while he was arguing with the horse beater, particularly if the latter were a giant of a man. It must be kept in mind that, although the poets and philosophers have talked of literally thousands of emotions, many of the latter may be only empty words. Perhaps no words can describe at all accurately an oscillation of fear and rage. Moreover, there is no way of telling how much one man's felt emotion of fear resembles the fear experienced by another. In extreme instances a man may approach a happy situation with every indication of sorrow or a sorrowful situation with raucous laughter. Persistent behavior of this sort is termed "psychopathic."

* For an illustration of one of the more elaborate uses of motivational terms as descriptive devices, that of W. I. Thomas, see Appendix note 37.

In "The imputation of motives" MacIver goes farther than the present authors in his dependence upon motivational analysis (R. M. MacIver, 1940). He would, apparently, seek the explanation of social behavior in imputed human motives. The present authors, on the other hand, consider that motivational analysis can never be more than a tool to be used in the search for those causative factors that lie outside the individual.

Misuse of Subjective Terms.—But the descriptive use of subjective terms must be clearly distinguished from the use of these terms to designate actual and specific covert antecedents of overt behavior. Failure to recognize that giving a subjective term to an observed overt act does not provide an explanation of that act has led to so much loose thinking that the social psychologist approaches the subject of covert nonsymbolic behaviors with the utmost caution. Terms such as “the instinct of maternity,” “the profit motive,” “the desire for prestige,” and the like are at best short-cut descriptions of observed overt behavior. But they have all too often been taken to symbolize definite and specific—and usually biologically determined—covert forces and states. This procedure is, of course, identical with what the animistic primitive does when he “explains” the behavior of falling objects by saying that they “want” or “will” to fall.

Present Avoidance of Subjective Terms.—Sociopsychological consideration of covert nonsymbolic behaviors at once transcends the descriptive use of subjective terms and at the same time avoids the fallacy of assuming that an act is explained by the attaching of a subjective term to it. Since nonsymbolized internal disequilibriums can be known only by inference from observed behaviors, no attempt will be made to break them down into specific motives or emotions and to assign to each a given name.*

FUNCTION OF COVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIORS

Sociopsychological concern with covert behaviors is made necessary, it will be recalled, because these behaviors would seem to be involved in the making of delayed and apparently inconsistent overt responses to external circumstances. The fact that many internal occurrences cannot be readily symbolized does not, however, preclude inferential analysis of them from their social consequences. For purposes of discussion, we shall think of this kind of inner disequilibrium as covert nonsymbolic behavior. Usually, if not invariably, such behavior is associated with some sorts of covert symbolic elements.

Social Motivation.—Both the well-trained dog and the small child can usually be aroused to activity by the offer of a piece of candy. Presumably their activity is in part an expression of internal disequilibrium induced by the sight of candy. But in both instances, the overt reaction to the candy is prompt and direct. We need not go beyond the learning situations in which the overt actions were origi-

* The difficulty, indeed the absurdity, of trying to distinguish between various covert nonsymbolic states is thoroughly demonstrated in *A study of jealousy as differentiated from envy* (T. M. Ankles, 1939).

nally acquired in an attempt to explain this specific instance of candy-getting behavior. In adult social life, however, many activities cannot be so easily "explained." We observe some men industriously painting pictures that no one will buy, diligently working their way up in ward politics, laboriously earning their way through a college course, devoting long hours to the acquisition of money they are too busy to spend, etc. We see other men who do none of these things, but sit, rather, in passive acceptance of the things that happen to come their way. We find every degree and many variations between these two extremes.

It was long the belief, and still is with some, that all variations in intensity of activity and all differences in the direction of that activity are biologically determined.* Thus traditional economics was based upon the presupposition that man's economic endeavors are an expression of his innate greed or instinct for material wealth. Much of the protest against proposals for revision of our economic system have been based upon the claim that they would run counter to nature, *i.e.*, to man's acquisitive instincts.

But, as was indicated in an earlier chapter, the organic "drives" cannot possibly explain the feverish painting of pictures, the earning of money, or other social activities.† The internal disequilibria involved in such activities may have been built upon organic drives, but they are so far removed from these drives in terms of the stimuli that produce them and the circumstances that will restore equilibrium that the relationship between the two is only historical. Whether a woman will be "impelled" to buy a new hat for Easter or a man to buy a bigger car than his neighbor's is a matter of social training. Furthermore, what course either will take, if any, to resolve his internal disturbance also depends upon social training. Comparative studies of the overt behaviors of various people, particularly anthropological comparisons of the characteristic behaviors of the members of various societies, lend no support to the assumption that inherent wants, drives, or the like are directly responsible for the specific social activi-

* Certain physiological conditions, such as those resulting from hookworm and malnutrition undoubtedly lower organic energy and thus discourage overt activity. But it is to be observed that, although such conditions secure their effects through organic channels, they are not a part of the individual's biological heritage. Certain forms of glandular unbalance, some of which seem to result in subnormal activity, are, however, congenital in origin. But even these would appear subject to at least partial correction by proper environmental treatment.

† It should be recalled (Appendix note 7) that the Freudians have ingeniously interpreted social motives as a sublimated manifestation of thwarted organic drives, *e.g.*, artistic endeavor is a substitute for taboo sex expression.

ties of men.* Only by a study of his cultural milieu and his particular life experiences can we hope to gain any insight into the reasons why the artist works feverishly, the businessman struggles to amass a fortune, and the healthy sluggard does little but sit in the sun. .

Emotional Aspects.—We have here used the term “motive” to suggest those internal disequilibriums that seemingly lead to overt achievement. People, moreover, overtly behave in such intense but random and irrelevant ways as to indicate disorganizing internal states.† The distinction can be illustrated by a comparison of the chess player who diligently concentrates upon the problem before him and the one who makes many frenzied but inappropriate moves.

In many instances the overt behavior follows so closely upon the stimuli that provoked it that the response can hardly be called delayed. Such is the case with the confused and disorganized behavior that frequently appears as a response to unfamiliar circumstances (*e.g.*, “stage fright”) and as a response to objects culturally designated as dangerous (*e.g.*, snakes). The antecedents of all such overt behaviors are clearly social, and as social psychologists we need not be especially concerned with the covert emotional elements that are involved. Once it is recognized that social experience rather than inherent nature determines the particular stimuli that will cause disorganization of the overt behavior of an individual, attention centers on the analysis of the external conditions that have caused snakes to be “feared,” villains to be “hated,” inadvertent display of the body or of its animal processes to be an occasion for “shame,” etc.

The problem is quite different, however, in the case of overt responses that have been long delayed, such as a man’s ultimately “blowing up” and smashing some inoffensive object, killing his wife, drinking himself into a stupor, participating in a lynching party or other mob activity, or otherwise behaving in vigorous and unprecedented fashion. The covert nonsymbolic elements involved in such responses are no doubt exceedingly important; and the experiences

* From what some of our great industrialists say, one would conclude that we human beings have inherited a strong competitive spirit without which no social order would survive. Anthropological evidence, however, makes clear the fallacy of such a belief. Various societies differ enormously in the amount of competitive spirit they show. Although the Kwakiutl (F. Boas, 1925) are more competitive than we are, most primitive societies show fewer competitive behaviors (M. Mead, 1937). The Zuni, for example, have so little competitive spirit that they discourage originality and the display of unusual abilities (R. Benedict, 1934a).

† Possibly these disorganizing internal states do not differ in kind from motives. They may simply be unfocalized or unchannelized motives or a conflict of two or more motives.

that have given rise to them date back so far in time, are so complex in nature, and are so many that their analysis in anything but general terms is difficult indeed

ACQUISITION OF COVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIORS

The process by which the innate internal responses of the human animal are developed into social motives and emotions is comparable to that by which the infantile wail is refined into adult speech. In both cases there occurs, as a consequence of experience, an association of some element of the general response with a stimulus that did not originally provoke it. It was upon the recognition of this general principle that Watson and other early behaviorists concluded that by the proper arrangement of external stimuli it would be a simple matter to train the human infant to hate or love his mother, to want rabbits or fear snakes, or into whatever emotional and motivational responses we might choose to establish. But experience has shown that covert training is most difficult, for there is an essential difference between teaching a child the overt symbolic behaviors of his society and training him to any given set of covert nonsymbolic responses.

In the case of speech development those around the child can follow the course of the child's learning and may, therefore, correct for errors in the child's verbal training. But since covert nonsymbolic responses are not directly ascertainable, those around the child cannot be certain what responses of this order the child is acquiring or to what stimuli. All deliberate training must proceed on the basis of crude inferences. Since many of the inferences made will be unwarranted and most of the corrections attempted will be speculative, actual training proceeds rather blindly, and the results are largely inadvertent*. Even when there is exceptionally close rapport between parent and child the latter may develop covert responses that he cannot express either in words or actions or else may inadvertently acquire responses that, in view of other acquired responses, he is afraid, ashamed, or otherwise unwilling to reveal. Thus begins the growth of what might be called one's secret self, overt evidences of which may be long delayed and therefore incomprehensible to others when they do appear (38)

* Illustrating the difficulty of deliberately controlled development of covert nonsymbolic responses is the general failure of our public-school system greatly to improve American standards of literary and artistic appreciation. For more than two generations, schoolteachers have endeavored to teach school children to enjoy the poetic form and "good" literature. But increasingly the popular taste is for simple, formula type stories (those in the pulps) and no poetry.

Anthropological evidence indicates that the more stable the social system the more effectively the individual is fitted on covert as well as overt levels for his social roles * Here cultural controls assure a minimum of inadvertent individual experiences, with the result that most of the individual's motivations and emotions are appropriate to the overt behaviors required of him If he is expected to act humble and subservient toward his father as he grows older, he will probably have learned also to "feel" humility and not "want" to be other than subservient

But in our disordered society there is, as we shall later see in detail, little consistency in the individual's experiences. Many of them are of conflicting orders, and any single experience may have contrasting elements As a result the covert behaviors of the individual are likely to lack pattern or consistency and to bear little relation to the typical aspects of his social environment.

CONFLICT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TENSIONS

When two or more patterns of adjustment are in opposition or when a given pattern is blocked by external circumstances, the conflict produces covert forces that, for lack of a more definitive term, are usually called "tensions" These are the emotions, mentioned earlier, that appear to be involved in long-delayed and inconsistent responses. Their exact nature is, of course, not clear But their existence and role can be inferred; and many individual and collective phenomena are entirely incomprehensible except in terms of the generation, accumulation, and discharge of tensions We may therefore think of the tensional concept as a useful working hypothesis, not unlike the hypothesized existence of unidentified cosmic masses which the astronomer uses in explaining otherwise incomprehensible movements of known star and planetary masses

Psychological tensions, then, can be described as a by-product of conflict Conflict circumstances and antecedents are of many orders, some of which will be described in Part IV. The more complex sorts of conflict are a consequence of various forms of malpreparation during early life for the circumstances under which one must live in later years In a multitude of ways the person brought up in luxury will

* It was a tenet of ancient Confucian theory that the best way to induce the internal feelings of respect, of anguish for the dead, of reverence for the aged, etc., was to provide elaborate ritualization for all human relationships The theory was that, if a child saw the weeping and wailing that followed the death of a relative, he would come to feel great sorrow, which the weeping and wailing were presumed to indicate, upon the death of a relative

be opposed to enforced poverty; the girl strongly motivated with the ideal of becoming a motion-picture or radio star will be dissatisfied with her life as wife of a truck driver, the man raised under the conditions of democracy will be ill prepared to live under a dictatorship; etc

The tensional by-products of conflict seem to be cumulative. Thus it is that the person who lives under conflict conditions—who is “bored” with the monotony of his routine work, who is “irritated” by his wife’s constant nagging over petty financial matters, or the like—may suffer increasingly until some incident leads to the expression of his distress in an overt act. It is only thus that we can interpret such facts as unpremeditated murder, suicide, collective fanaticism, and other of the more unusual forms of individual and collective behavior.*

It is to be noted that those covert disequilibriums that we have designated as tensions are not learned as are the disequilibriums previously discussed. They are acquired, but only as a by-product of opposition between previously learned patterns. The tensions are an indirect rather than a direct result of social experience and are wholly covert in character. As a consequence the overt behavior that they provoke is not, strictly speaking, socially determined, although it may at times be socially channelized into such forms of activity as shouting at football games. Because the existence of tensions can be objectively ascertained only as they are later manifest as overt behavior, and since the particular overt expression that will ultimately appear in any specific instance is, with some exceptions, not designated by the society, their appearance and their form may be predicted only in the most general way. We shall consider such behaviors in later chapters as being abnormal in character.

* For attempts to describe this concept in mathematical terms, see “The standard error of a ‘social force’” (S. C. Dodd, 1936) and “A tension theory of societal action” (S. C. Dodd, 1939).

PART III

The Human Personality

CHAPTER IX

HUMAN NATURE

The processes of socialization might be loosely compared to the procedures by which many men, using many tools, convert iron and other raw materials into automobiles. Many human beings, interacting with the "raw" organism of the human infant, gradually shape the infant into a human being. The socialization processes do not, of course, operate with the mechanical exactitude of modern industrial procedures. Human beings are made, as it were, by handicraft techniques. As a result, no two human beings will be anything near as alike as will be two modern automobiles of a given make and model. The fact that every human being is in some or many respects unique becomes exceedingly important when, as now, we turn from the study of the processes of socialization to the consequences thereof.

Personality—The term "personality" has come into scientific usage to stress the fact that the individual, however much he may be like others in some regards, is in some respects unique. "Personality"* may be defined as the sum total of the acquired behaviors of a given human being. It is the entire product of socialization, consisting of those behavior attributes that make the individual "like" other members of his society and those that distinguish him from them. The former attributes of personality we shall discuss in the present chapter as being the human nature of the individual, and the latter attributes will subsequently be considered as his individuality.

Human Nature as Socially Typical Attributes of Personality.—To the extent that the socialization processes work effectively, they develop the organic potentialities of the human animal into patterns of behavior that are typical for the members of the social group. These socially typical attributes of the individual's personality constitute his human nature. But just as we must know the typical heights of the members of a social group before we can say of a given individual that he is of "average" height, so we must know the typical attributes of the personalities of the members of a group before we can

* For an examination of sixty-six definitions of personality see "The definition of personality" (C. A. Gibb, 1940). The psychoanalytic interpretation of personality can be seen in "Can personality be measured?" (G. V. Hamilton, 1936)

say that this attribute or that is an element of his human nature. As a result, consideration of human nature necessarily turns from examination of the individual to the study of the members of the entire social group. It should be borne in mind throughout the subsequent discussion of human nature that we are for the moment concerned only with the typical behaviors of the various members of social groups and the differences in these behaviors between groups, not with individual personalities as such.

Nonuniversality of Human Nature.*—Just as the typical height of the Japanese people is different from that of the American people, etc., so the behaviors that are typical of the Japanese differ from those that are typical of Americans. Japanese and Americans have, in other words, different human natures. Earlier students endeavored to find norms of behavior that would hold true for all of mankind throughout all of human history. But no specific pattern of action that has any such universality has as yet been discovered. When we get beyond broad generalizations, such as that human beings eat and that they take care of their offspring, there is nothing that can be said of mankind as a whole. What people eat, when they eat, and how they eat have varied from place to place and from time to time. Who takes care of infants, how they are taken care of, etc., also vary from place to place and time to time. The similarities that exist among the members of a given society cannot, therefore, be traced to something inherent in the nature of man. They are a result of the fact that the majority of the members of a given society have had much the same set of social experiences. Thus likenesses that can be observed in the behavior of members of a society exist largely because this mode of behavior is characteristic for that society.

IN-GROUPS VERSUS OUT-GROUPS

The fact that human nature varies from society to society and, in lesser degree, between different groups within the society is the basis for the layman's classification of people into fixed categories; and it is

* Human nature defined as the typical behavior for members of a given social grouping conforms to general usage. But Cooley in *Human nature and the social order* (C. H. Cooley, 1922) and some others have used this term to indicate those attributes of behavior that are common to all people at all times, such as the consciousness of oneself in relation to others, love of approbation, resentment of censure, emulation, etc. These terms are subjective, and, even assuming that all men have the covert qualities referred to, it does not follow that the overt behavior of men will be similar, a point that Cooley, but not all his followers, realized. J. Dewey in "Human nature" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 7, 531-537) discusses and compares the various concepts of human nature.

this in turn that underlies many social phenomena, *e g*, the ridicule of the "country bumpkin," the periodic slaughter of "racial" minorities, the bitterness of class toward class, and the war of one people upon another

It was once the hope of sociologists that modern means of transportation and communication would so amalgamate the peoples of the entire world that there would emerge one universal way of life—a universal human nature—with the result that men could live together in peace and understanding. But today, as in the past, the peoples of the world are anything but standardized. The two billion and more inhabitants of the world are broken up into a great variety of groups, each with something of its own human nature and each more or less contemptuous of the human natures of other groups.

The In-group.—Because the various members of a social group are more like one another than any of them is like the "typical" member of another group, they can predict one another's behavior with much greater accuracy—usually described as ability to "understand" one another—and will, therefore, be able to adjust to one another with a minimum of friction. This is illustrated by the fact that under almost any circumstances we could get along better with almost any fellow American than we could with a "foreigner" whose language, sentiments, tastes, etc., we did not understand.

The likenesses of the members of a social group and all that stems therefrom are usually suggested by the use of the term "in-group." Every people have some word or phrase—"we-uns," "unsere Leute," "nous autres," or whatnot—by which they refer to the fact that they belong together and constitute a separate and special segment of mankind. The sense of belonging together is a reflection of the fact that their human nature is somewhat peculiar to them, and it constitutes in turn one aspect of human nature.

The Out-group.—The counterpart to in-groupness is the belief that those who do not belong are a different *kind* of human being (perhaps not human at all) who must of necessity be accorded treatment quite different from that accorded the members of the in-group. They—as distinct from we—are difficult if not impossible to get along with. Although "we" may have fixed ideas of what these others are like, our ideas do not lead to understanding of them—hence ability to get along with them—if for no other reason than that our ideas of them may have almost no relation to reality. They constitute, therefore, the antithesis of our in-group—an out-group.

Social Determination of In-group-out-group Dichotomizations.—The individual is socialized into a number of groups, each one of which

becomes for him an in-group. He is born and brought up in a family (or tribe or village), he and his family live in a neighborhood made up of a number of associated families, the neighborhood is a part of the larger society, or state, etc. The particular structure of the social groupings will depend upon the social organization. The more integrated the society, the fewer and more specific the number of groups to which the individual will belong. Many of the difficulties of contemporary life stem, as we shall later see, from the fact that we are partially socialized into a large number of vague, and overlapping, and often opposed, groups (U. G. Weatherly, 1934).

Status at birth and, today, accidents of migration and the like determine to what groups the individual will belong. Whatever these groups are, the socialization of the individual into the group ways of each group will involve the development of some degree of in-group feeling.* He will be taught that the various members of the group are his friends and that their ways of behavior are the "right" ways for men to behave. At the same time he will ordinarily be taught that people who do not belong to the group are strangers, foreigners, or outlanders†. If his group is for historical reasons in conflict with some group among the general category of outlanders, he will be trained to beliefs that are appropriate to fighting and destroying that group.

The ways that different peoples act toward their friends and their enemies are extremely varied. But that every human being will put some human beings into the category "friend" and others into the category "enemy" is as near to a universal law of human behavior as the social psychologist is likely to discover. Toward the people whom he classifies as friends, he will exhibit some degree of what may be described as love, loyalty, kindness, consideration, and the like. Toward those whom he classifies as enemy, he will exhibit some degree of hatred, fear, distaste, and the like‡. The covert processes that are

* Because our own social groups are at present notoriously unstable, it is difficult to develop in them any great amount of in-group feeling. There is, therefore, only a very slight positive correlation between length of group membership and homogeneity of opinion among the members (M. Smith, 1940b). See "A technique for measuring like-mindedness" (J. Zubin, 1938).

† An extreme form of dichotomization into in-groups and out-groups is described in *Patterns of culture* (R. Benedict, 1934a). In the particular society in question a person looks upon even his or her spouse as a member of an out-group. When illness comes, the spouse is the most logical person to blame, as he (or she), being in closest contact with the victim, possesses the best opportunity to exert that particular sort of magic which, according to tribal belief, results in illness.

‡ An interesting illustration of the social origin of in-group and out-group attitudes is to be found in the changing status in Negro society of the light-skinned

involved in such in-group and out-group behaviors can be understood as forms of identification

Positive Identification.*—Although in-group membership does not result in any specific pattern of person-to-person adjustment, all such adjustments appear to operate upon the covert process of positive identification. Positive identification consists of mentally putting oneself into the place of another and reacting more or less intensely to the stimuli that actually impinge upon that other person. Thus, should a person with whom we have closely identified ourselves cut his finger in our presence, we would vicariously "feel" the pain of that hurt. Conversely, should he receive good news, we would "thrill with him." The ability to react positively to the situations affecting another is evidently a consequence of social training and becomes more or less characteristic of our relations with the members of our in-group.

Apparently the positive identification of one person with another is dependent not so much upon the ability to understand and to react in the same manner as the other as it is upon the ability to react in some way or other to the stimulus that affects that other. Thus the child need not actually be happy in order that the mother derive vicarious pleasure, if the situation of the child is one in which the mother herself would be happy. The child who is playing in the street may be quite oblivious to danger, but the mother is afraid for him, since, under the same circumstances, she would be afraid for herself.

Positive identification leads the one who makes the identification to be affected vicariously by the situation that is directly affecting the

Negress. Two decades ago in the deep South, the "high yellow" was considered socially inferior to the full blood in Negro society. Today, the light-skinned girl has a great advantage over her darker sister in the south as well as in Harlem (G. A. Steward, 1927).

In the case of small children the darker their skin the more readily they identify themselves as Negroes (K. B. Clark and M. K. Clark, 1940). See also *Color and human nature* (W. L. Warner, B. H. Junker, and W. A. Adams, 1941) and "The relationship between minority-group membership and group identification in a group of urban middle class Negro girls" (M. Brenman, 1940).

* The term "sympathy" is frequently used to refer to the subjective aspects of positive identification. Cooley, in his *Human nature and the social order* (C. H. Cooley, 1922), and some others have used it in much the same sense as we use the phrase "positive identification."

For a picture of the way in which "sympathy" develops in children of our own culture, see *Social behavior and child personality: an exploratory study of some roots of sympathy* (L. B. Murphy, 1937) and "Measurement of sociation" (L. D. Zeleny, 1941b).

one with whom identification is made. The person who is positively identified with another is, therefore, encouraged to act in such a way as to contribute, in terms of his own personality, to the welfare of the other and is discouraged from doing anything that will injure it. The extent to which such in-group identification will influence his behavior depends, of course, upon the intensity of that identification.

People who have common reactions to situations and who are closely identified with one another will live together in a considerable degree of harmony. Since to hurt another hurts him vicariously, each member of the group will tend to do only that which contributes to the welfare of all. The process of positive identification is, therefore, the sociopsychological basis for social unity and mutual aid. It is the process underlying the Biblical injunction, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them."

Negative Identification.—But up to the present the members of mankind have not been integrated into one great in-group. All men are not brothers, they are broken up into innumerable antagonistic brotherhoods. Their capacity for self-sacrifice, loyalty, kindness, and humility is equaled by their capacity for selfishness, ruthlessness, greed, and cupidity. Although they love their friends, they may also hate some other group of human beings, their enemies. With the former they are, or can become, positively identified. With the latter they are identified in a reverse direction. This form of identification permits a vicarious reaction that is negative; *i. e.*, stimuli that produce "pain" in the other give pleasure to the negatively identified person, and vice versa. Thus we enjoy hurting our enemies, whereas their good fortune hurts and angers us. To obtain this response, we are in a sense identifying ourselves with the enemy; for only by so doing can we imagine what hurts him and what constitutes his good fortune. The difference between positive and negative identification is therefore entirely a matter of the direction of the identification. Frequently termed "antipathy," negative identification underlies much of man's inhumanity to man.

Individual and Social Consequences of Identification.—By making a positive identification with the hero of a story or play and a negative identification with the villain, it is possible to "live" with these characters, covertly participating in the struggles of the hero and enjoying his eventual success, covertly being relieved and gratified by the ultimate defeat of the villain.* It is only because reader and audience members

* In comedy and tragedy the process is much more complex. The interested student will find a discussion of how varying identifications make possible our

make such identifications that the novelist and playwright can manipulate the covert behaviors of their audiences. The recreational satisfactions derived from the reading of fiction and the witnessing of prize fights, plays, motion pictures, and the like are mainly secured by vicarious participation in the struggle and in the final resolution of the symbolic drama.

In real life also many human satisfactions, as well as dissatisfactions, are secured through vicarious participation in the life of others. A man lives in part through his children, sharing their pleasures and sharing their sorrows. He rejoices at the news that "his" army has won a battle and suffers with it in its defeat. His children, his soldiers, and the like are for him heroes in real-life drama.

Real life has its villains, too. Nature, evil spirits, poisonous food, and the tough boy down the street may be the villains of the little dramas in which his children are involved. The members of other races, other nations, other classes, and the like will be the villains in the complex dramas in which he and his in-groups are involved.

Bias, Prejudice,* and Differences in Human Nature.—In a fictional drama the hero represents those things which are good and the villain those which are evil. In the dramas of real life we, our in-group, represent for us the forces of good, and they, an out-group, the forces of evil. Ideologically this is expressed by some variant of the idea that "we" are the chosen people, the people of glorious destiny, the saviors of civilization, whereas "they" are the forces of destruction, the inferior peoples, the unworthy. It is to be observed, however, that they consider themselves the truly human and us the less than human †. Since who is which is a matter of group membership, the beliefs concerning the nature of the members of an out-group can have in-group, but not universal, validity.

laughing at the plight of the comic hero and enjoying the sufferings of the tragic hero in Appendix note 39.

* The term "prejudice" is often used to indicate negative reactions to any object, animate or inanimate. Thus we may say of a man that he is prejudiced against popular music, against spinach, or against cats. So used, "prejudice" means only "dislike." As indicative of negative identification of a person-to-person order, however, "prejudice" means something far more complex than simple dislike. See "The prejudices of men" (W. D. Wallis, 1929). For a study of dislikes as distinct from prejudices see "An annoyance test and some research problems" (H. Cason, 1930), "A multiple factor analysis of children's annoyances" (H. D. Carter, H. S. Conrad, and M. C. Jones, 1935), and "The categorization of an annoyance inventory" (C. M. Harsh, 1938).

† Among the Amerindians a great number of tribal names, such as Zuni, Déné, and Kiowa are, in reality, names by which these groups know themselves and are their only native terms for "human beings" (R. Benedict, 1934a).

Thus to the sixteenth century European, the Oriental was a "strange and wondrous creature, undoubtedly possessed of many human attributes, but yet in no sense truly human" Wrote a scholarly Chinese observer of a meeting with Jesuit priests in the same century

These "Ocean Men," as they are called, are tall beasts with deep sunken eyes and beak-like noses . But the strangest thing about them is that, although undoubtedly men, they seem to possess none of the mental faculties of men The most bestial of peasants is far more human, although these Ocean Men go from place to place with the self-reliance of a man of scholarship and are in some respects exceedingly clever It is quite possible that they are susceptible to training and could with patience be taught the modes of conduct proper to a human being *

In the objective study of human nature differences it is necessary to transcend the biases of in-group identification and the prejudices against out-group members The sociopsychological view of these differences will therefore run counter to the particularistic views of the members of any given in-group

The Social Origin of Differences in Human Nature.—In Chapter I, it was observed that the science of social psychology has grown out of the fairly recent rejection of the Aristotelian view that society is but an expression of human nature—conceived of as a natural attribute of the individual—and out of the acceptance of the Platonic thesis that human nature is largely a consequence of society This latter concept does not, of course, ignore the fact that man, the human being, cannot transcend the limitations imposed by nature upon man, the animal It does not question the importance of heredity It accepts as true the old adage that you cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear But it also recognizes that the silk must be made into a purse, and so, to attempt an explanation of the character of a silk purse in terms of the nature of silk ignores the fact that the finest Shantung raw silk will not, by its own nature, evolve into a purse and might, as a matter of fact, be made into any number of other silk objects.

* The quotation is from a letter written to his son by a scholar visiting Yun-nanfu. It is pertinent to note at this point that three distinctive views of human nature are to be found in Chinese social philosophy (a) Human nature is naturally bad; and only by law, operating through threat of physical punishment, can people be made to live together harmoniously, (b) human nature is naturally good; and, if freed from the effects of bad laws, the natural goodness of men would express itself through the emergence of a perfect society; (c) human nature is a consequence of social training, mainly through example and by means of rituals This last view was that of the Confucian school and was the one generally accepted by the layman The quotation referred to reflects this point of view

It is equally unfruitful to try to explain human nature in terms of the biological potentialities of the human animal. Biological inadequacy might explain the failure of an individual to attain the patterns of behavior normal for his social group, but, as we shall shortly see, it is futile and misleading to attempt to trace the different behavior norms of different social groups to variations in their biological heritages. There is, however, a pronounced cultural incentive for doing so.

The idea that the members of an out-group are inferior because they were born to be that way is a conventional justification for in-group bias. It fortifies the barriers between in-group and out-group members, it strengthens the in-group ties; it helps preserve the *status quo*. Thus, when Aristotle expounded the doctrine of the biological origin of social differences, he was but expressing the belief of upper-class Athenians that they had a permanent and irrevocable claim to the social status of master and that the slaves of Athens (members of an out-group) should keep to their place and refrain from protest if they found it an uncomfortable one.

That there is a certain social value in the belief that the members of an out-group are inferior because they are born that way does not, however, give it any scientific merit. The fact remains that society is not the direct expression of some inherent force, human nature is a consequence of society. As societies differ from one another, so, too, will the human nature of individuals differ.

RACIAL DIFFERENCES

The Concept of Race.—In some societies the concept of race has not existed. The idea that mankind can be divided on the basis of skin color or characteristic physiognomy into two or more distinct biological groups was apparently rather foreign to the early Egyptians, the Romans, the Chinese, and some other peoples. They had their in-group and out-group concepts, but because of historical accident, these were not founded upon biological criteria. It is only when out-group social divergences happen to coincide with some fairly well pronounced biological distinctions that the theory of the racial determinism of social attributes appears. In our own background, this coincidence has occurred, and with us the concept that there is an automatic relationship between physical appearance and human nature has served long and well in the perpetuation of animosity between in-groups and out-groups.*

* The extent to which we sometimes go in attributing human-nature differences to biological deficiency has been quite dramatically shown in *A comparative study*

Following the decline of the Roman Empire and prior to the twelfth century, there was little movement of peoples in the Western world. Isolation had resulted in the localization of cultural attributes, each small community forming a basic in-group where strangers were looked upon as enemies. With the breakdown of feudal isolation and the growth of world exploration and trade, Europeans came into contact with peoples of divergent cultures and different biological attributes. Cultural and biological attributes became associated, and the idea that the cultural "inferiority" of the peoples of Africa, India, China, and the Americas was caused by natural (biological) inferiority of these "races" provided Europeans with an excellent justification for political and economic exploitation of them.*

The Aryan Myth.—The fact that the peoples of the Western world today possess a more efficient technology than is found elsewhere is frequently taken as indicating that they have a superior biological heritage—an idea known to social psychologists as the Aryan myth. During the last century, the entire problem of cultural differences was neatly, if inaccurately, disposed of by the French savant de Gobineau. Following his lead, the early physical anthropologists devoted great energy to the measurement of human physical attributes in the attempt to find facts to fit the theory that mankind consists of a number of mutually exclusive racial groupings. As anthropometric techniques improved, the results became less and less convincing. It is true that upon the basis of some single criterion, such as skin color, or upon the basis of the more complex multiple criteria, such as pigmentation, texture of skin and hair, nostrility, and cephalic index, certain group types can be discerned. The typical African primitive is darker than the typical Polynesian, the

of the relationship existing between the white race and the negro race in the State of North Carolina and in the City of New York (C. W. Hunter, 1927). Several white groups were asked to rate the Negro's intelligence in terms of the white man's I. Q. Sixty-three per cent of the southern adults whom Hunter queried thought that the typical Negro was not over 25 per cent as bright as the typical white man. And unfortunately it has been demonstrated that northerners who attend southern colleges tend to accept the southerners' attitudes toward the Negro (V. F. Sims and J. R. Patrick, 1936). There is evidence that attitudes toward the Negro may change with college training (E. R. Bolton, 1937), but only if direct attention is paid to the cultures of other peoples (A. L. Porterfield, 1937). See also "The development of attitude toward the negro" (E. L. Horowitz, 1936); "The development of children's nationality preferences, concepts, and attitudes" (H. Meltzer, 1941b); and "Attitudes of Italian-Americans toward race prejudice" (H. L. Kingsley and M. Carbone, 1938).

* For a brief consideration of the historical factors lying behind modern racial preconceptions, see "The rise of modern race antagonisms" (F. G. Detweiler, 1932).

latter, darker than the Oriental, and the Oriental, in turn, darker than the European. But the variation of color, etc., among the members of any such group is wide, and the distributions of physical attributes of various groups overlap. An individual of southern Europe may come much closer to the norm for the Polynesians than to that for Europeans. Such overlapping makes ridiculous all attempts to classify the human animal on the basis of mutually exclusive biological groups (40)

The idea that there is a distinct Aryan race has, however, persisted (41). As commonly used, the term means no more than "superior." It is a favorite shibboleth of political demagogues who identify Aryanism with national or religious affiliations to suit their particular purposes. In relatively recent times, we have witnessed national political unification in Europe justified in the name of racial identity and racial "destiny." Furthermore, the idea that civilization is doomed unless Western peoples maintain a high birth rate is invariably founded upon the assumption that the peoples native to Africa and Asia are biologically incapable of carrying on our culture. Much of the alarm expressed over our declining birth rate is thus rationalized, although the objection to birth control probably finds its origin in religious preconceptions. Even were we to assume that the people of western Europe form a distinct Aryan race, it would not follow that they are biologically superior to other "races." Using historical materials and arguing that cultural superiority presupposes biological superiority, almost anything can be claimed. It all depends upon the period of world history which is selected for consideration.

The Cultural Nature of Race Differences—Most if not all the differences in human nature commonly thought of as racial are, in fact, cultural (42). We have already agreed that the people of Asia have both a somewhat darker skin and a different mode of social life than do those of Europe. That these correlations are causal does not follow. Vast cultural changes may take place without similar modification of "race." Many individuals of European origin have become "Chinified," and many Orientals have become culturally indistinguishable from Europeans. All the findings of sociology and of cultural anthropology support the conclusion that the source of social differences is to be found in historical divergences rather than in biological variations.*

* The human-nature attributes of "racial" groupings undergo pronounced modification as the social conditions under which these groupings live change. See, for example, "The modification of Hawaiian character since the advent of the white man" (A. W. Lind, 1934). See also "Changing personality traits of second

Although there may be underlying functional similarities between different social systems, the particular institutions, mores, technical practices, etc., may be very different, and hence the human-nature attributes of the members of one society may contrast sharply with those of another. With us it is probably true that few men will work hard and diligently unless they are spurred on by the prospect of self-gain. Ours is a society in which economic activities are still governed largely by the profit motive. Our human nature being what it is, there is therefore little reason to anticipate that an appeal to altruism will encourage men to work harder and more efficiently. It is also generally true of us that we tend to be preoccupied with tangible property, to evaluate one another in terms of the possession of material wealth, to deem quantitative increase in material goods a sign of progress, and to consider lazy and unworthy those among us who do not continually strive to increase their wealth.

The opposite has been true of some primitives. Our Northwest Indians, to be sure, were intensely competitive and like us measured almost everything in quantitative terms. But in some Indian groups it was definitely contrary to human nature to be competitive, either in work, sport, love, or other human activity.* With these groups, to be first was not esteemed. Among some of the American natives, wealth consisted not of material objects but of magic powers socially inherited or else secured as compensation for labor. In those social systems men worked not for individual material profit but for their group.

What is true of economic behavior is true of all other human-nature attributes: they differ from place to place, depending upon the society rather than upon the inherent nature of man. It is generally true that men in Western societies violently resent any amorous affairs that their wives or sweethearts may have. The "unwritten law" is a reflection of the conviction that it is "human nature" for men to be

generation Orientals in America" (W. C. Smith, 1928), *The second-generation Japanese problem* (E. K. Strong, Jr., 1934b); "A study of the causes of feelings of inferiority" (M. E. Smith, 1938), *Children of bondage: the personality development of negro youth in the urban South* (A. Davis and J. Dollard, 1940), *Negro youth at the crossways: their personality development in the middle states* (E. F. Frazier, 1940); and *Deep South* (A. Davis, B. B. Gardner, and M. R. Gardner, 1941).

* A survey of the literature on competition would force one to conclude that the evidence for a competitive urge is not convincing. See, for example, *Patterns of culture* (R. H. Benedict, 1934a); *Cooperation and competition among primitive peoples* (M. Mead, 1937); "The experimental psychology of competition" (J. Vaughn and C. M. Diserens, 1938); and "Social motives in economic activities" (T. N. Whitehead, 1938).

jealous of their wives. In some societies, however, men are resentful only when the wife, returning from an amorous adventure, fails to bring from her lover a token payment to the husband for her services. The fact that another looks with favor upon his wife is, in these societies, intensely flattering to the husband. If she reciprocates, the husband does not find in that fact a reason for jealousy.*

Contrasts in human nature, such as those suggested above, are many. The rapid cultural synthesis that has been going on during the past few centuries is, however, reducing them. Should a world society finally emerge, the biological divergences that permit us to think and talk of races will no longer be paralleled with differences in human nature. The present differences in "racial" human nature have developed as a result of cultural isolation; as cultural contacts grow, those differences tend to dissipate.

HABITATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN HUMAN NATURE

In addition to the larger cultural differences in human nature, there are many of a habitational character, which have never been thought of as racial in origin but are frequently believed to result from different natural endowments. These differences are of two orders: regional, such as those between the New England Yankee and the Georgia Crackers, and rural-urban, such as those between the sophisticated city girl and her naive country cousin.

Regional Differences.—Regional differences in human nature originate in sectional isolation. In many countries a conventional but somewhat unrealistic comparison is made between the people of "the north" and those of "the south." The former are supposed to possess the virtues—or, from the southern point of view, vices—of hardihood, persistence, economy, diligence, shrewdness in economic and political dealings, rugged honesty, sharpness of voice, and quickness of manner. The latter, on the other hand, are supposed to be complacent, generous, unambitious, unduly trustful in economic and political matters, rather more concerned with formalisms than with underlying realities, soft of voice, and slow of movement. This north-south dichotomy of the human-nature attributes of the people within their respective countries is recognized by the Chinese, Italians, Spanish, French, English, Scotch, and Americans. National histories frequently utilize this dichotomy in interpreting the cause of national events. To explain the presumed differences, recourse is invariably made to climate; but either the differences are not so common as many suppose, or some other factor than climate is involved. For northern

* See "Jealousy and sexual property" (K. Davis, 1936)

Italy is south of southern France, the climate of many regions in northern France differs little from that of southern England, northern England is south of southern Scotland *

Although they cannot be correlated with latitude and climate, regional differences in human nature do exist. In the United States, some distinctions can, for example, be drawn in rather general terms between the people of the north and the south (C. W. Hunter, 1927) and the east and the west. More apparent, however, are those of a more localized character. Outstanding in the popular mind are the hillbillies, people born and reared in certain isolated mountain regions of Tennessee, the Carolinas, Georgia, and Arkansas. Descendants of early Scotch-Irish immigrants who settled in the hill country, the "hillbillies," because of isolation, have retained many of the old-country modes of life, modified to suit the new conditions, but otherwise relatively unaffected by the current of American social development. Then there is the "poor white trash" of the southern lowlands—a people of diverse origin who have lived generation after generation upon submarginal land, in submarginal occupations, and in ways that are different from those more or less typical of American society. An even more striking group, perhaps the most famous in American literature, is the so-called Pennsylvania Dutch, whose language, religion, and customs are in some regards so unusual that a visitor to the region feels that he is in a foreign land.

Through isolation, many human-nature differences have developed between the "typical" New England farmer and the "typical" far west rancher. Both, however, are citizens of the United States, have a common national history, speak a common language, and have access to a common literature. The differences between them will therefore tend to disappear with the growth of interregional communication. The newspaper, good roads, and the automobile have gone far to level off the regional differences in human nature of the people of the United States. At present, the radio is believed by some to be wiping out regional linguistic differences. It may become a powerful force in establishing a common mode and manner of speech, based presumably upon the diction of the professional radio announcer.

Rural-urban Differences.—The basic aspects of our social heritage are rural. The urban community, creature of trade and industrialism, has been superimposed upon an older, agricultural society. But the human nature that is characteristic of the farm and village is in some

* For an attempt to correlate human-nature differences and nationality see "National character" (M. Ginsberg, 1942)

regards incompatible with the new conditions of life. The rural community is small, unconcentrated, homogeneous, and relatively self-sufficient. By contrast, the urban community is large, compact, heterogeneous, and dependent upon relationships with other communities for maintenance. Thus the modes of conduct that operate under rural-life conditions have been gradually modified among the people of cities. The city man has come to have attributes of human nature distinct from those of his rural brother.*

Human-nature differences of the rural-urban order are not peculiar to the modern world, but they have been made especially significant by the rapid rise of cities in western Europe and the United States during the past century. For the last fifty years the political and economic importance of the rural community has been declining, whereas that of the urban community has increased. The human-nature attributes of the city man have therefore gained prestige, and rural characteristics have lost value in the public eye. Reflected until very recently in our literature, art, and drama, this viewpoint led some of the earlier students of human behavior to assume that the city was draining the best "stocks" from the farm. They argued that the more ambitious, more intelligent, and better educated farm boys and girls moved on to the city, which offered greater opportunities and greater rewards. A depletion of the rural "blood" was envisaged, and the time was foreseen when we should have an American peasantry of low hereditary capacity.† Overlooked, however, was

*The wide gap that exists between the human-nature attributes of the rural and urban person even in contemporary America can be seen in "Rural-urban differences in religious culture, beliefs, and behavior" (P. A. Sorokin, 1929). See also "The rural mind: a study in occupational attitude" (W. C. Smith, 1927), *A study of rural society* (J. H. Kolb and E. de S. Brunner, 1935), "Personality development in farm, small-town, and city children" (L. H. Stott, 1939), "A comparison of the personality test scores of rural and urban college women" (A. E. Robertson and E. L. Stromberg, 1940), and *Mensch und Volk der Grossstadt* (W. Hellpach, 1939).

† If intelligence tests could be taken at their face value as perfect reflections of inherited intelligence, one would be forced to admit from Klineberg's studies that the rural populations of Europe possess less inherited intelligence than do the urban groups (O. Klineberg, 1935a). Klineberg's urban groups—from Paris, Hamburg, and Rome—differed but slightly one from another, yet they were markedly superior to his seven rural groups. On the other hand, Klineberg has offered other data that suggest that the differences between urban and rural groups in intelligence-test scores are at least in part a result of environmental differences. With 425 twelve-year-old Negro boys of New Orleans he found an almost perfect correlation between test score and length of city residence (O. Klineberg, 1935b). See also "Selective rural-urban migration" (C. C. Zimmerman, 1929) and "Inteligența în mediul rural-urban" (A. Rosca, 1939).

the fact that little concerning innate ability can be deduced from the observation that it is exceptional ambition that leads the boy and girl to leave the farm and strike out for themselves in the city. Moreover, except for personal biases, there is no reason to suppose that ambition is necessarily meritorious.

To say that the farmer is a farmer because he is naturally incapable of becoming anything else is simply to reveal an urban bias. In spite of the elaborate studies that have been made to prove the biological superiority of urban populations, nothing has been proved except the existence of differences between rural and urban human nature.

OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN HUMAN NATURE

Class.—From the processes of the Industrial Revolution, which has slowly narrowed racial and habitational differences in human nature, a new basis for human-nature differences—that of class—has developed. Until quite recently we here in America have been unaware of or at least unconcerned by the existence of classes in the American population. For one thing, class differences are in violation of our concept of democratic government. For another, the expanding character of our economic activities has made for such a great interchange of individuals between the classes* that there has been comparatively little class consciousness. In England and continental European countries, class distinctions have long been pronounced and the lines between classes relatively rigid. Some sociologists and economists believe that we are approaching something of the same sort in contemporary America.

The origin, nature, and function of social classes is a sociological problem.† Sociopsychological interest in classes lies in the fact that in a class system, each class will have something of its own human-nature attributes. Sociopsychological analysis of class differences in human nature is, however, made exceedingly difficult by the

* For an amusing attempt to develop a class system among three white rats, see "An experimentally produced 'social problem' in rats" (O. H. Mowrer, 1939). One rat "did all the work" by repeatedly pressing a bar some distance from a food slot, while the others merely waited for their food at the slot.

† For brief summaries of the historical forces that have made for the breakdown of the old feudal class system and the rise of the three-class system, which is characteristic of contemporary Western society, see A. Meusel's "Middle class" (*Encycl Soc Sci*, 10, 407-415) and his article on "Proletariat" (*Encycl Soc Sci*, 12, 510-518). That Americans consider themselves a middle-class nation is shown by the fact that only 21 per cent rated themselves as belonging to the upper or lower classes (*Fortune*, February, 1940). In an earlier Gallup poll 12 per cent so rated themselves (*Gallup poll*, April, 1939).

welter of popular preconceptions concerning the reason why one man belongs to the "lower" class while another belongs to the "upper" class. Unfortunately, more time and effort have gone into the attempt to verify the Aristotelian contention that some men are born to be slaves and some to be masters than into the actual study of class differentiation.

Class differences are based upon, and in the first instance arise from, some traditional method of division of labor among the members of a social group. Work differentiation is necessary for efficiency. Even the simpler peoples have occupational groups. Among the plains Indians, the males were divided into guardians (warriors), hunters, and butchers. With fishing peoples the division is necessarily different: boatmakers, boatmen, fishermen, etc. Among many primitives such occupational distinctions have no more than occupational significance. When, however, occupational position is associated with other distinctive social attributes, as it is in modern society, classes result.

The Greek ideal of class, expressed most understandingly in the writings of Plato, was threefold: warriors, workers, and leaders. Feudal society, also, involved three classes, although historians often lump the warriors and workers together as serfs. Class position was hereditary in feudal society, and the differences between the human natures of classes were pronounced. In the transition from feudalism to our present society the old class barriers were swept away, a bourgeois class arose, and leadership passed from the hands of the old feudal political aristocracy to a new economic one. Because wealth is not exclusively a matter of inheritance under the industrial system, there has always been considerable individual interchange between classes. In Europe, however, the economic class lines and distinctions have long since become clear, and membership has partly solidified.

In many European countries, class consciousness is a real thing, as is evidenced by the political party line-up in the various national governments. Each class has something of its own conventions, some distinctive traditions, and some special points of view. During this present century the disorder and destruction brought by war, subjugation under ruthless conquerors, and revolutionary upheaval have from time to time affected but not as yet revised the class structure evolved during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.* In

* The various European revolutions have no doubt been attempts to destroy the class structure and to establish new ones. So far, however, the general result has been only a change of personnel in the existing class categories. Thus in Germany during the 1930's the Nazis drove Jews from positions of economic

France, for example, we may still distinguish within the general population the agricultural peasantry—the “backbone” of the country—which is exceedingly conservative, intensely nationalistic, thrifty, and solid. In contrast to the peasant stands the industrial laborer, who is radically inclined, contemptuous of the peasantry, comparatively unstable, and, unlike the peasant, inclined to resent the political and industrial leaders. These leaders, although hardly a hereditary class, are cosmopolitan and tend to have their own social life and ways of looking at the world. Between the laborer and the leader stands the petty bourgeois—the small shopkeeper, small-scale manufacturer, and technician. He is conservative like the peasant but has somewhat different interests, something of his own society, and a definitely “middle-class” point of view. Movement does take place among these classes, a peasant may become a merchant and a worker may become a politician or industrialist. But so distinct are the characteristic human-nature attributes of each class that no one familiar with the French people would have much difficulty in placing a man in his class after a few moments of conversation with him.

In England, class distinctions are also clear. Although a poor boy may rise to wealth and knighthood, such exceptions only prove the rule. A man stays in the class to which he has been born. The distinctive behaviors associated with the various classes include such matters as speech usages, interests, values, modes of dress, manners, etc. Nothing could, for example, be more definitive of the human-nature attributes of an English servant than to state of him that he is a “gentleman’s gentleman.”

Here in America, where class lines are only now beginning to solidify, it is often more informing to designate the region where a man was born than to state whether he was born with a silver spoon in his mouth or a shovel in his hand. The human-nature differences of our various classes are still in the making.* We may, as some students predict, in time develop an agricultural peasantry† characteristically poor, uneducated, superstitious, docile, and patient. In some contrast to the peasants would stand the industrial worker—mobile rather than settled, but equally poor and unskilled, and ignorant except in matters of adjustment to urban life. Above these in the

leadership, but filled their places promptly with “Aryan” party members (H. Gerth, 1940)

* But see *Caste and class in a southern town* (J. Dollard, 1937). For an attack on the semipsychoanalytic approach employed in this study, see “Mr. Dollard and scientific method” (L. H. Lanier, 1939).

† See *Preface to peasantry* (A. F. Raper, 1936).

social scale might come the professional class—doctors, lawyers, and political bureaucrats—with a distinctive human nature of their own. Dominating these other classes might be the political, economic, and military aristocracy, easily distinguishable from the rest by their behavior as well as their dress. All that is necessary to establish some such class differentiation is a crystallization of some present tendencies in American life. On the other hand, we may attain that classless society envisaged by the American Constitution and the theoretical communists. In such a society no class differentiations would exist, the only differences between individuals being those which follow from their different natural potentialities.

Social Origin of Class Distinctions.—It is argued by most sociologists that class differences in human nature are based not upon native variations but upon differential training. Those who believe in the aristocracy of birth may argue otherwise, but in a society like ours, where class mobility has been very great, it would seem that the burden of giving evidence should be upon the hereditarian (43). The theory that wealth and power in society are a consequence of superior inherited potentialities is, after all, little more than a revision of the ancient and long discredited idea of the divine right of kings. That men differ in their innate potentialities to learn is highly probable; but that a class system represents a division of the better and poorer* strains in the social population is not to be proved by the mere fact that the "better" classes are better fed, clothed, and housed, better informed, more skillful at certain activities, and more ambitious and creative than those of the "lower" classes. There may be a positive correlation between innate potentialities and social position in certain localities, but there is no evidence that it is at all general. Among the things that a man "inherits" at birth is his class position, which in a large measure determines what he will become as a human being.

Craft Differences.—In addition to those of the class, each occupation within the class makes its unique demands upon the individual who follows it. For the members of each occupational grouping, there are behaviors typical for and peculiar to that group †. These

* Social competence is obviously much easier to study among the feeble-minded than among other portions of the general population. See "Growth studies in social competence" (E. A. Doll, 1939).

† For descriptions of the way of life of some commonplace craft groups see *The woman who waits* (F. R. Donovan, 1920), *The saleslady* (F. R. Donovan, 1929), *The schoolma'am* (F. R. Donovan, 1938), and *The railroader* (W. F. Cottrell, 1940). For a technical analysis of occupational role and personality attributes see "Institutional office and the person" (E. C. Hughes, 1937).

invariably involve more than special technical knowledge or skills. To be acceptable to craft membership, the vintager must know more than the craft techniques; he must know and accept the particular ideas, sentiments, and values of his craft. He must have a "feel" for wines and interest in those things—weather, for example—that go to make a good vintage year. He may see history in terms of wine and vintage years, know geography in terms of wine regions, and judge people by their tastes in wine. He will therefore differ as a human being in many respects from the norm for society as a whole.

Although the decline of craftsmanship during the last few centuries has tended to level off occupational differences in human nature, there remain such distinctions as those between the priest, the scientist, the medical man, the businessman, the politician, and the professional reformer. To illustrate, there is often a considerable conflict between the point of view of the scientist, who is interested primarily in facts, and that of the businessman, who is interested mainly in profits. Should the former examine advertising copy, he is likely to be concerned only with the validity of statements and therefore to be repulsed by its fictional nature; the businessman, on the other hand, will judge it in terms not of truth but of effectiveness. Such occupational differences become particularly apparent whenever representatives from a number of occupations are called upon to give expert advice upon some governmental problem. The fact that committees and commissions of investigation disagree is as likely to be an indication that the membership was drawn from different occupational groups, each with its special point of view, as it is to be an indication that their problem is unsolvable.

SEX DIFFERENCES IN HUMAN NATURE

The Sex Division of Labor.—In the modern world class and craft distinctions are dynamic. There is, however, one occupational distinction that remains at least relatively stable. This is the division of labor on the basis of sex. We frequently think of sex differences in human nature as an automatic consequence of sex. It is traditional that men and women differ intellectually and "emotionally" because they differ somewhat physiologically. This idea quite possibly developed out of the patriarchal family system, under which human activities were divided into two general categories: domestic and nondomestic. For reasons related to her sexual functioning, woman was assigned by convention to the former sphere of activities; man, to the latter. Basically nothing more than an expedient division of labor

between the sexes, the human-nature attributes that were associated with each occupation were long interpreted as a natural consequence of the fact that men and women are physiologically different. Probably because under this system descent was calculated along the male line, there developed the idea that women's "human nature" was somehow inferior to that of men. In the matriarchal family system, such as that still adhered to by the Basques, this idea does not, however, appear.

The Changing Status of Women.—We need not engage here in the interminable controversy over the respective merits of the two sexes.* The old sexual division of labor has broken down under the impact of industrialization. During the past century a great number of formerly domestic activities have shifted from the home to the office, shop, and factory, and women have been "freed" to compete economically with men in nondomestic occupations. In the process of working out a new equilibrium, there has been a considerable amount of bitter friction between the "new" woman and the old-fashioned male and quite possibly as much between the "new" man and the old-fashioned female. In the heat of debate almost everything has been claimed for one side or the other. Upon the contention that because of their natural moral superiority they would purge politics of its corruption, women were given the ballot, upon the charge that because of their natural intellectual inferiority they are incompetent, they have been denied any significant place in political life. Men have been called the destroyers; women, the creative force behind civilization. Women have been termed an insidious force undermining men, the hidden cause of war and social degradation; they have also been acclaimed the foundation of peace and security. All this indicates what every man and woman knows: there are some residual human-nature differences between men and women.

* Although the makers of mental tests attempt to be fair to both sexes, one type of test may favor the male and another the female. Thus, although girls are slightly better in the main on linguistic items, boys are a trifle better on arithmetic (H. S. Conrad, H. E. Jones, and H. H. Hsiao, 1933). But in total performance no socially significant sex differences in intelligence appear. Witky, for example, found that, contrary to general belief, high schools do not enroll more intelligent boys than girls (P. A. Witky, 1934).

For further reading on the topic of sex differences, see "Sex inferiority" (R. A. Hudnut, 1928), *Sex differences in the growth of American school children* (E. A. Lincoln, 1927), "Motility in newborn infants" (O. C. Irwin, 1932), "Sex in social psychology" (C. C. Miles, 1935), "Recent research on sex differences" (C. N. Allen, 1935); and "Sex differences in intelligence test scores" (G. M. Kuznets and O. McNemar, 1940).

That the small girl tends to be more interested in dolls than does her brother is not an indication, however, that such an interest is a direct consequence of her sex. In our society, as we have seen, girls and boys are treated differently. Because it is conventional—not because it is natural—the girl may be taught to display more concern over clothes, personal cleanliness, and intimate family affairs than may her brother; because he is a boy, the latter is allowed and encouraged to develop interests in games, play wagons, footballs, hiking, etc., and in associates outside the immediate family. If we find that the girl and boy in later life differ in their basic interests, capacities, capabilities, and sentiments, we should not be astonished. Although they live in the same society, that society has responded to them quite differently (44). Obvious is the fact that men are supposed to be concerned with “manly” things; and since dressmaking, hair-dressing, housekeeping, and child tending do not enter into this category, the male is discouraged from such activities. Because it is “proper” for women to be feminine, we discourage the girl from developing interests in blacksmithing, prizefighting, engineering, and other masculine activities. The list of exclusively male and female occupational interests is rapidly dwindling, and the forces that keep men and women in their respective “places” are subsiding, but the belief that men and women differ as human beings because they differ sexually persists.

It is a notable and unquestionable fact that the majority of great scientists, writers, artists, musicians, and statesmen and the most successful cooks, dress designers, decorators, etc., have been men.* This is often interpreted as proof of the natural inferiority of the female. The social superiority of men would seem, however, to be a direct consequence of the conventional sexual division of labor, which even today centers the attention of women upon the home and prevents

* Two phenomena—the greater frequency of male “geniuses” and the old belief that there are more male than female mental defectives—have led to the theory that man is more variable than woman. No complete survey has ever been made of the feeble-minded population. To know the relative numbers of the two sexes in hospitals for the feeble-minded is of little aid, for feeble-minded men are notoriously more difficult to care for at home than are women. The former, therefore, are probably passed on to the state institutions in far greater numbers.

Although one study (Q. McNemar and L. M. Terman, 1936) indicated that the I. Q. of boys is slightly more variable than that of girls, the most recent studies (A. M. Macmeeken, 1939, M. G. Rigg, 1940c) yielded no differences that were statistically significant. Yet in spite of these data most mental testers still hold that boys are more variable than girls, at least to the extent of one I. Q. point in standard deviation (A. M. Macmeeken, 1939).

any large proportion of them from acquiring the strong motivation necessary to any considerable success in nondomestic occupational life. The interpretation that it is natural for women to be domestic undoubtedly reflects only the prejudice of the successful male who would defend his social superiority.

We do not, of course, question the social importance of the physiological differences between men and women but simply suggest that the human-nature differences are almost entirely of a social rather than physiological origin. Every social system must certainly take into account the fact that the anatomy and physiology of the sexes are in some respects different. But it is to the particular social system that we must look for an explanation of the quite divergent patterns of life adjustment that men and women tend to have. Even the "emotional" distinctions between the sexes can be adequately explained without recourse to physiology, and the presumed variation in sexual responsiveness is probably a consequence of the double standard of morality. Where that standard does not exist, no significant variations of this order can be found. If, as is so often asserted, the women of our society are inclined to be a trifle "colder" than the men, the cause would appear to lie in the fact that some remnants of Puritanism still remain with us. If, as seems likely, women are more interested in and more efficient at domestic activities than are men and are less capable in other directions, the reason is to be found in the fact that, the Industrial Revolution notwithstanding, much of the ancient patriarchal division of labor upon the basis of sex is still retained.

HUMAN NATURE AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

Throughout the past few hundred years the forces of violent social change have been breaking down the isolation of social groups, mixing and blending the members of various groups, and disorganizing their social systems. One of the many consequences has been the blurring of human-nature differences with the consequent confusion of in-group and out-group distinctions. The old in-group ideologies, however, have persisted; and new ones have been developed. We still think and often act in terms of race, of nation, of class, etc. We still make positive identifications with those people who happen for the moment to be classified among our friends, and we still make negative identifications with others who seem for the moment to be our enemies. But there is today little functional basis for and still less stability to many of our in-groups and out-groups. The friends of yesterday may be the enemies of today, the despised inferiors of yesterday our companions in-arms of today.

With the decline in social stability and the blurring of human-nature differences, attributes of individuality have come to make up an increasingly large part of the personalities of modern men. To put it another way, as the differences between groups of people have lessened, the differences between the members of each group have increased. These are the differences that we shall consider in the following chapter.

CHAPTER X

INDIVIDUALITY

The human-nature aspect of personality is, as we have seen, the individual manifestation of a collective pattern. The likenesses between men make for social efficiency, they permit person-to-person adjustment in terms of group ways. No social system, however, has yet developed that could so completely socialize the individual that all members in the society, or even those of like sex and age, would behave exactly like one another. Accidents and incidents of personal experience are perpetually interfering with the development of typical attributes. As a consequence, each member of society, even a member of a small and isolated primitive community, will so differ from his fellows that he is in some respects an individual.

The early anthropologists often returned from primitive societies with a conviction that the members of a primitive tribe or village were "as alike as peas in a pod." More intimate and penetrating observation revealed that this idea was a consequence of such inadequacy of knowledge as might lead a casual observer to conclude that, since each of the peas in a pod is more like the others than any one of them is like a bean, the peas are all alike. All members of a Bantu village will be more like one another than they are like Australian bushmen. They will, however, differ to some extent one from the other, even as the several peas in a pod differ one from another.* The ways in which the individual deviates from that which is typical for his social group constitute his "individuality."

Relative Character of Individuality.—There is nothing absolute about the distinction between human nature and individuality. The mere fact that so-and-so walks down city streets hatless is not sufficient grounds for considering this behavior an individuality element in his personality. In New York City it would be, in Los Angeles such behavior is distinctly normal. The fact that Mr. Smith likes well-aged fish marks him out in this respect as a deviant. Mr. Smith is an American; and in America fish, unlike cheese, rots rather than improves with age. In an arctic village, on the other hand, not to

* See "Personality in preliterate societies" (J. Gilla, 1939) for an extensive bibliography on the subject.

like well-aged fish would be a mark of individuality. In the arctic, fish improves with the passage of time and the action of bacteria. What behavior will be an evidence of individuality depends, therefore, on the point of reference. Depending on the point of reference, one man's individuality is another man's human nature.

Although it is a relative one, the distinction between human nature and individuality is of considerable sociopsychological significance. The human-nature attributes of a given personality are to be seen as the successes of the socialization processes, whereas his individuality attributes are evidences that at this and that point the socialization processes broke down or were for some reason unsuccessful. Thus we look into the social system for the origin of the human-nature attributes of a given personality and elsewhere—broadly speaking, into the effects of social change and disorganization—for the origins of his individuality. Furthermore, we see in his human nature forces for the perpetuation of the social *status quo* and in his individuality forces making for disturbance and change thereof.

To the historian, the sociologist, and the political scientist, this latter distinction is particularly important. The study of historical events—social changes, political and economic developments, etc.—is, again broadly speaking, the study of the impact of individuality upon the normal way of life of a people. From a social viewpoint, an attribute of individuality is an experiment, if that attribute proves successful, it may be taken over by more and more individuals until it is normal for the society. It is then an attribute of human nature. This is what has happened when a new word, for example, has become so much used that it is formally incorporated into a language.

Lay Recognition of Individuality.—Since the human-nature attributes in the personalities of those about us are a commonplace, we take them more or less for granted and tend to be aware only of those attributes that constitute a person's individuality. Thus in our relations with an acquaintance or friend we can and will take for granted the fact that he speaks English. But we may be acutely aware of and strive to adjust to the fact that he speaks very slowly or rapidly, that he uses slang to excess or never uses a slang word, that he has a painfully small vocabulary or a distressingly large one, etc. But note that each of these distinctions implies the existence of some more or less definite norm from which the deviation occurs—a normal rate of speech, a normal use of slang, a normal size of vocabulary.

In lay usage there are thousands of terms by which we endeavor to suggest at once the character of the norm and the specific nature

and extent of the deviation from it * Some, such as fastidious, flashy, and arty, refer to peculiarities of taste in food, dress, art, and the like Some, such as mechanical and clumsy, indicate special manual skills or the absence of normal skills Some, such as modesty, shyness, boldness, and self-consciousness, are used to indicate deviant covert behaviors that are inferred from overt behaviors All such attributes of individuality are important to the people who possess them and to those who must get along with these people The man who likes his steak cooked in just such a fashion will be distressed if he is forced to eat in an ordinary restaurant; the restaurant proprietor who caters to epicures and gourmets must know the individual preferences of his various customers The girl who is shy will be at a disadvantage when she goes to a dance, and her partner may have considerable difficulty in getting along with her because, as he might express it, "She won't act natural"

The Lay versus the Scientific View of Individuality.—The lay idea of a criminal is ordinarily that of a person who is perpetually engaged in stealing everything he can get his hands upon, who is untrustworthy in all regards, who has no consideration for other people, etc The lay idea of a psychopath is usually that of a person who is constantly struggling against restraint, brandishing knives, or doing some extraordinary thing The layman may, therefore, be astonished and dismayed by the discovery that the pleasant man who lives next door is not a night watchman but is in fact a second-story burglar and may be mortified to learn that the man who has just given him a lucid explanation of the operation of the state hospital is not one of the physicians but is in fact one of the patients

In our ordinary person-to-person relations we frequently deduce the whole of a given person's personality from evidence of one attribute of his individuality † This procedure is "reasonable," however unrealistic The man we judge to be honest may prove to be honest in all his relations with us For us he is, then, an honest man That he may be dishonest in his relations with his wife, deceive his mistress, and cheat on his income-tax report is unimportant to us What is significant for us as individuals who must somehow adjust to the

* For a list of 17,953 such terms see "Trait names—a psycho-lexical study" (G W Allport and H S Odbert, 1936) For a criticism thereof see "Unitary traits of personality and factor theory" (J P Guilford, 1936) For a treatment of trait names as adjectival stereotypes see "A study of personality from the standpoint of social stimulus value" (M A Durea, 1939) and the discussion in the next chapter

† This procedure will be discussed at length as "personality stereotyping" in the next chapter

human beings around us is not the total personalities of those human beings but the relevant parts or phases of them.

But in studying the human personality—as contrasted to trying to adjust to it—we must attempt to examine each element in turn, to see the relation of each to the others, and thus to arrive at an understanding of the whole. This endeavor is vastly complicated by two interrelated circumstances.

In the first place, a personality is not a homogeneous entity. It consists, as we have seen, of some attributes of human nature and some attributes of individuality. The possession of one attribute does not assure the possession of another, nor does the possession of one preclude the possession of another. As a result the layman's deduction of the whole from the known part is scientifically not permissible. Until all the "parts" of the personality are known, the whole remains unknown.

In the second place, the "parts" of a given personality can be known only as they function in some sort of situation; *e.g.*, "honesty" appears only under circumstances in which it is possible to steal, cheat, tell lies, etc. This means that attributes of individuality must be observed in operation—as one factor in an interaction. Since the interaction necessarily involves a number of variables, it is difficult to isolate the personality from the context in which it behaves.* Thus, we are never absolutely certain whether two people are behaving differently because of different factors in their personalities or because of different circumstances in the situation in which they behave. Likewise, we are never completely certain whether changes in a given person's behavior are to be traced to variables within his personality or within the situation in which it operates. These complicating facts and the attempts that have been made to surmount them will concern us for the remainder of this chapter.

MANIFESTATIONS OF INDIVIDUALITY

Trait Analysis.—In general the study of the attributes of individuality has centered around the concept of personality traits. As used by many laymen and by even a few writers, a "trait" is an all-or-none quality possessed by the individual. Thus, if a man possesses the "trait" of honesty, he will invariably be honest; to put it another way, if he possesses the trait of honesty, he does not possess that of dishonesty. The individual is, therefore, either honest or dishonest,

* So difficult, in fact, is this procedure that at least one social psychologist would abandon the attempt (L. S. Cottrell, Jr., 1942).

stubborn or vacillating, persevering or lazy, aggressive or unaggressive, etc

But in actuality, the individual is seldom if ever all this or all that, but is rather a mixture of many things. He may, for example, be aggressive in love-making and yet entirely unaggressive in economic matters, in fact, he may be aggressive in making love to Mary and relatively unaggressive in his courtship of Ann. Such being the case, it is impossible to say of him that he is either aggressive or unaggressive. It does not follow, however, that there is no carry-over from one kind of situation to another and no generalization of responses, although there has been some tendency for psychologists and social psychologists to assume that such is the case and that, therefore, individuality consists of the sum of the unrelated, highly specific patterns, each of which appears in one kind of situation and that kind only.*

The concept of highly specific traits arises from observation of the apparent contradictions that appear in an individual's behavior. Of late, however, more extended analysis has disclosed two factors that throw doubt upon the validity of this concept.

The Covert "Frame of Reference."—From the observer's point of view various behaviors of an individual may seem markedly contradictory. But to the individual himself no contradiction may be apparent. The thief who is honest with his fellows may see no contradiction between stealing in some situations and not stealing in others, the man who teaches his children that honesty is the best policy may see no contradiction between this procedure and the grandiose advertising claims he makes for the product of his factory, the man who indulges his own children may see no contradiction between this practice and the fact that as a juvenile court judge he is severe with the children of other men.

That the individual may feel and think of himself as "logical" in all his behaviors, although the observer discerns many contradictions between his behaviors, is a result of the fact that his system of logic is personal rather than universal. Such a personal system of logic has been termed the individual's "frame of reference."†

* For a description and discussion of the Hartshorne-May studies of honesty—which gave great impetus to the trait-analysis approach to individuality—and of subsequent and often qualifying studies, see Appendix note 45.

† The concept of a frame or point of reference has been well described by Sherif in his *The psychology of social norms* (M. Sherif, 1936). Allport has also made use of the frame of reference in his treatment of the Hartshorne-May honesty data. According to him "The low correlations found between the tests employed

In terms of the struggling artist's frame of reference it may seem reasonable to go hungry so that pigment and canvas may be purchased and pictures painted that no one will buy. To the artist such behavior may be more sensible than spending his money for food of which he might say, "It will soon be gone, and then what will I have to show for it?" To the observer it may not "make sense" for a man to be aggressive in dealings with his business associates and yet humble and meek in his relations with his wife. But to the man himself there may seem to be the utmost good sense involved. As he might say, "I must be aggressive to make money in business, but it is easier to let my wife have her way than to run counter to her will. When I am home, I want a little peace and quiet, and the only way to get that is to agree to everything she says."

The individual's frame of reference serves for him in his various person-to-person relations much the same function as the ideologies of the in-group do for its members in their relations with the members of out-groups. Thus, because of his peculiar frame of reference, the individual can "reasonably" be severe with his son but lenient with his daughter, just as his social ideologies make it possible for him justly to kill enemy soldiers, although he succors those of his own side.

Situational Factors.—Attributes of individuality can be known, as we have said, only as they become manifest in behavior, and behavior is always a function of some sort of situation. As the situation varies, so too will the behavior of the individual. A man may be smiling and talking pleasantly until a new topic is introduced into the conversation, when his speech becomes bitter and violent, he may be flirting with the pretty girl at the next table until his wife returns to join him at his, when he becomes once again the model husband; he may be honest with his business associates until strong temptation leads to theft.

Trait analysis stresses the individuality variables. Some social psychologists would place primary emphasis upon situational variables. Neither position is necessarily exclusive of the other, and each would seem to be valid, provided it is not pushed to the extreme.

It should be fairly evident that for no two human beings will a given social situation be exactly the same. The physical aspects of the conference room Mr. Jones enters will be much the same as they were before Mr. Smith entered it a moment previously. But the situ-

prove only that children are not consistent *in the same way*, not that they are inconsistent with *themselves*" (G. W. Allport, 1937, p. 250). See also "Rationalization in recognition as a result of a political frame of reference" (A. L. Edwards, 1941b) and "Studies in the principles of judgments and attitudes. III. The functional equivalence of two differently structured references" (M. Hertzman, 1940).

ation will be changed, if only by the fact that Smith is there. If Smith came in confidently and Jones comes in meekly, it is impossible to ascertain from this one observation whether the difference in their behaviors is a result of different attributes of individuality or of the difference in the situation. Only by observing their respective behaviors in a large number of conference situations, and thus more or less canceling out the situational variables, would it be possible to determine that Jones has the trait of meekness in situations of this order, whereas Smith possesses the trait of self-confidence.

Such canceling out of situational variables is seldom possible. Suppose that Jones is surly when he comes into breakfast and sits across from his wife and that this is a characteristic of his behavior in this situation. Suppose, too, that Smith usually chats amiably with his wife at breakfast. Are we to conclude that the personality of Jones includes a "surly at breakfast" characteristic, whereas that of Smith includes a "cheerful at breakfast" one? Such may indeed be the case. But it may be that the personality characteristics involved are, respectively, "surly at breakfast with Mrs. Jones" and "cheerful at breakfast with Mrs. Smith", for it is always possible that the situations are more responsible for the behavior differences than are the personalities of the husbands. Possibly, if the wives changed places, Jones would chat cheerfully and Smith would hide behind his morning newspaper. The social psychologist cannot, however, arrange situations in the interests of science*. He must test his hypotheses as best he can against the evidences of social life.

The question of whether it is an attribute of individuality or a factor in the situation that is primarily—obviously, neither of them can be wholly—responsible for a given form of behavior may have practical as well as scientific significance. From the fact that a motorist has been involved in an accident, for example, should it be concluded that he is a careless driver? If so, public policy may dictate that his driver's license be revoked. But if his failure to avoid disaster is a result of peculiar factors in the accident situation, such treatment would be unjust, for the possibility is remote that this peculiar combination of factors will occur again in his lifetime. But how can we

* In animal experiments situations can be fairly well standardized. The white rat, for example, can be weighed daily, run on the maze at the same time each day, and fed only after his run and then but a fixed amount of food, the value of which has been previously determined. His learning ability can, therefore, be expressed in terms of quite well defined situations and can be compared with the learning ability of other rats in similar situations. With human subjects, such an ideal demarkation and limitation of the situation is never possible.

tell whether he or the situation is responsible? In practical police procedure, the motorist will ordinarily be given the benefit of the doubt for the first accident or two and will then be classed in the traffic files as "a doubtful risk"—meaning that there is growing evidence of his being a poor driver and lacking normal ability to extricate himself from the occasional "close shave" that every motorist experiences

In many ways this problem of individuality attributes versus situational factors appears in our daily life. If Jones and his wife finally separate, should it be deduced that they are both poor matrimonial risks? Clearly neither could get along with the other. But it does not follow that Jones will fail to get along with his second wife and the former Mrs. Jones fail to get along with her second husband. If, however, either or both repeat their marital failure, there is cause for suspecting that their personalities include attributes that are incompatible with success in marriage. And after the third or fourth failure, the suspicion justly turns to certainty

THE PROBLEMS OF INDIVIDUALITY ILLUSTRATED: LEADERSHIP (46)

Attitudinal questionnaires, vocational and other interest tests, personality rating scales, and many other techniques have been devised in an attempt to measure attributes of individuality apart from the situations in which they function. In general, it may be said that peculiarities of food, dress, housing, and other tastes or preferences are fairly easy to ascertain. Special intellectual and manual skills and lack of normal skills can also be measured with reasonable ease and accuracy. But those attributes of individuality that operate in person-to-person situations and are of primary concern to the social psychologist are difficult to conceptualize and all too frequently impossible to measure with any degree of scientific accuracy. The various problems that arise when we attempt to study any of the more complex individuality attributes can be illustrated by a consideration of the single attribute of leadership *

Leadership Defined.—Leadership is behavior that affects the behavior of other people more than their behavior affects that of the

* The same problems are encountered in attempts to distinguish between and to measure such attributes as introversion and extroversion, adequacy and inadequacy, stability and instability, activity and passivity, etc (48). In such attempts attributes of individuality are usually conceived of as deviations in one of two possible directions from a modal point. The opposite of leadership would, in this concept, be subordination.

leader.* Thus, when he gives commands that are obeyed, an army officer is exercising leadership; when he speaks and the students listen, the teacher is providing leadership; when she orders her son to wipe his feet and he does so, the mother is exerting leadership. At first reading, the idea of leadership may seem simple enough.

But the first complication arises from the fact that the situation in which leadership appears is always interactional. Soldiers who will respond must be present before the officer can exercise leadership over them, they must be faced forward before he can order them to face about, etc. What they do affects his behavior just as what he does affects theirs, but to a lesser extent. Since there is invariably an interaction occurring between the leader and the led, it is often difficult to determine just who affects whom and to what extent.

Nominal versus Actual Leadership.—In many instances leadership is nominal only. In the modern world the few remaining kings exercise little if any leadership in the governments they symbolize. They may go through the motions of signing documents, opening conclaves, and the like, but about the only people they actually lead are their personal servants. Many of the functionaries of government, business, and other organizations† also are leaders in name only. The chairmanship of the board may be a position of actual leadership. But it is just as likely to be the place to which the organization retires its outmoded president, a place where he can amuse himself by acting important without interfering with the conduct of the business. Likewise, the office of mayor may be one of actual leadership, in American cities it is frequently only a front for the undercover boss of the political machine.

Even in the more intimate person-to-person relationships of family and community life the apparent leader may not be the actual one. From the fact that a man does most of the talking around his home, it does not follow that he is necessarily leader in the husband-wife relationship. He may talk and she get her way ‡. And a man may

* For a detailed analysis of this concept see "Types of power and status" (H. Goldhamer and E. A. Shils, 1939).

† Many high-school student leaders exercise nominal leadership only. They are officeholders who have achieved their honors by way of seniority rules, social position, or some other institutional procedure (M. K. Remmlein, 1938). See also "Dilemma of leadership" (L. K. Frank, 1939a).

‡ In many cultures leadership by women must be indirect and subtle. Nominal leadership by men is the accepted rule, leadership and ladylike behavior are considered incompatible (A. H. Maslow, 1937).

Among the chimpanzees the dominant male yields his position of dominance to his mate whenever she is in oestrus. But only during this period is she able to

appear to be submitting to his wife's nagging while he is actually reading his newspaper. He is then refusing the leadership of his wife and accepting that of the people who contributed to the making of the newspaper.

The nominal leader has status as leader but does not exercise leadership. Many of the institutional and conventional roles in society give the individual the status of leader, but whether the individual in such a role actually exercises leadership will depend in part upon his own personality. In the old family system the patriarch was accorded the status of leader in certain fields of activity (the matriarch was supposed to rule in domestic matters). But if the patriarch was a weak and indecisive person, or if he was ill and incompetent, one of his sons might take over the task of actual leadership. During the time Harding was President of the United States, the actual administration of the Federal government passed from the presidency to other, and largely unofficial, hands.

As an Attribute of Human Nature or of Individuality.—Leadership status may be achieved by some socially designated system, such as seniority. But leadership status may also be achieved by taking over or usurping the role of someone else or by creating a new leadership role. Leadership is then in large measure a result of particular attributes of personality.

The attributes of personality that are involved in the leadership of those who have acquired their status as leaders by hereditary position, seniority, or the like are aspects of human nature rather than of individuality. It is socially normal for patriarchs to be leaders of their families, for army officers to progress slowly up the ranks, etc. The leadership attributes of such men are not accidental but are a consequence of systematic training. The landed aristocrat, the member of the military caste, the political bureaucrat, the son or daughter of a "best" family, and the economic "royalist" were brought up for their status as leaders. In England before 1940, for example, most of the governmental leaders were prepared for their positions by public school and then Oxford or Cambridge.

The person who has been socially and systematically trained to a position of leadership will usually display less aggressiveness and more

obtain her fill of food until her mate is satisfied. Perhaps her temporary dominance might be termed nominal (M. P. Crawford, 1940). The close relation between dominance and sex in animals is also shown by the fact that many male animals when in the presence of more dominant males will assume the female sexual postures (A. H. Maslow, 1936a and 1936b, and A. H. Maslow and S. Flanzbaum, 1936).

conservatism than will the so-called "self-made" man. He will generally show considerable concern for the welfare of his group—the traditional leader class—and depreciate self-advancement.* Such leadership often results in attempting to fight a new war with old weapons and stratagems, to meet new political problems with antiquated solutions, to meet new economic competition with timeworn economic practices, etc. Such leadership has characteristically had as its objective the perpetuation of the *status quo*.

In marked contrast are the conditions that produce the leadership attributes of the man who has literally or figuratively battered his way to power†. Different, too, are the personality attributes that constitute his leadership. As a person, he will be almost the antithesis of the leader who has achieved his status by some traditional mechanism. As a problem for sociopsychological analysis, he and the conditions that have produced him will be infinitely more complex. The political upstart, the military conqueror, the self-made businessman, the religious crusader, and even the little boy who rules the gang of other little boys or who dominates his parents, pose the question, discussed earlier in this chapter, of whether behavior is largely determined by the attributes of personality or by factors in the situation. To the extent that it is the former, we are clearly dealing with attributes of individuality, for it is not socially typical for this one of countless farm boys to rise to the leadership of a great corporation, this one of many ghetto-bred boys to become a noted composer, etc.

The Times versus the Man.—The older historians leaned to the view that personality—the "man"—was of paramount importance in determining the course of historical events. Thus in the characters of kings, princes, popes, and the like, they found historical causation. Napoleon the man was the determinant of the vast events that constituted the Napoleonic era in western Europe, Washington and his associates "founded" the American Commonwealth; Henry Ford "put" the American people on wheels, etc. Had any great leader been, as a person, other than he was, the course of history would have been different. This is the theory that men make their times. Based

* See "Ingroup membership and academic selection" (A. B. Hollingshead, 1938) and "Climbing the academic ladder" (A. B. Hollingshead, 1940).

† The man who is endeavoring to achieve leadership status is usually described as "aggressive" (47), the term suggesting that he meets resistance on the part of those whom he would lead. For a vivid description of the characteristics and stratagems of an aggressive political leader see *The boss* (D. D. McKean, 1940), for an analysis of the personnel of the Nazi party see "The Nazi party: its leadership and composition" (H. Gerth, 1940).

upon this theory, our older history books were the stories of a few men rather than the stories of peoples

But the "new" history, the history as written by Marx, Turner, Beard, and others, is based upon the situational interpretation of behavior * It sees leaders as a product of the times and leadership as a function of the circumstances of the moment

Two relatively distinct points are involved here First, the character of the "times" determines the extent to which individuality will be developed in the personalities of the various members of society and the nature of that individuality This fact is frequently indicated by the phrase "harsh times breed harsh men" Only during times of social turmoil will any considerable number of men appear who possess the potentialities for dynamic leadership In the second place the character of the times determines which among those who possess potentialities for leadership will rise to positions of leadership During times of technological advances inventors† multiply, during times of political chaos political spellbinders are in demand, during times of war military strategists rise to power ‡ The person who will be a leader at any given time is, therefore, the one who happens to have acquired the peculiar personality attributes that constitute leadership under the special conditions of that particular time The soundness of this view will become evident as we analyze in detail the various aspects of the attributes of leadership

Specific Nature of Leadership Attributes.—The behaviors that constitute leadership vary widely with the situations in which leadership occurs Musical leadership has almost nothing in common with military leadership Leadership as a trumpet player in a dance band is quite different from leadership as the conductor of a symphony orchestra The trumpet player could hardly exercise leadership over the symphony orchestra with his trumpet, and the symphony con-

* See "The cultural situation as a condition for the achievement of fame" (J Schneider, 1937b), "Social class, historical circumstances, and fame" (J Schneider, 1937a), "The definition of eminence and the social origins of famous English men of genius" (J Schneider, 1938), and "Class origin, and fame" (J. Schneider, 1940)

† See "Bio-social characteristics of American inventors" (S Winston, 1937) and "A study of the childhood, education, and age of 701 inventors" (J Rossman, 1935).

‡ For one interpretation of the historical forces that are responsible for the rise of new types of social leadership see *The ruling class* (G Mosca, 1939) A recent illustration of the fact that changing social circumstances bring forth different kinds of leaders is the rise in power of the German military and the partial eclipse of the Nazi party politicians in 1939 when Germany progressed from preparations for world conquest to military attempt at conquest

ductor would probably make a fool of himself should he attempt to lead off with a rendition of *St. Louis Blues* with his baton.* Neither could apply his musical skills to political, military, or industrial leadership. It is meaningless, therefore, to say of a man that he is a leader. A leader in what? Leadership presupposes some sort of skill, if only the ability to talk louder and faster than others. But there is no single kind of skill that will give an individual leadership in all kinds of circumstances and over all kinds of people. The successful leader of a shipbuilding organization may find all his skills worthless when he endeavors to direct the efforts of his companions in a floundering lifeboat. The skills of a fluent political orator may be "liquidated" by violent rioting or military conquest.

The personalities of various accomplished leaders will, of course, include some common attributes. All leaders are highly motivated, and all possess unusual ability. But the motivation of each is directed toward some specific form of achievement, *i.e.*, the leader in business wants to succeed in business, not in art, music, science, or politics. And the ability of each successful leader is usually restricted to his special field of endeavor, Henry Ford, for example, was extraordinarily ingenious in working out new industrial production methods but quite inept in a surprisingly large number of other matters.

Origin of Leadership Attributes.—Almost everything has been singled out at one time or another as the determinant of leadership attributes. Some have believed that leaders are people with superior physiques, others have believed that leadership behavior was an overcompensation for inferior physique.† Lincoln and certain other notables were taller or larger than the average, therefore their superior size, which made them tower over common men, caused them to be "natural" leaders. Napoleon, Hitler, and other leaders, were men of subnormal stature, therefore they felt physically inferior and as a compensation strove to dominate by "force of personality."

* For a study of leadership in the modern dance orchestra see *The professional dance musician: a study of the interrelation between the occupational and non-occupational attributes of the dance musician* (C. L. Lastrucci, 1941).

† Evidence supporting the overcompensation theory was offered in *The executive and his control of men* (E. B. Gowin, 1915). The leaders Gowin measured were found to be both taller and heavier than the less important men in similar lines of activity. Gowin found, for example, that small-town preachers weighed, on the average, seventeen pounds less and were one and eight-tenths inches shorter than bishops, presidents of universities weighed on the average seventeen and six-tenths pounds more and were one and two-tenths inches taller than presidents of small colleges. Some of the weight differences may be accounted for by better or at least more plentiful food. The height differences cannot be explained so simply.

As will be indicated in the subsequent chapter, physical attributes may have an indirect effect upon the development of personality. But to say that superior physique makes for leadership ignores the fact that many leaders are of subnormal physique and vice versa. Certainly the large man has the advantage over the small one in a hand-to-hand fight. But most forms of leadership do not involve sheer physical force. Certainly the small, shrewd man would have the advantage over the large, uncalculating fellow in economic, political, and other negotiations. But smallness does not automatically bestow shrewdness, nor does largeness necessarily presuppose lack of mental adroitness.

A superabundance of physical energy has frequently been cited as the key to successful leadership.^{*} Presumably this superabundance of energy is a consequence of factors of health, diet, mode of life, and glandular balance. It is true that many kinds of leadership require strenuous and sustained effort. The man who is physically weak will hardly be winner of a race, will probably be eliminated from command of a military force on the grounds that he is incapable of carrying through a strenuous campaign, etc. But most forms of leadership demand sustained "mental" rather than intense physical effort,[†] as is evidenced by the fact that many noted men (Robert Louis Stevenson, for example) have suffered ill health throughout their careers. This latter fact has, in turn, led some to the conclusion that sickness rather than health is the determinant of leadership. Sickness, specifically tuberculosis, syphilis, and a few others, are supposed to produce toxins that "irritate the nervous system" and stimulate mental activity.[‡]

Again all that may be said is that no generalization is possible. Neither the great mass of the sick nor the great mass of the physically

* Glorifiers of the human physique, such as Bernarr Macfadden, invariably claim that physical strength is the key to success in business, politics, and life in general.

† Perseverance, the ability to do sustained work, has been studied by a number of investigators. See "Two tests for perseverance" (W. H. Clark, 1935), "The meaning of persistence" (D. G. Ryans, 1938), "The measurement of persistence: an historical review" (D. G. Ryans, 1939), and "How general is the factor of 'persistence'? a reexamination and evaluation of Ryans' results" (G. R. Thornton, 1940). The relation of perseverance to perseveration is shown in "Perseveration and character" (W. Stephenson, 1935) and in "Studies in perseveration. V. Theoretical significance of the perseveration and repetition of conative activity" (I. Kendig, 1937).

‡ A careful check of the personal histories of fifty of the most eminent men of history showed their childhood health records to be normal—neither better nor worse than those of ordinary children (C. C. Miles and L. Wolfe, 1936).

fit ever become leaders of importance. Except in those few forms of leadership which presuppose superabundance of physical energy, such superabundance could mean only that the aspirant to leadership would, assuming equal motivation, be capable of more sustained and intense effort than would the normal man. But social achievement is not measured solely by the amount of endeavor. It is not how hard and how long you blow the horn that counts, but the kind of sound you get out of it. It is of course conceivable that in a given instance physical strength has contributed to a sense of self-confidence, which has in turn been a factor involved in the development of leadership attributes. In a given instance childhood illness may have precluded ordinary childhood activities and fostered intellectual activities, which were the basis upon which exceptional literary, mathematical, or other symbolic skills were subsequently developed. But there is no one key to success and therefore no simple way to an understanding of the reasons why one particular man is President of the United States and millions of men are not. The skills and the motives that are involved in a given form of leadership are attributes of individuality and, like all such attributes, the result of a multitude of factors.

In part the behavior that constitutes leadership, whether over a class of students, over a business enterprise, or over the national or international political scene, is a manifestation of attributes of individuality that have been acquired out of the accidents and incidents of social experience. In part leadership behavior is a function of the social circumstances that make the particular attributes of individuality, attributes of leadership. The same holds true in slightly varying degrees for all the deviant forms of behavior—subordination, extroversion, instability, etc.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVIANT BEHAVIORS

The fact that there is a complex interrelation between the state of society and the attributes of individuality should now be evident. Social change disorganizes the socialization processes and opens the way for what we have here called accidents and incidents of social experience. The highly integrated social system will fail in minor respects with all its members and in vital ways with some few of its members. The disorganized social system makes many major failures in socialization. In most of its members it produces a low proportion of human nature and a high proportion of individuality.

At the same time, the social significance, indeed the individual significance, of any given attribute of individuality will depend in large measure upon the social system itself. Some attributes will,

because of the nature of the social circumstances, result in adjustment behaviors that directly foster further social changes. Such is the case with those attributes, whatever their specific nature, that are manifest as successful leadership in some realm or other of social life. Other attributes of individuality will, however, because of social circumstances, make for friction between the individual and society which—through the generation of psychological tensions—may have indirect but profound effects upon the course of social events. In Part IV these friction-producing attributes of individuality and the circumstances responsible for them will be discussed.

CHAPTER XI

PERSONALITY STEREOTYPING

The Actuarial Function of Society.—Life, it has been said, is a constant gamble. Fate throws the dice, and they unroll our destiny. The stakes are high; on every toss our joys and sorrows are dependent. But the dice are loaded, and the final outcome is certain. It is death.

This makes good reading, but it is scarcely accurate. Human society serves the very function of reducing the risks of life. It is a systematic calculation of the probabilities of success for any given act, a systematic selection of those acts whose probabilities of success are great, and an elimination of those whose possibilities of success are small. For the individual, society is an insurance system; it eliminates chance* by providing him with those patterns of adjustment to the external world that are most likely, under given circumstances, to result in eventual life satisfaction. The social system cannot, of course, calculate and provide for all the factors that may influence the course of human life, some, such as earthquake and flood—"acts of God"—are quite unpredictable. But chance and disaster go hand in hand, and the integrated social system operates to eliminate chance and to protect the individual from disaster. Man's adjustments to nature are predicated upon the known and recognized "laws" of regularity of occurrences in nature. Given the knowledge that attacks of cholera follow from drinking polluted water, for example, society may eliminate from the individual's life the chance of contracting cholera.

Our knowledge of the physical and biological world has increased immeasurably during the course of the past two hundred years. We have, however, grown steadily less able to predict, and hence anticipate, social phenomena. Every human adjustment to the presence of other human beings is formed upon the presumed behavior of those others, for the adjustment value of any specific mode of social behavior is determined not by its specific character but by its fitness in terms of the behavior of other human beings. This fact is summed up in that well-worn phrase: "When in Rome, do as the Romans do." If one does not know what the Romans do, such sage advice is not at all

* "Chance" is here employed as the equivalent of "unpredictability." It should not be taken to mean "uncaused" factors.

helpful; and even in his home town the modern man is very much in the position of the stranger in Rome. He cannot predict with certainty how those about him will behave, he must work out many of his adjustments by undirected trial and error. The social consequences of his every act are thus to some extent a matter of chance. Life therefore becomes something of a gamble.

The Prediction of Human Behavior.—For the individual, the function of the human-nature aspects of the personalities of others is that of making their behavior predictable. The individual's in-group and out-group classifications serve him as a sort of actuarial table. He "knows" that members of his clan will respond pleasantly to such and such a greeting. Thus, when he meets any member, he anticipates this response and proceeds accordingly. Even in the modern world we are constantly predicting individual behavior on the basis of socially provided concepts of human nature—when we address a stranger in English, when we give a dinner party, when we put our savings in the bank. We may not consciously calculate the effects of these acts upon others; but the acts imply confidence in the predictability of the behavior of others. We simply take it for granted that the stranger will understand and respond to English, that people will be pleased rather than offended by the invitation to dinner and what we then serve them, and that all the people who constitute the banking organization will behave in ways to assure the security of our savings. Sometimes these assumptions are fallacious, but in the vast majority of instances our "predictions" are accurate*. Confident that they will respond in kind, we meet our friends with a smile and outstretched hand. Confident that she will be pleased by this untruth, we considerately assure dear Aunt Mary that the hideous Christmas tie is the nicest thing she could possibly have given us. Conversely, convinced that he would have killed us had he seen us first, we greet a member of the enemy with an arrow or a bullet through the head. Assured that he will humbly step from our path, we ignore the presence of an "inferior."

All such prediction of individual action proceeds from knowledge of the general—typical behaviors of the members of the group—to knowledge of the specific behavior of a particular member to which adjustment is being made. To the extent that the individual member of the group behaves in the ways that are typical for that group, *i.e.*, to the extent that his personality is composed of attributes of human nature, such prediction will be successful. But as we have seen,

* The pooled predictions of many people are more likely to be correct than is any one individual prediction picked at random (D. McGregor, 1938).

each personality will consist of a more or less unique combination of human nature and individuality attributes. As a result, person-to-person relationships that proceed solely on the basis of generalization from knowledge of the typical will invariably be subject to considerable error. For easy and effective relationships, knowledge of the typical must be supplemented by knowledge of specific personalities. Such intimate and personal knowledge is a normal outcome of life in the small, closely knit social group. Socialization into such a group includes, in addition to training in what in general to expect from people, training in what in specific to expect from particular people. Thus we learn that in general gift givers will feel hurt if we fail to express great admiration for the gift, but that Uncle Joe is an exception. He delights in teasing his friends and relatives by giving them small gifts that he believes they will not like. To please Uncle Joe, we must indicate—not too crudely—disappointment with the gift, even though it is a desirable object.

Personality in the Modern World.—Deviation among the personalities of the members of a social group does not preclude social harmony, but it does make necessary intimate acquaintance of each individual with all the others. In the stable society people do get along effectively with one another although they are not as “like as peas in a pod.” In our own social milieu, however, the pattern of organization is so much disrupted that individuality has become an increasingly larger part of the human personality. This fact complicates the matter of person-to-person adjustment and intensifies the difficulties of the social psychologist. As we have already remarked, almost nothing that will have significant universality can be said regarding the character of life in our society. We are, therefore, forced to describe not “the rule” but a complex mass of exceptions to the rule.

Two interrelated factors contribute to the difficulties of social adjustments of a person-to-person order in the modern world. In the first place, the more the human personality is a matter of individuality rather than of human nature, the more important it becomes that those making adjustments to one another be intimate in order to predict successfully the outcome of any form of action.* In the second place, the forces that have made for an increase in individuality have also been at work tearing down the conditions that permit long-time intimacy between people. The modern man does not often live

* From one point of view, all difficulties of person-to-person adjustment are a consequence of the failure of each individual to anticipate the behavior of the other. For a sociological approach to this problem see *Personality and social adjustment* (E. R. Groves, 1931).

in a compact grouping of intimately known people. He tends to live anonymously, adjusting himself to a stream of constantly changing strangers. To bridge the gap between his inability to make accurate predictions of the behaviors of others and the necessity for his doing so, the modern individual commonly resorts to stereotyping *

STEREOTYPING (49)

Stereotyping as a Substitute for Intimacy.—In our society the individual must get along with many people whom he does not “know.” His real intimates may be rather few; and his social welfare may depend largely upon his adjusting to a series of people whom he meets, to whom he relates himself, and from whom he is then severed. Contrast in this respect the personality knowledge of the old-time country-store merchant, whose customers were mainly old and intimate “friendly enemies,” and that of the modern department-store salesman, whose customers may never return a second time. Each makes his living by selling goods to other human beings. The former has a steady and only slowly changing group of customers, the latter, a series of customers. In all walks of contemporary life and in most phases of human association, we today are in the position of the man who must sell to strangers. Moreover, the personalities of these strangers are, as we have seen, extremely varied.

It is in an effort to avoid the time and errors involved in the working out of adjustments to strangers on the basis of trial and error that we stereotype them. This consists of putting a person into a simple personality “type” and treating him in terms of the “known” type attributes, rather than attempting to treat him in terms of his actual, but unknown, personality. From some element of his behavior, from his physiognomy, from his dress, or from some mannerism, we “type” him and proceed accordingly. Thus, perhaps only because Cousin Jane is short and fat rather than tall and lean, we decide upon first meeting her that she is the sort of old maid who has a sense of humor and likes to be teased. Casting her into this role, we proceed to treat her as a humorous, teasable person until, as may happen, experience with her teaches us that she is literal-minded and sensitive.

Stereotyping is the use on the individual level of the same process that is involved in the classifying of people into in-groups and out-groups. It results in treating the individuality attributes of per-

* Although the term “stereotypes” was introduced into social psychology by the journalist Lippmann (W. Lippmann, 1922), it has been sociologists, educators, and psychologists who have demonstrated experimentally some of the characteristics of the stereotyping process.

sonality as though they conformed to some pattern of typicality The man who can make his type casting relatively realistic is the man who is honored as a shrewd judge of character

Conventional Personality Stereotypes.—Although two people upon being introduced simultaneously to a new acquaintance may not put him into the same stereotype, their sets of personality stereotypes may be much alike We have developed more or less fixed, conventional preconceptions of the nature and variety of human personalities Nowhere is this fact more clearly indicated than in drama and in fiction The personality types of our grandfathers' day were relatively clear and unvarying, there was the villain, the hero, the heroine, the comic relief, the "dear old" mother or father, and perhaps the well-meaning but misguided fool With these personalities the world of make-believe was peopled The moment a character walked onto the stage, our grandfathers knew into which category to put him and could, therefore, promptly make the proper identification with him In keeping with the times, dramatic stereotypes have become somewhat changed The heroine need no longer be the pure and simple maiden of yesterday, she may be smart and slightly soiled We believe that we are more sophisticated and more realistic than our grandfathers were, but only the forms of the stereotypes have changed, and we are just as insistent as were our grandfathers that the dramatic characters run true to type

Effects of Resorting to Conventional Stereotypes.—In literature and drama the practice of fitting characters to conventional stereotypes is a laborsaving device that can have no unfortunate consequences In real life, however, the effects of assigning people to stereotypes depend upon the skill of the person who does the assigning and the degree to which the stereotypes approach reality Once we have type cast a person, we tend to keep him in the role, whether or not that role is the "correct" one Thus it often happens that we adjust ourselves not to people but to our ideas of people—to preconceptions determined by the types we have judged those people to be The busy salesman may automatically classify the approaching customer as a "looker" and give her scant attention because "lookers" look and seldom buy Whether he is right or wrong depends upon his skill at stereotyping All of us use stereotypes Some of the more conventional ones are labeled "nigger," "foreigner," "Jap," "Chink," "Wop," "rube," "city slicker," "traveling salesman," "hillbilly," "big shot," "politician,"* etc

* It has been claimed that political stereotypes have four dimensions—definiteness (uniformity or the degree of conformity of persons reacting), direction

The danger of stereotyping is not simply that of failing to put a person into the correct conventional classification. These classifications are themselves little more than conventional fictions. A "nigger," as northern whites know him, is a dusky-skinned man with an irresistible yearning for fried chicken and watermelon, a tendency to change his wife frequently, a large collection of multisyllabled words, small education, preference for a razor over other weapons of defense and offense, and the unfortunate habit of getting lynched. This stereotype has been fostered by the writings of men who live in Park Avenue penthouses and who have seen but few Negroes in the flesh.*

Cases can, of course, be found that will roughly fit the stereotype. Intimate association with many "niggers" would, however, partially break down stereotyped reactions to them. Experience would show that a man with a dusky skin may prefer pork to chicken, may be loyal to his one and only wife, may speak intelligently on many subjects largely in words of one syllable, and may never fight with his fellows. The traits imputed to the stereotype will, however, be used in the formation of adjustments to a Negro, and this process may preclude the development of intimate association with him and eventual understanding of his true personality. We tend to see what we are looking for, to ignore that which our preconceptions tell us cannot exist, and so to react to the stereotype rather than to the human being.

Artificial Control of Stereotyping.—This tendency on the part of people in our hurried and disorganized social life to behave in terms of stereotypes rather than in terms of actual personalities has led to the practice of providing people in public life with characteristics that will lead to their being put into desirable stereotypes by the general public. The technique is probably as old as politics and has undoubtedly been in the bag of tricks of every noted courtesan, religious reformer, and political leader. In a society that is noted for lack of

(affective tone), intensity, and quality (A. L. Edwards, 1940a and 1940b). College students agree very well on their Negro, German, and Jewish stereotypes and very poorly on those for Japanese, Chinese, and Turks. The American stereotype is only moderately definite (D. Katz and K. W. Braly, 1933 and 1935).

* Quite naturally whites and Negroes will place Negroes into somewhat different stereotypes. Both Negroes and Princeton students were found to regard the Negro as superstitious, lazy, happy-go-lucky, very religious, ostentatious, loud, and musical. But whereas the Princeton students added to the list the adjectives ignorant, stupid, naive, slovenly, and physically dirty, the Negroes listed intelligent, progressive, faithful, and imitative (J. A. Bayton, 1941). As might be anticipated, the Japanese are differently regarded by whites and by Japanese (K. Kusunoki, 1936).

uniformity among its members, it has become a remarkably effective means of molding the "public mind." To select an appropriate stereotype and to associate his client's name with it constitute the task of the public relations counsel. Such control of the stereotyping process is attempted for everyone and everything from motion-picture stars to office buildings. A public entertainer, politician, or financier is always in some measure dependent upon his "good name" among the people who make up his public. Unless control is exercised, his "name" would be determined largely by the whims of rumor. In the effort to assure that a name becomes attached to a desirable stereotype, the public relations counsel feeds the press with appropriate items of "news" and withholds from the press every fact that runs counter to the desired stereotype. Similar control of the stereotyping process is also attempted for impersonal corporations. Since men think and act mainly in terms of human beings, they attribute a personality even to a business enterprise. Uncontrolled, the personality that people impute to an organization might be of the villain type, consequently, every means is used to make Mr. C and B Oil, Mr. XYZ Motors, etc., something of heroes, giving them agreeable and charming personalities.*

The ability to build up a partly fictitious personality stereotype by means of proper censorship of the facts and fictions that the public learns about a person is illustrated by the stereotype that was built up for one of our recent presidents. Upon his unanticipated elevation to the position of president, a news conference was said to have been held in Washington to decide what could be done with a man who was noted for his remarkable ability to say the unpolitic thing. It was decided, so the story goes, to make him fit, so far as press reports were concerned, the "wise, silent man" stereotype. As a consequence, the public was given the idea that he seldom spoke, that what he did say was always couched in homely phraseology, and that his shrewd observations were never self-evident but were to be found between the lines. This stereotype served him long and well.

So accustomed are we to thinking and acting in terms of personality stereotypes that newspapers must give to every name that appears in important news items some clue that will help us put the person into his proper category. Mr. Smith is just a name; and, no matter how spectacular the things he does, they have little meaning for us until

* Colleges are also subject to the stereotyping process. Thus Dartmouth is supposed to harbor out-of-doors, college-loyal, hard-drinking collegiates, whereas Harvard is supposed to have an intellectual, blasé, and snobbish student body (K. Fink and H. Cantril, 1937).

Mr Smith acquires a personality. The newswriter, therefore, gives us a clue or two to help us in selecting the appropriate personality stereotype. The clues, like the stereotypes, are often conventionalized. "Late, great" says *Time*. Banker, potent industrialist, prominent society matron, blonde beauty, café socialite, naval hero, astute strategist, and radical are a few of the conventional clues by which we are expected to stereotype what would otherwise remain a blank, impersonal name in the news.*

Individual Stereotypes—The conventional stereotypes tend, however, to be somewhat individualized. It is probable, for example, that the pauperized laboring man will include in the category "banker" quite different personality attributes than will the professor of economics, the average businessman, or the spinster with money in the bank. When the laboring man meets a big banker, he may anticipate nothing but ruthless treatment. But the economist, the businessman, and the spinster may expect the big banker to be something of a gentleman, to be logical but sympathetic, and to be a personal symbol of security and financial integrity.

Furthermore, each person has, in addition to the more or less conventional personality stereotypes, a few private categories of his own into which he can file people when occasion arises. The acute pessimist has his individual apprehensions about people, a set of personality stereotypes that leads him to expect, at the least, the very worst from those he meets. The extreme optimist, if such a person exists, has a set of stereotypes that leads him to expect the best from everyone. In adjusting to the same man, the pessimist would tend to guard against the worst and the optimist to take the best for granted.

Generalization on the Basis of the Particular.—The conventional stereotypes are acquired by the individual in much the same indirect ways as are his in-group and out-group categories. Individual stereotypes, on the other hand, are generalizations from one or a small number of direct and specific experiences. Just as the child may decide from experience with one hot stove that all stoves burn—a generalization from experience with one member of a category to include all members of that category—he may also conclude from an unpleasant experience with one bearded man that all bearded men are to be avoided. The process of generalization is not logical, but it is psychologically imperative. We cannot forever go around testing whether or not this specific stove will burn us. We must act upon the assumption

* For a discussion of stereotypes as they appeared in one important newspaper see "Emotional stereotypes in the Chicago Tribune" (S. S. Sargent, 1939).

that, since all the stoves we have so far touched burned us, this particular stove is to be treated with caution

But men are more complex than stoves; and there is, as we have seen, no certainty that any two of them will have a great deal in common or that a given aspect of the personality of one of them can be taken as an indication of the other aspects of his personality. As a consequence, all personality stereotypes are unrealistically simple, and the bases we commonly employ for classifying people we meet may be fully as unrealistic as are the stereotypes. The highly trained and experienced clinician would not think of making a guess about the personality of a patient until he had carefully studied all that was available about the background of the patient and had had a number of intimate interviews with him. But the clerk in a store, the teacher in a classroom, and the woman at a tea will often glance at the customer, student, or new acquaintance and promptly file him in some personality stereotype on the basis of some gesture, some quality of voice or mode of speech, some physical attribute, or some element of dress.

QUASI-SCIENTIFIC STEREOTYPING

The Rationalization of Stereotyping.—Efforts to give scientific validity to the process of personality stereotyping have not been lacking. Just as some pseudo scientists have endeavored to prove such ideas as that non-Aryans are inferior, other pseudo scientists have endeavored to prove such common lay beliefs as that people with receding chins are weak-willed.

The most obvious and easily measured things about a human being are his physical characteristics. That is probably the reason why we commonly "explain" our type casting on some physiognomical basis. We say, perhaps, that we do not trust a man "because he has close-spaced eyes" and that someone else can be trusted "because his eyes are wide apart." Stereotyping a person as hot tempered on the basis of his red hair is so commonplace as to be traditional. Careful observation will indicate, however, that physiognomical characteristics are often observed after and not before we have classified the individual. What has really been used as a clue for type casting is seldom ascertainable. We presumably respond more or less automatically to something in the person's appearance or behavior and make our classification in terms of that response. When called upon to justify the classification, physical characteristics are the straws at which we grasp.

Pseudoscientific Justifications.—It is apparently this frequent resort to physical characteristics in rationalizing personality stereo-

typing that has misled some scientists into trying to predict human behavior on the basis of a study of physical characteristics. They have taken seriously what the man in the street says but may not act upon. As a consequence, an unbelievable number of books have been written under the misapprehension that there exists a significant, automatic, and unvariable relationship between physical characteristics and behavior.

Physiognomy and Phrenology.—One of the earliest of these attempts to correlate personality type with objectively measurable physical characteristics was that of Cesare Lombroso, the noted French criminologist, in 1876 (G. Ferrero, 1911). Tarde, it will be recalled, had concluded that criminal behavior was the consequence of imitation. This concept was of little practical value to those who were engaged in the apprehension of criminals. Lombroso, however, presented the ingenious and intriguing theory that all mankind was divisible into the criminal type and the noncriminal type and that, since nature had fortunately stamped the criminal personality with a criminal physiognomy, all that was necessary to prevent further crime was to round up the people who looked like criminals. After long study, Lombroso provided criminologists with a set of pictures showing the types of physiognomy indicative of personalities typical of people who would commit specific types of crimes. He confessed, somewhat belatedly, that the correlation between face and crime was only 40; but that concession to reality did not dim the ardor of his disciples, the latest of whom, the physical anthropologist E. A. Hooton, has produced amazingly large volumes of remarkably dubious data on the physiognomy of criminals.*

Lombroso, however, was not the originator of this interesting bit of sociopsychological nonsense. Aristotle had formulated a "scientific" treatise on physiognomy, in which he described the physical signs and symptoms of personality. Late in the eighteenth century the physiognomist J. K. Lavater had listed in detail the relationship between physical traits and personality, giving us one hundred physiognomical rules by which to misjudge our friends. Rule 77, for example, states that "a broad, brown wart on the chin is never found in truly wise, calmly noble persons"†. A century later, the world

* See *Crime and the man* (E. A. Hooton, 1939a) and Volume I of *The American criminal: an anthropological study* (E. A. Hooton, 1939b). Concerning the former, one reviewer comments: "And he [Reuter] likes Mr. Hooton's book. In fact, he considers it the funniest academic performance that has appeared since the invention of movable type" (E. B. Reuter, 1939).

† From *Essays on physiognomy* (J. K. Lavater, 1878).

had been made a more convenient place in which to live by the astonishing "discovery" of F J Gall and J K Spurzheim that the traits that go to make up the human personality have anatomic counterparts in various regions of the brain and that the presence or absence of these traits is revealed by the exterior configuration of the skull. Thus had been founded the "science" of phrenology.* Lombroso's work, however, revived these prescientific ideas and thus diverted attention for some decades from the pursuit of a scientific understanding of the origins of criminal behavior (A Lindesmith and Y Levin, 1937).

All the evidence derived from truly scientific study refutes the idea that there is any very important correlation between what a man's face looks like and how he will act under given circumstances (50). To the layman, however, all such evidence seems to count for little against the fact that it would be extremely convenient if there were some such relationship. And so the modern rehashers of Lavater, Gall, Spurzheim, Lombroso, and other pioneers in misinterpretation find a lucrative field for exploitation. It must be very satisfying, we suppose, to know that "always and everywhere, the normal blond has positive, dynamic, driving and variety-loving characteristics, while the normal brunette has negative, static, conservative . . . characteristics" (K M H Blackford and A Newcomb, 1915, p 141).

Pyknic and Asthenic "Types."—Equally unfruitful and unscientific have been the efforts to reduce the complexities of personality prediction to matters of body build. Hippocrates, the Greek physician, distinguished between the *habitus apoplecticus* and the *habitus phthisicus* types of people. The former—fat people—were disposed, he thought, to apoplexy, the latter—thin people—were disposed to tuberculosis. This idea of neatly classifying people into a few body types has been made the basis for personality prediction. Most widely known, perhaps, is the work of E. Kretschmer (51) who would have us believe that we can determine the specific temperament of the people with whom we must live if we subject them to physical measurement in accordance with the complicated indexes he has set up. Serving as a

*Neurologists of today postulate only a very tentative map of brain areas with accompanying "functions." The name of the function is derived either from the sense organ from which the nerve impulses come, such as the visual or the auditory, or from the body region in which there will be a response if the particular brain area is electrically stimulated. Thus, in the pre-Rolandic area is a spot the stimulation of which will effect wiggling of the toes. But one brain area can apparently take on functions formerly associated with other brain areas, and some neurologists believe that the brain acts more or less as a whole. Clearly, the views of modern science are far removed from those of phrenology.

basis to his theory is the idea that there are two fundamental classes of personalities: pyknic and asthenic (leptosomic). These elaborate technical terms are, upon examination, found to be little more than substitutes for the older extrovert-introvert classificatory system, which is in turn based upon the time-honored distinction between the "doer" and the "dreamer." It is true that in certain psychopathic cases we find the extreme introvert who lives in a world of unreality and is more or less unresponsive to stimuli of external origin. But to generalize from these cases and to conclude that the mass of human beings can be divided into two mutually exclusive categories is neither sound logic nor common sense. Furthermore, even though we were to assume that these two classes of personalities exist, it would not follow that classification could be made on the basis of anatomic or of anthropometric criteria. The notion brings to mind the ancient superstition that the physically crippled human being is a creature of the Devil and has a mind as crippled as his body.

The Unscientific Character of All Stereotyping.—Every so often someone, frequently a medical man, "discovers" that human behavior is simply a matter of glands. "Gland types" will be described, and the effects upon the behavior of abnormal "types" which are produced by supplying them with some hormone or other will lead to the conclusion that all undesirable behavior, from criminality to economic incompetence, can be promptly driven from the world by so many cubic centimeters of this or that. There is just sufficient truth behind such claims to give them credence. The complex, interdependent, and little known system of glands of internal secretion is a part of the physiological mechanism that aids men to behave in ways that are human. Disturbance of that system, for whatever reason, may affect behavior. It is no doubt true that the "thyroid type" is likely to be more active than is the normal person (52). This knowledge does not, however, help us much in attempting to predict the behavior of the personality involved. Our interest is, of necessity, in the qualitative aspects of personality. What will so-and-so do under such and such circumstances? To say that he will do more of whatever he does than would the average person does not tell us what he is going to do.

All claims to evaluate the human personality in terms of objectively measurable physical criteria, however scientific their pretensions, belong in the same category as "character reading" by means of palmistry, astrology,* numerology, and the countless other ologies through which the unscrupulous exploit the credulous.

* An analysis of the birth dates of over six thousand musicians and artists has made it clear that possessors of the "artistic temperament" know no particular

INDIRECT RELATION BETWEEN PHYSIQUE AND PERSONALITY

Personality stereotyping is generally unrealistic and without verifiable basis. It proceeds upon the assumption that there is a direct and unvarying relationship between two phenomena, usually between a certain physical attribute and a certain personality attribute. But, as has been indicated, modern people are forced to make many of their person-to-person adjustments at least initially on the basis of stereotyping. Such stereotyping will have its immediate effects upon the behavior of the one who is stereotyped and may in the long run affect his personality development. In some instances certain attributes of a person's individuality would appear to be indirectly related to some aspect or aspects of physique.

Nature of the Relationship.—A given attribute of physique may lead people to stereotype an individual in a certain way and to treat him as though he had the personality attributes that are imputed to this stereotype. Thus, although there certainly is no demonstrated relationship between the color of one's hair and one's covert behaviors, there may be a relationship between hair color and the sort of treatment accorded by others. If most people rather consistently treat the redhead as though he were "hot tempered," the blonde as though she were "beautiful but dumb," and the striking brunette as though she were innately flirtatious, the redhead, the blonde, and the brunette might conceivably become so. The redheaded boy who is perpetually plagued by his companions, constantly teased to provoke his "hot temper," frequently accused by adults of being hot tempered, etc., may develop intense covert responses of the hot-tempered order. Indeed, it is possible that in time he will come to pattern himself upon some real or symbolic hot-tempered redhead model. Even so, his red hair has not been the direct cause of his hot temper. The relationship between them was indirect: red hair provoked a given sort of response from his fellows, and that response developed the hot temper.

The distinction between the indirect and direct relationship of physique and personality is of vital significance. The attributes of physique are more or less fixed by nature, but the social stereotypes associated with given physical attributes are subject to change. In our society where there is a tendency to stereotype redheads in the "hot-tempered" category, there may well be some tendency for redheads to develop hot tempers. But the stereotype may change in

birth month, in spite of the contentions of the astrologers (P. R. Farnsworth, 1938b).

time, and then the indirect effect of red hair would be quite different from what it now is *

The Either-or Result of Stereotyping.—If all other things were equal, the person who was consistently placed in a given stereotype would develop the personality attributes of that stereotype, the red-head would become hot tempered, the overgrown boy a clumsy and inept man, the undersized boy a meek little adult, the beautiful girl a brainless clotheshorse, etc. But stereotyping is seldom consistent, and all other things are never equal.

Whereas strangers and acquaintances of brief standing tend to stereotype us and may do so in terms of some physical attribute, the people who are most vital to our social development will tend to treat us in terms of our actual personality attributes. Strangers may overestimate the age of the overgrown boy, stereotype him as a fifteen-year-old when he is only twelve, and treat him as a clumsy, inept oaf. But his parents and other intimates know that he is just a little boy, however big he is physically, and will therefore tend to excuse his stumblings and not expect him to perform on the fifteen-year-old level. The other boys in the neighborhood may stereotype the red-headed new arrival as hot tempered, but before such stereotyping has had time to become effective, they may have become sufficiently intimate with him to know, as do his parents, that he is really of gentle disposition. Whether stereotyping on the basis of some physical attribute will be at all significant in the development of the individual's personality attributes will depend in the first instance, then, upon the importance to the individual of the people who do the stereotyping. Even a striking physical attribute, such as redheadedness, may have no significant effect upon the growth of personality.

Stereotyping does not operate irrespective of other factors affecting the development of personality, and these other factors will largely determine the way the individual will adjust to the fact that he is rather consistently treated as though he were this or that sort of person. To the extent that he accepts the role accorded him, he will come to fit the stereotype, to the extent that other factors lead him to struggle against acceptance of the role, he will tend to develop personality attributes diametrically opposed to those of the stereotype.

The two extreme possibilities can perhaps be most clearly illustrated by the case of the undersized "sweet-looking" little boy. Damning in the eyes of other boys is the golden, curly hair and child-

* With the Arabians red hair means not hot temper but "one who has been to Mecca." The Arabian who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca may dye his beard red and will thereafter be looked upon with respect.

like physiognomy that lead adults to stereotype a small boy as "a sweet child." Boys will promptly label him for persecution as a sissy, a "mama's boy," or the like. The effect upon him of the treatment they accord him is not, however, predictable in terms of itself. He might, of course, have so little association with other boys that their stereotyping of him would be ineffective. If, however, it is effective, that effect will tend to be one of two extremes. If he has, as a consequence of prior factors, learned to accept as his role that of the small, insignificant person, he will probably submit humbly to mistreatment at the hands of his playmates and in time gain their acceptance as a useful but distinctly inferior member of the gang. He is then well on the way to becoming the sort of meek adult who is perpetually exploited by others; in making him this way, his physical appearance will have played an indirect part. Undoubtedly the meekness and humbleness of the meek and humble little man are in many instances thus indirectly related to his "littleness."

But the golden-haired little boy may, because of antecedent factors, resent rather than accept the role accorded him by other boys. To overcome the handicap of small stature and sweet appearance and to gain acceptance as a "regular fellow," he will then struggle against the stereotype, endeavoring to prove to his companions that he is by nature anything but a sissy, anything but a mama's boy. The direction that such struggles will take depends upon his own ingenuity. But if he is successful, he will become, so far as his playmates are concerned, some sort of antithesis to the stereotype in which they originally placed him. Perhaps he will discover that fighting words and a fighting manner make fighting unnecessary, perhaps he will learn that by being mentally resourceful and suggesting gang procedures, he can win the desired respect. In either event he will have acquired some attributes of the so-called domineering and aggressive personality. Undoubtedly the blustering aggressiveness of the blustering and aggressive little man are often thus indirectly related to his subnormal stature, even as is the slyness of the sly little fellow.

There is, therefore, a degree of truth in the old saying that a man will become what you believe him to be. But the long-run effects of stereotyping upon a person so stereotyped are so complex and so much conditioned by other factors, that treating a crook as an honest man is quite certain to have disappointing results.

PART IV

Personality and Social Adjustment

CHAPTER XII

THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

For purposes of analysis we may inventory the various attributes of a given personality as of a given time; but in point of fact life is a process, living is a procedure, and personality is of necessity dynamic. In this chapter and in subsequent chapters we shall examine the various factors that make life dynamic in any society and the special factors that operate under conditions of social change to make many of the personality "assets" of today "liabilities" of tomorrow

Dynamics in the Static Society.—From an ethnographer's report on the structure of a primitive society one is likely to get the impression that in such a society life must be very dull, a constant repetition of age-old acts. The student of our own medieval order or of the traditional Chinese social system might likewise be led to conclude that in such a society the individual's life must be one of deadening monotony. Year after year, century after century, men have gone on doing the same old things, thinking the same old thoughts, and repeating well-worn phrases.

From the sociological point of view a social system may be relatively static and the pattern of the individual's life may have definite historical continuity. The patterns of social behavior are comparatively stable. They change but slowly with time, and the new is always an outgrowth of the old. But to the social psychologist, whose attention is focused upon the behaving individual, human behavior is never static. However old a thing may be in point of social history, it is entirely new to the newborn child; however traditional a way of life may be, it is novel to the one who must learn to follow it. Thus, from the standpoint of the individual's adjustment to society, life is dynamic even in the stable social system.*

The human infant starts life without any of those social adjustment techniques which *in toto* we designate the human personality. From birth onward he slowly, laboriously, and in the ways previously described acquires a personality. But it is never a completed struc-

* See *The individual and his society: the psychodynamics of primitive social organization* (A. Kardiner and R. Linton, 1939) for a detailed discussion of this point.

ture; for a personality is not something that, once acquired, remains static. It is perpetually being modified—added to and subtracted from. We may romantically say of the youth that, having grown to maturity, he “maimies and settles down.” But neither at marriage nor at any other point in his life history does he achieve the state of being so much “settled down” that his personality attributes may long remain fixed. Two interrelated sets of factors—the physical life cycle and the social life cycle—make necessary continuous personality change, even for the individual who is born into, lives in, and dies in a relatively static social system.

THE PHYSICAL LIFE CYCLE

Like all the complex organisms, man has a normal life cycle. He is conceived and born; he grows to maturity, and he begins his organic decline, which terminates with death. Each event along this cycle will lessen the value of some previous patterns of adjustment and will necessitate some modification of the individual's personality.

Physical Maturation.—The human infant has, as we have observed, great organic potentialities but slight organic capabilities. His organic machinery is only partly developed. He is physically as well as psychologically incapable of walking, talking, and otherwise engaging in human activities. He learns how to do these things as he gradually gains the physical ability to do them. Thus, when he has matured sufficiently, he begins to learn to walk in a particular fashion. The acquisition of even such a comparatively simple manual skill as that of walking is, however, dynamic. To the growing child the physical world is constantly changing. It is at once expanding, in the sense that his sphere of activity is enlarging, and contracting, in the sense that the twenty-step room becomes a nineteen-step room as his legs and his stride grow longer. All the child's adjustments to his physical world must, therefore, undergo constant revision. If growth rate were always slow and consistent, the child would probably have no difficulty in correcting his manual adjustment patterns to the changing relative sizes of rooms, tables, chairs, doors, trees, etc. But children tend to grow by “fits and starts.” A period of rapid growth will temporarily maladjust the child to his physical environment, making his former adjustments so out of keeping with his changed relation to his physical environment that he bumps against walls, scrapes against tables, falls over chairs, and overreaches doorknobs, dishes, and all the other things he takes into his hands. Just as he has outgrown his clothing, so he has outgrown his home and all the physical objects with which he deals. The outgrown clothing can be

replaced with new and larger clothes. But the physical world cannot be enlarged to accommodate him; he must readjust to it *

As he grows in physical size, he will also grow in strength. Substances, including people, will in effect get increasingly fragile, a fact to which he must make readjustment. The door that just closed when it was pushed with all his strength when he was five will slam when it is pushed with all his strength at eight. The kick that amused the dog and Father six months ago may hurt them now. Thus the act that secured one result yesterday may secure quite a different one today.

Not a little of the child's baffling experience with the world arises as a consequence of his growth in physical size and strength. Not a little of the child's propensity for slamming doors, falling down stairs, smashing precious vases, and hurting the family pets is simply evidence that psychologically he has not caught up with his changing body.

Adolescence.—Growth in size and strength are largely matters of quantitative change. The first important qualitative changes are those which occur at puberty, when the sex glands come to maturity. Adolescence begins sometime around the twelfth, thirteenth, or fourteenth year in girls and somewhat later in boys †. The physiological

* In the case of exceptionally rapid growth, the manual clumsiness of a child may have important consequences other than the inevitable danger to physical welfare. The abnormally clumsy child or youth may impress those about him as incompetent. This social judgment may in time become a self-judgment and may thus discourage effort on the part of the child to achieve a normal adjustment. The boy who matures late has a period during which his strength is inferior to that of his associates (N. Bayley, unpublished data.) Although height and weight are not correlated with personality scores in group studies, it is obvious that the abnormally tall or short child often has especially difficult adjustment problems (W. C. Middleton, 1941a). It is in view of such possibilities that child psychologists urge a sympathetic tolerance of children's ineptitudes.

† It is frequently held that external factors, such as climate, play some part in the rate of maturation and thus in the age at which puberty occurs. The conventional belief that children "come of age" very young in the tropics because of the climate has not, however, been verified. Considerable individual variation exists, but the reason why one girl becomes sexually mature at the age of ten and another not until she is seventeen is so far unascertained. That the age at which puberty occurs may have considerable bearing upon the development of personality characteristics is a possibility that should not be ignored. Studies of American girls of the same age showed that those who had reached the menarche (first menstrual flow) displayed greater maturity of interests, more heterosexual interests, more interest in daydreaming and self-adornment, and less interest in strenuous games than did those who had not. There were no significant differences in IQ (C. P. Stone and R. G. Barker, 1937 and 1939). Boys with great

aspects of adolescence include a sharp intensification of erotic sensitivity and a fairly sudden development of capacity for true sexual experience. The sensitive zones of the skin may tend to become more sensitive; increased erotic satisfaction can be secured by lightly stroking these zones; and the body becomes capable of achieving a psychophysical crisis (orgasm) under prolonged stimulation. At the same time, certain secondary sex characteristics begin to make their appearance. The boy's voice changes, in the course of time dropping a full octave or more and, in the process, getting somewhat out of control, hair begins to make its appearance upon the face and other regions, especially those surrounding the sexual organs. The girl's breasts develop, hair makes its appearance beneath the arms and elsewhere, and the periodic menstrual flow begins.

Some of these physiological changes, such as the change of voice and appearance of the beard in boys and the enlargement of the breasts and occurrence of the menstrual flow in girls, impel the individual to learn some new ways of handling his own body. It is by no means clear, however, that the appearance of the capacity for sexual experience makes such experience a biological imperative and so accounts for the marked adjustment difficulties that have long been thought an inevitable phase of the process of growing up. At any event, the personality changes that we associate with the period of adolescence are so much a consequence of a change in social status, which is only precipitated by sexual maturation, that we cannot discuss the one apart from the other (53).

Maturity.—The human organism normally reaches a period of comparative stability sometime after its twentieth year. During the period of maturity, physiological changes are slight and of little importance to personality. Maturity is for most people in most societies a period of great physical well-being and, hence, of great potential productivity*. The duration of the period varies widely, depending on the inherited constitution of the organism and the uses and abuses to which the organism is subjected. The professional pugilist is old at twenty-five, and the dance-band musician at thirty; chronic malnutrition and extremely arduous labor may exhaust the primitive, the peasant, and the modern industrial worker before they reach the age of thirty-five; the hard-driven physician may begin to crack up at forty, whereas a member of the academic profession (the longest

male hormone activity were found to have more mature interests than those who were less physiologically mature (R. T. Sollenberger, 1940)

* The most creative years are different for the several occupations (H. C. Lehman, 1936, 1937, 1941, and 1942, H. C. Lehman and D. W. Ingerham, 1939)

lived occupational group in contemporary society)* may so conserve his energies that he is still a sound organism at fifty.

Accidents and Illnesses.—The normal life cycle may be interrupted at any point by an accident to the organism. It can be injured from without by a fall, a bullet, or any one of countless other misadventures. It can be injured from within by bacterial infection, food and other poisoning, deterioration or malfunctioning of one or more of the organs, etc. Any interruption in the life cycle will necessitate more or less significant changes in the individual's personality. A broken leg and other temporary interruptions will ordinarily have but temporary consequences, although the experience of being injured or ill may itself affect the personality †. Permanent injury or chronic illness will necessitate marked and permanent changes in the personality ‡. Obviously, loss of sight not only destroys the value of many attributes of personality but makes necessary the development of new ones. The blinded man, for example, must reconcile himself to the fact that he can no longer be an architect and must somehow learn to make the best of his remaining senses. The man who develops a weak heart must give up tennis and content himself with such intellectual pastimes as bridge.

Senescence.—When the human organism has passed its period of maturity, it begins the slow descent toward final death. Somewhere along this descent the individual will begin to feel the effects of declining vigor, declining stamina, declining sexual powers, § deterioration of the sensory mechanism, etc. (54). At some point or other he must readjust to loss of teeth, loss and graying of hair, loss of youthful appearance, and, vastly more important although frequently ignored in contemporary society, loss of physical ability to keep going at the pace that was possible during the period of maturity. As we shall see, the nature of the readjustments and the ease with which he makes them are almost wholly dependent upon social factors. But that

* See *Length of life: a study of the life table* (L. I. Dublin and A. J. Lotka, 1935).

† There is some evidence that children who have many minor illnesses learn to adjust to reality better than do their sturdier brethren (M. C. Hardy, 1937).

‡ See *Born that way* (E. R. Carlson, 1941) for a discussion of the adjustment problems of those suffering from spastic paralysis. See also "Discussion on the psychological aspects of deafness" (H. Frey, A. B. Stokes, and I. R. Ewing, 1940-1941).

§ There is an interesting and at times socially significant difference between men and women in the senescence of sexual powers. Man's capacity to procreate declines slowly and may not terminate until death. Women's procreative capacity, on the other hand, terminates rather suddenly at the menopause, a period of glandular readjustment that occurs about the forty-fifth year; but, contrary to much lay belief, the capacity to engage in the sex act may not be impaired and may actually increase.

some sorts of readjustment are necessitated by the various factors of aging should be clear. The personality attributes of the gay young blade of twenty-five simply cannot be retained when the organism begins to deteriorate. At fifty the gay young blade is but an aging man pretending to be young.

Senility and Death.—If the human organism lives to complete its life cycle, the latter years of that cycle will be a period of rapid physical deterioration and rapidly approaching death. Both factors will force marked changes in the personality. Although some few human beings retain their "faculties" more or less intact during senility and die all at once, in the manner of the one-horse shay, most senile people die by degrees. Bit by bit the organic machinery runs down; little by little the various "faculties" are lost. Each such decline, each such loss, forces the senile person to make some sort of readjustment. In the main such readjustments are of the order of abandoning former activities, they seldom involve the development of new personality attributes. In a sense, then, the personality of the senile person steadily contracts until, as it has been put, he becomes again the helpless infant, like the infant in that he must be cared for but unlike the infant in that he is unable to learn how to care for himself.

It is, ordinarily, only during the latter years of the life cycle that the imminence of death becomes an important factor in personality adjustment.* The individual may, of course, anticipate eventual death to the extent of purchasing life insurance, preparing a will, etc. But it is not until old age that the probabilities of surviving tomorrow become so slight that the human being must actually prepare himself—as contrasted to providing for others in the event of unexpected death—for dying. Presumably the lower animals are spared this necessity, since recognition of imminent death probably can come only by means of complex symbolic processes. But society teaches men, among other things, that they will eventually die and that the older they get the sooner (in terms of probabilities) death will come. Although death is an inescapable law of life, the recognition of this law is a social matter, and the mode and ease of adjustment to the eventuality of death are largely determined, as we shall see, by social factors.

* Exceptions include times of physical crisis, such as occur during illness and participation in hazardous activities—engagement in military combat, work in mines, construction projects, etc., and travel by dangerous means and into dangerous regions. The real but uncalculable hazards of so-called natural catastrophes—earthquake, fire, drought, flood, etc.—are seldom adjusted to in advance. See *The child's discovery of death* (S. Anthony, 1940),

Indirect Effects of the Life Cycle.—As the individual grows up and old and makes his adjustments to the organic processes, all the people with whom he associates are doing likewise. The social system may remain relatively stable, but the people whose behavior constitutes that system are coming and going in an endless stream. Abstractly, this coming and going may be of no significance. But to the individual it is significant in that his environment of persons is perpetually changing. As a child his world of people includes, among others, a mother, a father, perhaps a small brother and sister,^{*} and a middle-aged grandmother and grandfather. As the years pass, the latter die, the father and mother become middle-aged, and the brother and sister become mature persons. At the same time, new persons to whom he must make adjustments are born—sons and daughters, nieces and nephews, etc. And all of them are constantly changing. His son becomes mature; his wife becomes middle-aged; etc. The aging of others means that his adjustment techniques of yesterday will need revision for today, and those of today will be inadequate for tomorrow.

THE SOCIAL LIFE CYCLE

As the individual progresses through the physical cycle, he also progresses through a more or less definite social cycle. The two cycles are often concurrent but are not necessarily correlated. The social life cycle consists of a succession of socially designated roles, the exact nature of which will depend upon the particular society, the individual's class position therein, and his sex. But whatever its nature, each shift from role to role will necessitate some readjustments of the individual's personality.

The Nature of the Social Role.—The role of a child is different from that of a man, the role of a man different from that of a woman, the role of a priest different from that of a soldier. The social role, whatever its specific character, is made up of cultural elements and is enforced in much the same way as the role of a character in a play is enforced upon the player. The other members of the cast—of the play or of real-life situations—expect the individual to behave in accordance with the role that age and other factors have assigned to him. Thus, as Johnny grows older, he is told, "You are a big boy now, and big

^{*} Birth order in the family is one of the variables that determine the sort of adjustment a child is called upon to make. The eldest child of a large family tends to be the most adequately adjusted (E. M. Abernathy, 1940). Throughout childhood sibling rivalries necessitate many readjustments (D. M. Levy, 1937, and M. B. McFarland, 1938).

boys don't do this and that." When he reaches maturity, he may be told, "You're on your own now, John" When he marries, his friends and relatives may say, "At last you will settle down and become responsible"

The way people respond to an individual depends in considerable measure upon his designated social role In relations between comparative strangers, stereotyping will determine their relative roles; perhaps the shabbier is respectful to the one who is better dressed. In intimate relations, the role of each person has developed through time and will depend upon factors of age, economic status, educational status, achievements of one sort and another, marital and parental status, and the like The father may excuse the child, reprove the youth, and disown the man The law may send the youth to a correctional institution and execute the adult

Supplementing, and at times conflicting* with, the response of others to the individual's designated role are his own ideas of what sort of person he is or should be The processes here involved have already been discussed as learning by example Just as the juvenile may long to play the role of Hamlet, the youth may strive to act like a man (or his idea of a man), the man to act like a responsible husband and father, etc

Childhood and Youth.—The period of childhood is largely a matter of social definition and varies from place to place and from time to time But the role of the child is everywhere much the same The child is expected to acquire many of the basic attributes of human nature, but he is not expected to use these attributes in contributing to group welfare Childhood is, therefore, a period of preparation rather than of participation The child is an economic and social parasite, living off the surpluses produced by those who have progressed through childhood to adult roles †

The period of youth frequently begins at adolescence and often involves induction into the new role by some more or less elaborate puberty rite ‡ Youth is a period of social apprenticeship, when the

* Adolescent girls often suffer severely from the mother-daughter conflict of ideas Most of the discord is due to differences in thinking regarding manners, personal appearance, attitudes, and goals (M F Nimkoff, 1931, and V L Block, 1937) See also "Age group conflict and our changing culture" (E H Bell, 1933)

† Exceptions are to be noted In rural societies children are often partially self-supporting as soon as they become capable of doing simple tasks In early industrial England, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, children were fed into the factories, worn out, and discarded long before they reached their teens

‡ The functional value of puberty rites as a means of introducing the maturing

social skills that were learned during childhood are tiled out under adult guidance. The social demands upon the youth are much greater than those upon the child. Generally, the youth is expected to "earn his salt" in social as well as economic ways, but he is not expected to be fully self-reliant or to make a contribution to the welfare of the group. In most social systems the demands made on the youth are tempered by the granting of liberties that he did not possess as a child. Thus the youth, unlike the child, may be permitted to wander afield in search of adventure, amorous and otherwise.

Occupational Maturity.—At some point or other in the social life cycle, the individual comes of age economically. The young man, "goes to work," not as a part-time and rather casual apprentice, but as a member in good standing in an occupational group. He joins the hunters or the fishers or becomes a soldier, or, as is the case in the modern world, he gets a job in a factory, office, shop, etc. For the young woman occupational maturity frequently means getting married. Her job is then that of wife and daughter-in-law or wife and homemaker, as the case may be.

Whatever the specific characteristics of the occupational role, that role invariably presupposes a considerable degree of self-reliance and a productivity (in both social and economic "goods") that is above that necessary for self-maintenance. It is during maturity that the individual tends to pay off the debts incurred during childhood and to store up for the unproductive period of old age. He and she may do this by raising a family and at the same time providing for their elders or, as is the modern tendency, by paying taxes on the one hand (part of which will go to the maintenance of schools, old-age pensions, poor farms, etc.), and buying annuities and life insurance on the other. The debts incurred and payments made are not, of course, exclusively economic.* During childhood we are given much attention that will ordinarily be returned by giving attention to our own children and to "the old folks." In any event, it is the period of occupational maturity that requires the greatest self-reliance, imposes the greatest burdens, and offers the least immediate returns.

Marriage and Parenthood.—Marriage and its frequent consequence, parenthood, are likewise roles that make new demands on the individual. Upon entering marriage both the husband and wife normally renounce certain liberties and assume new responsibilities

child to his or her new social responsibilities is clearly shown in *Life in Lesu* (H Powdermaker, 1933).

* In *Growing up in New Guinea*, Mead describes a system of economic indebtedness that effectively enslaves husband and wife to their elders (M. Mead, 1930).

In most societies it is at least tacitly assumed that as parents they will provide their children with economic maintenance and social training. The moral and legal responsibilities of husband for wife, and vice versa, and of parent for child vary from society to society. In general, the marital and parental roles are much more restrictive than is the role of youth, and grant few, if any, new rights. These roles are ordinarily, however, a necessary prelude to rights that will mature in later years

Old Age.—In most social systems the role of the elder is theoretically and often actually one that involves many rights and few onerous responsibilities. In most societies, age has been revered and respected as the period of greatest wisdom. The aged have been granted every possible consideration, including that of the choicest foods the household could provide. The role of the aged has been that of nominal and perhaps actual leader. From the sociopsychological point of view, the granting of such rights and the release from arduous duties has served as a partial if not complete compensation for declining vigor and health.

Shifting Roles and Personality Adaptation.—Although the point has not been stressed in the foregoing, it should be evident that, as the individual moves from social role to social role, his personality must undergo some sort of readaption. As he enters the roles of maturity, he must, for example, reconcile himself to new responsibilities and the loss of former liberties. How marked the changes that must be made in his personality will be will depend upon the extent to which his previous role or roles have fitted him for the new one. And that extent, in turn, will depend largely upon the stability of the social system that has trained him and that assigns him his roles.

SOCIAL DYNAMICS

With some notable exceptions, the stable social systems have given continuity to the personality of the individual. Not only were his various social roles well defined and so graduated that each one led rather easily to the next, but his methods of adjusting to the various phases of the physical life cycle were socially provided and were compatible one with another. Under such conditions the individual's personality necessarily acquired new attributes as he grew up and old, but each new attribute was only an elaboration and extension of what he had previously learned. Thus the attributes of personality that he acquired during childhood would both fit him to the child role and partially prepare him for adolescence and the role of youth, etc. In the contemporary world, on the other hand, the individual may arrive

at each successive point on the physical life cycle and at each new role on the social life cycle without many of the personality attributes that are necessary and with some that are in the nature of malpreparation.

Social Disorganization.—We have remarked from time to time that ours is a disorganized society. Abstractly, this disorganization of our society may be considered as a variable, complex, and continuing disequilibrium between the functional units of the social order.* In general terms, it might be said that we have replaced old Dobbin with a high-powered internal-combustion motor and are having difficulty keeping the buggy and the motor together. Now a buggy is an effective conveyance for use with a horse, but it was not designed to house a one hundred-horsepower motor. A considerable amount of tinkering is going to be necessary to adapt the buggy to this new motive power.

During the past few hundred years vast changes have occurred in our techniques of nature control. The tractor has replaced the old hand plow, the truck the wagon, and the automobile the horse and buggy; the sailing ship has become the fleet steamer, and all our means of transportation have been supplemented by the airplane. The electroturbine has replaced the little water wheel, the lance and sword have become machine gun and bomb. Handicraft has moved from the home to the great factory, men have moved from the farm and village to the vast city. And the changes in our techniques of nature control go on incessantly.

Our techniques of social relations, however, have not kept pace. For reasons that need not be considered here, we have clung to the old social ways while avidly accepting new mechanical, industrial, and agricultural devices. But the old ways have been disrupted and disorganized by these new devices.† Slowly, by painful experimentation, the old social patterns are being readjusted to them. During this period of readjustment, the social system is functioning so inadequately that many despair of its survival. Others offer easy panaceas—ranging from an abandonment of the new technologies and a return to the “good” life of some distant time to the establishment of a planned social order based upon the new techniques.

The inescapable fact is that, whatever the future holds, the present is one of profound confusion. The disorganization of the preindustrial

* For attempts to establish objective criteria for the measurement of social disorganization, see “The measurement and significance of institutional disorganization” (J. F. Cuber, 1938) and “The problem of teaching social problems” (R. C. Fuller, 1938).

† See *Technology and society* (S. M. Rosen and L. Rosen, 1941), especially Part III.

units of social life and our failure as yet to replace them with new forms of group organization does nothing to decrease the dependence of the individual upon society and only tends to set him at odds with society * In the first place the socialization processes are disordered, and the individual does not receive that systematic social guidance which makes possible easy adjustment to his successive social roles He is, as a consequence, often in the position of an actor who is thrust out onto the stage expected to play the part of Hamlet but equipped to play the part of Bottom In the second place, social change has disorganized the social system and outmoded many time-honored human practices and procedures Thus the outlines of the play itself are blurred, new plot elements are introduced from time to time; and the cast is constantly perplexed and confused A story of peace? Of war? Of revolution? A comedy of errors, individual and social? The tragedy of poverty or the equal tragedy of excess wealth? In a dynamic social system it is quite impossible to predict, and hence prepare for, the social changes of the future and their effects upon the course of an individual's life

Long-run versus Short-run Adjustment Values.—The human infant is plastic and could, presumably, be fitted for almost any sort of life He could be trained to make adjustment to wealth or poverty, to idleness or slavery, to peace or war, and to long life or early death But every adjustment that he learns reduces by that much his plasticity, fitting him to one sort of life circumstance and unfitting him for many others This is not to say that, as a human being becomes older, he grows incapable of learning new habits, but rather that habits already acquired tend to interfere with the learning of new ones † Thus it is comparatively easy to learn the correct pronuncia-

* There is a vast and ever-growing body of literature on the relation between social disorganization and personality disorganization The May, 1937, issue of *The American Journal of Sociology* and the August, 1940, issue of *The Sociological Review* are devoted to the subject and will provide a general introduction to the problem Note especially the articles by H. Blumer and P. Schilder in the former and that by L. Wirth in the latter See also *Social pathology* (S. A. Queen and J. R. Gruener, 1940), "The concepts social disorganization and social participation" (S. A. Queen, 1941), "A study of personal disorganization" (E. R. Mowrer, 1939), and "Maladjustment and social neurosis" (G. Devereux, 1939)

The most thoroughgoing systematic analysis of the problem from the sociopsychological point of view is *Personality and problems of adjustment* (K. Young, 1940)

† Older people are considerably less adept at solving problems where the task to be undertaken conflicts in great degree with what has been already learned If, for example, older people and adolescent youngsters are both asked to solve problems that contain the peculiar assumptions that three times one equals one, three

tion of a new word, but it is exceedingly difficult to learn the correct pronunciation of a word that has long been mispronounced. As the personality develops, the original plasticity of the individual diminishes. The personality cannot be melted down and recast to keep it up to date with changing circumstances.

The individual's personality develops largely in terms of short-run adjustment values. Under conditions of social stability these short-run values will more or less coincide with their long-run value—their effectiveness in future life situations. But in the disorganized society, short-run and long-run adjustment values will, as we shall see, often run counter one to the other. Under such conditions, a curious sociopsychological contradiction makes its appearance: the more thoroughly and effectively the individual is trained in terms of short-run adjustment values, the more he is malprepared for later life. In a very important sense, the less the child and youth are socialized, the better they will be fitted for the unpredictable conditions they must adjust to in later life. To a considerable degree, the best preparation for adjustment to social confusion is no specific preparation at all. In a dynamic society effective adjustment means meeting each new situation in terms of itself rather than in terms of some preestablished attribute of personality.

times four equals two, and the like, the former age group will progress in its learning much more slowly than will the latter. On the other hand, if the learning task is of a type in which there is far less conflict with well-established habits, the oldsters will be under a much smaller handicap (F. L. Ruch, 1934).

CHAPTER XIII

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND MALPREPARATION

FAMILY DISORGANIZATION

The family is still the basic training unit for most children in contemporary society. It is in the home—Park Avenue penthouse or crowded auto trailer—that the child acquires the primary patterns upon which all subsequent experience will operate. From the intimate, personal relations with parents and siblings he would seem to secure many of the overt and most of the covert patterns that become vitally important in his adjustments as an adult. Through these relations he acquires those complex personality attributes that are suggested by such terms as selfishness and unselfishness, confidence and lack of confidence, and self-reliance and lack of self-reliance.

But the modern family is not the family system of a hundred years ago or even that of fifty years ago. It is not a system at all.* It is no more than the fragments of a system that has been shattered by the forces of social change. As one consequence, the modern family frequently malprepares its children for the situations to which they must subsequently adjust.

The character of the family in which the modern child is born and in which he receives his early training† may vary from a reasonable facsimile of the old-fashioned family (the farm family tends toward this pole) to a child-mother relationship that is almost untempered by the presence of other adults. About the only safe generalization that can be made regarding the modern family is that no two will be very much alike. The infinite variety of ways in which the modern family may malprepare the child for later life will, however, for simplicity of analysis be treated in terms of a few polar types. These are, in effect, the extreme possibilities. The malpreparation of a given child may,

* See *The family: a dynamic interpretation* (W. Waller, 1938) and *Marriage and the family* (R. E. Baber, 1939).

Social disorganization (M. A. Elliott and F. E. Merrill, 1941) contains a treatment of family disorganization as well as of community disorganization—a topic to be considered later in this chapter.

† See "Early home background and personality adjustment" (M. M. Bolles, H. F. Metzger, and M. W. Pitts, 1941).

of course, fall far short of an extreme and may include aspects of more than one of these types

The Petty Tyrant.—All children must be indulged in the sense that they must be taken care of, guided, and protected from the consequences of their own ineptitude. When, however, the child is elevated within the home to the status of petty tyrant, he is likely to acquire attributes of personality that will make for his being mal-adjusted when he leaves it.

In the modern world many things may foster such overindulgence of the child. The decline in family size, almost universal in Western societies, tends to give to each child a more important role in the family. The parents of five children ordinarily divide their parental time five ways, and the child with four siblings is unlikely to develop an excessive sense of his own importance.* But the parents of only one child can, though they may not, lavish on him the parental attention that might have been divided among five. Such an overindulged child may learn to rule his parents with a childish will.

As the size of families has declined, so too has the function of the home as a domestic workshop. In the old family system women had much more to do than tend their children, they were processors of food, fabricators of textiles, etc. Today most such work has been taken over by the factory. Where the women have not also gone to the factory, they are left at home as unemployed. The housewife's free time may be absorbed by a host of pleasurable and nonproductive activities. But in many instances about all she has left to occupy her time is her children. If, then, she has but one or two children, each will be likely to receive from her far more attention than he or she will ever receive from anyone else during his or her lifetime.

An adoring and otherwise unoccupied mother or father or both will constitute an exceedingly bountiful environment, particularly if they can afford to indulge the child with material goods as well as attention. Under such conditions the child will ordinarily learn to want many things, in fact an unending series of things. At the same time he will usually come to accept these as a sort of natural right, an offering that is normally forthcoming. Because he has only to ask for in order to receive, he will not learn the techniques of "earning" what he wants. He will more likely learn to be a petty tyrant, getting

* It is always possible, of course, for the parents of a number of children to favor one of them above all the others; and it sometimes happens that the presence of numerous siblings fosters, rather than limits, overindulgence. This is especially true of the child who is so much younger than his siblings that they tend to assume the parental role toward him. See *Parent-child relations* (M. F. Nimkoff, 1935).

what he wants by insistent demands, temper tantrums, sulking, and other devices that are successful with indulgent parents largely because of their nuisance value

The personality attributes of the petty tyrant are, thus, the product of an overindulgent and therefore submissive family environment. As long as he is within the family sphere, he will be a well-adjusted person. But when time and changing circumstances force him out into the larger world, he will be not "mama's darling boy" but "that damned brat." The boys of the neighborhood, the adults of the community, the teachers at school, and the people who make up his adult economic world will be unlikely to enshrine, pamper, and indulge him. They will expect of him what his adoring parents never did—full repayment in kind for all they give to him. The techniques by which he got his way at home will be a distinct handicap to him in his effort to get recognition outside the home. He will, therefore, come to the outside world not only unprepared, but malprepared for it. From the ideal and artificial environment of the home, he will go out into the real world expecting what does not exist and unprepared for what does. He may in time learn reasonably adequate adjustments to some or many aspects of the outside world. He may, however, have his "spirit" broken by the shock of discovering that he is not so important as his family has led him to think, or he may become defiant and fight against the world, which refuses to submit to him.

The Overguided—Coincident with the decline in the number of children per family has been a rise in the average age at parenthood. Many factors are involved in bringing this about: the rising standard of economic life encourages postponement of marriage, the development of birth-control techniques makes possible postponement of children after marriage, etc. In any event, there is a significant tendency toward middle-aged parenthood.

As a general rule people become increasingly cautious as they grow older. Whereas the twenty-year-old parent may trust to luck and take each day as it comes, the thirty- or forty-year-old parent may be overcautious, foreseeing all the hazards in the child's first step, the dangers inherent in the stairway, etc. If the overcautious parent is also an adoring one, the result may be overguidance. The child may thus be trained to conform to his parents' ideas of what is right and expedient and may be given little opportunity to learn by direct experience. His parents may succeed in teaching him to wear the proper clothes and to behave properly in all those situations that they can anticipate. They may provide him with cautious adjustments to wet feet, dangerous crossings, and all other anticipatable circumstances. But in so

doing, they prevent him from learning for and by himself. If all his future adjustment problems could be anticipated—and in the stable social system such tends to be the case—this protection from the hazards of trial and error would be wholly advantageous. But the modern parent cannot possibly anticipate a fraction of the circumstances that the child will in time encounter. As has already been remarked, a sort of psychological agility is necessary for survival under conditions of social change. Ability to work out adjustments in terms of the actual circumstances would seem to be largely a matter of skill at covert trial and error. The adjustment consequences of such skill, which may be specific rather than general, are usually spoken of as self-reliance.

The overguided child will be well adjusted within the ordered sphere of the home. But when he enters the disorder of the outside world, he will find a multitude of situational problems that cannot be solved by any of the parentally provided patterns. He will be unprepared in that he has not been allowed to learn the techniques of problem solving; he will be malprepared to the extent that his training leads him to use established elements of personality in adjusting to unprecedented circumstances. Such, for example, is the case when the gentlemanly little boy tries to resolve an encounter with the neighborhood bully by explaining that it is unmannerly to engage in fisticuffs. Not only will he fail to impress the tough, but he will be defenseless in the rough-and-tumble fight imposed upon him.

It should be observed that the overguided child does not expect the world to bow to his will. Rather, he expects others to conform to the same set of rules to which his parents have taught him to conform. He has what might be called a legalistic view of life; he endeavors to adjust in terms of precedent. If he finds an ordered segment of the world in which to live, all may go well with him. But under any other circumstances he will be more or less severely maladjusted unless and until he has acquired some degree of self-reliance. It is possible that many of the more earnest and serious of social reformers are maladjusted conformists who are trying to shape the world into the orderliness necessitated by their own personalities.

The Solitary.—One of the more striking results of contemporary social disorganization is that, although modern people live in great aggregations, they often have few permanent acquaintances and even fewer intimate friends (R. K. Merton, 1938). For the most part their associative life is with passing acquaintances, with coworkers, and with functionaries, such as clerks and elevator boys. In the modern city particularly, associates must be sought out and “impressed.” The

shy person and the person who has not learned to be agreeable to acquaintances may find his associative life exceedingly restricted. The perennial popularity of lectures and books on how to be charming and win friends suggests that a considerable number of modern people want more associates than they are able because of their personalities to secure *

The solitary is frequently the product of a home background so much circumscribed that he had no opportunity to learn to get along with other children. Getting along with others cannot be learned from books or by parental guidance. It can be acquired only by practice. The child who is limited, because of the nature of the home and its relation to the outside world, to association with adults will probably learn to get along with adults. But, as we have seen, the child-adult patterns of relationships will be of little value when the child, becoming an adult, must get along with equals. In general, the personality attributes that are necessary to the achievement of associative life under our impersonal urban conditions—social assurance, good sportsmanship, and all the various ways in which sociable people “win” friends—would seem to be most readily acquired through participation in childhood play activities. The decline in the size of the family means that many children will not be able to secure such training within the family itself, and the urban apartment type home often precludes their securing it among children outside the home. Nursery schools, public schools, playgrounds, and the various girl and boy organizations may be partial substitutes for the informal associations of family and community. But many modern children grow to maturity without having had the opportunity to learn to get along with their kind† and as adults may therefore be solitary rather than sociable.

The Irresponsible.—Too much parental attention is one extreme consequence of the disorganization of the family. Too little is another. The tenement home may be no more than a squalid single room to

* For many years the manufacturer of a well-known mouthwash has claimed that social failure is usually caused by bad breath. Body odor, poor grammar, the wrong face powder or lipstick, and dingy teeth are some of the many things that have been blamed by one manufacturer or another as the reason for lack of friends. Such claims demonstrate only that advertisers believe that many people feel the need for more associative life. In this, rather than in their claims, they are no doubt correct.

† Certain geniuses appear to have overcompensated for a feeling of social inferiority. They had never learned how to make friends and were thus somewhat solitary characters. Unsociability may not, however, be typical of the genius (W. C. Middleton, 1935).

which working parents return wearily at the close of day and from which they go when morning comes again. The costly apartment may be a place of adult gaiety in which children are in the way.* The poor parents will of necessity let their children make out as best they can. Under such circumstances children tend to become street vagabonds, subject only to the intermittent and probably injudicious guidance of the cop on the beat and the school authorities. The well-to-do parents will shift responsibility to hired nursemaids, boarding schools, and other commercial agencies. In both cases, the children are likely to develop into irresponsible adults.

All work and no play undoubtedly make for unsociability, but all play unquestionably makes for irresponsibility. A few children grow up to be men and women who can go through life engrossed in self-amusement. But most children face eventual maturity and the responsibilities, economic and social, that are imposed by the role of the adult. Youth, it will be recalled, is ordinarily a period of social apprenticeship during which the individual is more or less gradually introduced to the responsibilities of the adult. The child who is given too little guidance may have a prolonged childhood, skip the period of youth, and then have adult responsibilities thrust forcibly upon him.

Unpreparedness for adult roles is no doubt a general tendency in contemporary society, but it is most striking in the children of many of the very poor and many of the relatively wealthy families. The playboy, poor or rich, who is suddenly thrust into the role of worker, of husband, and of father will find the demands made upon him extremely irksome. Perhaps he can in time accept his responsibilities. More likely he will continue on his irresponsible way, losing job after job, spending as he earns, deserting or divorcing his wives, and ignoring, insofar as he is able, the obligations of social membership. And should he be brought to a full stop, he is likely to stare in bewilderment at the adult world, a world that expects of him things he is unprepared to give.†

* The presence of children is so incompatible with the way of life of apartment-house dwellers that managers of the "better" sorts of apartment houses often prohibit them. Children are, perhaps, even more inappropriate to the way of life that centers in the hotel. See *Hotel life* (N. S. Hayner, 1936).

† Mead reports that among the Manus of New Guinea, in striking contrast to most primitive peoples, the step from childhood to adult status is so abrupt that the adult forever after looks back upon his childhood as the only happy period of his life. This condition she compares with the consequences in our society of the tendency to prolong childhood. Among the Manus both girls and boys are taught to swim, to handle themselves in boats, and otherwise to take care of them-

The Unstable.—The disorganization of family life is most clearly reflected by the constantly rising divorce rate. Today about one out of every five marriages is terminated by divorce.* Probably another one out of the five is broken by desertion, the poor man's divorce. How many of the remaining three are precariously maintained conflict relationships, no one knows.

Not all unsuccessful marriages involve children, but in those that do, the effect on the child is usually pronounced. The child who has been raised in a relatively tranquil domestic atmosphere will figuratively be torn apart if parental conflict arises—whether or not that conflict resolves in an actual breaking of the home. It will be recalled that intimate association tends to develop positive identification of one person for another, with the result that the one vicariously shares the experiences of the other. In a relatively happy home the child ordinarily develops such identification[†] with both parents. Opposition between his parents will, then, place the child in a conflict position. He will be positively identified with each of two people who are more or less negatively identified with each other. His positive identification with each necessarily involves negative identification with the other

selves. From then on, until puberty in the case of girls and until marriage in the case of boys, they are allowed to run loose. They have no responsibilities and are not required to enter at all into the life of adults, therefore they play. By playing they learn many things, but they do not learn the duties and responsibilities that will be theirs in later years. They pay little attention to adults and do not model themselves to any degree upon adult patterns. At maturity they are little more prepared psychologically for adult life than they were at the age of eight. Suddenly, the lid is clamped down, they must be adults although they have not learned to behave as adults (M. Mead, 1930).

* The ratio of divorces to marriages in the United States has been growing slowly but steadily over the past fifty years. See "Recent increases in marriage and divorce" (S. A. Stouffer and L. M. Spencer, 1939).

† Ever since the advent of Freudian psychoanalysis the problem of father-son adjustment has been clouded by the Oedipus complex, the notion that the son, jealous of his mother's affections, has a submerged or instinctive desire to kill his father. This concept is basic to orthodox psychoanalytic theory (G. Roheim, 1932) and has been regarded by the Freudians as a universal phenomenon. It should be noted, however, that the complex does not appear in some societies. Malinowski, for example, found that in the Trobriand Islands (B. Malinowski, 1927), where family authority is vested not in the father but in the mother's eldest brother, whatever hostility exists is directed toward the uncle, not the father. The Oedipus complex would thus appear to be based on reactions to authority, not on instinct. No doubt Freud was biased by the frequency of the father-son conflicts he encountered in Vienna, where the authority of the father, particularly amongst the orthodox Jews, was very great. In *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (E. Fromm, 1936) conclusions similar to those reached by Malinowski are advanced.

In lay terminology, he at once loves and hates both his father and his mother. He will frequently be forced to take sides in the marital conflict, but no matter which side he takes, it will be in opposition to his "other interest."

One of the more characteristic consequences of such divided filial allegiance is instability*—vacillation from side to side with resulting indecisiveness. This instability toward his parents is likely to be extended into other aspects of the child's behavior by the division and opposition of parental authority, *eg*, what the father represents, advises, and orders will be countermanded by the mother, and vice versa. Under such conditions instability may be the only adequate form of adjustment. But in the world outside the home some degree of decisiveness and persistence is normally necessary for success, and the unstable child will be malprepared for adult life.

When the home is actually broken, the situation may be further complicated by the fact that the child is, in the eyes of the community and, hence, ultimately in his own eyes, atypical. It is still true that the parents of most children live together. This is the normal, as well as what the child has been taught to consider ideal, parental background. The child who has lost one parent through separation, divorce, or desertion may come to feel intensely the contrast between what is and what should be. Such contrasts between the real and the ideal not infrequently lead to abnormal forms of behavior, a subject that will be considered in a later chapter.

COMMUNITY DISORGANIZATION

Just as the old family system has disintegrated under the impact of industrialism, so too has the community—the neighborhood, the village, or the farm families within easy traveling radius—which was an integral part of the old social order. The community served as a supplement to the family. It was particularly important to the individual during his youth, guiding him through his adolescence into marriage and occupational maturity. From the community he obtained his bride, in the community he secured his adult employment.

In the modern world the "community" of the individual is usually dispersed, composed of heterogeneous elements, and largely beyond the jurisdiction of the family. Thus, when the modern child begins

* The problem behavior of the children of broken homes cannot as a rule be traced directly to the overt delinquencies of the parents (H. A. Weeks, 1940). It would seem to be more related to subtle emotional relationships within the family (B. Silverman, 1935).

to enter the enlarged world of the youth, his parents can only hope for the best. There is little that they can do to assure that his associates will be "good" for him or that the collective activities of him and his friends will serve as effective training for future marriage and occupational status. There are no integrated and cohesive communities of youths, constantly under adult supervision, for the modern youth to join. He must seek out his associates, and they must together seek out things to do. Most of his activities will be of an order of play that is only a slightly more adult version of the play activities that engrossed him during his childhood. Yet it is largely out of such youthful play that he must somehow find his job and his girl and achieve maturity.

The disorganization of the family, plus the disorganization of the community, leave the development of those personality attributes that will be relevant to occupational and marital life quite largely to fortuitous factors. The modern individual is not socially prepared for and guided into his adult responsibilities. He fumbles and stumbles his way into them, and it is no wonder that he makes many mistakes on the way and often fails in the end.

Sexual Adjustment.—Prior to adolescence, sex as such will have played little part in the actual adjustments of the child. But the child cannot have reached adolescence without having become aware of the existence of sex and having acquired some ideas regarding its nature and what he will do when he "comes of age."

In all the integrated societies some provision is made whereby the child is systematically prepared for sexual maturity and then is guided into the culturally predetermined pattern of sexual adaptation.* In such societies the period of adolescence is not ordinarily one of "storm and strife," as it so often is with us. So general are the psychological troubles of adolescence in our society that, until recently, they were considered a natural and inevitable consequence of sexual development. But it would now appear that the flounderings of the adolescent are caused not by sex but by malpreparation for adjustment to sex. Such malpreparation is a fairly common product of the disorganization of family and community life.

* Many so-called "primitive" societies have treated sex as a commonplace and have left the adolescent free to select his life companion through socially approved sexual experimentation. In the patriarchal family—the background for our own ideologies of family life—sex was depreciated, and the individual was taught to consider sex life and marriage as synonymous. He was then guided into marriage by the elders of the family. For fuller discussion of these opposing systems, see Appendix note 55.

In a wide variety of ways, the growing child, particularly the girl, is taught the ideals of monogamy.* These ideals were appropriate to the system of family life that was in existence a century or two ago, but they are inappropriate today. They include stress upon the material and spiritual worth of virginity, the idea that there is one perfect mate, and, in its worst expression, faith in that stereotyped ending to all love stories, "They got married and lived happily ever after."

Opposed to our ideals regarding sex life is our overidealization of the desirability of sexual experience. We are, as has frequently been pointed out, a sex-ridden people. Directly and indirectly, sex is emphasized in popular literature, in music, and in drama. It is the primary topic for most *sub rosa* conversation. Sex, therefore, cannot be taken casually as a perfectly normal and to-be-taken-for-granted fact of human life, as it is with many primitives and has been for centuries with the Chinese. For the adolescent, sex is likely to become a focus for preoccupation. Thus sexual experience frequently is something that is prohibited until marriage but is greatly to be desired before marriage.

Absolved from the social restraints that prevent the working out of an adequate outlet to the socially stressed need for sex experience, the maturing boy and girl could, through sheer trial and error, attain some sort of adjustment. On the other hand, much the same end would be accomplished were the desirability of sex experiences to be depreciated during youth, since, as has been said, there is no reason to suppose that sex is a physiological "must," the denial of which inevitably results in weird and disturbing complexes.†

Not all the uncertain fumbblings of the modern adolescent are, however, even indirectly related to sex. Many of the "show-off" activities, much of the semihysterical chatter, and the vacillating pre-occupations with this today and that tomorrow are inept attempts to be grown up, to play the social roles of the adult.

Occupational Adjustment.—Most young people arrive more or less unprepared at the age when they are expected to take on responsibility.

* A picture of the readjustments made necessary by the clash of two sex ideals—monogamous and polygamous—can be seen in the behaviors of the polygamous Mormons. The plural wives particularly felt the conflict (J. E. Hulett, Jr., 1940, and K. Young, 1942).

† For an elementary discussion of the problems of adolescence see *Social psychology of adolescence* (E. DeA. Partridge, 1938). For discussions of the social origins of these adjustment problems see "The adolescent world" (E. B. Reuter *et al.*, 1936), "Institutional demands" (R. G. Foster *et al.*, 1936), and "The sociology of adolescence" (E. B. Reuter, 1937). See also Appendix note 53.

for their economic welfare During childhood they have not been learning economically remunerative skills The boy simply cannot follow his father into the factory, the shop, or the office, there to acquire bit by bit the techniques of the machinist, the salesman, or the accountant The girl, who in later life will most probably find herself in the occupation of wife and mother, might possibly learn to run a home, to manage a husband, and to take care of children by participation in the work of her mother, but she seldom does In general most of the skills that boys and girls learn have significance for recreational rather than occupational life

The public school, originally presumed to be a substitute for the informal educational functions of family and community, does little to prepare the mass of children in the skills—and still less in the ideals—necessary for occupational adjustment By and large, our educational system is geared to the production of scholars, scientists, doctors, teachers, and other professionals.* For those who enter the professions, the educational system functions reasonably well But the vast majority of those who go through the primary and secondary schools cannot, in the nature of things, enter the professions There is a limit to the number of professionals and so-called “white-collar workers” that a society can support Someone must fabricate and run our machines; someone must cultivate the soil, someone must wash dishes, cook meals, change diapers

Most modern youths are not only unprepared to get and hold a job, but are also malprepared In our society the ambitions of most young people exceed their reasonable expectations † To the extent that it has effectiveness, the school contributes to this by reinforcing the popular misconception that there is plenty of room at the top Our economic class lines are not clear, and class position is not entirely determined by status at birth Poor boys do rise to riches, and many of our economic leaders are self-made men But the way up is long

* Our high schools generally make some feeble attempt to provide vocational training, and some cities have special technical high schools where specialized vocational training can be secured But the vocational-training movement has met with strong resistance on the part of the academicians who control the public-school system and has secured little encouragement from parents As a result, adequate vocational training is usually obtainable only from private sources at considerable cost to the student and is therefore not available to those who need it most

† The difficulty in coordinating ideals with future realities is shown by a poll taken by G. B. Gallup (April, 1939). Only 6 per cent of the general public felt themselves to be members of the lower class Yet many more than that percentage must be “hewers of wood and drawers of water”

and hard; the competition is bitter; and except for a few who have "struck it rich," those who have succeeded have displayed great resourcefulness and exceptional diligence and have foregone much in order that they might achieve this one thing

Most modern boys and girls, having more or less played their way through childhood and early youth, are likely to feel that their high ambitions will be fulfilled effortlessly, much as a matter of course. They are therefore likely to be dismayed by the first impact with harsh reality, and many of them give up the struggle (K. Horney, 1937). They must then either become reconciled to the unspectacular and probably dull routine of the work into which they ultimately drift or remain occupationally maladjusted. Whatever may happen in the individual case, it is clear that a large proportion of modern people find their work life irksome and at times unbearable.

Marital Adjustment (56).—The child who is brought up in one of the more or less disorganized families of contemporary society will in time become the founder of another. His preparation for this event will probably be no more adequate than is his preparation for getting and holding a job. The procedure by which he arrives at marriage is romantically described as "falling in love" but is more validly characterized as trial-and-error mate selection. In this trial and error the bases for judgment are largely irrelevant, and one of the first errors may have to serve as the final solution.

Because the eminently practical aspects of the marital relationship are obscured by romanticism, the "choice" of a wife or husband is far more likely to be made on the basis of appearance, status within the community of youths, manner, and similar irrelevancies, than upon the basis of compatible personality attributes*. It is, therefore, largely a matter of chance whether a particular young man and a particular young woman will be able to make a success of their marriage. As has already been said, about two out of five such unions are such bad errors that they are ultimately broken by divorce or desertion.

We have seen that the unmarried youth, particularly in our society, has limited responsibilities. He is, because he can be, self-centered. Consideration for the welfare of others will be restricted to passing concern with the parental tendency to worry unnecessarily. At marriage, however, self-concern must, if the marriage is to endure, be extended to include the marital partner. This means, of course, a modification of many established attributes of personality. It can no

* Detailed description and analysis of the courting procedure in modern society is to be found in *The family: a dynamic interpretation* (W. Waller, 1938) and in *Marriage and the family* (R. E. Baber, 1939).

longer be, "What do I want? What shall I do? What effect will this and that have on me?" Each spouse must make his or her calculations and temper his or her behavior in terms of "we" and "us" There are exceptions, as when one spouse is willingly subservient to the other, but in general the marital adjustment is most easily effected between individuals whose personalities happen to involve similar attributes There is no reason to suppose any inherent advantage in blonds marrying blondes and brunets marrying brunettes, but there is every reason to think that the more comparable the personalities of the bride and groom, the greater is the possibility that each will be able to make the transition from "I" to "we" The heiress and the stable boy may live happily ever after in fiction; in real life they would probably never come to a meeting of minds on much of anything In the modern world personalities are so diverse and mate selection is so dependent upon irrelevancies that even the most fortunate of matings will demand of each spouse many readjustments if marital harmony is to be achieved (H. V. McLean, 1941)

The articulation of the personalities of the partners to a marriage is, however, but one aspect of marital adjustment Not only must they learn to get along with each other, but they together must learn to get along with their respective friends, relatives, and acquaintances Conventionally, the honeymoon is a brief period of social irresponsibility during which the bride and groom are free to begin the solution of their own adjustment problems The honeymoon over, they are expected to behave like sensible and responsible adults But marriage involves factors that make the satisfactions of social demands difficult in the modern world

Ordinarily, marriage means a doubling of the number of people to whom each spouse is to some extent obligated—relatives, friends, and acquaintances When he becomes a husband, the groom also becomes a son-in-law, a brother-in-law, etc., and for many people the "husband of Jane." There may be twice as many family dinners, twice as many relatives and friends ill and in need of comfort, etc., as there were before marriage. At the same time, the married person is less likely than is the unmarried to be excused for not attending the dinner, not calling on poor Aunt Ellen, and not repaying this social obligation and that. A thousand and one responsibilities descend upon the married partners that were unknown to either before their marriage. One of the more important factors determining whether or not they will be able to make their adjustment to the new social status is the compatibility of each with the community of the other and of the two communities of relatives, friends, and acquaintances with each other.

The heiress and the stable boy might conceivably work out an adequate adjustment to each other. It is improbable, however, that her community would accept him or that his would accept her. And in the modern world so much is left to chance that marriages not infrequently have something of the stable boy and heiress quality.

RELIGIOUS DISORGANIZATION

Every stable social system has included an organized explanation of final causation. This is a system of verbal abstractions which are used to represent the otherwise incomprehensible forces making for, among other things, the phenomena of life and death.* Around these abstractions the society builds a great complex of beliefs and rituals, and over them it exercises influence through prayers and incantations. Usually, a specialized occupational group—the magic men or priests—serves these abstractions on behalf of the people as a whole. The result is organized religion.

For the group, religion generally functions as a control to keep the individual from deviating too widely from group ways. To the threat of punishment in this life, religion adds the threat of punishment in the future life, to the promise of earthly rewards for good behavior, religion adds the promise of rewards in the hereafter.

Religion serves the individual, also, and in a number of vital ways. It gives an abstract meaning and continuity to his life, comforting him in his disappointments and explaining away his personal failures and sufferings. It helps him in his adjustment to events for which he is unprepared. It is a sort of over-all preparation for his misadventures. Religion also attempts to reconcile the individual to the certainty of eventual death and to make the infirmities of old age but a prelude to the new life. It has been rather contemptuously referred to as the "opiate of the people," a costless substitute for the material necessities of life. But in the integrated society at least, religion may assist the individual to make adjustment to many of the inevitabilities of life.

No other aspect of our old social system has been so thoroughly shattered by the forces of social change as has organized religion. The modern individual is, consequently, unlikely to be equipped with an

* For books bearing on the psychology of religion see *The return to religion* (H. C. Link, 1936a), *Psychology and religious origins* (T. H. Hughes, 1937), *Psychology and the religious quest* (R. B. Cattell, 1938); and the references on the religious aspects of the audience *fanatique* in the last chapter of this text. See also "Scientific method in the study of the psychology of religion" (R. H. Thouless, 1938). A number of articles have been written on the mental-hygiene aspects of religion (K. R. Stolz, 1937; P. Hopkins, 1937; M. E. Kirkpatrick, 1940; E. B. Backus, 1940, and S. Hiltner, 1940).

integrated and unshakable system of religious beliefs. From time to time he will, however, be forced by circumstances to make adjustments for which some system of beliefs is apparently the only adequate preparation.

Bereavement.—However long anticipated, the death of an intimate is never truly prepared for. A husband, anticipating his death, might prepare his wife for that eventuality by insuring his life, establishing a trust fund for her, etc. But he cannot completely prepare her, nor can she completely prepare herself, for the vacancy in her life which his death will bring.

Bereavement makes necessary two kinds of readjustment. In the first place, the loss of an intimate means that all those specific attributes of personality that operated in relations with that person must be allowed to atrophy. In the second place, the loss of an intimate may necessitate the bereaved's taking over responsibilities for which he or she is entirely unprepared. The widow may be forced to assume responsibility for the financial management of the household (or to endeavor to become the provider), she must decide for herself the countless things that her husband formerly decided for her, etc. The widower may be forced by the death of his wife to assume as fully as possible the mother role for his children, a role for which he will, most certainly, be quite unprepared. The youth may be forced by the death of a parent to shoulder adult responsibilities—to become a substitute father or mother for the family.* The death of a more distant relative, of a friend, or of an acquaintance will constitute a crisis only to the extent that such a death liquidates some personality attributes and makes necessary the development of others.

The integrated social system did not prevent bereavement from being a crisis, but it did cushion the shock and facilitate the process of readjustment. In most systems the community (family, village, tribe, or the like) descended upon the bereaved, he was swept up into a flurry of ritualistic activity and kept so much engaged that he did not have time to think of his loss for a while. By the time he could think, he was too weary to do so, and by the time he had recovered from the prolonged funeral ritual, he had to some degree become accustomed to the absence of the deceased. Furthermore, living as he did in a large and integrated social grouping, the necessary readjustments were not so severe as they usually are today. The widow had her brothers and brothers-in-law who would fill to some extent the role of her late

* For a discussion of the effects on the child's personality of the loss of a parent through death or divorce see "Character and personality of children from broken homes" (N. Wallenstein, 1937).

husband, and the large family would provide for her and make unnecessary her taking over the responsibilities that had been her husband's

More than this, the bereaved was prepared by religion to consider the crisis as something temporary. The deceased was only gone from this life, not just gone. In some believed-in tomorrow and some believed-in hereafter, the wife would join her husband, the husband his wife, the parent his child, etc. Some religions, indeed, have had the spirit of the deceased still living around the house, a situation that might not always have been conducive to the peace of mind of the bereaved.

The consolation value of religious faith should not be underestimated. Its importance to individual welfare is revealed by the extremes to which people who have no established faith may go in erecting a belief in a benevolent deity and a life hereafter. The tenacity with which so many moderns cling to such patently absurd pseudoscientific faiths as magic cure-alls for human ills, mental telepathy, palmistry, spiritualism, and so on simply demonstrates how much in need they are of assurance that all will come out right in the end.*

Old Age and Death.—One of the most commonplace, most intense, and certainly most futile endeavors of modern people is their attempt to perpetuate their youth. The legend of the fount of eternal youth is old, but the frantic struggle to stay young is a relatively recent phenomenon. It takes a thousand ever-changing forms, each no more realistic than the others, *e.g.*, hair restorers, skin tightenors, eye brighteners, bust lifters, stomach restrainers, slimming and fattening procedures, pep producers, gland improvers, and so on *ad nauseam*. This struggle to stay young would be amusing were it not so pathetic. Pathetic it is, since it indicates an unwillingness to grow old, an unpreparedness to adjust to the physical and social changes that come with the passage of years.

A number of factors have contributed to the worshiping of modern society at the shrine of youth. Under conditions of social change the younger members, being more adaptable, are likely to be successful in competition with the less adventurous and less pliant elders. Thus older men tend to be displaced from positions of leadership, a fact that puts a premium on youth. Furthermore, the rapid growth of populations which has occurred in Western countries has meant until very recently a more than normal proportion of young people. The

* The extent to which various death rites actually constitute a means of reconciling the living to the fact that they will eventually die is ably indicated in A. M. Hocart's article "Death customs" (*Encycl Soc Sci*, 5, 21-27).

young have been numerically as well as effectively superior to those in the old-age group. Finally, the disintegration of the family and community organizations has displaced the elders from their former roles as nominal if not actual leaders. As a result, age no longer brings compensations in the way of increasing status. It brings, in fact, a hard bed in the old people's home and an occasional begrudging call from son and daughter, or perhaps the spare bedroom, a place at the family table, and a plea not to be more of a nuisance than necessary; at best, it brings a cottage in the country and the company of other and equally cantankerous "retired" people.*

These factors have all helped to lower the status of the aged and thus to make that status something to be avoided just as long as possible. But the factor that perhaps more than any other makes so many modern people reluctant to grow old is that old age is a preface to death, for which they have not been prepared by indoctrination into some system of religious beliefs. In isolated instances, the individual may find death preferable to continued life, but by and large modern people show a reluctance to grow old and die which was not so commonly found in those societies that provided the individual with a firm conviction that death was but a transition to a new and better life.

* See "The study of senescence: psychiatric and sociological aspects" (G. Lawton, 1938a) and "The social adjustment of 381 recipients of old age allowances" (J. K. Folsom and C. M. Morgan, 1937).

CHAPTER XIV

SOCIAL CHANGE AND MALADJUSTMENT

In the preceding chapter attention was focused on some of the more crucial ways in which the disorganization of our social system may lead to the malpreparation of the individual for his progress through life. The counterpart to social disorganization is continuous social change. In this chapter we shall examine some of the more significant consequences to personality of such social change.*

Many of the changes that are constantly occurring in our society are of little moment, the rise and fall in popular dance tunes, the ebb and flow of clothing fashions, and the like are directly significant only to those who make their livelihood by catering to the whims of public taste. Some of the changes are of considerable ultimate significance but occur so slowly that people can keep up with them without much difficulty, this is in general true of the continuing developments in automobile design and production, in housing, in food techniques, and the like. Many of the changes are, however, both so rapid and so significant that they inevitably maladjust a great many people, no matter how well adjusted those people were to the circumstances of life prior to the changes.

SPATIAL MOBILITY

During the past hundred and more years great shifts in population have taken place (D. R. Taft, 1936). Here in the United States the effects of this migration have been most profound. Year by year native Americans have been uprooted by one circumstance or another and have moved westward, leaving the relatively settled life of their home communities and entering the rough, harsh, and unsettled life of

* For a listing of forty-four hypotheses to account for social change, see "Some hypotheses concerning social change" (G. Watson, 1941). Some of the more important theories that have been advanced are discussed with great insight in *The problem of social change* (N. L. Sims, 1939). Attempts to predict the social effects of future technological developments are made in the following "The influence of invention on American social institutions in the future" (W. F. Ogburn, 1937) and "Technological trends and national policy, including the social implications of new inventions" (Subcommittee on Technology of U.S. National Resources Committee, 1937).

the frontier The difficulties of making an adjustment to the requirements of the new community and the frequent failures to do so have been the theme of many novels, plays, and motion pictures * This phase of our history would now seem to be over; the west is conquered, and today a New Englander can migrate to the Pacific coast without feeling that he leaves civilization and enters a barbaric world

But there is still much spatial movement, and spatial movement is always disturbing to some degree, for the migrant leaves some sort of community of people behind and has to adjust himself to some sort of community in the place in which he settles † Only professional migrants are prepared for migration, all others will be to some degree and for some period unprepared for life in the place to which they have migrated Anyone who as a child was moved from one neighborhood to another knows how difficult it is to relinquish the status that has been achieved in the old community and to secure a comparable status in the new.

Immigration.—At the same time that Americans by the tens of thousands were moving out over the continent, Europeans by the millions were entering the United States They were largely people of peasant background and entered mainly into urban, industrial communities here in America The flow has not entirely ceased, although of late years we have called the immigrants refugees, ‡ and most have come from a different stratum—urban and professional—of European society

In general, the older immigrants failed to make the transition from the Old World ways of life to the new They tended to cluster into immigrant colonies and to form little Old World societies within the larger American community Within their colonies they preserved insofar as they could their traditional ways of life § Indeed many of

* For a scientific appraisal of the adjustment problems with which these pioneers were faced, see *Pioneering in the prairie provinces the social side of the settlement process* (C A Dawson and E R Younge, 1940)

† Even such comparatively minor shifts as that from family and home town to college may produce severe if temporary maladjustments (K Young, N. Drought, and J Bergstresser, 1937)

‡ For a consideration of the adjustment problems of the refugee see "The psychology of the refugee" (G Saenger, 1940) and "Refugees" (F J Brown, ed., 1939)

§ The classic study of the sociopsychological processes and consequences of immigration is *The Polish peasant in Europe and America* (W I Thomas and F. Znamecki, 1918-1920) See also "Emigrant-immigrant neuroses" (E Harms, 1937) and "Acculturation and personality" (J Gillin and V Raimy, 1940). Among the more recent studies of specific immigrant groups in America are *The Puerto Rican migrant in New York City* (L R Chenault, 1938) and *The Negro*

our European immigrants found it unnecessary to learn even the language of Americans. This is not to say that all or even a majority of immigrants have not been severely maladjusted by being transplanted from the land of their birth to this new one. The fact that a large proportion of them have cherished the hope of someday returning to their native country suggests that they have seldom become fully reconciled to their life here.

The Second-generation Immigrant.—But it is the children of immigrants who are most adversely affected by migration. Although they themselves do not necessarily move in the spatial sense, they are nevertheless born into one world and later drawn into another. During their childhood within the Old World environment of the home and the surrounding foreign colony, they develop their basic personality attributes. In later childhood and youth, they venture out into the larger society and discover that all they represent as persons is inferior in the eyes of this richer, more rewarding world. Thus, perhaps for the first time when he first goes to school, the son of the immigrant discovers that he is a Kike, a Wop, a Hunkey, or something equally regrettable. In some instances he withdraws, insofar as circumstances permit, and endeavors to live out his life in the psychological security of the colony.*

In general it would appear that the second-generation immigrant usually is able to take over only the more superficial aspects of American life. To him the use of slang, the wearing of modish clothes, the possession of an automobile, and the like constitute being an American †. He struggles to achieve these items of distinction and, when he gets them, is baffled by the fact that he is not accepted as an equal

immigrant, his background, characteristics and social adjustments (I. D. Reid, 1939). Various aspects of the general problem are discussed in *Our racial and national minorities* (F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, eds., 1937).

* The arguments in favor of this withdrawal are put forth in literary form in *The island within* (L. Lewisohn, 1928). *Up stream* (L. Lewisohn, 1922) portrays the bitterness and futility of trying to become and to gain acceptance as an American.

† The second-generation immigrant is sometimes described as a marginal person to suggest the fact that he is partially attached to each of two societies (E. V. Stonequist, 1937). This two-way attachment is well shown in *The second-generation Japanese problem* (E. K. Strong, Jr., 1934b). See also "Personality in a white-Indian-Negro community" (G. B. Johnson, 1939).

In some instances the marginal status of the second-generation immigrant would seem to be an important factor in the development of criminal behavior. See, for example, *Brothers in crime* (C. R. Shaw et al., 1938) for the case histories of five brothers who were born into a maladjusted immigrant family and who became professional criminals.

within the American community. In the struggle to get them, he is unprepared by past training and at a grave disadvantage because of subnormal opportunities. That his endeavors frequently lead to activities that bring him not into the larger society but into conflict with it is not surprising.

Urbanward Migration.—The movement of peoples from one country to another is one result of the commercial and industrial revolutions and will no doubt continue in one form or another—implemented by agricultural and technological changes, by wars of conquest, by large-scale forced displacements of people, and by the chaos of revolutions—until a balance of peoples and cultures has been reached. Any such migration will inevitably maladjust the migrant and will have repercussions for a generation or two thereafter.

Another form of spatial movement, also traceable to the Industrial Revolution, is at times equally disturbing to those who move. This is urbanward migration, the importance of which is indicated by the tremendous growth of cities in the past hundred years. Only a small part of that growth can be accounted for by natural increase within the city itself. The city is a “consumer” of people who are born in the small town, the village, and the open country.

Although, as we have seen, the cultural differences between country and city are being leveled off by highway, motorcar, newspaper, radio, and, perhaps most significantly, the gathering of rural children into consolidated schools, the country youth is certain to be somewhat malprepared for urban life. This is not to say that he necessarily arrives in the great city in the manner of the old dramatic stereotype—as a country bumpkin, awkward, gawking, and so naive that he promptly makes a down payment on the Brooklyn Bridge—although he might be outwardly the country boy. It is more probable, however, that he is sufficiently urbanized to be indistinguishable at first glance from those born and reared in the city. But, as was indicated in a previous chapter, there are still some remaining significant differences between rural and urban human nature. Thus, however much he may be attracted to the city by its promise of greater economic opportunity, by its excitements, etc.,* the country-bred person is certain to be maladjusted to some if not many of the aspects of urban life †. It is, for example, generally true that rural peoples

* See “Intelligence as a selective factor in rural-urban migrations” (N. P. Gist and C. D. Clark, 1938), “Selective migration from small towns” (W. P. Mauldin, 1940), and “Selective migration in a rural Alabama community” (G. A. Sanford, 1940).

† See “Urbanism as a way of life” (L. Wirth, 1938).

still have relatively large families and retain the beliefs, values, and practices appropriate thereto. Urban circumstances are, however, much less conducive than are rural to large families, and the rural youth who migrates to the city psychologically prepared to have a large family will be maladjusted to the extent that the conditions of city life preclude his doing so.

There is reason to think that on the covert levels at least, many modern people are maladjusted to urban life. To put it another way, although the city dominates the contemporary scene, it has been superimposed upon a rural heritage. The nostalgia for the "peace and integrity" of rural society that is expressed—mainly by people born to the city—in literature, poetry, music, and art suggests a considerable discontent with the urban way of life. The preservation of rural mementos—such as Henry Ford's Greenfield Village in Michigan—indicates a sentimental, however impractical, longing for the farm and village.* The sanguine plans of scientists and quasi scientists for the garden city, for the decentralization of industry, etc., reveal how serious is the problem of maladjustment to present urban forms † Finally, the persistent effort of urban peoples to "get back to the soil," although they may have lived all their lives surrounded by pavements, would seem to suggest that the growth of cities has come about as a matter of material necessity rather than of fundamental desire for the urban way of life.

SOCIOECONOMIC MOBILITY

Spatial movement usually takes the individual from one kind of cultural setting into another kind. It does not necessarily imply a significant change in class position. The rural worker, for example, may move to the city to work in industry and remain a member of the laboring class. Socioeconomic movement, on the other hand, is a change in class status; it need not involve any significant change in the place of residence—other than, perhaps, movement from the wrong to the right side of the tracks, or vice versa. As was indicated in a previous chapter, ours is an "open" class system, and social changes constantly make possible the rise and fall of individuals within the

* See *Henry Ford and Greenfield Village* (W. A. Simonds, 1938)

† There is, one may suspect, a good deal of romanticizing about the virtues of the old rural way of life—a pronounced tendency to dwell on the beauty of lush, green fields, the joys of neighborhood gatherings, etc. Generally ignored, perhaps because unknown, are the inadequacies of rural plumbing, the hardships of farming as an occupation, etc. It is quite possible that any concerted ruralward migration would prove just as maladjusting to the people involved as the urbanward movement has been.

class structure and periodically modify the status of many or all the members of a given class

Individual Mobility.—It is always possible in our society for the individual who is born into poverty to die, years later, a person of great wealth, of political eminence, or of scientific attainment. It is equally possible for the individual who is born into wealth and family prominence to die poor and unknown. As a people we are rather proud of the fact that a great many of our financial, political, social, and artistic leaders have been self-made men. We tend to overlook the fact that what can rise can also fall, that, although many strive to rise, most are thwarted in this endeavor, and that any shift in social status maladjusts the individual to some degree (A. Davis, 1941).

The phenomenon of individual mobility and its personal consequences is most strikingly illustrated by the exceptionally rapid rise and fall of motion-picture stars. Because it is always possible for the possessor of a reasonably pretty face to be "discovered," and because the rewards of stardom are apparently great, thousands of reasonably pretty-faced girls flock to Hollywood each year. Of these ambitious girls, the vast majority will suffer disappointment. They will either return home, embarrassed and brokenhearted, or stay on in Hollywood, settling down to the lowly career of extra, waitress, or prostitute. Of the very few who are "discovered," the majority will be eliminated after a brief period of synthetic glory by their own incompetence or by the whims of producers and the public. They will then be forced to make the best they can of the fact that they were "starlets" but never stars. The one or two who do achieve great success will find their positions exceedingly precarious: they have displaced someone else in public favor, and there are many striving to displace them (L. C. Rosten, 1941). With some notable exceptions, the life of a star is at best brief. Hardly will she have adjusted herself to the new role—having acquired a husband, an estate, the proper number of motorcars, etc.—than she will find herself on the way down. Hollywood is, as a consequence, filled with pathetic "has-beens," people who may have made an adequate adjustment to stardom but have been unable to make any adequate adjustment to the role of ex-star.

The personnel turnover in other fields of achievement is slower and less dramatic; but the underlying processes are much the same. The farm boy who becomes the captain of industry because he has acquired a strong ambition and some sorts of skills that make possible success under the conditions of his times will probably not be so severely maladjusted as will the boy or girl who has "shot" to stardom in the motion pictures. But when the son or the grandson of the

captain of industry loses his inheritance because he has not been taught how to maintain it against competition of more energetic, skillful, and calculating men, he will probably be even less prepared for lowly status than will the motion-picture star who has fallen from stardom.

The Nouveau Riche.—Movement up the socioeconomic scale is in general less disturbing than is movement down. For one thing, upward movement is socially approved. It is the achievement of socially sanctioned personal ambitions. For another thing, it usually means a lessening of physical hardships and an increase in the goods and services ministering to physical comfort, *i e.*, better housing, food, clothing, etc. Not all those who move rapidly up the socioeconomic scale, however, are prepared to make adequate adjustments to their new roles. To be accepted, the *nouveau riche* may need to learn what amounts to a distinctly new way of life. This will involve the abandonment of many old habits—including, perhaps, such practices of the “lower” classes as eating with noisy gusto—and the acquisition of those modes of conduct which are considered appropriate to the man of wealth and position. Any considerable movement up the socioeconomic scale is quite certain to open an unbridgeable gap between what the person is and what he is now supposed to be. The poor boy who becomes the rich man cannot, after all, retrace his steps and acquire those personality attributes which are the product of life in one of our “best” families, Groton, and Harvard. Lacking these personality attributes, he is likely, therefore, to be maladjusted in association with those who once were but no longer are his economic superiors.

Success often goes to people's heads; and the person who has become successful without long and serious endeavor on his part (the lucky holder of oil lands, for example) is particularly likely to be disorganized by the opportunities that the new status affords. Such is the case with the newly rich man who proceeds to throw his money around so recklessly that it is soon gone. Such, too, is the case with the man who, quickly successful in one field of endeavor, gets inflated ideas of his own importance and enters fields for which he is in no way fitted.

This latter phenomenon frequently takes the direction of social climbing. The new rich and the new near-rich are perpetually clamoring for social status equal to, if not in excess of, their economic status. The endeavor takes forms that are, from the point of view of the socially elite, gauche. The established elite resent the inroads of the new rich and set up many barriers. What the socially elite would like to have the socially ambitious new rich believe is that

gentlemen and ladies are "born" to their station * Money does, of course, often make up for lack of "proper" family connections But financial success not infrequently leads to maladjustment in that it gives the new rich social aspirations that they are unable to achieve.†

The Nouveau Pauvre.—The woman with too many diamonds, too many airs, and a great ambition to crash society may make an amusing character in fiction, if not in real life But even in fiction those who have recently descended the socioeconomic scale are hardly amusing

The *nouveau pauvre* is in his own eyes and in those of his former associates a failure ‡ His course has run counter to the established values It is unlikely that he will, as the *nouveau riche* may, find in the new status compensations for the things that he is now forced to relinquish. Whereas the formerly poor man may not greatly mind abandoning the comfortable practice of eating his meals in the kitchen, the formerly rich man certainly will not be gratified by the fact that he now has to follow it His loss of status means a contraction of his world; and the people in this smaller world and the things that he must do to survive in it have always been, in his eyes, humble and humiliating

In order to make an adequate adjustment to this smaller and inferior world, the new poor must not only acquire the appropriate personality attributes but, as it were, unlearn those inappropriate attributes that he will have brought with him into the new status Thus, if he was a rich man's son and is now a truck driver, he must learn both to eat hamburgers and to get along without squab, to get along in the company of shopgirls and to do without the company of debutantes, and to get up when the alarm clock rings and to renounce the pleasure of lying abed

A significant distinction between getting richer and getting poorer is that the former does not impel readjustments, whereas the latter does The man who has risen in economic status could probably go on living much the same sort of life as that to which he is accustomed. Psychological rather than economic factors are usually responsible for the endeavor to achieve a social role appropriate to the new

* For a discussion of the ideological barriers erected against the *nouveau riche*, see "The assumptions of aristocracy" (C. E. Merriam, 1938)

† For a history of social climbing in America see *The saga of American society* (D. Wecter, 1937)

‡ In our culture responsibility for failure, economic and otherwise, tends to be attributed to the individual (D. Gandine-Stanton, 1938) But in some primitive cultures, responsibility is attributed to forces outside the individual Under such circumstances the adjustment is relatively easy, and little or no sense of personal failure appears (L. M. Hanks, 1941).

economic status But the new poor is forced by economic circumstances to reduce his scale of living and otherwise adjust, however unwillingly, to his new estate

The Liquidated Class.—In the modern world there is always some individual movement up and down the social scale It results in a gradual change in the personnel of each class grouping Some social changes, however, have their effect not upon isolated members of a class but upon the entire group War and revolution invariably liquidate one or more classes in the population An economic crisis, such as that which followed the stock-market crash of 1929, will either reduce the membership in the upper economic groups, lower the status of the entire group, or both * Monetary inflation, whether caused by war, revolution, or an economic boom, invariably depresses the status of all those who have fixed incomes

The maladjusting consequences of the lowering of the status of an entire class of people are the same as those which accompany the fall of a single individual, except that the distress of the individuals involved in the former is somewhat tempered by the fact that their friends, relatives, and acquaintances are facing the same adjustment problems Misery does seem to gain some comfort from company, particularly if the company is "respectable." Furthermore, if all of a class are going down, the individual is freed from self-responsibility He is not a failure, rather, "evil days have fallen on the land" And when an entire population is suffering adversity—as is the case when a nation is engaged in war—all the indexes of status are temporarily reversed One can then be proud of his rags, joke with his guests at the inadequacy of the food he serves them, etc

Any permanent lowering of socioeconomic status is, however, inevitably distressing It can hardly be consoling to the dispossessed aristocrat, the dispossessed peasant, the disfranchised Jew, etc, to know that many others accompany him into permanent and abject poverty Time after time whole classes in a population have been so suddenly and markedly depressed that they were unable to build a

* For some years following 1929 there was a steady fall in the national income, widespread unemployment, etc No segment of the population escaped the necessity of making more or less profound readjustments For analyses of some of the more significant effects of this economic catastrophe see *The lost generation* (M Davis, 1936), *Research memorandum on the family in the depression* (S A. Stouffer and P. F. Lazarsfeld, 1937), *Research memorandum on minority peoples in the depression* (D Young, 1937), *Research memorandum on rural life in the depression* (D. Sanderson, 1937); and *Research memorandum on internal migration in the depression* (W S. Thompson, 1937)

new way of life compatible with their new economic status * Liquidated aristocracies, for example, have generally given up and become parasitic. The White Russians in China furnish many examples of this parasitic behavior.

The New Elite.—Generally, the same events that liquidate one class elevate another. In revolution and conquest a new class of leaders dispossesses the old. The aristocrats, priests, and professionals of czarist Russia, for example, were displaced by the bolsheviks. Likewise, during 1939–1942, as Germany conquered various European countries, the native economic and political leaders were either replaced by or subordinated to German military, economic, and political masters. In other instances, the new elite do not usurp the position of the old but rise, as it were, to fill the position that other forces have made vacant. Thus when the great economic crisis of 1929 discredited the former economic and political leaders, the so-called New Dealers simply moved into the leadership position. The Eighteenth Amendment (prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages) liquidated by governmental fiat the producers and distributors of alcoholic beverages. Into the vacuum thus created, countless petty criminals (and not a few formerly honest men) swarmed to become a new economic elite—the bootleggers, who were soon organized into vast gangs that ruled the multitudinous vice interests of the United States for a decade or more.

Whatever the circumstances that cause its rise, the new elite will be composed of the more ambitious, energetic, and ingenious members of the “lower” classes. During any period of really violent turmoil within the class structure, it is always the vigorous, no-hold-barred type of individual who rises to a position of leadership. And for this reason if no other, the members of the new elite no sooner establish themselves as a class than they turn to internecine conflict. They are, in other words, extreme “individualists” and are malprepared for membership in a ruling clique. The personality attributes that brought them up the social scale preclude their subordinating themselves to group welfare. Each must be boss, and in the ensuing struggle one may survive and, dispensing with his competitors, fill the ranks with men of less personal ambition and more loyalty. This is what happened after the Russian Revolution and the death of Lenin; it accounts for the “puge” of the Nazi party after its rise to power, it explains the rapid dispersal of most of the original New Dealers after

* *After freedom the portrait of a community in the deep south* (H. Powdermaker, 1939) gives an indirect but vivid picture of the decadence of the upper classes of the South after the Civil War.

1933 Sometimes, however, the struggle within a new elite leads not to the emergence of a single boss but to the breaking up of the new elite into a number of cliques that fight among themselves for leadership. The railroad wars of the 1870's and the 1880's were the result of the fact that competition for leadership within the elite was too intense for the welfare of the group as a whole.

It is perhaps inevitable that the belligerent and calculating men who rise to the top during periods of social turmoil should be maladjusted when, the new elite established, the time for fighting has passed and the time for coordinated activity has come. Furthermore, each member of the new elite is faced with much the same problems of adjusting to his new status as is the solitary *nouveau riche*—problems that are tempered only by the fact that his peers are also unprepared for their new roles.

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

We have seen how difficult adjustment to occupational life can be in the modern world. There is, however, no assurance that, when an adjustment has been effected, it can be maintained. Social changes frequently liquidate an occupational group, just as they do a socioeconomic class, thereby destroying the economic value of specialized skills and the occupational status that may have taken years to achieve. The invention of a new machine, the development of a substitute for an old product, changes in the demand for goods and services, and wars, revolutions, and depressions make most occupations insecure. The economists, arguing in favor of technological progress, contend that the new machine opens up more jobs than it closes. In the long run this may be true, but it is slight consolation to those who are dispossessed from their occupational niches to know that somewhere, sometime there will be some kind of job open to them. Some inventions (*e g.*, mechanization of glass blowing) have displaced thousands of workers in a single year, some events (*e g.*, the shift during 1940-1942 of American industry from consumption goods to armaments) have displaced millions.*

Economic Insecurity.—Economic security is a matter of food, clothing, shelter, and the like. A dynamic society gives much to some, little to many, and assurance of continued income to none. In the modern world no man's livelihood is truly secure. However

* A study of the occupational mobility of the citizens of San Jose, California, is described in *Occupational mobility in an American community* (P. E. Davidson and H. D. Anderson, 1937).

competent and conscientious a worker he may be, society may deny him profitable employment. Disequilibrium is an inherent characteristic of our economic system, even the rate of total production of goods and services must be either rising or falling.

One aspect of this perpetual change in our economic life was discussed in terms of individual and class mobility. Another aspect is the fact that every occupational group—working men, professional men, or entrepreneurs—faces the possibility of being liquidated. Moreover, the instability of the economic processes means that many specific jobs (as distinct from trades and crafts) are of short duration. This is most evident in seasonal occupations, such as agricultural harvesting, canning and packing of agricultural produce, and building of houses and other structures, where climatic factors prevent spreading the work throughout the year. The same short-time conditions obtain in such industries as automobile, furniture, clothing, shoe, and many other kinds of manufacturing. Finally, the high mortality of business enterprises means that jobs are constantly being closed because of the inability of the specific organization to continue operations at a profit. Every displacement from an occupation, every drying up of a job, means that a worker and his family have lost their economic security.*

The Occupational Way of Life.—Fairly self-evident are the mal-adjusting consequences of loss of economic security. Not so apparent, but quite as vital to the individual involved, are the psychological consequences of being displaced from one occupation and forced to seek employment in another one. A man has more than an economic interest in his occupation. He has presumably spent some years learning the skills required by the occupation (even the day laborer has learned to do his heavy but simple tasks), but he has also adjusted himself to the occupational way of life. To shift into another occupation, then, means more than learning the necessary manual or intellectual skills. It means adjusting to another occupational way of life.

As was observed in a previous chapter, each occupation has something of its own peculiar culture. This involves a more or less highly specialized language (the mechanic has his jargon, just as do the physician and the lawyer), a complex of values that are specific to

* Many and varied are the adjustment problems of the unemployed and his dependents. See *Twenty thousand homeless men* (E. H. Sutherland and H. J. Locke, 1936), *Social security* (M. S. Stewart, 1937), *Men without work* (A report made to the Pilgrim Trust, 1938), *Workers on relief* (G. Adams, 1939); *The unemployed worker* (E. W. Bakke, 1940a), and *Citizens without work* (E. W. Bakke, 1940b).

the occupational group, and a code of conduct by which the relations of the members of the group with one another and the relations of the group with outsiders are more or less effectively governed

Skill in playing an instrument is, for example, but the minimum requirement for employment in a dance band. The professional dance-band musician must have certain personality attributes. He must know his history—the history of the notables of jazz. He must believe that true jazz is the ultimate in human achievement and that the “commercial” music he plays for the public is no more than a means to an end. He must be willing to endure almost anything—including constant insecurity—for the sake of his “art.” He must be rootless, generous with his associates, indifferent to family ties, etc. Unless he is all these and countless other rather specific and socially atypical things, he will not be accepted by the established members of the occupation. And he might be an exceptionally skilled instrumentalist; but unless he belongs, he will not for long play his instrument in a dance band (C Lastrucci, 1941)

The individual who has made an occupational adjustment has, as we have seen, acquired the human-nature attributes of the members of that occupational group and is, therefore, somewhat atypical in terms of society as a whole. When such a man is displaced from his occupation, he is then maladjusted, many of his personality attributes as well as his skills have been liquidated. Under conditions of social change it is inevitable that a significant proportion of the population will be continuously maladjusted by occupational displacement and that from time to time large segments of the population will be so affected.*

* One of the more striking mass displacements occurred with the introduction of talking pictures, circa 1930. This revolutionary development displaced a large part of the silent-picture technicians and most of the more important actors and actresses.

Less spectacular but more important was the displacement of the soft-coal operators, which began with the introduction of oil as a household and industrial fuel. Theoretically, the coal miners should have gone over to the work of oil-well drilling and operating. Actually, few could make any adjustment to the new conditions, and a generation later the majority were still to be found huddled around the disintegrating collieries.

The story of the mass displacement of farmers by a complex of social and climatic factors and the difficulties they encountered in becoming migratory agricultural laborers in California is told in *The grapes of wrath* (J Steinbeck, 1939). For more scientific discussions see *The people of the drought states* (C Taeuber, I Taeuber, and C C Taylor, 1937), *Newcomers and nomads in California* (W T Cross and D E Cross, 1937), and “The intelligence of migrants” (O Klueberg, 1938b).

WAR AND REVOLUTION

From time to time during the course of human history the normal, however disordered, processes of life have been disrupted by cataclysmic events. In the older societies these events were mainly of natural origin: flood, fire, crop failure, plague, earthquake, and the like. Modern society has developed techniques that can eliminate many natural catastrophes and can prepare people for effective adjustment to others. At the same time modern society itself precipitates from time to time cataclysmic events more widespread and more disturbing than any that originate in nature. Modern war, whether of offense or defense, is one such event. Modern revolution is another.

Total War and Total Revolution.—Wars* and revolutions have apparently plagued men since the beginning of human history. But the wars of the relatively stable societies have been clashes of professional soldiers, men trained to conflict and more distressed by prolonged peace than by war. The civilian populations of the past have been affected only indirectly by such wars—except, of course, when their homelands served as battlefields. In the modern world, however, war is increasingly a phenomenon engulfing and disturbing, if not destroying, the entire population. The total population and its total energies are thrown or forced into the conflict†. All peacetime activities are disrupted, every man, woman, and child is affected. This is true even when the population is not subjected to the violence of bombing, of mass slaughter, or of being driven from place to place. Because modern war involves an ever-increasing use of machines, a society at war will necessarily shift its industrial resources to produce destruction instead of consumption goods. There was a time when a country could send an army off to war and then quietly await results. Today it must root every citizen out of his peacetime rut and make him a participant‡.

* For several rather diverse views of the causes of war see *Personal aggressiveness and war* (E. F. M. Durbin and J. Bowlby, 1939), "The causes and the prevention of war" (K. Dunlap, 1940a), and "Psychological causes of war" (R. Stagner, 1941a).

† For a definition of total war see "Class structure and 'total war'" (H. Speier, 1939).

‡ The January, 1941, issue of *The American Journal of Sociology* is devoted to articles by sociologists, anthropologists, and others on the subject of war and its social effects. Although none of the articles is focused on the sociopsychological aspects of war, they will provide useful background reading.

Some indication of the vast and varied consequences of war to the individual can be secured from *War in the twentieth century* (W. Waller, ed., 1940a). The effect of war on the family is described in *War and the family* (W. Waller, 1940b).

Much the same thing can be said of revolution. The relatively stable societies had, perhaps, their "revolutions." But these were at most "palace" revolts, shifts in the personnel of the established leadership clique. The mass of the people were largely undisturbed by such events. Modern revolutions, on the other hand, are a phenomenon of social disorganization. They are an explosion of the tensions generated by the maladjustments of a large number of individuals in the population.* In one sense, they are collective attempts to change the conditions that have made for widespread discontent, but they will surely cause, in the short run at least, more maladjustments than they can possibly cure.

Limited revolutions, usually spoken of as social movements, do not involve armed conflict and affect only a limited part of the population. The Townsend movement (for old-age pensions), for example, gave false hope only to impoverished oldsters. The majority of the American people were not significantly disturbed by it. Violent revolutions involving armed conflict, on the other hand, are, like international wars, now "total."

Effects of Total War and Revolution.—War and revolution intensify all the forms of malpreparation that were discussed in the previous chapter and all the forms of maladjustment that have been discussed in this. Thus, the bereavement rate is increased manifold, there are more widows, widowers, parentless children, etc. Economic insecurity and occupational mobility are increased; the problems of adolescent adjustment are intensified; the aged become even more of a burden than usual, etc. But in addition to intensifying the normal forms of malpreparation and maladjustment, such conflict imposes some special forms of its own. Only the professional soldier has been trained to warfare; only the professional revolutionary has been brought up in the tradition of internal chaos. All the rest of the population have been more or less effectively prepared to live out their lives under the sufficiently eventful conditions of peace.

The immediate special effects upon a people of a war or revolution are fairly evident, however varied and complex. They range from

and "War and the family" (J. H. S. Bossard, 1941). See also *The psychology of fear and courage* (E. Glover, 1940), *A psychologist's war-time diary* (A. Weymouth, 1940), "The development of war" (R. E. Money-Kyrle, 1937); *Psychological aspects of war and peace* (R. Waelder, 1939), and "The causes of war" (M. Gansberg, 1939). A survey of German efforts at inducing wartime morale is given in *German psychological warfare: survey and bibliography* (L. Farago and L. F. Gittler, eds., 1941).

* The conditions making for and the processes involved in revolutionary upheaval will be discussed in Chapter XXI.

unprecedented danger of violent death to the lesser irritation of food and other rationing, and from exhausting demands upon time and energy to the distasteful presence of victorious conquerors in the streets. The long-run effects are equally varied and complex but are somewhat less apparent. They arise from the disruption of the individual's normal (*i.e.*, anticipated) life history. How such disruption causes prolonged and multifarious maladjustment may be suggested by the effect of war upon the career of the person who is conscripted into the military service.*

Whereas the professional soldier makes a career of military life, the conscript is torn out of his social context. All his normal expectations are interrupted; and, if he survives, he is returned to a "different" society and as a different sort of person. As war becomes increasingly "total," everyone is torn thereby from his normal social role and returned, if ever, to find himself and his role considerably altered.

Man is, however, an exceedingly tenacious creature. He may at a given moment despair of finding continued life tolerable; but he usually recovers to go on and meet successive and equally discouraging moments. This tenacity of the individual is reflected in the fact that no social system, however disorganized, however battered by war or by revolution, actually collapses.

Greek civilization, for example, did not "die" from internal disintegration and external assault, as a man may die when his heart is punctured. Rather, it declined, as a man does toward the end of his life span.

During periods of acute crisis people are prone to forecast the end of civilization, the imminent collapse of society, etc. But in point of historical fact the processes of social change are relatively slow and are always continuous.

* For studies of wartime psychopathies see "Psychoneuroses and other mental conditions arising out of the war" (R. D. Gillespie, 1941) and "Psychoneuroses in wartime" (E. G. Zabriskie and A. L. Brush, 1941).

CHAPTER XV

SOCIALLY ATYPICAL PATTERNS OF ADJUSTMENT

Life does not run smoothly in the disorganized and ever-changing modern world. But most "spoiled brats" become reasonably subdued in the course of time, most adolescents settle down to marriage and a job, and most *nouveaux riches* and *nouveaux pauvres* live out their normal life spans. The processes of adjustment are always painful, and complete adjustment is seldom achieved. Nevertheless, these processes do tend to resolve in the establishment of fairly typical patterns of life adjustment. Not yet can it be said, for example, that most marriages are failures, that most men are out of work, that most people give up the endeavor to adjust to social reality and escape into insanity.

It is more or less typical for the modern youth to arrive eventually at a heterosexual form of adjustment to sex, to stabilize his relations with members of the other sex through marriage, and to secure his livelihood by participation in some socially sanctioned occupation. What is typical for our society is, of course, vague and shifting. But, obviously, *unless there were something of a norm, there would be nothing of a society*.

Atypical Adjustments.—Marked peculiarities of individual experience, however, result in adjustments that deviate so far from the typical as to cause the individual to stand out in striking contrast to his fellows. Those who fail to make a heterosexual adjustment to the problems of sex life, those who are so badly malprepared for marital adjustment that they never succeed in marrying, those who have been prepared to make their livelihood only in antilegal ways, those who have failed to make any occupational adjustment and have turned to the life of the open road, etc., are people who are atypical*. Although the norms of modern society are somewhat vague and always shifting, they are the culturally designated standards of effective adjustment. The atypical is simply one who, as a consequence of peculiar life experiences, has arrived at a mode of adjustment that is at such wide variance with the cultural standard that he is treated in some exceptional manner by society. Atypicality is of many orders and degrees,

* A wide variety of terms are in use as synonyms for "atypical." See, for example, "A la recherche de la norme en psychopathologie" (E. Minkowski, 1938).

but all atypical individuals can be divided into those who have been socially trained for atypicality and those who have been socially prepared for a normal life adjustment and have become atypical because of subsequent events

The Atypical and the Maladjusted.—It will be recalled that analysis of the personality attributes of an individual is always complicated by the fact that any action is a product of two variables, the individual's personality and the situation in which it operates. The question arises, then, whether the personality or the situation is primarily responsible for any specific act. As we have seen, one cannot, for example, tell from the fact that Jones is surly at breakfast with Mrs. Jones whether Jones is characteristically surly or whether it is Mrs. Jones who has made him surly.

In analyzing atypical modes of adjustment we must constantly keep in mind the distinction between the act that is a direct and consistent expression of the personality attributes of the individual and the act that is provoked by a peculiar and perhaps unprecedented combination of external circumstances. This is, in brief, the distinction between the man who regularly steals to make his livelihood and the man who one day steals because his children are starving. When the atypical act is a consequence of prolonged and consistent atypical training and atypicality is therefore imbedded in the nature of the individual, we are dealing with a truly atypical personality. The atypicality of such an individual may be described as habitual or inveterate, and the individual is often referred to as a professional—a professional criminal, a professional bachelor, a professional tramp, etc.

When the atypical act is mainly a consequence of peculiar circumstances, it is not a normal expression of the personality. Thus the man who steals only in an attempt to resolve an unprecedented predicament is inadequately prepared for stealing and its consequences. He is, as it were, "choosing" the lesser of what seem to him two evils. Theft makes him, by social definition and thus probably in his own eyes, a criminal. By acquiring, if only in his own eyes, the status of a criminal, he becomes maladjusted. He is not only at odds with society but at odds with himself.

The distinction between the atypical and the maladjusted personality is a vital one. An atypical adjustment, although inadequate in terms of society, may be almost the only one that is possible in terms of the personality of the individual plus the social situation. The atypical is a round peg in a square hole, but his life has had such continuity and the things that he has learned from social experience are so compatible that, although his personality deviates markedly from

the social norm, it is reasonably symmetrical. The maladjusted person, on the other hand, has violated his prior training. Whereas the professional thief is completely complacent about his atypical behavior, the amateur thief is not, and whereas the former may end up in jail, the latter is at least as likely to end up in a psychopathic institution.

Although it is an oversimplification of reality to speak of types of atypical personalities, we can, for convenience, focalize attention upon some of the more characteristic forms of atypical behavior manifest in contemporary society.* There is perhaps no such thing as a typical criminal, although both the police and the mystery-story writers resort to the stereotyping process in speaking of the typical gangster, the "big shot," the killer, the confidence man, etc. But it is true that, however divergent, the behavior of all criminals, professional and amateur, is alike in that it brings them into conflict with our social ideas of personal and property rights.

THE CRIMINAL

The criminal has at various times been looked upon as one possessed of an evil spirit, as one who consciously and willfully sins against the laws of God, and as one who is a victim of natural forces. Historical contrast can be seen in the fact that the Chinese blamed the wrongdoings of a man upon his parents, that medievalists blamed them upon Satan, and that Lombroso and other physiognomists tried to find a correlation between the antisocial behavior of a man and the contours of his face or the bumps on his head. Efforts have also been made to relate the frequency of crime to such natural variables as climate and seasonal changes in the weather. Thus the fact that crimes against persons are more frequent in Mediterranean countries, whereas crimes against property predominate in northern European countries has been explained as a consequence of climatic variation. The relation of this idea to Montesquieu's theory of climatic determination of human nature is obvious.

Extreme Views Concerning the Criminal Personality.—At present, there are two extreme views of the criminal personality and of the treatment that should be accorded him. Many of those who deal with criminals—police, judiciary, and institutional personnel—take the attitude that criminals cause crime and that it is, therefore, only by exterminating or permanently incarcerating the criminal that

* It should be observed that the standard for typical adjustment (previously described as human nature) is set by society and is subject to change. As a result, that complex of personality attributes which today is an atypical adjustment might be typical under other social conditions. See "Psychopathic trends in culture" (B. W. Aginsky, 1939).

crime can be stamped out. Those who hold this view usually assume that the behavior of the criminal is an automatic consequence of some innate attribute, such as subnormal intelligence* or an "instinct" for crime. Holding the opposite view are the sentimentalists, who see the criminal as a victim of circumstances—one who means well, but who has been forced by society to do wrong. They would appeal to his better nature, show him the error of his ways, and then send him out to sin again.

Between these extreme views is one that has gradually come to be accepted as valid by the more careful students of criminology and one that would appear to follow from our present sociopsychological concept of the origins of human behavior. Although based upon a mistaken idea of cause, the hard-boiled view of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of modifying the criminal personality is valid insofar as the professional criminal is concerned. With our present training methods, there would seem to be little possibility of reforming him, and if society finds his behavior dangerous or expensive, he had best be disposed of. It does not follow, however, that if all the criminals in the United States were apprehended and promptly removed from action, crime would cease. There is partial validity in the sentimental view; criminals are, in every sense, victims of social circumstances. Until the circumstances that breed criminal behavior are wiped out, disposing of criminals is much like killing mosquitoes. New ones come to take the place of those who have been removed from action.

The Sociopsychological Definition.—The criminal† is an antisocial person, but many who are antisocial are not criminals. By legal definition, a criminal is one who has been convicted of committing a

* Intelligence as measured by group tests of the Army Alpha type has been found to vary considerably among various sorts of criminals. Inmates of workhouses and county jails usually make the lowest scores, and those in the state and Federal prisons the highest. In several instances, the average intelligence of a prison population has been found to be higher than that of the guards. Apparently there is some correlation between the intelligence of the criminal and the type of crime he commits, but that crime is caused by low intelligence does not follow. See *Criminal intelligence* (C. Murchison, 1926) and *Intelligence and crime* (S. H. Tulchin, 1939).

† For case studies and discussions of the adult criminal personality see 500 *criminal careers* (S. Glueck and E. Glueck, 1930), *The personality of criminals* (A. W. Stearns, 1931), *Criminology* (R. H. Gault, 1932), *An introduction to criminology* (W. A. Bonger, 1936), *Later criminal careers* (S. Glueck and E. Glueck, 1937), *Crime and the community* (F. Tannenbaum, 1938), *Principles of criminology* (E. H. Sutherland, 1939), *Criminal behavior* (W. C. Reckless, 1940), and *Crime and its treatment: social and legal aspects of criminology* (A. E. Wood and J. B. Waite, 1941).

felony. Frequently, however, a man who breaks vital laws, such as those against murder, is not apprehended; or, if he is caught, he may escape conviction. Furthermore, by legal fiat, a whole new class of criminals may be created; thus the legal definition of the criminal has none but legal significance.

For our purposes, a criminal is one who behaves in a way that is so contrary to those mores of his society that have to do with rights of persons or of property that, if the act were known to the members of the community, he would be considered a hazard to its welfare. The fact that he does not get caught does not keep the thief from being a criminal in the sociopsychological sense. On the other hand, the fact that a man suddenly becomes a criminal by legal fiat does not make him a criminal in the sociopsychological sense. In a changing society such as ours the line between the criminal and noncriminal is a vague and shifting one. In the stabler societies the distinction was reasonably clear.

The Inveterate or Habitual Criminal.—Perhaps since time immemorial, there have been certain minority groups who have lived parasitically upon the larger community through resort to force. These are the brigands of history—not to be confused with those members of the majority group who, although living parasitically, do so in accordance with the conventions of the community. The brigands have been recognized as enemies and ordinarily have not lived within the community, but have stayed perhaps in the inaccessible hills, venturing forth only for an occasional raid. Their way of securing a livelihood has been typical for their in-group but atypical in terms of the larger community. They have considered all except the members of their in-group natural prey. To the larger community they have appeared as habitual criminals.

There is no essential distinction between the brigands of old and the professional criminals of today, except that the latter breed in the slum regions within the larger community instead of the distant hills and are less easily identified as enemies of society. Like the brigands, our professional or habitual criminals are men and women who have been trained into modes of behavior that are in marked contrast to the ways of the larger community and that make them antisocial parasites. They do not—as has frequently been claimed—lack socially determined principles of conduct. They, like noncriminals, have attitudes, values, interests, conventions, mannerisms, and morals;* but

* See *The professional thief by a professional thief* (E. H. Sutherland, ed., 1937)

these take a form of expression at sharp variance with the ways of the majority.

The criminal personality is shaped by the same kinds of forces and processes that develop that of the noncriminal. The boy whose parents, parental associates, or play gang are antisocial simply takes over the patterns of their behavior, becomes a member of their in-group, and, in so doing, achieves the status of a criminal within the larger community.* Members of the so-called "underworld" are of course divided into classes—fully as class conscious as those of the larger community—and into specialized work groups. In some respects, the underworld of our modern cities is more thoroughly organized than is the rest of the city population.

The habitual criminal may have no sense of wrongdoing so far as society is concerned, for it is an aspect of his human nature that he accepts the philosophy of the underworld. He considers honest labor repulsive—something for fools to do. He has special technical skills and knowledge, peculiar in-group loyalties and codes of conduct, and his own argot, superstitions, beliefs, etc. But the criminal is also an individual, and there is probably as much individuality among criminals as among the noncriminal members of society. Some are leaders, others followers. Some are skillful, others crude. Some are parsimonious, others spendthrifts. Some are ambitious, and others content just to "get by." It is, in fact, frequently because of some individual idiosyncrasy that a criminal is apprehended.†

The Incidental or Fortuitous Criminal.—Not all crimes are committed by habitual criminals. The man who steals a loaf of bread may do so because he is hungry. Finding no other means of getting food, he steals in spite of his early training. He is a criminal, not because of the character of his personality, but because the situation is one that in a sense forces him to act in this antisocial way. We

* There is no single road to crime. It is true that many criminals have as children lived in cramped quarters in an unsavory location, lacked proper playground facilities, had quarrelsome or foreign-born parents or a broken home, gone nightly to the movies, had bad associates, etc. But no one of these or any other factor by itself is guaranteed to induce delinquency. Thus only a small percentage of slum children become delinquent or criminal, and the vast majority of the second generation become respectable citizens.

† The police, for example, generally know all the apartment-house burglars—a specialized group—in the community. When an apartment is robbed, the problem, assuming it is a professional job, is to find out which one of the specialists did it and then to secure his conviction. Not infrequently such a man follows his own individual pattern in doing the job and can be identified by the clues he leaves behind. Apprehending the man is seldom difficult, securing a conviction is usually the major problem.

usually refer to action arising under such circumstances as the result of temptation. It would appear that there is some truth in the contention that every man has his price. Although a man has been trained into the mores of his community, pronounced changes in his status may lead him to commit antisocial acts in a trial-and-error attempt to reestablish himself at his old social level. Such is the case with the man who, having lost his job and being unable to secure another, resorts to theft or even murder in order to obtain the necessities of life.

Changes in external conditions do not, however, of themselves cause criminal behavior, that behavior is a consequence of the interaction of a personality and a situation. Some men would starve rather than steal, others are not so well prepared to resist temptation. The person who has been defeated in an intense and lifelong ambition to achieve financial or social success by honest labor may in desperation resort to antisocial methods. More complex, and perhaps more frequent, is the case of the person who is faced with the alternative of committing a crime or of losing something he values above his social integrity.* Embezzlement is commonly a consequence of this sort of situation. Then there are the typical crimes of person against person—rape, assault, and murder. The jealous husband may in a moment of rage kill his wife. Except in the case of rape, there is a tendency to make a judicial distinction between those crimes of violence that are a means to an end—such as murder with the object of securing money—and those that are, in a manner of speaking, an end in themselves—such as killing the seducer of a wife.

Other than separating the old from the young and the first-timers from the recidivists, there is little effort in the United States or elsewhere to segregate and administer differential treatment to habitual and to nonhabitual criminals. The more enlightened judge attempts to mete out punishment fitting to the criminal rather than to the crime. Some effort has been made to establish a legal method of recognizing and permanently removing the professional criminal from society. It is probably true that local police forces, when they are not involved with the underworld, frequently resort to extralegal methods of solving the professional crime problem. But the amateur criminal, when caught, is often forced by the way he is treated to drift into the professional class. The man who has stolen as a result of necessity is in a much worse position to secure an honest livelihood after discharge from prison than he was before he committed the theft. Moreover, with the exception of juveniles there is little con-

* See "White-collar criminality" (E. H. Sutherland, 1940).

certed effort on the part of society to change the conditions that breed professional criminals

The Juvenile Delinquent as a Potential Criminal.—In the past youthful offenders have often been treated exactly like adult criminals, but in recent years there has developed, particularly in the United States, the practice of treating the juvenile delinquent as a potential rather than an actual criminal. He is handled as an object requiring social care rather than as one upon whom society should wreak its vengeance. In keeping with this concept, separate courts, social agencies, and reformatories have been established for juvenile delinquents. Since experience with reformatories has not always been encouraging, in some communities an effort is made to change the physical and social environment of the delinquent by placing him in a socially adequate foster home. Some attempt is being made in the large cities to break up antisocial boy gangs by providing facilities for socially desirable gang play under adequate adult supervision. The establishment of public playgrounds, gymnasiums, boys' clubs, and the like is based upon the realization that the formation of antisocial gangs can be discouraged only by provision of more attractive substitutes.

The boy delinquent is a potential adult criminal of the professional type (57). If he can be uprooted from the social conditions that are molding him into an antisocial pattern and be transplanted to more normal surroundings, he can often be brought into line with the larger community. The girl delinquent, on the other hand, frequently presents a far more difficult problem. Whereas the boy delinquent can often be detected and removed from antisocial influences long before he becomes habitually atypical, the girl, whose antisocial behavior is seldom traceable to some such obvious factor as membership in a gang, is not usually recognized as a delinquent before it is too late. The delinquency of girls frequently takes the form of breaking our sex mores, and the girl delinquent is often apprehended only because of pregnancy. No matter how intelligently and sympathetically she is treated as an unmarried mother, she usually feels that reestablishment upon a normal level cannot be achieved and drifts into prostitution or joins the underworld as a gangster's moll.

THE PROSTITUTE

Sex promiscuity is in some societies entirely normal for the members of both sexes before marriage and therefore cannot of itself be considered as a form of atypical behavior. But in any society where men are permitted a degree of sexual freedom that is not allowed women—where the so-called "double standard" of morality exists—

there is necessarily present a class of women who are sexually atypical. Theirs is the occupation of prostitution,* which at times has been economically and even socially recognized, at other times subjected to economic and political exploitation.

Prostitutes today are socially atypical only in the sense that their occupation is one that excludes them from normal participation in social life. However necessary to society, the prostitute usually receives social disapproval and is therefore a member of an out-group. She is tolerated and used, only to be discarded in contempt when her function as a prostitute is over. Society may feel some sense of social responsibility for the welfare of the aged and feeble scullery maid, but it will likely force the ex-prostitute to shift for herself.† The ignominious status of the prostitute is seen in the fact that, although ordinarily a man publicly recognizes and treats with consideration a shopgirl in his employ, his relations with a prostitute seldom exceed those of a sexual-economic order.

The prostitute, however, has not always been *déclassée*. In certain periods of history and under certain conditions the beautiful and clever prostitute has had an enviable social and economic status. In Greece, her position was surrounded with an aura of religious mysticism, and she had certain prerogatives denied all others. In later Rome, she often had considerable prestige and political power. Even in the early days of San Francisco, she plied her trade openly and occasionally rose to a position of prominence in the life of the city. Practically all the romantic poetry of classical China was written to and about prostitutes. They were considered intellectual and social as well as sexual companions. In the exceptional case where filialty did not determine marriage, a wealthy Chinese might select his wife from prostitutes of a large city.

* Forced prostitution, so-called "white slavery," probably plays a small part in the recruiting of prostitutes. In contrast to such popular but unrealistic approaches to the problem of prostitution as are found in the treatise *The oldest profession in the world* (W. J. Robinson, 1929) should be set such undramatic but realistic examinations of the subject as G. May's article "Prostitution" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 553-559), *Prostitution in the United States* (H. B. Woolston, 1921), *Five hundred delinquent women* (S. Glueck and E. Glueck, 1934b), *Prostitution* (T. Kemp, 1936), "The sociology of prostitution" (K. Davis, 1937), *Prostitutes their early lives* (League of Nations Advisory Committee on Social Questions, 1938), and *Designs in scarlet* (C. R. Cooper, 1939).

† Although commonly condoned by local government, the existence of prostitution is, like the trade of housebreaking, ignored by the U. S. Census Bureau in its Census of Occupations. Prostitutes are not, furthermore, covered by the Social Security Act, nor has there been any attempt to bring this occupational group into the protection provided by this act.

The fact that, in any society, prostitutes form a sort of society within a society and have, like the criminal class with whom they are frequently associated, something of their own customs, conventions, and mores has led to their being spoken of as a profession—the “oldest” profession in history. The young novice is put through a period of training, during which she acquires not only the techniques of her occupation but also the personality attributes of this minority group.*

The Professional versus the Amateur.—Some prostitutes have fallen into the occupation because it seemed to offer them the only means of securing a livelihood. In times of economic stress, the number of girls and women who resort to this means of earning a living always increases. The economic stresses and the social dislocations of a period of war or revolution invariably cause many girls who would otherwise marry or else earn their livelihood in socially sanctioned occupations to enter prostitution. At such times the established prostitutes complain bitterly that their business is being ruined by the amateurs.

The true professional enters the occupation as a normal consequence of her early training, she has been brought up into a pattern of behavior that fits her for the life. Such atypical training may be a consequence of the inferior character of her family situation. More often, perhaps, the home has been respectable but inadequate, and influences outside it have molded her into that pattern. It has been said that many enter the occupation without any feeling of regret but with the ambition to be successful. The amateur prostitute, on the other hand, is psychologically ill fitted for the occupation. Prostitution is for her a desperate last resort and may be in such contrast to her life preparation that she eventually becomes psychopathic.

The use of sex as an economic commodity is not of itself extremely unusual, for the numerous women who marry for money really sell their sex services. Neither is sexual promiscuity necessarily evidence of atypicality. In some societies all unmarried women are somewhat promiscuous, and in others some few women are entirely promiscuous. Whether sex promiscuity and the sale of sexual services, both of which are characteristic of the prostitute, will constitute social atypicality depends, therefore, upon the particular forms they take and upon the reaction of society to those forms. The professional prostitute in our

* From the fact that they have no argot of their own, Maurer concludes in “Prostitutes and criminal argots” (D. W. Maurer, 1939) that prostitutes do not constitute an occupational m-group. If so, they are the only class of professional atypicals who do not.

present society is atypical in that her occupation involves social disapproval and invokes persecution from agencies of the larger society

THE SEX PERVERT

In a sense, the professional prostitute is sexually perverted, for she generally receives her gratification for the sex act indirectly, through the medium of money * But if sexual action devoid of sexual gratification were to be classified as sex perversion, this category would be expanded far beyond its conventional limits In our society at least, a considerable number of otherwise normal women submit but do not respond to the sexual advances of their husbands The sexually cold woman or man is, of course, atypical, since the normal is that of sex responsiveness of a heterosexual order We need not analyze here the social antecedents or individual consequences of sexual coldness Undoubtedly it is very common in our society, particularly among women † Occasionally, no doubt, a normally adjusted person may become unresponsive to sexual stimulation as the result of a single unfortunate experience with sexual activity Both the unfortunate victim of circumstances and the extreme puritan who never feels deprived of desirable sex gratification are sexually abnormal, but it is not conventional to speak of them as perverts As with other forms of atypical behavior, it is the society that defines the sexually atypical personality; and the term "sex pervert" is usually reserved for those who are sexually responsive but are so in an unconventional manner or to unconventional objects The sex pervert is one who prefers to find sexual gratification through autosexual practices, the homosexual relationship, or some such extraordinary method as zoerasty

The Autosexual.—Masturbation, ‡ although practically unknown among those primitives who allow adolescents sexual freedom, is

* The professional prostitute is often attached to a pimp, who serves as her business manager and lover Perhaps she will have sexually gratifying experience with him

† In our culture approximately one woman in three fails to achieve orgasm This ratio seems to have held constant for many years See *Psychological factors in marital happiness* (L M Terman *et al*, 1938) and "Correlates of woman's orgasm" (L W Ferguson, 1938a)

‡ Masturbation has sometimes been termed self-love and included under the broader heading "narcissism," which also embraces love of one's own personality Quite obviously much masturbation is not self-love at all but is, rather, lust for some absent person See *A study of masturbation and the psychosexual life* (J F Meagher, 1936) and "Masturbation as a mental hygiene problem" (E V Pullias, 1937)

generally recognized as prevalent among both boys and girls in our society. It appears most often as a temporary adjustment to sex maturity; it is also resorted to when no other is permitted or possible. Often this practice is arrived at by socially undirected trial and error. Traditionally it has been believed to be morally and physically degrading, and discovery usually involves social disapprobation. Certainly the heterosexual outlet is the biologically normal one; but even the lower animals sometimes indulge in autosexual practices when long denied sexual mates. There is no evidence to show that such practices necessarily dull sexual capacity, as medical men once believed, or invariably preclude attainment of a normal heterosexual adjustment.

The Homosexual.—The homosexual or invert is one who finds sexual gratification through association with members of his or her own sex. In later Greece and Rome the practice was so common that homosexual prostitution existed openly, effeminate men were available for men, masculine women for women. The practice of homosexuality was considered more exotic than aberrant. Although with us it is strongly disapproved, the number of homosexuals is considerable. Once thought to be inevitably a consequence of some physiological abnormality, it is now believed by many to be largely an outcome either of unconventional sexual training or of social necessity.* The former circumstances produce the orthodox homosexual; the latter, the lay or fortuitous homosexual.

Social Backgrounds of Homosexuality.—Although there may at times be anatomical or physiological reasons for homosexual behavior, at least a significant part is socially determined. In old China, for example, small boys were deliberately trained to take the part and place of women in the theater and in sex life. In our society the social circumstances that make for such a personality development are largely accidental. Certain types of early life conditions may encourage a boy to develop personality attributes usually associated with girls. He may find at adolescence that his group identification is so largely with girls that, rather than feeling sexually attracted to them, he is attracted to those of his own sex. His adjustment to sex there-

* The body build of the homosexual is sometimes quite masculine (J. Wortis, 1937) and sometimes of an intersexual type (H. S. Barahal, 1939). Some believe that endocrinological factors play a large role in all homosexuality (S. Kahn, 1937, and C. A. Wright, 1939), others believe that it is not at all an organic condition (H. S. Barahal, 1939). At any event, it would be impossible to explain such phenomena as widespread homosexuality in prisons in any but social terms. See also "Homosexual trends in children" (L. Bender and S. Paster, 1941). For an alleged statistical proof that the homosexual is a genetic type, see "Zur Genealogie der Homosexualität" (K. Jensch, 1941).

fore takes the homosexual pattern, since it is not superimposed upon the heterosexual pattern, he is an orthodox homosexual

The personality of the orthodox homosexual, particularly the male homosexual, is often quite distinctive. Oscar Wilde is likely to be his patron saint; and his interests are likely to run to clothes, art (notably terpsichorean), and other things usually associated with the personality of a female. The man who in the sex act takes the part of the female may go so far in assuming the role of a woman as to dress like one (A. Masson, 1935). Within any community, orthodox homosexuals tend to form their own social clique and are often quite indifferent to or even proud of the social disapprobation that they incur.

The background of the incidental or amateur homosexual is quite different from that of the orthodox. Under duress, the man or woman who once was accustomed to normal sex life but has long been denied heterosexual relationship may, in spite of a feeling of aversion to it, resort to that of a homosexual order. Homosexuality of this origin is very common in prisons and in other places where men and women are segregated. In those prisons where homosexual prostitution has developed, orthodox homosexuals serve as prostitutes for other inmates. If no money is in circulation, flattery, choice morsels of food, clothes, and other things are used to secure the services of the "woman" or, in the women's wards, of the "man" *.

THE CELIBATE

Social Antecedents of Sexual Abstinence.—In medieval Europe, as in some other times and places, certain men and women entered religious groups in which the vows of celibacy and chastity were taken. Theoretically at least, they went through life without experiencing normal sexual behavior. Some, no doubt, entered this life as refugees, finding in its security a compensation for the things they had renounced; others were trained by their parents for the priesthood or brotherhood. The members of such religious orders are orthodox celibates †. But the individual who throughout life remains

* Gradually we are seeing the folly of suppressing all normal sex outlets among prisoners, and, in certain countries, an attempt is being made to direct the prisoner's sex behavior into adequate channels (J. F. Fishman, 1934). Nelson contends (V. F. Nelson, 1933) that practically all men, even those who were normally adjusted in regard to sex when they entered prison, eventually resort to either masturbation or homosexual practices. See also "The mind of the prisoner" (J. S. Roucek, 1937).

† For an excellent description of the human-nature attributes of the members of various priesthoods, both primitive and modern, see A. Bertholet's article "Priesthood" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 388-395). Not all priesthoods require celibacy and

unmarried without securing adequate social compensations is a celibate of an amateur order and is quite likely to be maladjusted to the role Society does not often disapprove of such a person, but he is living in society only to a restricted degree, since full membership involves marriage

The Celibate and Sexual Abstinence.—Although in rare instances sexual abstinence may be a consequence of physical or physiological incapacity, it would appear to result more often from unusual or limited social experience. In a society such as ours, where sex life and romantic love are commonly identified, a bitter failure in the latter may condition the individual to an avoidance of the former. Fear of—or distaste for—premarital relationships combined with economic inability to enter into matrimony may postpone sex participation until the physiological drive for it has waned. An adolescent resort to autosexual techniques may result in adequate adjustment to sex on this level, thus relieved of the impelling need for a heterosexual relationship, the individual may be disinclined to take the risks of clandestine affairs or the troubles of marriage

Although the term "spinster" implies sexual abstinence, that of "bachelor" does not.* As a part of the liberation-of-women movement of a few decades ago, the phrase "bachelor girl" was coined to indicate the unmarried woman who was not, or did not want to be known as, sexually abstinent. It is highly probable, however, that under present conditions far more women than men go through life without experiencing normal sexual behavior, for the unmarried man is less likely to be sexually abstinent than is the unmarried woman. Moreover, in European countries, the differential death rate, male emigration, periodic decimation of the younger males by war and revolutionary violence, and other factors have long resulted in there being a greater proportion of females than males in the total population. The same situation is developing in the United States. A considerable number of women must, therefore, remain unmarried, and if they are prohibited extramarital relationships, they must also remain sexually abstinent

chastity of their members, and it may well be doubted that the medieval priests who took vows of lifelong chastity always lived up to them. But where celibacy and chastity are required and generally adhered to, they cannot socially be considered a form of atypicality

* For a consideration of the unmarried, see *The single woman* (R. L. Dickinson and L. Beam, 1934), "A study of the unmarried" (H. Hausheer and J. O. Moseley, 1932), "The emotionality of spinsters" (R. R. Willoughby, 1937b), and *Sex in development* (C. Landis et al., 1940)

The factors that may lead or force a person to remain unmarried after reaching maturity are many and often complex. As was previously indicated, the social pattern is undergoing rapid change, and there is much malpreparation of the individual for such critical transitions in his life history as that of marriage. We can, however, make a rough distinction between those who want to marry and cannot, and those whose early training has led them to an avoidance of the status and responsibilities of married life. Probably many of the middle-aged bachelors who explain their status as the tragic consequence of a broken heart are merely rationalizing an early developed distaste for marriage. The financial, moral, and emotional responsibilities that marriage incurs are more than they can face. Occasionally we find a man who is so woman-shy that he never really becomes acquainted with members of the other sex. Although most women probably remain unmarried from necessity, some spinsters are no doubt orthodox old maids, in these cases malpreparation for marriage often consists of setting up standards for the marriage partner and for marital relationships that are beyond all possibility of achievement.

THE UNSOCIABLE

Although people who are considered normal may vary greatly in their ability and willingness to adjust to the presence of others, those who definitely withdraw from the world of others are distinctly atypical. When a person deliberately cuts off or steadily neglects the lines of communication between himself and others, he does so either because he has never learned the normal and conventional person-to-person adjustments or because, having learned them, he finds his treatment by society—in terms of his personality—intolerable. The former source of atypicality is illustrated by the shepherd who often grows to be more accustomed to the presence of sheep than to that of human beings. He is an inveterate unsociable, his entire personality is one that makes sociability undesirable. He is self-sufficient (R. G. Bernreuter, 1933) and content to be let alone.

More interesting but far less important is the hermit, a person who has retired from participation in normal social life, often because of unfortunate experiences with it. Although we usually think of the hermit as a man who lives in a cave and looks like a wild animal, the hermit may be a rich and cultured woman who lives in dignified seclusion on Riverside Drive because she is afraid or intolerant of the world outside her door. Such withdrawal borders upon, if it does not achieve, the abnormal.

THE VAGRANT

Professional Migratory Parasites.—Except among a pastoral people, who must follow the grass with changing seasons, the normal social status is one in which the individual has a settled if not permanent abode and some occupation. His home may be a hut in the wilderness or an apartment in the city to which he returns from periodic trips, and his occupation may be anything from hunting wild game to selling life insurance. But the person who does not have "roots," either in terms of residence or of occupation, is definitely atypical.

The gypsies of central Europe were a group of people who had adapted their migratory habits to economic conditions. Professional migratory parasites, they lived on the road and on the people. They had something of their own culture and brought their children up into the practices and traditions of the group (M. Block, 1939). Overidealized in literature, the gypsy seems to have been tolerated merely because his visits were infrequent and colorful. Until recent years "tribes" of them came annually to America to spend the summer months living on their wits and on the credulity of the American farmer and small townsman.

In contemporary America the nearest counterpart to the gypsies is the rising generation of "auto tramps." Like the gypsies, they have no fixed abodes. Some live parasitically, others are migratory part-time workers. Ultimately we may develop a new type of "gypsy," one geared to the life of our present age. In the meantime, the auto tramps are likely to remain social outcasts who are ill prepared for the form of life that circumstances have thrust upon them.

But it is the hobo, the tramp, and the bum who most clearly exemplify the sort of person who has no roots in contemporary society. The terms are often used indiscriminately. The definitions of Jeff Davis, the self-styled "king of the hobos," show, however, the distinctions which this surprisingly class-conscious group of people make among themselves. "A hobo," he said in opening one of their annual conventions, "is a migratory worker, a tramp is a migratory non-worker, while a bum is a nonmigratory nonworker."

The Hobo as an Urban Product—The hobos form a loosely knit and informal grouping throughout the United States. They have their jungles, camps where they gather to eat, sleep, and gossip. But they have no specific place to call home, home is on the road. They have little property and keep nothing that they cannot carry in their pockets. They have even developed something of their own language,

customs, and group mores Like all true itinerants, the hobos are afflicted with wanderlust Although they work when necessary and for brief periods, they are not true migratory workers The true migratory worker, such as the fruit picker of the western states who follows the crops, is one who migrates because his occupation demands it, with him, migration is incidental to occupation But for the hobo, migration is primary; work, incidental * Give him an easy and remunerative job, and he soon becomes restless, finding some fault in the work to justify resumption of his interrupted travels

The Tramp as a Rural Product.—Within the jungles a distinction is drawn between the hobo and the tramp, for the vagrant is often as snobbish as are his settled compatriots Apparently the real difference between the tramp and the hobo is that the former is more rural and frequents the small towns, whereas the latter is essentially an urban product The hobos travel "on the rods" and hang out on the edges of cities and in camps near railroad terminals Perhaps because they are accustomed to spending many hours together in freight cars as they go from place to place, the hobos of America are better acquainted and far more of a fraternity than are the tramps

A few decades ago, many of the tramps had some definite occupation They were itinerant camp cooks, barbers, printers, etc With the declining economic value of craft skills, their avocation, traveling, got the upper hand, and so they worked only that they might move on in search of some other place to work

With the coming of the automobile, a new class of tramps developed These are essentially beggars on wheels, they beg rides from passing motorists and a coin or two at the end of the journey Such people may travel tens of thousands of miles a year in any direction and to a constantly shifting objective In the western states there is a type of tramp relatively unknown in the east Because he plods down the highways with a bedding roll upon his back, he is called a "bundle stiff" Disdained by his fleeter fellows, he is a perpetual and rather complacent vagrant, who works a week or two on one ranch before moving hopefully on to some other and temporarily better place across the hills

Another type known only to the west is the "desert rat" He combines the personality attributes of the bundle stiff with those of the hermit By avocation he is a searcher after lost mines, of which

* See *The hobo* (N. Anderson, 1923) and *Men on the move* (N. Anderson, 1940)

C Goodrich in his article on "Migratory labor" (*Encycl Soc Sci*, 10, 441-445) has drawn a clear distinction between the migratory worker as a normal person and the professional migrant as an atypical person

there are legendary thousands. He secures his annual stake—sufficient to buy a burro, some food, etc.—from some kindhearted or credulous person and spends eight or ten months in solitary wanderings over mountains and desert. If he should strike a paying vein, he would probably squander the proceeds as quickly as possible and then set out again on the perpetual quest.

Professional Vagrants.—Until recently the vast majority of hobos and tramps were male. Such material as we have upon them seems to indicate that most of them are professional vagrants,* *i e*, they have broken from home and community ties at an early age and have “gone on the road.” Because they are orphans, because their parents are loath to take care of them, or because their parents or guardians have mistreated them, boys occasionally run away from home.† Unless they quickly find a means of self-support, they may learn while wandering in search of work to prefer wandering to working. Gradually they acquire the special skills, knowledge, and other attributes of the professional hobo or tramp. The effect of the tradition that the life “on the road” is relatively easy and adventurous should not, however, be overlooked. No doubt, some boys with reasonably adequate home backgrounds have secured from literature and other indirect sources an idealization of the life of the vagrant and have been encouraged by this to break home ties.

In contrast to the professional vagrants are those men who as adults have become itinerant in the effort to escape some unsatisfactory condition in their home community. Many of these are, in fact, criminals who have become itinerant to avoid the social consequences of crime. Some wanderers are, of course, actually moving about in search of work. But if they remain unemployed too long, they become habituated to unemployment and make wandering their vocation or else sink to the level of the bum.

* Material on both the personality traits and the social origins of the tramp, the hobo, and the bum are to be found in the following studies: *The bunkhouse man* (E. W. Bradwin, 1928), *American tramp and underworld slang* (G. Irwin, 1931), “Transient unemployed men” (B. Culver, 1933), *Der Wandertrieb* (L. Mayer, 1934), “The relations of individual personal data, responses and transiency, place among siblings, and academic ability” (H. J. P. Schubert and M. E. Wagner, 1936), “The emotional stability of the transient” (W. H. Brentlinger, 1936); “Clinical observations on the reactions of a group of transients to unemployment” (H. Shlonsky, P. W. Preu, and M. Rose, 1937), “The educability of transients” (C. H. Smeltzer and C. R. Adams, 1937), *Sister of the road: the autobiography of Box-car Bertha* (B. Reitman, 1937), and “Determinants involved in boy transiency” (G. E. Outland, 1938).

† Armstrong has demonstrated certain of the social factors in family life that may cause boys to break away from their homes even in times of comparative economic security (C. P. Armstrong, 1932).

The Bum.—The hobo and the tramp are atypical in that they have made no occupational adjustment. They are men who have remained permanently in the temporary status of the adolescent, economically and socially irresponsible. In a manner of speaking, they have weighed the advantages of occupational maturity against the disadvantages and have decided not to grow up. They are the poor counterpart to the rich playboy. The bum, on the other hand, is one who has attempted occupational adjustment but has been persistently defeated in this endeavor. As a young man he may have been a reasonably competent and diligent worker, but he has secured and lost so many jobs that, like the dog who is beaten too often and too severely, his "spirit" is broken.

As we have seen, fluctuations in the demand for labor, changes in industrial techniques, and other factors mean economic insecurity for the individual worker. Even during periods of high national production (*e g*, in 1928–1929 and again in 1941–1942), there is always a large labor reserve. The men who are too frequently and for too much prolonged intervals members of this reserve gradually become its dregs, deteriorating from unemployed to unemployable. Unless these men are taken over by some agency of society and rehabilitated or else given a dole, they become bums.

The bum is, thus, the human wreckage of our economic system. Whatever he was at the outset, repeated failures have made him despondent, unenterprising, and completely irresponsible. He lives, or maintains life, from city soup kitchens if there are any, by foraging in garbage cans, or by desultory panhandling*. He sleeps, when he can find the necessary dime, in the flophouses that abound in the poorer sections of our cities. As hardship and privation beat him down, the bum usually becomes mentally abnormal.

Atypical Times and Atypical Patterns of Adjustment.—The criminal, the prostitute, the sex pervert, the celibate, etc., are "normal" atypicalities of our disorganized and continuously changing society. Out of any violent economic, social, or political upheaval in this disorganized society comes, however, some form of atypicality more or less peculiar to that upheaval. The Russian Revolution, for example, produced a large number of orphaned children who became, for lack of social guidance, juvenile criminal gangs that ran in vicious packs and lived parasitically upon the larger society. Our economic crisis following 1929 forced thousands of boys and girls to shift for

* Although the bum may occasionally beg, he is not a professional mendicant and cannot maintain himself in this way. The professional mendicant is well adjusted occupationally and has at times been accorded a fairly high social status. See *The beggar* (H. W. Gilmore, 1940).

themselves, it uprooted them and set them "on the road"* Perhaps for the first time in our history, there developed a group of vagrants who had among their membership a considerable proportion of girls

As we have seen, whole classes of people may be liquidated by severe economic crisis, revolution, and military conquest These may gradually work out an atypical adjustment to the new status Such was the case with the dust-bowl refugees—the so-called "Oakies" and "Arkies" of California—who became semiparasitic, migratory agricultural workers. Refugees from war or revolutionary violence may, when peace comes, return to take up their old ways of life Often, however, the period of their enforced idleness is so long and there is so little to return to that they never are rehabilitated In 1939, before a new series of events sent new waves of refugees on the move, colonies of poverty-stricken refugees from World War I and the revolutions that followed that war still existed in France

SUMMARY

The disorganized continuously changing society produces a great many social misfits, individuals who have resolved one or many of the major problems of social adjustment in markedly atypical ways This atypicality sets them apart from the normal social membership and is, from the group point of view, a major failure of the socialization processes The criminal, the prostitute, the sex pervert, the spinster, the economic parasite, and all the other socially atypical people are society's "problem children "

It does not follow, however, that the socially atypical person is badly adjusted from the individual point of view If his atypical behavior is a normal outcome of atypical personality development, he will be well adjusted within himself, however badly adjusted he is in terms of the social norms. But if his atypical behavior is a consequence of peculiar situational factors, it may lead to marked disorganization of his personality, setting him not only in opposition to society but in opposition to himself, with the result that he is maladjusted

The maladjusted person may in time work out a socially typical form of adjustment, or he may become habituated to atypicality But it often happens that, in endeavoring to resolve his maladjustment, he resorts to some psychologically abnormal device Psychologically abnormal adjustments are sometimes an individual, sometimes a collective, phenomenon. In the following chapter those which are individual in character and the nature of the social circumstances that impel their use will be discussed

* See *Boy and girl tramps of America* (T Minehan, 1934)

CHAPTER XVI

PSYCHOLOGICALLY ABNORMAL PATTERNS OF ADJUSTMENT

In the preceding chapter, we have examined the ways in which social disorganization and continuing change complicate the process of individual adjustment. From time to time it was said that under this or that circumstance the individual might be so badly mal-adjusted that he fails to resolve his predicament in "realistic" terms and instead resorts to some abnormal device. This is what has happened when the widow, unreconciled to her bereavement, begins to "hear" the voice of her deceased husband, when the formerly rich man becomes convinced that he is the victim of an evil conspiracy, when the unhappy husband, instead of divorcing or murdering his wife, forgets that he has one; when the spinster begins to live in but not of this world. Such behavior is a form of adjustment, but in that it denies "reality," it is psychologically abnormal.

The layman is inclined to divide the people of his in-group into a fixed dichotomy—sane and insane. The fact that members of out-groups behave in ways different from his own he can explain on the assumption that they are a different kind of people—they are Negroes, Germans, primitives, criminals, or lower class—and are for this reason different. But when one of his in-group members—a friend, relative, acquaintance, or fellow citizen—behaves in a way that he does not understand, he commonly falls back upon the concept of insanity. This is vaguely recognized as a sort of mental sickness and is generally assumed to be a definite and specific thing, which some few people develop and the majority escape.

The common practice of dividing people into those who are sane and those who are insane is a form of personality stereotyping and involves all the misunderstanding and oversimplification characteristic of this process. The problem of making a scientific distinction between the mentally sound and the psychopathic is fully as complex as that of differentiating between the physiologically sound and the pathological.

The Normal Personality.—The idea of a psychologically "sound" personality is like the concept of a physically sound body, a pure abstraction. From a tallying of many observations, the normal health

of human beings may be derived, but sound body functioning should presumably be perfect and not just normal. The physiologist, however, has no idea what a perfectly functioning body would be. He observes that some work better than others and that some break down and cease to operate. In the same way, we can determine the normally adjusted personality by tallying the personalities of a social group. Since, however, this normality is socially determined, the normal personality may or may not be a psychologically sound one. Thus, although we may abstractly conceive of the psychologically perfect man, in practice we can only observe that some men function more effectively than others and that a certain number break down so completely that they cease to make normal adjustments to the external world.

Abnormality Socially Defined.—Insofar as biological nature prescribes few specific reactions to sensory stimuli, it is impossible to define the abnormal personality in terms of reactions alone, the cultural setting must also be considered. Nature provides man with a mechanism by which he can communicate with the world external to his body and with the various parts of his body. But the response that he will make to any combination of stimuli, such as those which come from an apple, is socially determined and is therefore not of itself an adequate criterion of psychological "normality." The mere fact that a man believes that an apple is poisonous, that it harbors an evil spirit, or that "an apple a day keeps the doctor away" is no evidence that he is psychologically abnormal. In actuality, apples may be neither poisonous nor a magic cure-all for human ills. But what they are psychologically depends upon experience, which may be derived rather than direct. In some communities, the apple may be regarded as evil, in others as an object of quasi-religious reverence. For the members of such groups unrealistic beliefs concerning apples are entirely normal. For the educated American of today the idea that a tomato is a poisonous fruit may be an evidence of some mental disturbance. But this idea was perfectly normal for the Americans of a century ago. In other words, the distinction between a true belief and a delusion or false belief must be social. Is the belief in keeping with the cultural ideas of the group?* If it is in agreement, it is a "true" belief, if not, it is a delusion. True beliefs of today may become delusions of tomorrow, and vice versa.

* The scientist may, because of information not yet imparted to the lay public, have beliefs not held by the latter. Such beliefs are not usually considered delusions, they are a part of the scientist's culture and have been verified in accordance with a science-sanctioned procedure.

The "reality" to which the individual makes or fails to make adjustment is, therefore, socially defined. Only when an individual denies what is socially defined as "real" is his behavior abnormal. It is not the reaction per se that determines the normality or abnormality of a person but that reaction in terms of the established social reality. If a man who has been taught to recognize an apple as an edible fruit subsequently develops a strong and "unreasoned" aversion, responding to apples as he has been trained to respond to snakes, we should say that he is suffering from a delusion. If, on partially awakening from a dream, a man perceives an ordinary apple as a cannon ball and treats it accordingly, he is said to be in the throes of an illusion. Finally, should a man perceive an apple when none is present, we should say that his internal stimuli are calling forth an hallucination.

The Psychopathic Personality.*—The term "psychopathic" may be used to designate those individuals whose behavior is markedly abnormal. Various technical terms are used by psychiatrists to distinguish different degrees and forms of abnormality, more because they are a convenient descriptive short cut than because psychopathic personalities can be clearly classified into definite types. With the attempts of psychopathologists to define and to distinguish among mental diseases, we need not concern ourselves. It is important, however, that we realize that there are many, perhaps innumerable, manifestations of mental abnormality, that an individual may be psychopathic in one regard and reasonably normal in all others, and that an individual may be mentally normal at one time and psychopathic at another. Finally, we should realize that there are infinite graduations of abnormality. All this means that it is impossible to say that one man is entirely sane or that another is entirely psychopathic.

For legal purposes, a distinction is made between the sane and the insane, but much more than mental abnormality enters into the legal classification. It is, after all, one of social convenience. Some kinds and degrees of mental abnormality are deemed socially undesirable, some despicable.† Many men who from the psychological viewpoint are abnormal—many kings, prophets, and wizards of finance, industry, and science—have been revered as great men. The legally insane are

* For discussions of psychopathy from the standpoint of the psychopath see *A mind that found itself* (C. W. Beers, 1923) and *A mind mislaid* (H. C. Brown, 1937).

† The fighting courage and ability of the "psychological cases" of World War I were as good as, and quite possibly better than, those of more stable soldiers (E. Miller, ed., 1940).

simply those whose behaviors are recognized by the courts as actually or potentially dangerous to themselves or to others

Throughout the latter Middle Ages and down close to the present day, those psychopaths who came into conflict with society were assumed to be "possessed of the Devil" and were treated in the most cruel and barbaric way.* Only in recent years has it been realized that the psychopath is not a victim of some evil eye or necessarily of some organic disorder but may be a victim of society itself

Organic versus Functional Bases for Abnormality.—Certain drugs, diseases, and a few disorders of a physiological order affect the organism and break down normal communication within the organism and between it and the external world. Narcotics dull the sensibilities. Some drugs distort perceptions and call forth hallucinations. Syphilis can cause neural deterioration and may thus disrupt the machinery of communication. Encephalitis, brain tumor, and many other disorders may leave permanent effects upon the organism and its ability to adjust to the environment. Senility involves an impairment of mental efficiency, the senile regresses psychologically, losing his ability to make and retain new habits and falling back upon those acquired in early life. Psychological disorders that arise from these and comparable sources have been called organic. Their causes are reasonably clear and distinct.

There are, however, a large number of psychological abnormalities that do not parallel known pathological changes in the structure of the organism. These are usually designated as functional disorders †. The distinction between the functional and the organic disorder is a commonplace in medical practice. When he can find no physiological cause for a patient's headaches, chronic indigestion, insomnia, pain in the neck, or whatnot, the physician will conclude that the disorder is not organic but functional or psychological ‡.

* The social treatment of psychopaths has always been a reflection of the current social concept of the origin and nature of abnormal behavior. At times, the mentally disordered have been revered as possessing superhuman qualities, at other times, they have been brutalized on the grounds that they were sub-human. It is only within the last few decades that we have come to consider and to treat the psychopathic person as mentally sick and as one who might perhaps be cured. For a brief description of historic views and methods of treatment of mental aberration see H. S. Sullivan, "Mental disorders" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 313-318).

† For an attempt to measure the beginnings of psychological abnormality—emotional instability—see Appendix note 58 and "The psychotic and the pre-psychotic personality" (T. V. Moore, 1938).

‡ Even when there is evident organic disorder present, the abnormal behavior may be of functional character. But because of their physiological bias, many

Social Disorganization, Social Change, and the Conflict Situation.—

It is mental abnormality of the functional type that particularly concerns the social psychologist, since the occurrence and character of functional disorders are intimately related to the social milieu. In an earlier chapter it was observed that certain of the covert responses of the individual appear to be a tensional by-product of unresolved or conflict situations and that these tensions may ultimately become manifest in some apparently inexplicable form of overt action. It was then observed that the long-delayed overt response can be explained in no other way. The sudden outburst of "temper," the seemingly unprovoked murder, the "impulsive" suicide, and the like are made much more comprehensible when viewed as the overt culmination of many conflict situations, each of which left its tensional residue.

Presumably tensions are subject to continuous and periodic release. Many of the recreational activities of men would appear to serve something of this function, and we shall later see in detail how certain forms of collective action, *e.g.*, evangelical meetings, permit and foster periodic release of tensions. But when the psychologically permissible outlets are inadequate or when participation in conflict situations is too frequent, tensions may be resolvable only by resort to abnormal forms of behavior*—the functional disorders under discussion in the present chapter.

In the four preceding chapters we have been discussing what may now be described as the social backgrounds of the conflict situation. Even in the most stable and highly integrated social systems conflict situations will arise as a result of failures in the socialization process. Under conditions of social disorganization and social change other conflict situations appear†. Many individuals will be malprepared for the circumstances to which they must adjust as they grow up and old and shift from social role to social role. Many of the circumstances to which they have been prepared to adjust will be modified. Functional disorders of personality are, therefore, to be considered as

medical men are prone to seek the cure for all abnormal behaviors in some sort of physical therapy—insulin injections and electric shock being the favorite techniques at the present moment. For a discussion of such "shock" techniques see Appendix note 59.

* Abnormal forms of behavior cannot be attributed to the presence of a single trait of neurotic tendency. See "A factor analysis of certain neurotic tendencies" (C. I. Mosier, 1937).

† The structure of the many types of conflict situations that may be set up by a disorganized and changing society has been variously analyzed. The system devised by Lewin is, perhaps, as adequate as any. See Appendix note 60.

individual attempts to resolve the tensions resulting from conflict situations *

A Classification on the Basis of Social Antecedents.—The psychiatrist distinguishes a great many more or less typical functional disorders. His interest is in the diagnosis and treatment of patients. Ours lies in the social antecedents of psychopathic adjustments rather than in the type of adjustment itself. We may therefore somewhat simplify our analysis and classify the various functional psychopathic adjustments under three concepts: compensatory devices, dissociational techniques, and escape mechanisms. It is assumed that these categories either include or are more basic than those usually designated as suppression, rationalization, resistance, transference, regression,† identification, projection, sublimation, etc.

COMPENSATORY ADJUSTMENTS

The Conflicts of "Wants" with Actualities.—A compensatory device is a symbolic substitute for something that the individual wants but cannot secure ‡. In Freudian theory this is a substitute for the natural outlet of inherent drives. Normally the libido is diverted by social forces into unnatural but partially adequate channels. When these channels are completely inadequate, conflicts arise. Stripped of its mystic terminology, the core of Freudian theory is that there is an inevitable opposition between the individual's wishes and the restraints of social life.

But many so-called Freudians recognize by implication and some few state explicitly that the vast majority of the individual's wants, needs, or wishes are of social derivation rather than of biological origin. If a child desires candy, if an orphan wants parents, if a man wants a car as impressive as his neighbor's, if a spinster wants a husband, and if a hesitant person is desirous of being a fluent speaker, they do so because they have been taught by social experience to want

* Some students of abnormal behavior believe that there is no direct relation between the character of the society and the frequency of psychoses. They contend that such breakdown is traceable to hereditary "predispositions," that various peoples have much the same proportion of such inherent weaknesses, and that the predispositions toward abnormal behavior will become manifest, whatever the society. For a discussion of the evidence pro and con see Appendix note 61.

† "Regression" refers either to a return to earlier habits or to behaving on a simpler and more primitive level. For research having to do with the latter see "Frustration and regression: an experiment with young children" (R. Barker, T. Dembo, and K. Lewin, 1941).

‡ Certain of the devices included here under the term "compensatory" are sometimes designated "substitute responses."

these things. Unless they have been so taught, they will not miss such things and will not find it necessary to compensate for them

The fact that people cannot miss what they have never had or been taught to want, is most clearly seen in the congenitally crippled child. It is a common experience of orthopedic hospitals that straightening twisted legs may be far less difficult than adjusting the child to the possession of legs that have been straightened. Because a child has never had two strong legs upon which to run and play, he has never really missed them. His personality has not been that of a physically normal child. When surgery gives him the sound legs he did not formerly have, he may become badly adjusted, for his personality may remain that of a cripple although his body is now normal.

Let us stress again that what a person will want to have, be, or become as a social being is dependent upon his social experience. He may be quite contented with the status of a slave or extremely discontented even with that of a prince. Under conditions of contemporary life, many factors contribute to the development of adjustment demands that are later denied satisfaction and of ambitions far beyond the possibilities of attainment. When the gap between what the individual has been taught to be and what society permits him to be has become excessive, he tends to fill in social reality by resorting to compensatory devices.

Daydreaming as a Compensatory Device.—There are many ways by which the individual can provide symbolic substitutes for social realities. They range all the way from the commonplace practice of daydreaming to that of shutting out the external world and living completely in one of make-believe (a type of schizophrenia). The child who has been accustomed to playmates and is subsequently deprived of them may substitute imaginary children with whom he talks and plays, sometimes taking alternately the parts of himself and the others and seeing and hearing the others only in imagination. A daydream playmate may become so vivid that the child orders his life in terms of that playmate, he may wait for the playmate to dress, demand that it be fed at the family table, and express puzzlement when others do not know about it.

Although children frequently do their daydreaming out loud and act out the incidents of their daydream life, social disapproval and inconvenience, combined with increased skill in the use of covert symbols as a substitute for nonsymbolic actions, lead the relatively normal adult to do his daydreaming in silence and outward passivity. But the function remains the same. Because his actual role in society is not adequate in terms of his personality, the daydreamer finds

satisfaction in telling himself a story in which he is the central figure. Daydreams frequently have, as all those who indulge in this pastime will recognize, a definite plausibility. In view of what is known by the individual, they might become true, however small the probability. Reveries or fantasies, on the other hand, may be no more than a sort of self-amusement and may have little if any relation to reality.

Fiction as a Compensatory Device.—Written fiction, the drama, the motion picture, and such spectacles as a football game, an elaborate wedding, and an impressive military review often provide the individual with a ready-made daydream. By identifying himself with the hero or heroine of a story, he can secure vicariously something of the excitement, romance, wealth, and social recognition that he wants but is denied in actuality. All reading of novels and attendance of motion-picture shows, games, and spectacles cannot be so interpreted, however; such activities are often but time killers and do not serve as substitutes for felt lacks in life experience. The individual may, moreover, use written and other fiction as a source from which to draw certain elements of his personality.

There is, however, reason to believe that extreme dependence by an individual upon the moving picture, the novel, and other fiction is a consequence of the inadequacy of his social reality. One of the most interesting developments in the field of radio broadcasting has been the growth and persistence of "radio-family" serials, in which family and neighborhood incidents are dramatized. The tremendous popularity of such serials came as a surprise to broadcasting agencies. That a million or more people could become intensely interested in the commonplace and, to any but themselves, trivial doings of an entirely fictitious group of people, known only through the medium of radio broadcasting, was not suspected. But, when we reflect upon the number of people who have been brought up under the intimate social relationships of the old-fashioned neighborhood and large family and who now find themselves living in comparative social anonymity, this interest in the intimate affairs of fictitious persons can be seen as a supplement to real friends, relatives, and acquaintances.

Only when dependence upon make-believe comes to exclude acceptance of and response to reality, do we consider the individual actually psychopathic. There may, however, be no more than a difference in degree between the person who is lost in the action of a book and the psychopath who is ruling his imaginary subjects in a near-by institution for the insane.

Romanticizing.—Few men entirely avoid occasional verbal exaggeration of their social roles. For the fisherman to inflate the size of

his catch in telling of it is recognized as a normal and permissible part of the art of fishing; and at basis psychopathic romanticizing is nothing more than an extension of the braggart's trick of making verbal victory from actual defeat, verbal pounds from actual ounces, or verbal feet from actual inches

Unlike daydreaming, such romanticizing is an effort to change the external world. By exaggerating, misinterpreting, and twisting past events, the individual endeavors to impress others with his importance. Unless he feels that he is less important in their eyes than he should be, he will make no attempt to pull himself up by verbal bootstraps. All bragging in which the braggart is elevated (and even boasting about one's relatives, country, or civilization is subject to this interpretation) is an indication that, at least in this specific situation, the individual feels a distinct inadequacy in social reality. It is, therefore, a compensatory device. If one cannot "be somebody," he can at least "talk quality."

Much lying, which is sometimes considered an evidence of abnormal adjustment, is of this order. The man who talks among his friends as though he were master in his home may be thereby compensating for the fact that he is not, although he would like to be, the master. Unless, however, his tales of prowess become too insistent and too obviously untrue, we do not think of him as psychopathic. Too great intensification of conditions that have led a man to innocuous bragging may push him over the vague border between the relatively normal and the psychopathic. In the extreme case, the individual is usually described as suffering from delusions of grandeur.*

We must distinguish, however, between the person who exaggerates for some specific and recognized object of self-interest, such as the salesman who makes extravagant claims for the goods he wishes to sell, and the one who exaggerates because his social position is inadequate in terms of his earlier experience. The former is not fooling himself, but the latter may easily do so, in which case the distortion of reality that he makes through exaggeration is for him entirely real. Again, we must remember that the line between the two is never clear. It is not, for example, uncommon for the salesman by his extravagant claims to "sell" not only his customer but himself as well.

DISSOCIATION AS A MODE OF ADJUSTMENT

Logic-tight Compartments.—The substitution of symbolic realities for inadequacies in social reality takes many forms and has many

* For an interpretation of Mussolini as a psychopath see *Sawdust Caesar* (G Seldes, 1935)

degrees of expression. Somewhat distinct in terms of social antecedents is the abnormal technique of segregating aspects of social experience into logic-tight compartments. This, too, takes many forms but may be considered under the general concept of dissociation.

Principles of logic, morality, and the like are by definition generalizations and are therefore applicable to all of a common category. If it is true that to kill any man is against the will of God, it cannot also be true that to kill some men is the divine wish. Yet it often happens, particularly in contemporary society, that an individual's social experience teaches him first one and then the other of such mutually exclusive principles of behavior. When, as is common, segregation into unrelated elements is characteristic of his social group, no mentally abnormal consequences follow. No pressure is brought upon the individual to relate them, he does not have to reject forcibly the fact that they conflict with each other.

But when opposition between aspects of personality springs from the fact that the individual has lived and been influenced first by one social grouping and then by another and antagonistic one, elements making for a psychopathic adjustment are present. The man who has been brought up into acceptance of religious fundamentalism and who is subsequently inducted into the concepts of modern biology is faced with a conflict situation. Since both fundamentalists and scientists recognize the mutual exclusiveness of their viewpoints, the individual who has been trained to accept both of them is, by this fact, forced either to reject one or the other, to try to reconcile them, or, retaining both unmodified, to keep them artificially segregated. If, because of factors in his social experience, he cannot reject either one, he may attempt to reconcile them and may thus be "torn between two antagonistic truths," in the end resorting to some psychopathic escape from the unsolvable dilemma. Or he may make an equally unrealistic adjustment to this conflict by refusing to recognize that the two viewpoints are in any way related, thus applying one "truth" in some situations, the other in different situations.

The conflicting forces of contemporary life impel most of us to resort to the dissociational technique in some respect or other. We are, however, practically incapable of recognizing our own utilization of it. One of the greatest dangers to science is the inability of the scientist, however conscientious his efforts, to perceive his own blind spots. He may recognize the cultural dissociations of the primitive, the irreconcilables accepted by the medieval theologian, and the adherence to sets of mutually exclusive principles by those around him. But his own must be forever kept secret from himself. The value of a

dissociational adjustment lies in its making unnecessary any effort at reconciling the irreconcilable

The "Split Personality."—Dissociations are to be found underlying some of the most puzzling phenomena in contemporary life. The child psychologist whose children are notoriously "spoiled brats," the economist who puts all his savings in the wildest stock, the scientist who consults a spiritualist before undertaking any important act, and the domestic-science authority whose home is unkempt may not be hypocrites but only extremely mild psychopaths. They have two or more distinct personalities, in some situations one will function, and in other situations another becomes operative. The so-called "split personality"* is but an extreme manifestation of this exceedingly commonplace technique by which the individual can avoid the tensions that are caused by conflicting personality attributes. Most of us to some degree play the dual role of a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.

ESCAPE MECHANISMS AS MODES OF ADJUSTMENT

As Distinguished from Compensatory Adjustments.—It is as impossible rigidly to classify the social antecedents of psychopathic adjustments as it is to classify those adjustments themselves. But it is one thing for a child to use daydreaming as a means of filling in the gap caused by the death of a parent, and it is another for him to avoid by some abnormal technique the fact that his stepfather, unlike the ideal father, is cruel and harsh. For convenience we may distinguish between the psychological filling in of a felt inadequacy in social reality and the evasion of some reality that the individual cannot tolerate. Adjustments of the former order we have termed compensatory devices, those of the latter may well be designated as escape mechanisms.

One of the simplest forms of escape is that of fainting under the tension imposed by extreme physical pain. A person may also faint as the means of escaping from some situation that is psychologically too painful to bear. As is true of all such mechanisms, fainting must be a psychologically permissible means of escape, otherwise some other device will be utilized. To the person who has been taught that fainting is a sign of undesirable weakness, the "pain" of fainting may be less acceptable than is the "pain" of an unpleasant situation.

That which an individual will find intolerable and therefore necessary to escape is a matter of personal definition. Whereas one man

* For interestingly described examples see *Two souls in one body?* (H. H. Goddard, 1927) and *Persons One and Three* (S. I. Franz, 1933).

finds poverty a "natural" state, another may see it as a living hell, whereas one may take financial bankruptcy as a bit of bad luck, another may feel it an irreparable disgrace, and although the professional criminal looks upon criminal indictment merely as a business matter, most of us would consider it a personal tragedy. Unless one has been taught by social experience that some situation is intolerable, no need to escape that situation by resort to psychopathic devices will be felt. The boy who has never known any but a harsh, cruel stepfather may adjust to the latter's presence and not find it psychologically necessary to make an escape.

Under conditions necessitating some escape adjustment, the one that the individual will utilize is, as has been indicated, determined by his personality. There are many escape techniques, the possibilities range from the temporary expedient of fainting to the permanent resolution of life's difficulties by self-destruction.* The technique that is utilized will be the one that is least incompatible with the personality of the user.

Hypochondria.—One of the simplest and most effective escape adjustments takes the form of functional aches and pains. The hypochondriac is a person who uses this technique to excess. Many headaches, possibly even those of the migraine type (O Knopf, 1935), have at least some of their origin in mental factors and serve as an escape from the petty annoyances of life.† Such vague, but to the sufferer exceedingly real, complaints as general lassitude are frequently of the same order. It is often difficult for the physician to distinguish in individual cases between symptoms whose prior cause is largely psychosocial and those which, although having psychological manifestations, are at basis of physiological origin. He can clearly differentiate the imaginary from the actual cancer; but many disorders,

* Perhaps the most remarkable fact about suicides is that the people whom we might a priori assume to be most anxious to enjoy the luxury of death—the poverty stricken, the socially exploited, the dregs of humanity—resort to suicide less frequently than do those who are financially and socially more prosperous.

For studies of the social factors affecting the incidence of suicide, see "Prosperity, depression, and the suicide rate" (W C Hurlburt, 1932), *To be or not to be: a study in suicide* (L I Dublin and B Bunzel, 1933), "A thousand cases of attempted suicide" (F C Lendrum, 1933), "Suicide and mental disease" (G R Jamieson, 1936), "Attempted suicide: an investigation" (F Hopkins, 1937), "A study of personal disorganization" (E R Mowrer, 1939), "Suicide as wish-fulfillment" (I Hendrick, 1940), and "Suicide and its prevention" (E H Derrick, 1941).

† Hypochondria may also be a compensatory device—the person who has an inadequate social role may find an absorbing interest in pampering an otherwise normal digestive tract or heart. Compensatory, too, is the use of functional aches and pains as a means of securing desired attention not otherwise forthcoming.

such as indigestion, constipation, and some heart afflictions often defy diagnosis. There is, to illustrate, a considerable interaction between "mental states" and digestive functions. Abnormal mental states may be a consequence of digestive disorders, but, on the other hand, digestive disorders may be a reflection of mental disturbances.*

In our society at least, sickness generally releases the individual from a considerable degree of social responsibility and at the same time intensifies the responsiveness of others toward him. Whenever a person finds his responsibilities intolerable or his problems unsolvable, he may use sickness as a means of escape. Although such sickness may be almost entirely of psychological origin and may not deceive the doctor or others, the "sick" person is not consciously making believe. To him the "pains" are as real as are those of physiological origin. The efficacy of sugar pills, patent nostrums, and quasi-religious methods of faith healing arises in part from the fact that those cured by these things have been suffering from only psychological pains. In the ritualism of these curatives they find a better escape from conflict tensions than they have in their functional ills.

Dipsomania.—One of the most common, perhaps because most socially permissible, escapes is temporary release from a conflict situation by excessive indulgence in alcohol (dipsomania). A depressant, alcohol seems to effect an escape by "wiping out" recently acquired associations—those which it is necessary to escape—and by permitting earlier and more fundamental ones to become operative. Thus, by drinking, a man can often secure temporary release from the effects of a nagging wife, from the fact that he is a business failure, from his feeling of shyness or insignificance in the presence of his associates, or from whatever it is in his present life circumstances that conflicts with his earlier experience. Should the necessity for such escape become persistent and his indulgence in alcohol become excessive and periodic, he is considered definitely psychopathic †. In terms of social antecedents the distinction between the occasional drinker and the true alcoholic may be one of degree only.

* There are few symptoms of physiological disturbance that have not in some instance or other been traced to psychosocial origins. For a summary of the medical data on this subject see *Emotions and bodily changes: a survey of literature on psychosomatic interrelationships* (H. F. Dunbar, 1938).

† See "The social psychology of alcoholism" (A. Myerson, 1940), "Personality factors in alcoholic addiction" (N. D. C. Lewis, 1940), "Alcohol: a critical review of the literature, 1929-1940" (H. Marshall, 1941), "A highly successful approach to the alcohol problem" (W. D. Silkworth, 1941), "Psychiatric resultants of alcoholism" (N. D. C. Lewis, 1941); and "Alcoholic mental disorders" (K. M. Bowman and E. M. Jellinek, 1941).

Rationalizing.—The man who is actually poor but who is convinced that he should be rich may adjust himself to this conflict by romanticizing—imagining that his rags are fine clothes, that the stones he picks up in the roadway are diamonds, and that scraps of paper are bank notes. Such a person is immediately recognized as psychotic. A more subtle method of securing the same self-grandiosity, one more likely to avoid detection, is that of accepting the actualities of social status but of distorting the reasons why this status is not what it should be—rationalizing. Often this is accomplished by imputing evil motives to someone. One who does this believes that his status is a consequence of systematic persecution. The man who has been taught to believe that wealth is his by right of birth or worth but who is actually poor may reconcile these contrasts to his own satisfaction by imagining that he is poor because some enemy, perhaps an impersonal one, is defeating all his efforts to secure his normal rights. In this way, he shifts all blame for his actual status from himself to others. The elaborate and quasi-logical rationalization that is involved sometimes excels the plots constructed by professional fiction writers. Not infrequently, such psychopaths have fooled others besides themselves, even police, courts, and psychiatrists have been caught in the mesh of their verbal fabrications.

The egotistical but unsuccessful artist or writer who blames his failure upon the “stupidity” of the public or upon the “monopolistic efforts” of art dealers or publishers is resorting to this sort of device. By thrusting the blame for his lack of recognition upon others,* he is saved from admitting to himself and others that he is incompetent and that the fault lies in his books or his pictures. Similarly the businessman, struggling impotently against the painful realities of a business depression, may blame his troubles, not upon “business,” of which he is a part, but upon “the radicals,” who, as he may firmly believe, have willfully and maliciously undermined the economic system.

The shifting of blame from self to others takes many forms and is resorted to in some degree by most of us. It is a means of escaping the fact that we are in some respects less competent than we have been taught that we ought to be, and of thereby preserving confidence.

* This mechanism, often spoken of as projection, has been studied through analysis of play activities (E. Homburger, 1937). See also “Experimental studies of projection. I. Attribution of traits” (R. R. Sears, 1936), “Literature and personality” (H. G. McCurdy, 1939), “Projective methods for the study of personality” (L. K. Frank, 1939b), “Verbal attitudes scores from responses obtained in the projective technique” (S. S. Dubin, 1940); and “Play technique” (F. F. Tallman and L. N. Goldensohn, 1941).

in ourselves. Many of our individual rationalizations are but escapes from less severe conflicts than those which lead a psychopath to believe himself the hero of a cosmic tragedy.

Amnesia.—Amnesia, or loss of memory, is commonly an escape mechanism.* The individual may block off the psychological consequences of conflicting experiences and thus forget what is too "painful" to remember. Some of the psychoanalysts contend that whenever we forget a past event, even the name of a new acquaintance, we do so because that event is incompatible with other experiences. Forgetting is, to their minds, always an escape technique. Although this extreme view is hardly tenable, it is no doubt true that forgetting often serves as a means by which the individual may resolve the tensions engendered by conflicting experiences. When large areas of past experience are blotted out, the person may forget his identity, his occupation, his home, etc., but may be in other regards entirely normal. Since concussion of the brain may cause quite similar symptoms, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the man who has lost his memory because of an automobile crash and the one who is suffering from a business or matrimonial smash-up.

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR

That the psychopathic are often socially incompetent and must therefore be cared for by social agencies is an obvious social consequence of mental abnormality. A less apparent but no doubt equally important social consequence results from the fact that psychopaths occasionally provide social leadership of one form or another. Religious sects have frequently received their initial momentum from the psychopathic delusions of individuals who found in such sects an escape from intolerable conflicts in social reality. The issue is of course debatable; but there is reason to believe that much that passes for political, economic, artistic, and literary genius is actually a manifestation of psychopathic adjustment. This is not to infer that the social leadership provided by a psychopath is necessarily disadvantageous to society. Although it is impossible to concur with such an extremist as Adler, who would interpret all exceptional individual activity as a compensation for inferiorities of some sort, it is probably true that excessive concentration upon a single phase of social life, such as business, politics, science, or art, is often a method by which the individual endeavors to compensate for inadequacies or

* For an unusual view of amnesia, that from the standpoint of the patient, see *I lost my memory the case as the patient saw it* (Anon., 1932).

failures in other aspects of his life. And such concentration is commonly the secret of success.

The "Mass Movement."—Often merely an individual reflection of social disorganization, the psychopathic personality may, however, play a considerable part both in furthering social disintegration and in inventing and disseminating new elements of organization. As the unit through which social organization is manifest, the individual is both an expression of that organization and a contribution to it. If society forces the individual to work out a psychopathic adjustment in an attempt to reconcile conflicting elements of social experience, this mode of individual adjustment may be taken over, or at least provide leadership for, others who are equally in need of some means of reconciling irreconcilables. The result is a collective, as distinct from individual, phenomenon and is usually described as a mass movement. In the succeeding and final part of this book we shall discuss first the "normal" and then the "abnormal" forms of collective interaction.

PART V

Social Interaction

CHAPTER XVII .

THE INTERACTIONAL SITUATION

So far we have kept our attention focused upon the individual, endeavoring to discern the various ways through which his participation in social life prepares him or malprepares him for adjustment to subsequent circumstances. We have examined the processes by which the human infant is socialized and have observed that under contemporary conditions there is a marked lack of continuity and consistency in his socialization. We have discussed the consequence of the social experiences of the individual, his personality, and have seen that the personalities of modern men are often in some or many regards incompatible with the social demands made upon them. Throughout all this discussion we have taken the fact of social interaction more or less for granted. From this point on we shall take the individual more or less for granted and shall examine into the nature of the social interactions from which he has acquired his personality attributes and in which he participates. Heretofore we have been, as it were, studying the characters in the play—their training, their qualifications for their respective roles, and the effects of their being promoted to better parts and being demoted to inferior parts. Hereafter, we shall examine the enactment of the scenes that make the play.

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

All behavior is the response of an organism to stimuli. The stimuli may be either of internal origin or of external origin. The act of food seeking as a response to the hunger pang is of the former order, whereas picking up a food object from the ground belongs to the latter. In analyzing the behavior of human beings, we may for convenience distinguish three levels or forms of behavior—levels that are not, however, to be thought of as in any sense separate. Each of these levels of behavior has something of its own laws, although, as we shall see, the second is built upon the first, and the third upon the second.

Nonsocial and Social Behavior.—First to appear in point of time and first in degree of simplicity is what may be termed nonsocial

behavior. This includes all unlearned reactions, sometimes spoken of as reflexes or nonsocial drives. The infant wail is at first presumably of this order—a generalized natural reaction to certain body states or to stimuli of external origin. Also included in the category nonsocial are all individually acquired responses, *i e.*, all responses acquired out of trial-and-error experience that is not directed by other human beings. The distaste and aversion reactions to a bitter fruit acquired by a man from his random picking and eating of such fruit would come into this category.

Only an exceedingly small part of the behavior of men is, however, nonsocial. Social forces direct most of the learning process, and generalized natural reactions to stimuli are quickly refined into a large number of specific reactions, each one of which can be evoked only by a specific and socially designated stimulus situation. Thus the wail soon becomes a cry for something, not just a cry. The specific reactions that have been learned through social direction belong to the second category, which, for simplicity, is termed social behavior. Most of the behavior of a man who is strolling down a quiet path in the woods is, for example, social behavior, since he responds to natural objects mainly in terms of his social training. If he finds the sounds made by a bird enjoyable, he does so at least in part because he has been taught by other human beings to consider such sounds enjoyable. If he jumps in fright when a harmless snake slithers across his path, he does so because he has been taught to consider all snakes as objects of fear.

Social Interaction and Collective Behavior.—The third level of behavior is that which arises when two or more human beings respond in socially acquired ways to one another. The process that then appears is interactional, and the consequence of that process is collective behavior.

The distinction between social behavior and collective behavior arises from the fact that in the former we are dealing with what is essentially a series of one-way cause-and-effect relationships, whereas in the latter each effect serves in turn as a cause.* The behavior of the man strolling through the woods is a series of reactions (effects) to a sequence of relatively constant stimuli (causes). His behavior is largely a result of the effect of the stimuli (visual stimuli from the

* As was indicated in Chapter I, much of the early social psychology was developed around the one-way cause-and-effect concept, as was, for example, the "stimulus-response" approach (F. Allport, 1924). Of recent years the trend in social psychology, as in other sciences, has been constantly toward multiple-variable or interactional analysis.

path, trees, shrubs, and flowers, auditory stimuli from the birds, wind, and the sound of his feet on the path, olfactory stimuli from the soil, plants, and decaying organic matter, kinesthetic and tactual stimuli from the ground underfoot, the air, contact with branches, etc.) upon his socially developed personality. His behavior affects these stimuli sources but little. The tree may fall under the blows of his ax, the snake may die under his foot, and to this extent his behavior modifies nature and thus in turn his reaction to it. But, in the main, the reaction is of a one-way order: he reacts to nature, not nature to him.*

Differing so much in degree that we may conveniently consider it a difference in kind is the interaction that occurs when the man walks into the presence of another human being or group of human beings. Then, not only does he react to them as stimuli sources, but they with rare exceptions react to him. His reactions are, therefore, at once the effect of their behavior on him and the cause of (the stimuli for) reactions on their part.† And so, whereas in the previous circumstances we have but one variable to consider—the personality of the man walking in the woods—in this case we have as many variables as there are people. Each of these people will respond in terms of his particular personality to the behavior of all the others. The behavior of any one is, therefore, a consequence, not of a simple one-way cause and effect, but of an interaction. The product of an interaction, collective behavior, is perhaps the most complex, baffling, and yet most interesting phenomenon with which the scientist has to deal.

* Much of the land surface, many of the animals, and not a little of the internal area of our globe have, of course, been modified by the activities of men. But the point is that nature responds to man's efforts very slowly, whereas man must adjust himself to his surroundings rapidly and constantly. For a detailed classification of the various environments to which the individual must make his adjustment, see *An introduction to social psychology* (L. L. Bernard, 1926, Chap. VI).

† The behaviorist Weiss has stressed the point that in an interaction the distinction between stimulus and response practically vanishes. Whenever two human beings, A and B, hold a conversation, the speech of A can be classified as A's response, yet it constitutes the stimuli for his listener, B, as well. Weiss has also suggested that stimuli (or responses) might well be classified two ways—as biophysical and as biosocial. Two stimuli are biophysically equivalent whenever they are similar physically (alike in wave form, weight, height, width, etc.). To be alike biosocially, they must call forth equivalent responses in others. Thus, "Gut' Tag" and "Good day" will be biosocially equivalent although, since their sound pictures are quite dissimilar, they are not biophysically equivalent (A. P. Weiss, 1929). See also "The study of personality and the method of equivalent and non-equivalent stimuli" (H. Kluver, 1936).

Collective Behavior as More Than the Sum of Individual Behaviors.

Although the behaving units are individual human beings, collective behavior cannot be described as the sum of the separate behaviors of a number of individuals, any more than water can be considered as the sum of two free atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen. The interaction of the parts in combination produces a new phenomenon, and thus the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Like one of the parts of a machine, a single personality is but one of the factors that contributes in small or large measure to the interaction that in totality constitutes collective behavior. It is because of this fact that so much difficulty is encountered in analyzing attributes of personality. Those attributes, it will be recalled, are usually made manifest in situations; and it is often impossible to distinguish between actions that are mainly a function of the personality and those which are mainly a function of the situation.

THE SOCIAL OR INTERACTIONAL SITUATION

In the study of collective behavior the unit of observation is the social, or interactional, situation.* A situation has its inception, duration, and termination. As a unit of study it is the real-life counterpart to one of the scenes of a play. Sociologists and other social scientists study the "plot"—the social organization, the processes of social change, etc. The social psychologist, on the other hand, studies the many specific situations out of which and through time the "plot" emerges.

A social situation has its inception whenever two or more people come into interaction, it is terminated when they separate or when a distinctly new form of interaction is set off by the introduction of a new factor. The meeting of friends on a street corner is, thus, the

* For a time the concept of the social, or interactional, situation seemed to be developing mainly in sociology. Now, however, psychologists are interesting themselves in the concept, *e g*, Allport with his event-system theory (F H Allport, 1940b) and Lewin with his field theory (K Lewin, 1939). The psychiatrists, too, are helping to develop the concept, Moreno with his technique of sociometry (J L Moreno, 1937), and H S Sullivan with his theory of interpersonal relationships (E Beaglehole, 1940).

For other discussions of the concept see "The behavior pattern and the situation" (W I. Thomas, 1928), *The quest for certainty* (J Dewey, 1929), "The situational approach—a reaction to individualism" (F J Bruno, 1931), "Some problems of the situational approach" (S A Queen, 1931), "The observation of societal behaviors of individuals" (F H Allport, 1937a), "Personality traits and the situation" (J M Reinhardt, 1937), and "Social interaction. the problem of the individual and the group" (L Wirth, 1939).

inception of a situation That situation continues until they separate to go their independent ways or until an explosion in a near-by building, the coming of a person they dislike, or something else, changes the friendly conversation into a dash for safety, a forced rather than friendly conversation, or whatnot

In the succeeding chapters we shall be principally concerned with the processes that occur within the limits of situations as so defined In some instances, however, situations build so much one upon another that we can trace certain phenomena only through a sequence of situations. Such a procedure is necessary, for example, in the study of such phenomena as rumors, lynchings, and mass movements

Factors Facilitating Interaction.—The proximity of human beings to one another does not of itself constitute an interactional situation (62) Unless human beings are adjusting themselves to one another, they remain socially isolated and do not in the sense of interaction merge into a unit Necessary for effective interaction is some degree of similarity or some interlocking dissimilarities between the personalities of the individuals involved They must be able to communicate with one another, their individual personalities must be such as to permit at least a start toward the working out by trial and error of an adjustment, and they must have or be capable of formulating a common objective.

Although people who speak different languages may to some extent communicate with one another on the basis of simple gestures and thus interact, commonness of language greatly facilitates interaction A North American and a Latin American may adjust to the presence of each other in the smoking room of a ship on the basis of visual stimuli, each judging what the other intends to do and shaping his behavior accordingly, to the end that they at least do not try to sit down on the same chair And it is possible, of course, for two men to interact with each other solely by pushing, pulling, and punching. Such behavior is conceivably collective Ordinarily, however, the means of communication involved in interactional situations are of more complex orders and presume some degree of individual preparation for interaction in the specific situation

Ability to communicate through a common language facilitates but does not, however, assure effective interaction The fact that the members of a situation are capable of communicating indicates a degree of similarity in their symbolic training* But symbolic

* When such variables as age, race, occupation, social background, and place of conversations are held fairly constant, even sex differences in conversational interests are rather small People with interlocking patterns of nonsymbolic

behavior is often only the means to adjustment; and unless the members of a given situation have been prepared not only for communication but also for interlocking or parallel patterns of nonsymbolic adjustment, they may be forced to resort to trial and error in attempting to interact. For effective interaction it is not enough, therefore, that people want to get along together and can communicate with one another. They must also have, or be capable of learning, patterns of nonsymbolic adjustment. Probably most people entering marriage want to get along with the marriage partner, and certainly most husbands and wives speak the same language. Nevertheless, as the records show, marital discord—lack of adequate adjustment—is a commonplace. The value of parallel patterns of nonsymbolic adjustment is readily seen in the uniform response of a company of soldiers to an officer's command, for example, each member of the company will turn left at the command "Left face!" The value of divergent but interlocking modes of behavior may most clearly be seen in the artificial actions of people on the stage. The members of the cast do not behave alike, but each responds at a given cue in a way that facilitates the behavior of all the others and contributes to the organization of the whole situation.

Further facilitating effective interaction is commonness of objective, which may exist at the inception of the situation or may be developed as a function of the situation itself. The extent to which predetermined unity in objective facilitates a situation can be simply illustrated by what may happen when acquaintances meet casually on the street. If they have as a common objective that of arriving some place, perhaps one to his office and the other to the bank, they will resolve the situation easily. This will also be true should they both feel in the mood for a bit of idle conversation. But should one be in a hurry to continue on his way and the other want to pause to chat, the situation may be awkward and tense, the behavior of the two at cross purposes, and the interaction consequently ineffective. Under these conditions, a common objective may, however, arise as a function of the situation. The conversationally inclined person may introduce an interesting subject for discussion. On the other hand, the one who is disinclined to tarry may lead the talkative one with him down the street or organize the situation for immediate dissolution.

In addition to the foregoing, there are a number of other factors, the presence or absence of which may facilitate effective interaction

adjustment tend to have similar conversational interests (S. M. Stoke and E. D. West, 1931).

in a specific situation. Among the most important of these is the physical environment or setting of the situation.* Lecturers know the importance of an adequate and comfortable auditorium. Actors are keenly aware of the extent to which audience reception of their program may be influenced by the theater in which they are playing, and stage directors know that the "atmosphere" of a stage setting influences not only the audience but the players as well. Business and other executives have elaborate offices partly because these may facilitate conferences with subordinates and customers. The physiological states of the people who make up the situation are also significant. The sober man who finds himself in the midst of a drunken brawl is not likely to merge with the group. Thus one sober member may dampen the enthusiasm of a group of inebriates who are "all set" to act in a given way. On the other hand, one intoxicated person may, because of the nature of his reactions, break up the interaction existing among the members of a sober group. Fatigue, like alcohol and some drugs, may facilitate interaction in some situations and inhibit it in others. In some sorts of situations, as we shall later see, effective interaction is dependent upon the development of strong covert responses on the part of the participants during the course of the interaction itself.

ASPECTS OF SITUATIONAL INTERACTION

For purposes of scientific analysis we may break down the interactional situation into a number of aspects. This is of course somewhat artificial; collective behavior is the consequence of all aspects of the situation, just as the behavior of the individual is the result of a total personality rather than of some special element thereof. But, even as we may dissect the personality for analytical purposes, so may we also dissect the interactional situation.

Origin and Membership.—The inception and personnel of interactional situations vary considerably. In terms of the antecedent forces or events that have led certain people to come together at a given place and time, situations range in type all the way from those which are culturally established to those which are fortuitous or accidental. The presence of a man, his wife, and his two children

* For a general discussion of the effects of the physical environment, particularly climatic, on interactions see V. E. Shelford's chapter in *A handbook of social psychology* (C. Murchison, ed., 1935).

A very elaborate and impressive set of experiments that calls attention to a number of important physical factors is reported in *Problems of installation in museums of art* (A. W. Melton, 1935).

at the dinner table is the outgrowth of a multitude of prior situations that can be described only in abstraction and as a social plan or institution of family organization. The situation is traditional, conventional, or normal for the given society. Not only is the time and place a customary thing, but the membership has been determined by a customary procedure.

In extreme contrast to such a situation is the meeting on Fifth and Broadway of three strangers waiting for the "go" signal. So unascertainable are the events that have led to this particular situation that we can describe it only as accidental. The meeting was not prearranged in accordance either with some system of social organization or with individual design. It just happened, and its membership is unselected. Almost anyone can encounter almost anyone else at Fifth and Broadway. But only members of a family can sit down to dinner with their family, and family membership is a highly controlled and sharply defined thing.

Leadership.—The role of the individual must not be overlooked in the study of the interactional situation. He is the element from which situations are formed, and without individuals to behave, there could be no collective behavior. This would seem an obvious enough fact; but it can easily be lost sight of when large numbers of individuals are included within an interaction, and the role of each is, consequently, relatively small.

Situations vary in the degree and extent to which they are dominated by one member of the group. Such domination is usually spoken of as leadership. On one extreme are those situations in which one individual is steadily and persistently dominant. His leadership is, of course, a function of the situation, since without the presence of the other members he could not be domineering. As we shall see, the leader is led, in that he must direct his course of action in terms of the personalities of those he leads. As an individual the leader, however, reacts much less to any other individual in the situation than any one of the others reacts to him. This point was made, it will be recalled, in the analysis of the attribute of leadership in the chapter on individuality.

Situations in which there is one dominating personality may be further distinguished in terms of the nature and antecedents of that leadership. The lecturer in the classroom leads because it is conventional for him to do so. Behind his leadership is a long and complex process of selection, and his position as leader depends less upon his particular personality than upon factors that may have nothing to do with his immediate fitness for leadership. In contrast

to such situations are those in which leadership is arrived at by competitive struggle among the members of the group. Here attributes of individuality may be the determinants of the person of the leader, as is the case when the most talkative member of a group comes to dominate the conversation or when the most qualified man rises to the position of leader in an emergency.

In contrast to situations in which there is a specific and continuous leader are those in which leadership is reduced to a minimum and shifts from member to member. Such situations may also be divided into those in which the shifts in leadership follow a predetermined pattern or process and those in which they are a consequence of person-to-person give and take. The former are exemplified by the leadership process in a game of bridge. In accordance with a fairly definite formula (we are speaking of bridge played in a systematic fashion) leadership shifts around the table and is limited in degree to becoming the leader upon securing the bid. In a conversational interchange, on the other hand, there is a shifting of leadership arrived at in considerable measure by trial and error. Although we may have a sense of what is appropriate, there are no definite rules, and the leadership of such a situation is both loose and subject to moments of instability, as is the case when two leaders emerge simultaneously.

TYPES OF INTERACTIONAL SITUATIONS

Analytical versus Descriptive Approaches.—In succeeding chapters we shall analyze in some detail the origin, membership, and leadership processes found in typical interactional situations. It is obviously impossible to describe the multitudinous forms of human action that fall into the concept of collective behavior. History, anthropology, ethnology, political science, economics, and sociology make such descriptions and endeavor to find some pattern of recurrences in the phenomena so described. Just as social psychology does not attempt to describe all the various forms of human nature or of individuality manifest in societies of the past or present, it does not attempt to describe all the forms of the behavior of men in interactional situations. To do so would be to repeat, perhaps in slightly different terms, what scientists in other fields are doing.

Our task, then, is not so much that of describing forms of collective behavior as of analyzing the ways in which interactional situations arise, the processes of leadership involved, the factors conditioning the course of interaction, and the methods by which the situations are resolved. The forms of collective behavior may be in marked contrast to one another; but from the sociopsychological viewpoint

the situations in which these contrasting forms of behavior evolve may be very much alike. In old China a man ordinarily preceded his wife through a doorway, whereas in modern America a man generally gives his wife precedence. The behavior is quite dissimilar, but in terms of the interactional processes the situations are of the same order.

Multiplicity of Situational Types.—From analysis of various situations and by comparison of those occurring among primitives with those of civilized peoples and those occurring among the peoples of history with those of the present, the concept of situational types arises. In the rather brief analysis that follows, the various types of interactional situations will be classified mainly in terms of the leadership involved. On this basis four general categories, each with a number of subclasses, emerge: situations in which leadership is culturally designated, those in which leadership is determined by individual initiative and operates on the basis of direct contact, those in which leadership is determined by individual initiative and operates through distant contact means of communication, and those in which leadership is determined mainly by fortuitous factors.*

In the past students of collective behavior have been prone to focalize attention largely upon those situations in which the behavior is abnormal—those involving the mob, the crowd, the boom, the craze, the mass movement, and others in which there is a rapid swing away from the norms of social action. Significant though they may be, the stressing of situations of this type to the exclusion of all others is comparable to the recounting of the history of social life in terms of wars. Wars have been frequent and recurrent during the last few centuries; they are spectacular and impressive. But the history of wars is only a small part of the history of a society. To consider only the unusual types of interactional situations is to give a biased picture of the processes of collective behavior, much as the history of wars gives us a biased idea of the past—or as the newspaper with its stress upon individual and social catastrophe provides the reader with a severely distorted picture of his times. To avoid such distortion in social psychology, we must study the commonplace as well as the unusual and must not assume that we comprehend a thing simply because it is commonplace.

This caution is felt necessary because of the general tendency to assume that the key to social behavior has been found once it is explained why a man, normally peaceful, suddenly becomes a raving

* A more detailed and inclusive classification than that presented here is to be found in *Collective behavior* (R. T. LaPiere, 1938a).

member of a maddened mob. The fact is that we have still to discover why this same man may kiss his wife upon one occasion, beat her the next, and "make up" a few moments later, why he gives good money for useless goods at one time and refuses to take advantage of a real bargain at another time, why he will sing in church but will blush and stammer if asked to sing at home. These latter and countless other typical situations are quite as important quantitatively and qualitatively as that in which the man becomes a member of a mob.

Metaphysical Concepts.—As was pointed out in Chapter III, it is dangerous as well as misleading to speak or think of society as an entity. Likewise, to speak of a social mind, of the spirit of a people, or even of such a commonplace as the public is to run the danger of being taken or of taking oneself literally. Such "entities" exist only as unrealistic concepts of the observer, comparable to such imputed personifications as God, Satan, and Destiny. Since all we know about them is what we believe—and anyone's belief is as good as another's—it is impossible to extend our knowledge of them by any method, scientific or otherwise.

The behavior of men in various interactional situations has some continuity and forms something of a pattern, much as the separate notes of a musical instrument may form a musical series or pattern. No one would extend the observation that music is a pattern to the conclusion that notes as such have no existence or that they are but manifestations of the spirit, soul, mind, or anything else of the piece of music. Likewise the fact that collective behavior, as appearing in a long series of situations, may be seen to form a pattern or system is no reason for imputing to this behavior any sort of collective mentality, group soul, or other metaphysical entity. Yet this is what is done by those who think and speak of collective behavior as though it were an expression of some collective entity. To do this is to deny the reality of the individual human being, to disregard the fact that all collective behavior arises through the mechanism of individuals, and to close the field of collective behavior to scientific investigation. Thus in imputing to collective behavior some abstract cause, one reduces the student of such behavior to the method of falling into a quasi-religious spell, from which he will emerge with a final and absolute "truth," derived from the substance of his own preconceptions. As scientists we must realize that society is a perceived abstraction, that the study of collective behavior is susceptible to objective methods, and that truth arises from factual analysis rather than from some inner feeling. There is much that is still unknown, but there is no reason to assume that that which remains to be revealed is of a different order from that which has already been uncovered.

CHAPTER XVIII

CULTURAL LEADERSHIP SITUATIONS

CONVENTIONAL SITUATIONS

The exceeding complexity of even the simplest interactional situation makes analysis difficult and makes the effort to compare and classify various situations somewhat baffling. As a starting point for our analysis it might be well, therefore, to consider the hypothetical situation of two men meeting on a very narrow path. To pursue their individual objectives, they must somehow contrive to pass each other. This means that they must inevitably interact, since the behavior of each is significant only in terms of the behavior of the other. From our own casual observation, we know that such a situation can be resolved in one or another of many possible ways. One man may step aside to give the right of way to the other, they may both step aside halfway, they may argue which one is to have the right of way, they may fight the matter out, the stronger securing the right of way, they may even resolve the situation by one man's turning around and preceding the other down the path.

Our problem, however, is not what they do, but how they come to do whatever it is that is done. In this respect we may distinguish three basic and in a sense mutually exclusive types of adjustment: first, if they have never faced such a problem before, they may be forced to the trial-and-error devising of an adequate pattern of interaction, second, if they have met on this or on another path before, they may this time utilize the adjustment technique that they have previously devised, finally, they may employ a conventional method of adjustment that has been handed down to them as a part of their social heritage.

Conventional Patterns of Interaction.—It is with situations involving an adjustment of the last order that we are here concerned. Whenever an adjustment problem is immediate, has no long-run implications, and concerns only those directly involved, a conventional pattern of interaction may be utilized by the members of the situation. The character of the collective behavior that will emerge from the situation is, of course, dependent upon the conventional forms of the people involved.

Even for the meeting of two people on a narrow path there is no single, universal, conventional pattern of interaction. It was, for example, conventional in old China for the peasant to step aside to give his social superior the right of way. Furthermore, that this might be effective, it was conventional for the superior to take the right of way. Each, as it were, knew his place and took it. The eventuality of social equals meeting on a narrow path, in a doorway, or in any situation of like order was also provided for in convention. Here the elder took precedence, the younger stepping aside. And should they be of similar age, it was conventional to go through a preliminary giving-precedence-to-the-other ritual, which led ultimately to the more impatient member's actually taking the lead.

All this might seem an unnecessarily complex and time-consuming method of resolving a trivial situation. But in comparison to the difficulties that might arise were there no conventional formula, it is exceedingly effective. What happens when our own convention of passing on the right breaks down and two people spend a number of moments in embarrassing trial and error in order to pass on the widest of streets indicates the social necessity for conventional forms.

Like all other culturally determined situations, conventional situations involve a minimum of trial and error, there is in them little dependence placed upon any individual member as leader or organizer, and highly effective interaction is attained because each individual member of the situation has learned a customary mode of response which fits into the responses of the other members. This does not mean that the members are necessarily like each other in the sense that they have identical modes of reaction, but rather that each knows his special part—he is either the one to step aside or the one to take the right of way. But should they have been trained into different systems of adjustment, they will conflict and thus be forced to resort to trial and error in working out an adjustment to the situation.

Conventional patterns of interaction are a matter of momentary convenience only and serve the interests of those immediately involved in the situations in which these patterns appear. Many culturally determined patterns, on the other hand, have a function that transcends the specific situations in which they appear and serves the interests of the entire social group rather than just the situational membership. The situations in which such patterns emerge are always related to many prior situations and lead to many subsequent situations, the entire sequence of which constitutes an institutional constellation.

INSTITUTIONAL SITUATIONS

The Institutional Basis of Behavior.—The sociologist often speaks of systems of human relationship—the family, feudal, clan, tribal, and village systems—as social institutions * Specific methods of economic or governmental procedure—monogamy, private property, public education, democratic government, etc—are also termed institutions Institutions are, thus, the perceived patterns of social organization Each institution has some special function or functions but is of course coordinated with and dependent upon the other institutions of the society (63)

Institutions and the Institutional Situation—The sociologist, economist, political scientist, and social historian are concerned primarily with the development, characteristics, changes, functional relationships, etc, of institutional patterns Thus they may trace the historic emergence of the patriarchal family as a social institution, plot the changes that historically have occurred in that institution, and describe its disintegration under the impact of modern industrialism All this, it will be recognized, is study of the system of human relationships that comprises the institution of the patriarchal family rather than of the behavior of the individual men and women adjusting themselves in specific situations to the presence of one another

The social psychologist, on the other hand, is concerned with the behavior of the individual men and women and with why it arises on the situational level Once it is well established with the individual, such behavior involves an order of person-to-person interaction in which trial and error plays little part, as is indicated by the fact that the pattern of that interaction appears over and over and has a history that transcends the life of the members of any situation in which it appears The social psychologist must, consequently, go

* The term "institution" suffers from a multiplicity of meanings, as a consequence it frequently means nothing at all Hertzler in his book *Social institutions* (J O Hertzler, 1929) fails after two hundred and fifteen pages to arrive at a clear-cut definition of his title phrase The concept that we wish to symbolize by the term "institution" will no doubt become apparent to the reader, especially as we distinguish between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized behavior For other and often contrasting usages see "The nature of institutions" (F H Allport, 1927), *An introduction to social psychology* (L L Bernard, 1926), Chaps II and III in *An introduction to sociology* (C A Dawson and W E Gettys, 1929), Chap XII in *General sociology* (H P Fairchild, 1934), W H Hamilton's article, "Institutions" (*Encycl Soc Sci*, 8, 84-89), *Social life and institutions* (J Hart, 1924), *The psychology of social institutions* (C H Judd, 1926), and pp 15 and 16 in *Society its structure and changes* (R. M MacIver, 1931)

beyond the immediate interactional situation and seek in the institution an explanation of how the members came to behave in the way that they do. How, in other words, does it happen that the pattern of interaction in some situations is not only recurrent but is of such a character that it can be seen to be merely a part of a large constellation of situations?

The collective behavior emerging from institutional situations may range from that of ritualistic human sacrifice upon the altar of the sun god to nothing more startling or impressive than a man and his wife climbing into the same bed. But all institutional situations have in common the fact that their inception, function, membership, and the person of their nominal leader are determined by the social heritage.

ATTRIBUTES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SITUATION

Origin.—Since the origin of social institutions lies in the history of a people, the origin of any specific situation of institutional order is to be found in some special circumstances of the social training of the members of that situation. All culturally determined situations have their antecedents, but a clear distinction can be drawn between the unplanned encounter of two men on a narrow path and the pre-arranged meeting of a man and a woman at an altar, there to enter into a marriage contract. The former situation may be resolved in accordance with a customary formula, but there is in its origin little of the systematic social preparation of the individuals involved, the cultural anticipation, and the social significance which have led to the latter.

Although each of the men who meet on the path may have been prepared by prior experience to adjust in a given way to anyone he so meets, he has not been prepared to adjust to this specific man at this specific time and place. The origin of the situation is therefore in a sense fortuitous. The lives of these two men have not been so organized as to make this specific encounter one of a series of related situations. What they do when they meet may be culturally predetermined, but the meeting itself is a consequence of individual factors and thus of antecedent behavior that is only in slight degree related to the situation itself. One man may have been on his way to town to sell produce grown in his garden, the other may have left the town simply to take a stroll in the hills.

Constellations of Situations.—An institutional situation, however, originates in closely related antecedent situations. The meeting of a young man and woman, their parents, and others, with a priest or

minister in a church at high noon is not a chance encounter. It is the culmination of a multitude of correlated activities on the part of the individuals concerned. Under the highly institutionalized conditions of times past, a marriage was arranged with little if any initiative on the part of the bride and groom. They came together in accordance with the plan of their parents and were little more than pawns in the operation of the family system. To understand their meeting, we must therefore look first to that system. Only then does any one of the series of events, such as the decision that Son John was to be married to the daughter of such and such a family, become meaningful.

The cultural origin of institutional situations makes for an elimination of individual trial and error.* This fact can, perhaps, best be seen by contrast. Although with us marriage is normal, it can hardly be termed fully institutional. Today the presence of a man and woman at an altar may be a consequence of much individual initiative and of considerable individual trial and error. But in the old family systems, both Occidental and Oriental, a marriage was but one of a large constellation of situations, each related to all the others. The origins of all these situations lay in the institutional patterns.

Under social conditions more stable than those we know today, a considerable proportion of the situations in which the individual participated were institutional. Neither he nor any of his contemporaries had devised these situations, nor were they in any sense fortuitous. They were but elements of a larger social plan, devised in the past and handed down generation after generation more or less intact.

The monks assembled for the evening benediction, a gathering of the village elders in a primitive community, the king presiding at his court, and the family sitting at the dinner table are groupings that have their origin in institutional constellations. Most obvious is the fact that religious or other ceremonial situations are formulated in accordance with some definite institutional law. There is, for example, little that is fortuitous in the meeting of a number of people at high mass in a Roman Catholic Church even in these days of social

* There is a measure of trial and error involved in the formation of even the most highly institutional situation, since it is human initiative that puts into operation the plan resulting in any meeting of people. The decision, for illustration, that Son John would marry a specified girl was probably arrived at in family council. But that he would marry and that his wife would be selected for him in accordance with a systematic procedure were all predetermined by his social heritage.

change. They have come together in accordance with a complex social plan. Their individual actions have been socially directed, coordinated, and systematized, to the end that they should meet at this given place at this specific time. Even a funeral, itself a series of connected but distinct situations, cannot be said to have originated in the accident of death. Death is but the sign or signal for pre-determined social forms to come into operation. Less obvious, perhaps, is the institutional origin of such situations as that in which a woman and a number of children sit at table with bowed heads while a man, the husband and father, expresses their collective thanks for the food spread before them. Such a situation may be as fully institutional as that in which a minister says, extending a bit of bread to his parishioner, "Take and eat this in remembrance that Christ died for thee."

Ideological versus Actual Function.—Since it is but a part of a system of situations, no institutional situation can be understood in terms of itself alone. The function of any institution is the guidance of the individual into modes of behavior that assist in one way or another in the maintenance of group life. The interaction that occurs in an institutional situation is therefore but a single step toward a distant social goal.

Seldom, however, is there any conscious recognition by the members of an institutional situation that their behavior has a long-run institutional or group objective. The rules and regulations for individual conduct incorporated in early Christianity were those developed in part at least from the experiences of the Hebrew peoples. The "good life" was one that appeared to contribute under this particular system to long-run and collective welfare. Each element was a mode of conduct that men had found reasonably effective and adequate in terms of the given social order. But the explanation for adherence to the specific institutional patterns was supernaturalistic, *i e.*, based upon the idea of divine law. The Jewish avoidance of pork had its utilitarian basis in the danger of trichinosis or other infection. The Chinese avoidance of unboiled water was a sanitary measure. Yet both these practices were "explained" on the basis of supernatural forces*. Even in present-day theology utilitarian arguments are

* Even in the field of the arts, practices that have quite obviously grown out of human trial and error have often been explained in terms of divine or magical forces. Both the ancient Greeks and Chinese explained their failure to use in their music any but the simplest musical ratios (1. 2, octave, 2. 3, fifth, and a few others) on the grounds that more complex ratios would offend the gods. The Greeks would not use ratios in which the numbers six and seven appeared because

seldom used. It is not claimed that one should love his neighbor because this is essential to the social system or because the effective functioning of the system is necessary to the welfare of the individual. Rather, the principle is justified in terms of divine command, as is clearly indicated by the fact that even the most obviously expedient of institutional practices is invariably given a mystic or supernaturalistic explanation.

When, as frequently happens, the long-run social significance of a situation is camouflaged beneath ritualistic and symbolic action, a distinction arises between the purported function and the true function of that situation. The purported function is an ideological justification, a humanly satisfying "explanation," for actions that are really significant not in themselves but only in terms of a larger pattern. The distinction between ideological justification and true function can be clearly seen in the behavior of a Chinese woman boiling water to "drive off the evil water spirits." She does not know it, but in boiling the water she is actually doing her part to prevent an epidemic of cholera.

The vital function of any institutional situation can be seen only upon study of the entire institution of which it is a part. The ideological justification, on the other hand, usually makes the situation appear to be of some immediate and personal value to the members. The primitive initiation rites serve to mark the individual's transition from childhood to maturity. Only as a part of the system of social education, therefore, do such rites function. But the boy who is just reaching sexual maturity cannot be expected to understand the sociological and sociopsychological significance to him and to his group of transition from one group membership to another. Thus the initiation rites, like other institutional situations, are related to spirit-world concepts and are thereby given personal significance and interest. As we have already indicated, religion provides the individual with an effective pattern of adjustment to the fact of ultimate death and gives him an abstract and unfailing life goal. But the primitive with his bag of ancestral bones, the Oriental with his ancestral shrine, and the Christian with his altar, cross, and prayer book seldom see this ultimate function in the rituals through which they go. The purported function of a church service may be to secure for the

six and seven were magical numbers (*e g*, there were six directions—north, south, east, west, up, and down). The Chinese would not use ratios in which the number five appears because five was the number of life fundamentals (*e g*, there were five directions—north, south, east, west, and center, five human relationships—between king and subjects, father and son, brothers, husband and wife, and friends).

participants a desirable status in life after death or, perhaps, to control through divine supplication the course of natural events. But the actual individual and group functions of that situation can be discerned only in terms of the entire system of institutionalized religion and are seldom, perhaps never, understood by the participants at a religious ceremony.

Flags, banners, robes, uniforms, thrones, altars, titles, etc., are the material accouterments used in the more ritualistic of institutional situations. They, like the rituals themselves, are highly symbolic. But beneath the symbolic behavior of a ceremonial situation, as with the more commonplace and less colorful behavior of other institutional situations, there is usually some definite, utilitarian social function.*

Membership in Institutional Situations.—Inasmuch as institutional situations are but units of a larger constellation, membership in such situations has continuity. The men on the path may never meet again, but the members of an institutional situation will come together time after time. In order that they will interact in the predesignated mode, it is essential that the individuals entering into any specific situation be prepared not only for it but for all others of its constellation. This means, in turn, that situational membership must be controlled. Only those who are prepared to play their specific roles, not only in it but in all related situations, can be permitted to participate in an institutional situation. The mechanisms by which a social system assures that the members of any institutional situation will be adequately trained to that situation and to others of the same constellation are an intimate part of the total social pattern and are exceedingly complex.

Training for Membership.—The processes of socialization, which were discussed at some length in Part II, are directed toward preparing the individual for social membership. Not all such training, of course, is directed toward fitting the individual for membership in institutional situations. Under conditions of social stability, however, the processes of socialization consist largely of shaping the individual's personality in such a way that he will react in accordance with his socially designated role in situations of an institutional order.

We have had occasion to observe, from time to time, some of the ways in which, and the extent to which, children are socially prepared.

* The functional place of ritual in a social system is primarily the concern of the sociologist and the anthropologist. Yet it is imperative that the social psychologist recognize the fact that rituals, however incomprehensible in themselves, may be of great significance when examined in their social context. See R. Benedict's article "Ritual" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 396-397) for a more detailed expression of the point.

for situations long before those situations actually arise. In particular, we have noted the manner in which society guides the psychological growth of the individual, preparing him for the dynamic adjustments necessitated by factors of physical and social maturation. A contrast was shown between the lack of system in our present milieu and the exceedingly systematic preparation in stable societies for such critical life transitions as sexual maturity, attainment of occupational, marital, and parental status, and the coming of middle and old age.

The vital importance to individual psychological welfare of adequate and appropriate preparation for future events is apparent. Moreover, it is as important for the group as for the individual that the latter be adequately prepared for situational adjustment. Thus, in the old order, it was necessary for family welfare that a son or daughter be so brought up that he would behave in the ways prescribed by the family system. The failure of a parent to train a child properly not only reflected discredit upon the parent but meant that the parent would suffer discomfort in those institutional situations of which the child was a member. Presumably because it worked most effectively, the socialization of prospective institutional members—*i. e.*, children—for a particular situation was largely the responsibility of the members of that situation. Since they would bear the most immediate and apparent consequences of educational failure, they could be depended upon to do their best in directing the personality development of the child into institutional patterns.

As a result, membership in institutional situations has in the past been largely a matter of birth. It must not, however, be supposed that blood kinship is the cause of effective person-to-person adjustments in institutional situations. Biological relationship can make for more effective person-to-person adjustments only when it facilitates educational efficiency. As a matter of fact, in some social systems blood kinship has not been significant in personality development.*

Selection of Members.—Birth, then, is not the sole basis for membership in institutional situations. The monks in a monastery were not necessarily related by birth; obviously, recruiting of new members had to be from other than blood-kin sources. Under certain of the older family systems, the women were recruited from sources outside the family, they were nevertheless members of many institutional situations in which the others had been born to membership.

* In Samoa, for example, parents often have exceedingly little to do with the training of their children. The education of children is here a responsibility of the community (M. Mead, 1928).

It is apparent that, if the monks were to adjust to one another in an institutional fashion and if the wives of a family were to interact in a predesignated mode with other members of the family, some selective process must have operated to assure that each individual of outside origin would know and behave in accordance with his specified social role. To this end, every functioning social institution has involved some systematic procedure for selecting new adult members from all those persons available.

It is perhaps with the process by which families of the old type selected the wives for their sons that we can most clearly perceive the organic working of the total institutional pattern to the end that each situation would resolve with the least possible resort to individual trial and error. Under present conditions the selection of spouses is, as was previously remarked, a relatively uncontrolled and haphazard affair. Marriage, the establishment of a presumably permanent relationship between a man and a woman, is not now the integral part of a larger constellation of family situations that it once was. Like some of the primitives to whom we have already referred, we today permit and depend upon a considerable degree of trial and error in the individual selection of marriage partners.

In the old patriarchal family system, however, it was imperative that a wife be satisfactory not only to her husband but to his father, mother, brothers, their wives, and to all the others who lived under a common roof. Many of the situations in which they would behave were highly institutional. Unless a girl was properly prepared to play her role as a wife, daughter-in-law, and sister-in-law before she came to the family of her husband, that family would have to educate her. By selecting her in accordance with a traditional system, they assured themselves that such education would be unnecessary. Contractual marriage may strike us as contrary to the "laws of God or of nature." But upon close examination it appears that this method on the average assured that a wife would fit the family of her husband, and there is no reason to suppose that the absence of what we term "romance" necessarily made the relationship between husband and wife any less satisfactory. Although they may not have met previously, the bride and groom were, after all, prepared to accept each other.

Leadership of Institutional Situations.—The character and extent of leadership is one of the most indicative attributes of an interactional situation and provides us with a significant key to its situational type. An outstanding aspect of institutional situations is the subordination of the individual to the institutional pattern. Each individual member acts in the main according to a designated institutional role. The

presence of the members and the pattern of their interaction are not determined by the personality of any single member, and there is scant opportunity for the display of individual initiative or the appearance of trial and error.

Although institutional behavior involves little trial and error and is guided by the system rather than by individual initiative, we can discern in every such situation some one individual who is designated as leader, even though his leadership is no more than nominal. He neither selects nor devises the pattern of interaction, but is simply the focal point of interaction and the one who provides cues that guide the other members in the enactment of their separate roles. The designated leader of an institutional situation is therefore somewhat analogous to the conductor of an orchestra, who does not devise the music but who guides its rendition.

The institutional mechanisms by which the person of the designated leader of institutional situations is determined are comparable to those mechanisms by which members are selected and trained. The most common bases for selection are heredity, age, and sex. Thus in the old patriarchal family system the nominal leadership of all situations involving members of a family and members of some other family devolved upon the eldest son of the eldest son of that family. In the absence of the patriarch, his eldest son or, when the latter was too young to act the part, the eldest of the patriarch's brothers was the designated leader. Under the feudal system the same sort of mechanism was operative and became the basis for the hereditary position of kings, princes, and the petty nobility.

Limitations of Institutional Situations.—It must not be concluded from the foregoing that the interaction of two or more human beings in a situation of the institutional type is automatic (64). Even the more fundamental and persistent of institutional forms are little more than a framework for social life. In a sense they are a social generalization from past group experience, which is handed down in a systematic fashion from generation to generation. Elaborate, complicated, interlocking forms of person-to-person adjustment, they are rule-of-thumb procedures for accomplishing social ends with the least possible resort to trial and error and with the least possible dependence upon the organizing ability and foresight of individual leadership. At best, institutional forms are more the pattern than the substance of human relationships. Within the pattern, there is invariably some noninstitutional interplay of the individuality of the members of the situation. It is this interplay that gives the "tone," the human qualities, to institutional behavior, just as it is subtle variations in the

rendition of a musical classic that make each performance somewhat distinctive

Social Disorganization and the Institutional Situation.—Since situations of the institutional type are preorganized in terms of long-run social objectives and each situation is significant only to the extent that it fits into a pattern of prior and subsequent situations, social changes inevitably disturb the functional nature of institutional situations. The institutional situations in which we find ourselves today and for which we have been adequately prepared in past experience are few, and the functional value of even these is open to question. In a changing order much dependence, individual and collective, must be placed upon trial and error in the working out of situational adjustments. As the reliability of old social forms declines, the role of the individual as a dominating factor becomes peculiarly significant; there is an increase in the importance of individual initiative, of inventiveness, and of those personality qualities that make for leadership under competitive conditions. The rise of political demagogues, of spellbinders, and of great "salesmen" is an offset to hereditary rulers, traditional priests, and a communal form of economic life in which human behavior followed a socially designated form.

FORMAL SITUATIONS

The institutions of preindustrial Western society have all been disorganized and their functions largely destroyed by the revolutionary developments that have taken place in our means and methods of making a livelihood. But with a sort of despairing unwillingness to be cast loose into the stream of social change, we cling to the remains of some of the old institutions. They have lost most if not all their original individual and group functions and now have only sentimental value. Much political, legal, economic, and dramatic symbolism is an appeal to values derived from practices that were appropriate to forms of institutional life no longer possible. Many of the interactions in which we participate follow institutional forms but are devoid of institutional significance.* They are, as it were, but a fragment of the skeleton of a body long since dead. Such situations may, for convenience, be designated as formal.

* Thus the church service, which once functioned as a part of the institution of religion, may now provide the members of a congregation with anything from recreation to social prestige. For example, the lower class Negro church provides its members with revelous outlets for sex conflicts, the middle class Negro church is mainly a social center, and the upper class Negro church, the members of which are relatively light skinned, serves primarily as a prestige source (R. A. Bilings, 1934).

Social Decadence.—There is a pronounced tendency for the members of a disintegrating social system, especially for those of the so-called “upper classes,” to become increasingly concerned with outward form in social relationships. This includes great emphasis upon the symbols of status—precedence in introductions, order of seating at formal dinners, and the like, fastidious regard for details of dress, speech,* etc., and preoccupation with ritualistic observances. In general, these formalities are elaborated fragments of old institutional patterns. But they are empty of institutional meaning and are used only for purposes of display.

Preoccupation with formalities to the exclusion of functional effectiveness is evidence of social decadence. Political, economic, and military aristocracies tend to become decadent in time. They cease to fulfill their function as leadership sources and come to devote the major part of their time and energies to going through the motions of being important. This decadence would seem to be a part of the process by which an established elite deteriorates and is finally dispossessed by members of a more vile and earthy “lower class.”

Social decadence may, furthermore, affect the entire social system, lowering the functional efficiency of the members of the society to the point where the system disintegrates at the slightest attack from within or without †. Undoubtedly it was in part the preoccupation with formal observances that made the ancient Greek city-states easy prey for conquering armies, that made the Roman Empire subject to slave revolts and the inroads of the barbarians, and that more recently made the conquest of France a simple matter for the German military machine.

Contemporary American society is much too young in the historical sense, much too dynamic, and much too vulgar to be described as decadent ‡. There is, however, some tendency to preserve as formalities fragments from the old institutions that we inherited from Europe. The Easter service, Mother’s Day—the ritualization of old filial sentiments—debutante parties, socialite weddings, and elaborate

* For a discussion of the manner in which speech and dress parallel each other as symbols of status, see “Suggested parallels between speaking and clothing” (T. Pear, 1935).

† Thus it was probably not the Spanish conquistadors but their own incredible ritualism that destroyed the Aztecs of Mexico. By the time the Spanish arrived, the major energies of the Aztec population were being devoted to the worship of the Sun God and a significant number of the population were being killed as sacrificial offerings. See *Aztecs of Mexico* (G. C. Vaillant, 1941).

‡ But for a careful analysis of an entire system of formalized human relationships in America see *The etiquette of race relations in the South* (B. W. Doyle, 1937).

funerals are but a few of the more striking formalities of contemporary American life. Each of these forms has its old institutional background, but it has lost its institutional significance.*

Self-interest of Participants.—The truly institutional situation operates toward the furtherance of group and long-run ends. But when an institutional pattern becomes no more than formal, it then serves only individual and short-run interests. Thus, many of the people who go to church on Easter Sunday do so because they wish to be seen by and to see the "right" people, to display their new hats and suits, etc.† Many of the people who hold fashionable weddings do so because marriage can be made an occasion for the display of wealth, an opportunity to gain the attention of the socially important, or the like. Many of those asked to attend such a wedding, a formal dinner, a debutante party, or even an ostentatious funeral will have been invited for what they can contribute to the occasion. Many of them will attend only if they feel that to do so will be profitable in some way for them individually.

The Formal versus the Actual.—In the formal situation there is usually a distinction between what happens on the surface and what is occurring behind the scenes. The institutional form is in fact often merely a means of making the true purpose of the situation less obvious. Thus the formal dinner may be but a screen for the fact that the host is repaying unpleasant social debts, trying to ingratiate himself with his employer, or endeavoring to bring together men who should be brought together for some business or political purpose. The elaborate wedding may be but a polite way for the bride's mother to celebrate her successful disposal of daughter, to gloat publicly over the quality of the "catch," or to make a bid for acceptance into the "best" social circles.

Within the framework of the formal situation, almost anything can happen. Personal leadership is, therefore, a significant factor in such

* An interesting illustration of the use of old institutional rites as the basis for grievous exploitation is the "racket" that commercial interests have made of death. One might think that of all human events, death would be least likely to be used as means of securing large and excessive profits. But see J. C. Gebhart's article "Funerals" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 6, 527-529) and *Burial reform and funeral costs* (A. Wilson and H. Levy, 1938).

† Private attitudes often differ markedly from publicly expressed or implied attitudes. When a group of Methodists were asked to state their public views on baptism, 90 per cent held that sprinkling was the only proper way. But when asked for their private attitudes, only 16 per cent held out for sprinkling. Of a group of Baptists similarly queried, 67 per cent of the public attitudes favored immersion as the only proper form of baptism. This figure fell to 17 per cent when the private attitudes were tapped (R. L. Schanck, 1932).

interactions The formal situation may, in fact, best be described as a competition between a number of individuals for leadership under the camouflage of an institutional procedure The principal immediate difference between such situations and those which will be discussed in the succeeding chapter is that the former profess to be what they are not, whereas the latter are pretty much what they seem to be

CHAPTER XIX

PERSONAL LEADERSHIP SITUATIONS

In the more stable social systems at least, the most vital human needs are satisfied through institutional mechanisms. As we have indicated, these mechanisms subordinate the individual to the group and subordinate momentary considerations to long-run aims. Individual needs of an immediate character generally secure their satisfaction, therefore, in interactional situations of other than the institutional type. We may term such situations personal leadership situations, for the pattern of situational interaction is primarily a function of the particular personalities who compose the situation and is only secondarily a matter of institutional antecedents. Thus, although the individual needs from which such situations arise and through which they are organized are often incidental outcomes of institutional membership and are seldom in antagonism thereto, our approach to situations of this order must be the reverse of that which was utilized in the preceding chapter.

CONGENIAL SITUATIONS

Basis in Recreational Needs.—Those personal leadership situations that function largely in terms of the recreational needs of the members constitute a special type, which can best be described as congenial. All those groupings which occur within the larger social membership in terms of mutuality of special recreational interests belong to this type. Thus, although a church service of a generation or two ago was institutional, the small groupings that formed outside the church after the service were of a congenial order. The younger boys formed one interactive group, the young girls another, adolescent boys and girls still another, and the adults sorted themselves out into still other groups. Such subdivision of the larger membership was based upon mutuality of interests in activities that were primarily of recreational value.

The character of the interests of the members of such groupings was, of course, in some measure a reflection of institutional factors. The character of any neighborhood is a consequence of institutional patterns—family, economic, political, and religious. Thus the similarities of interests on which the congenial gatherings of the neigh-

borhood are based are somewhat institutional in origin. Furthermore, since the members of such situations have been trained into specific institutional practices, the fulfillment of their mutual recreational interests cannot take forms of behavior that are definitely anti-institutional. This limitation upon behavior in congenial situations is, however, indirect rather than direct. The institutionalized personalities of the members operate only to prevent certain modes of interaction from arising.

Function, an Automatic Check.—The interaction that does arise in congenial situations is primarily the result of individual leadership. This interaction is mainly verbal, and the function is, as we have pointed out, recreational. The neighborhood women sitting on the porch on a summer's evening, the farmers gathered around the stove at the country store on a wintry day, and the workers refreshing themselves at the corner pub on their way home form recreational groupings. Such groupings arise out of individual needs. Unless those needs are satisfied in the situation, the members will soon drift away.

This tendency of the individual members to drift away unless they find the situation valuable to them means that no single individual can long dominate a congenial situation. The member of any congenial situation who likes to talk but is given little chance to do so will soon seek more congenial companions. Some individuals, of course, are quite content to be submissive, for them a situation is congenial in which strong and persistent leadership is present. But in the main the leadership of congenial situations shifts in rather unpredictable fashion. More specifically, it shifts in accordance with the competitive strivings of the individuals composing it. Such strivings are, however, limited first by the fact that the rewards for success are small and secondly because too much success, *i e*, dominance, will disrupt the situation. The function of a congenial situation thus places an automatic check upon the leadership of it.

The "Bull Session."—The "bull sessions" common to any American campus furnish excellent illustrations of the congenial type of situation. Proximity and similarity of interests, together with lack of anything more pressing to do, will bring two or more students together to discuss the coming examination, next Saturday's football game, last night's dance, or whatever it is that they are mutually interested in. Such groupings are a modern version of the gatherings of the young people of a generation or more ago after church, when they talked over the things that then interested young people, while their mothers dwelt upon domestic affairs and their fathers discussed business, crops, or the state of the nation.

Modern Separation of Work and Play.—Under some conditions congenial situations have served a function in addition to that of satisfying recreational needs. The old-time husking bee and the various forms of mutual aid that were given at harvest time resulted in congenial situations from which there arose, by virtue of the effects of rivalry and of the division of labor, a very practical gain in work efficiency. Many communal work situations belong in this category and combine in a most effective way the presumably irreconcilable business and pleasure aspects of life. Under an older production system, even mowing a field or buying a pound of meat from the corner store was likely to have its sociable aspects.

One of the great disadvantages of modern productive techniques is that they force many workers to do their work in psychological isolation and make for a clear distinction between work and play. The old-time craftsman played and conversed as he worked, but the modern man at the machine has little time to engage in friendly intercourse with the man working next to him.* The imperative need for leisure time and leisure-time activities in the modern world is a direct consequence of the fact that modern industrial methods take much of the fun out of work. The commercialization of recreation which has come about in recent years can be traced to this fact and to the disappearance of the other congenial situations that formed so much and such a satisfying part of the life of the individual in the older order.

FUGITIVE PATTERNS

Rumor.—It is in the congenial more than in any other type of situation that there occur those processes that make for the rise of rumors and for the preservation of legends. A rumor is simply a story attached to some actual rather than fictitious person or to some actual rather than imaginary event (65). Rumors appear and spread as the consequence of the initiative of so many individuals that they are for all practical purposes unpredictable. They are, furthermore,

*The efficiency engineer is finally seeing the dangers associated with the psychological isolation that too often surrounds the modern workman. It has gradually become apparent that improvements in the physical surroundings of the worker do not necessarily result in increases in his output and that the quality of the relationships that exist between workman and employers is of paramount importance. Employees who are encouraged to report grievances, who feel that their efforts are appreciated, and who think that the plant officials are genuinely anxious to improve working conditions (even though the company's actions actually make the conditions physically poorer) are the best workers. For an interesting discussion of employee morale see *The human problems of an industrial civilization* (E. Mayo, 1933).

transitory and of momentary rather than long-run significance. We may therefore designate the rumor—as distinct from the many situations in which it develops and spreads—as a fugitive pattern.

Sociopsychologically, there is nothing in the processes involved in their rise and spread which justifies distinguishing true from invalid rumors. Although the term “rumor” is often used as a synonym for “scandal,” the latter is really but one aspect of rumor. Rumors may contribute to as well as detract from the reputation of the central character of the story. The scandalous are perhaps more characteristic, but complimentary rumors are commonplace. In terms of the effect upon the persons concerned in the story, it may matter greatly whether a rumor is true or untrue, complimentary or scandalous. But the process by which it spreads from person to person is the same whether the rumor is fact or fiction, laudatory or disparaging.

Drama and Authenticity in Rumor.—In spreading, the rumor tends to undergo certain characteristic changes, so that even those stories which originate in actual incidents become distorted. Like every good story, the rumor must acquire dramatic appeal, or it will soon pass out of circulation. As was indicated in another connection, the typical dramatic form, consisting of conflict between hero and villain, suspense regarding outcome, and the resolution of this conflict, seems to have universal human appeal. We cast most of our life experiences into this form, and we view the experiences of others in terms of this plot formula. Thus, whether it be an incident in which a man slips on a banana peel or one in which a baby chick pecks its way through its shell, a story becomes humanly interesting only as it is made dramatic. The chief difference between the raconteur and the club bore is not in the stories they tell but in the way in which they tell them. A good storyteller can dramatize the most trivial events, real or fictitious. Significant, therefore, is the fact that the rumor soon takes on attributes of the dramatic form.

There is another element that the rumor-story acquires in passage—an air of authenticity. However unreliable the original source, a rumor soon secures an “authentic” origin, which in some measure compensates for any lack of factual evidence. Thus the story that may have started as “I overheard someone say . . .” will in passage become attributed to some impeccable person who is believed to be in a position to know whatever there is to know about the people involved in the rumor.

The crystallization of the dramatic elements, including the addition of supplementary detail, and the acquisition of source authority are characteristic of all rumors. The factual basis for a rumor may be

no more than a suspicious action on the part of an unidentified person or a sound that might have been made by the explosion of a boiler; but should a story develop, it will soon be a neat little melodrama, tragedy, or comedy, with all the trappings of authenticity

Conversational Rivalry and the Spread of Rumor.—Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the rumor is the rapidity with which it may spread. Upon leaving Washington, a man may hear a rumor concerning an event said to have occurred there that day and upon arriving in San Francisco find that, although it has not supposedly appeared in the press, the story is common knowledge. Such phenomena have led some students to impute quasi-supernatural attributes to the rumor process.

But the fact is that rumors spread in a perfectly comprehensible way and gain their characteristic attributes through the mechanism of their spreading. This mechanism is the competition for conversational leadership among the members of congenial situations. In congenial situations, as has been said, conversation is the principal activity; and rivalry stimulates each individual to do his best, which means doing such things as introducing a topic that is of general interest to the members of the group, telling a better story than the one just told, or adding details to that story. Under such competitive bidding for conversational leadership, a rumor-story is likely to get "stepped up" in the retelling. The stepped-up story then becomes a part of the conversational stock in trade of the situational members, any one of whom may later use it in his bid for conversational leadership. When he tells the story, he, like the one from whom he heard it, is likely to sharpen it, adding some details of his own and, if the tale is doubted, using as a source the name of someone with local prestige. In retelling it, no two people will, however, step up the story in quite the same way, thus a rumor turns up in many forms and with great variation in detail and authority. In time those elements which have survived in crossings of the various versions may be synthesized, and the rumor may become highly stereotyped.

Conditions Making for Rumors.—In an intimate, settled community people know one another so well that a story concerning one of them will not be accepted and will not therefore spread as a rumor unless it is at least possible in view of the personality concerned. When the life of such a community follows its normal pattern, rumors concerning events will be comparatively accurate and comparatively few. There will be much gossip and endless discussion of people and things, but the intimate character of the relations between such people will preclude much rumor building.

The less people actually know, the more they will depend upon story inventions to satisfy their desires to know * A story of conduct, scandalous or otherwise, is therefore far more likely to be accepted at its face value when it is attached to the name of a comparative stranger in the community than when it is imputed to a man known to love his wife and to spend every night at home. Thus it is generally the person about whom little is known who is the one to become the hero of many rumors. These serve to fill in the gaps of public knowledge. The little known man must, of course, be interesting, and he must be a person known at least by name or by reputation to the members of a congenial situation. Otherwise a story about him will be of little value in the bid for leadership and, if told, will soon be forgotten.

A university or college campus provides an excellent laboratory for the study of rumor. In the larger institutions particularly, students know rather little about the private lives of faculty members. For information they must depend in the main upon unverifiable rumors. Since a story about some faculty man who is unknown by name to the students will have little conversational appeal among them, it is with faculty "personages" that most rumors are concerned. A rumor originating on the basis of an incident involving an uninteresting man may become attached to such a personage. The latter is likely, therefore, to become a local stereotype, reputed to lead more lives than ten ordinary men. The sort of story that will be imputed to him will depend upon general student opinion of his character. If they like him, they will believe only the best of him, that best being, of course, their own interpretation of what is desirable in a faculty hero. Should they dislike him, his name will become associated with a multitude of disparaging stories.

The rumor process is not, therefore, unrestricted. To succeed in gaining attention, the rumor-story must be believable and in addition must be in accord with the general opinion concerning the central figure. It is no doubt true that rumor is one of the most potentially tragic forces in social life. It can help to make a hero out of a cheap charlatan or can bring ruin to the honest and sincere †. Yet it is fairly safe to

* The remarkable extent to which the Russian people, when denied a free press, resorted to and became susceptible to rumors about national and international events is clearly brought out in "Stuffed laughter" (E Lyons, 1935). A somewhat similar dependence on rumor existed in 1934 among the earthquake sufferers of India (J Prasad, 1935).

† The setting off of rumors for the purpose of discrediting political opponents has frequently been resorted to, particularly in presidential campaigns (J T Adams, 1932). It is doubtful, however, whether this mode of propaganda has

judge from the character of the rumors told about a person, not what he is, but what his standing in the community is. We may all enjoy the scandalous story, but we will not believe scandal of those we hold in esteem.

Rumor as a Substitute for Knowledge.—As has been suggested, rumor is a substitute for knowledge and thrives in ignorance. Thus, in times of social crisis, when no one really knows what has happened, is happening, and is about to happen, the human desire to know makes any story concerning aspects of that crisis good conversation. At such times rumors generate, spread, and dissipate with astounding rapidity.

It has been said that an army lives on its stomach. It is equally true that an army lives on rumor. Under crisis conditions and with little actual knowledge of what is happening, soldiers on campaign figuratively live on rumor. During wartimes the conversation of soldiers is necessarily restricted to matters of current life. Their congenial groups are more a consequence of proximity than of actual commonness of interest and similarity of background. Mechanic, farmer, laborer, men from east, west, north, and south, educated and uneducated men—they will have in common the fact that they do not know where they will be the next day, what they will eat, or any of the things that under normal conditions can be taken for granted. Consequently, the man who knows a man who has heard the captain say . . . can always get a hearing. In fact, one of the principal recreational activities of the more ingenious soldier is to start a rumor and hear it grow and grow, until at last it loses all recognizable form. Indeed, under these crisis conditions, many a man may be duped by his own rumor, so dramatic, detailed, and authenticated can it become in passage.

Civilians, too, become dependent during wartimes upon rumor for their "knowledge" of the momentous events that are happening all around them. Even when the communications system does not break down, they soon become skeptical of the official news and eagerly listen to and pass on the latest rumor. This fact was cunningly made use of in World War II first by the Germans and later by the "democracies" in the so-called "war of nerves," during which every effort was made to undermine enemy morale.

any significant effect upon the outcome of an election. In the first place, the rumor process is entirely uncontrollable. A story intended to discredit an opponent often rebounds to his credit. In the second place, the type of rumor that concerns the personal life of a candidate and gets general circulation reflects his status among his constituents far more than it affects that status.

Legend.—A legend is a rumor that has become an established part of the verbal heritage of a people * As a story it may explain the existence of a vacant house, the reason for a specific social practice, or anything that has long-time interest Legends have leadership value in the presence of strangers to the community and of children to whom they have not yet been told Obviously, few of the rumors in circulation at any time will have sufficient survival value to become legends A story soon becomes tiresome, or events make it archaic

The constant turnover in the student population of a university or college, however, forces the individual to depend to a considerable degree upon local legends for his knowledge of even recent events This fact speeds up the legend-making process As each freshman class comes in, the rumors of last year gain new value The freshmen will listen to a story that is new to them but old to the rest of the students. Thus, because of the shifting population of a university, legends quickly develop around the personalities of the more outstanding students and members of the faculty Once established, a legend—even a complimentary one—may persist, regardless of public denial by the person with whom it is associated

Other Fugitive Patterns.—The competitive bid for leadership in congenial situations may take other than conversational forms To the individual who is striving for leadership, there is frequently a significant advantage in being distinctive This distinctiveness may consist of following the very latest fad or fashion It may involve use of a new slang word or catch phrase, knowledge of and interest in the latest game, ability to do the latest parlor trick—whether that be standing on one's head or talking glibly about the current best seller—or wearing clothes divergent in some way from those characteristic of the group Except that it frequently involves action of a nonverbal sort, the spread of a fad is traceable to much the same process of competition in congenial situations that makes for the spread of rumor Other rapid and more vital shifts from the conventional in human behavior, such as the boom or the craze, also are diffused mainly through congenial situations

When we consider such widespread deviations as those involved in fads, fashions, booms, crazes, etc., we shall therefore have occasion to refer to the congenial type of situation A fashion may originate in Hollywood, but if Mrs. Jones in Middletown takes it up, she does

* The terms "myth" and "legend" are often used synonymously But the true legend deals with mundane affairs, whereas the term "myth" should be reserved for stories or moralistic tales of the supernatural (R. Benedict, "Myth," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 11, 178-181)

so because it will give her prestige among her friends and acquaintances. If they in turn follow her lead, then reason for doing so is to bring them up to the level of Mrs. Jones and, perhaps more important, to give them prestige among those who have not yet adopted the new fashion.

ARRANGED CONGENIAL SITUATIONS

Recreational Clubs.—Americans have been called a nation of joiners, and the number of clubs and associations to be found in most American communities gives factual support to this taunt. Such joining is actually an effort to secure the satisfactions that were once to be had from membership in informal congenial groupings. The so-often-remarked fact that modern people have varied personalities makes it difficult for people of common interests, tastes, etc., to find one another without deliberate effort. No longer can a man expect to have much in common with his next-door neighbor, or a woman to find much satisfaction in talking with the women who live near by. As a consequence, those individuals who have most keenly felt the lack of congenial companions have established clubs of one sort or another. In a sense, therefore, we have by necessity come to cultivate that which once arose spontaneously. The character of the congenial situations that result from such efforts is suggested by the term "arranged."

The inadequacy of such efforts is attested by the high fatality rate of recreational clubs and associations. In most American communities, there are always a number of informal clubs in the process of organization, and a number of others in the process of disintegration because the members were not actually congenial or, if congenial, simply were unable to find a time and place convenient to assemble. Most clubs are therefore rather short-lived. In a changing world it could hardly be otherwise.

Some organizations, of course, have become so well established that the prestige value of belonging may offset the fact that the members are not particularly congenial. We have then what might be termed a "prestige club." In this case the satisfaction derived from belonging comes not so much from companionship with club members as from the prestige that membership in the club gives in the eyes of more congenial companions.

Games.—Some device or other is utilized in many arranged congenial situations to offset the fact that the members are not completely congenial. These devices operate to assure each member an opportunity to enjoy some form of leadership. The maintenance of a

large and wholly irrational number of officers, committee members, and other officials by the usual club organization is one such device. Games are another. In the game situation, athletic or otherwise, leadership shifts either in rotation or in accordance with competitive merit as determined by a set of arbitrary rules. In both cases there exists a mechanism that tends to prevent any one member from dominating indefinitely and therefore assures each member opportunity of assuming leadership.

Most closely related to the truly congenial are those situations in which games of a more passive order appear. A game of bridge is often little more than a substitute for conversation. People commonly fall back upon such games when conversation drags. In view of the great diversity among modern people, it is not remarkable that the members of many arranged congenial situations should find difficulty in keeping up a stimulating and interesting conversation. Their interests, fields of knowledge, and points of view are often so diverse that they must resort to some mechanized procedure for shifting leadership from member to member, or they will find themselves listening to a lecture on a topic interesting only to the speaker. When they have no more in common than the fact that they can play bridge or some other game, they may resort to this pastime as an acceptable substitute for monological conversation. Such games are stimulating in that they are competitive, in that they bring into play elements of skill, and in that they subordinate the other and possibly diverse personality traits of the members. In addition, they effectively limit the competition for leadership, which shifts in accordance with a fairly definite procedure—one that does not, however, eliminate the appearance of rivalry.

In contrast are such active games as baseball, basketball, etc. These games do not limit competitive leadership to an effective degree, but, rather, secure congeniality by specifying the role of each member, a role for which he must be prepared by training. Unless the members of a team are almost equally competent, one member may secure and retain leadership, thus subordinating and discouraging the others. When this happens, we have what is disapprovingly known as a "grandstander," a player who subordinates the welfare of the team to his own interests. Only when there is rotation of leadership can there be for long effective teamwork among the members of a game situation. The strife for leadership among team mates must be subordinated to the welfare of the team itself.

A game of this order actually involves two interlocking situations: the interaction of the members of each team and the interaction of the

teams Thus, competition takes two somewhat distinctive forms: first, each member of a team endeavors to outdo his team mates without stepping from his assigned role and thereby destroying the pattern of cooperative action; second, the team as a whole competes with the other team Thus, in addition to the satisfaction derived from acting as leader of his own team (whoever has the ball is for the moment leader) are the satisfactions derived from rivalry with the other team and from the possibility of being a member of the winning team

CONFERENCE AND COMMITTEE SITUATIONS

Formal Objectives of the Conference.—In apparent contrast to the situational subtypes so far discussed in this chapter are the conference situation and the committee situation—a variant of the conference and usually a consequence thereof (66) The members of such situations have come together for the professed purpose of solving a specific adjustment problem or of putting a plan into action They have in some manner been selected in terms of their fitness for the task and are supposed to achieve a synthesized leadership in which no one member has a predominant part

The conference technique is relied upon to a considerable degree in government, business, and scientific affairs. The department heads of a corporation confer concerning some matter of general policy, scientists gather for a conference on their field of study, student representatives have a conference on some matter of general campus interest Whatever the specific problem is and however the membership is selected, there is a presumed gain in efficiency through the process of synthesizing the inventive abilities of a number of individuals by the conference method.

There can be no doubt that at times two heads are better than one It is also highly probably that the sum of the knowledge of ten men is greater than the knowledge of any one of them But it does not follow, as certain conference-technique enthusiasts believe, that a policy of action that will be reached by ten men is certain to be more expedient than that designed by one Still valid to a degree is the old adage that "too many cooks spoil the broth" In many problems that demand initiative, ingenuity, and unity of purpose for their effective solution, some one individual will be best fitted to provide leadership A conference of those who include that one person might conceivably serve the function of giving him an opportunity to display his powers

Recreational and Politic Functions of the Conference.—In actual operation, however, the conference is often nothing but an arranged

congenial situation that is well disguised. Even the conference of scientists may be more recreational than scientific. Like most human beings, the scientist likes to talk, but the specialized nature of his knowledge and interests makes it difficult for him to find congenial friends with whom he can talk shop. Periodic conferences give scientists in a specific field an excuse to get together. The recreational function of most business conferences is even more evident. Because conference members talk much and accomplish little, it has been ironically said that conferences and committees keep minutes and waste hours.

Executives of the larger business organizations often hold conferences for the purpose of giving their subordinates an opportunity to get acquainted and to develop a sense of unity of purpose. The conference is in addition an effective safety valve, since it permits disgruntled subordinates to air their grievances and in so doing to indicate to the executive how far and in what directions he can assert himself without losing the good will of those upon whom he is dependent.

When there is a real problem to be solved, the Machiavellian leader—business, political, or otherwise—utilizes the conference as a means of making his subordinates believe themselves responsible for the solution at which he has already arrived. To this end, he may outline the problem that is before the conference or committee and then sit back to listen to the random suggestions offered, until some member makes one that fits or can be twisted to fit his own plan. He then asks all the members to consider Mr. So-and-so's suggestion. In the discussion that follows, someone else may make a contribution to that suggestion. By the process of selecting those acceptable elements that arise through the give and take among the members, he may be able to dictate his personal solution to the problem, at the same time making each member feel in some measure responsible for that solution. Thus hearty cooperation will be secured, although with some sacrifice of the time and patience of the actual leader.*

EXCHANGE SITUATIONS

In the more commonplace congenial situations the members have come together because of similar interests and similar needs.

* From the sociopsychological point of view the convention is but a sort of three-ring-circus conference, whether it be a political convention in which a party platform and candidates are decided upon, a business convention upon which the good of the industry depends, or a Legion or Shriners convention at which little pretense is made of deciding anything.

Although the interests may be anything from babies to political platforms, these situations function mainly to satisfy a need for recreational activities. This need is satisfied, as we have seen, principally through the relatively rapid shifting of leadership from member to member.

In contrast to congenial situations are those personal leadership situations that arise out of similarity of interests but divergency of needs. The merchant and his customer are interested in a common commodity, but the one wants to sell, the other to buy. Their interaction is directed toward the making of an exchange, in which a thing of one order, money, is given for one of another, the commodity. Although we commonly speak of conversation as an exchange, it is more accurately styled an interchange, the things exchanged—words, ideas, attention—are of a similar order. The distinction between those personal leadership situations in which the needs are similar and in which an interchange takes place and those in which the needs of the members differ and in which an exchange occurs can best be seen when viewed in terms of leadership processes.

The Sales Situation.—As we have seen, the function of congenial situations places a mechanical check upon the tendency of one person to dominate the others, no one person can be leader for long. In situations that grow out of similar interests but divergent needs, on the other hand, it is often entirely normal for the members to accept passively the leadership of one person. This is most apparent in the typical buyer-seller relationship in American contemporary society. We today do not consider it quite proper for the customer to haggle with a merchant. The former must take the role of subordinate and listen patiently to the most asinine of sales arguments,* even when the salesman has sought him out. It is conventionally permissible to say "No," but to express doubt concerning the quality of the goods or to attempt to beat down the price at which a commodity is offered is generally considered bad manners. Only the uncouth or the eccentric will struggle against the leadership of the seller, who, in his bid for dominance over the buyer, is restrained less by convention than by law. This characteristic of the buyer-seller relationship is a reflection of the nature of our present economic system.

* For books on the psychology of salesmanship see *Applied Psychology* (R. W. Husband, 1932), *An introduction to applied psychology* (C. R. Griffith, 1934), *Psychology in business and industry* (J. G. Jenkins, 1935), *Psychology of advertising* (H. E. Burt, 1938), *Psychological aspects of business* (E. K. Strong, Jr., 1938), and *Psychology applied* (G. W. Crane, 1940).

Barter.—Such seller domination has not, however, existed at all times and in all places. In precapitalistic societies exchange of goods and services was effected through the medium of barter. The barter situation is one in which a buyer and seller compete on fairly equal terms for leadership; and, since their skills are comparable, they come at length to something of a compromise. Under such conditions the phrase "Let the buyer beware" signified that he should look out for his own interests. A housewife and a merchant who haggled over the price of a piece of meat were struggling for leadership each over the other.

Under present circumstances, however, the typical buyer-seller situation is one in which conventional factors give leadership preference to the seller and reduce the buyer to passive resistance. To typify that situation, we might say that it is one in which the operating principle is "Let the buyer get caught." We have only to observe that, although many books have been written and courses offered on the art of salesmanship, the art of sales-resistance* has received relatively little attention, whereas that of getting the best of the seller—"buyermanship," it might be called—has received none at all. Consumer education has been at a minimum, seller education has received considerable and energetic attention.

The Clerk.—Contemporary buyer-seller situations may be roughly classified as those in which seller leadership is impersonal (advertising) and those in which it is personal. The situation is of the former order when the buyer goes to a store or shop prepared by advertising to purchase a specific article. In this instance the role of the seller may be no more than that of providing service—that of a clerk †. According to present standards, however, a good store clerk is one who can

* In a business-controlled society it is inevitable that any effort to enlighten consumers will be strongly resisted. But, in recent years, there has developed a considerable literature directed toward consumer education. In the main it takes the form of an endeavor to build up consumer sales resistance, not in the effort to get the best of the seller, but simply to protect the buyer's economic and physical welfare. Following the publication of *Your money's worth* (S. Chase and F. J. Schlink, 1927), there were organized two agencies for the collection and dissemination of information on "best buys." *Consumers' Research* and *Consumers Union* now appear to be well established. The rise of the consumer movement is also expressed in the growing number of books on consumer problems. *One hundred million guinea pigs* (A. Kallet and F. J. Schlink, 1932), *Skin deep* (M. C. Phillips, 1934); *Partners in plunder* (J. B. Matthews and R. E. Shallcross, 1935), and *Good health and bad medicine* (H. Aaron, 1940). See also "The repair man will gyp you if you don't watch out" (R. W. Ruis, 1941).

† The distinction between the role of the salesman and that of the store clerk is elaborated in "Salesmanship" (L. Galloway, *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 519-521).

sell the customer either more than he has come to purchase or possibly a substitute for the article he seeks. When the buyer has been inadequately prepared by advertising, as is the case when he comes to the seller wanting a suit but having no specific suit in mind, the role of the clerk or salesman as a leader is of course self-evident. In the next chapter we shall see how advertising is an attempt so to dominate the buyer that he becomes resistant to the persuasions of the clerk who would sell other than the advertised article.

The Peddler.—The seller who seeks out a buyer is in a less favorable position than is the store clerk. The peddler, whether he be a seller of books, insurance, or household gadgets, must secure and maintain active domination to be successful. Since the situation originates in his own interests rather than in mutuality of interests, he must convince his prospect that what he offers is desirable. In attempting to do this he may lack the support of convention or of advertising. He must therefore first create the need for his sales leadership and then proceed to provide that leadership. His position is consequently a difficult one, for success depends upon skillful appeal to interests of the customer—such as that of seeing worthy young men go through college—which are extraneous to the thing he would sell. The ultimate in sales leadership is, of course, to sell something intrinsically worthless to a person who would have no use for the article if it had the virtues claimed for it and to obtain in return a sum far greater than the purchaser could afford to pay if the article were useful and if he had a need for it.

AUDIENCE SITUATIONS

The term “audience” is commonly applied to a great variety of situations.* We shall restrict its use to those situations in which the person of the leader is designated and is to a high degree unshifting. The audience situation is in some respects, therefore, not unlike the modern type of sales situation. In the audience, however, the article “sold” is ordinarily intangible, and the buyers far outnumber the sellers.

Some audience situations are highly institutionalized and would be so classified were it not for the fact that the character of the leadership is not rigidly controlled by custom. When a minister turns from institutional ritual, which is designated for him, to his sermon, in the construction of which he may within limits use his own initiative, the members of his congregation become members of an audience.

* For an extensive but largely theoretical treatment of the audience see *The psychology of the audience* (H. L. Hollingworth, 1935).

He now becomes a true leader. The members of his audience are, however, so well prepared to accept his leadership that little effort is required to dominate them. Among other things, they have come to church prepared to hear a sermon and trained to accept the leadership of the minister in this situation. Under such conditions, maintaining leadership is comparatively simple. The leader need not be particularly ingenious, forceful, or fluent, and his dramatic techniques can be stereotyped, for his audience is easily satisfied.

Theater Audiences.—In some contrast to such relatively institutionalized audiences are those of the contemporary theater. Modern theatergoers are “sophisticated”—they have heard and seen almost everything—or so they are inclined to think. The Chinese may be content to see an ancient drama unfold in accordance with an age-old pattern, the backwoodsmen may be satisfied with an antiquated melodrama, but the members of a modern theater audience have come as buyers who must be sold satisfaction. Since they have paid for the privilege, they are highly critical. The leadership of a theater audience is, therefore, relatively difficult.

The play, revue, motion picture, or musical program must not offend the sensibilities of any considerable number of the audience members. It must operate within the limits of a relatively conventional pattern, yet it must be made to seem new and different. How much trial and error—and what a large proportion of error—is involved in the formation of such leadership is indicated by the uncertainties of the legitimate play and by the conservatism of the motion-picture world. In the effort to achieve something new, playwrights, actors, and producers often produce unsuccessful plays. In the effort to avoid such failures, motion-picture producers, actors, and script writers often deviate so little from the last box-office success that a new picture is quite obviously but an old one in new clothes.

Although there may be some fairly universal dramatic principles, it does not follow that there is a single and universal method of theater-audience leadership. The dramatic theme must be one that is appropriate to the specific audience, and the appropriate theme must be communicated through symbols to which the members of the particular audience can respond in the appropriate way. Thus, what will be enthusiastically received on Broadway may be a failure in Middletown.* It is also true that a play that is successful with an

* Producers of motion pictures have long known that their products cannot appeal equally well to all elements of the population. Some pictures have, therefore, been issued with two types of endings—a good or unrealistic one for the middle west and a bad or realistic one for the coasts. The sophisticated coast dwellers

audience at one time may be quite inappropriate, in terms of either theme or symbols or both, for the same audience at another time. This is particularly true of the timely theme. Some plays, however, do seem to have a remarkable degree of universality, and of course all plays—modern, ancient Greek, or the stylized classical plays of the Chinese—are built upon common dramatic elements.*

Some of the other aspects of theater-audience leadership need only brief mention. Fully as important as the play and its symbolization is the skill of the players. A good cast can satisfy an audience with a bad play, whereas a poor cast may ruin what might otherwise be a good play. Also important is the physical setting, perhaps more so in the theater than in any other audience situation. Finally, extraneous factors, such as the weather, the condition of local and national affairs, and the physical condition of the audience (coughing and sniffing may distract members of the audience), all play their parts in determining the effectiveness of audience leadership.†

Audience satisfaction would seem to come from vicarious participation in the action of a story. This is ordinarily secured by what can best be described as audience identification with the person of hero or heroine. The primary task of theater-audience leadership is thus to provide for the members of the audience some person or persons with whom they can identify themselves not only for the moment but throughout the performance.

Lecture Audiences.—The lecture-audience situation is a more strictly limited one than is that of the theater. It may be of the order of the church sermon already referred to, or it may be far less institutionalized. But it is normally one in which a number of people have come together for the purpose of listening to a designated person speak upon some announced subject. The members of a lecture audience tend, therefore, to be selected and thus prepared to submit to leadership of a specific type. There is, however, a vast difference between a lecture audience that is composed of individuals who have paid their money to hear a popular speaker on some such subject as "Mankind at the Crossroads", an audience that has assembled to hear what a political candidate has to say for himself, and an audience

and the seaboard immigrants have been trained to accept less sugar-coated and more realistic action.

* For a description and analysis of the dramatic techniques that have been used historically, see *The theater, three thousand years of drama, acting and stagecraft* (S. Cheney, 1929).

† See "External conditioning factors in public behavior" (J. W. Armstrong and T. D. Elliot, 1927).

that comprises a class in the history of philosophy. In all three, the person of the leader is at the outset designated, and the leadership range is limited to the extent that the announced topic, the conditions of admission, etc., have led to a selection of the audience members. In all other regards, however, the three subtypes of the lecture audience, as illustrated above, are quite dissimilar.

The Popular-lecture Audience.—The popular lecturer who speaks on some topic of general interest is supposed to offer something of cultural or educational value to the audience. This formal purpose of the meeting is, however, unlikely to tell the whole story, for the lecturer who wants a return engagement must do far more toward entertaining than informing his audience. His skill as a dramatist is of at least equal importance with his ability as an interpreter of social forces, a political analyst, or a philosopher.

The Conversion Audience.—In some contrast to the popular-lecture audience is that which has assembled to hear a would-be political, economic, or social reformer expound the virtues of his special doctrines or his personal worth. The leader of such an audience must convert as well as entertain; and unless the audience has been packed with members who already accept his leadership, a stratagem that is frequently used for purposes of outside publicity, his leadership over it must be forcibly maintained. The ultimate aim of the leader of situations of this sort is so to convert the audience members that they themselves become conversion leaders in subsequent situations. If the audience leader has "sold" them his point of view, the members of that audience may later sell it in turn to their friends. This, the so-called word-of-mouth advertising, is the goal of every conversion-audience leader and, as we shall see, of every propagandist. If his audience is willing to believe, the political aspirant need, of course, only avoid saying or doing anything that will antagonize it. A few jokes, a few harmless platitudes, some not-too-obvious compliments, and an air of warm friendship (or in some instances of impeccable dignity and authoritativeness) will then be adequate. But if he or / what he stands for is unpopular, he must resort to demagogic tricks to be effective; argument will be of little avail. If he is a candidate up for reelection, he must present his audience with a cosmic drama in which he is the heroine, representing all that the audience considers desirable, and his opponent is the villain, representing all that the audience fears or considers repugnant, and in which the audience itself is the noble hero whose actions will save the heroine from the villain and itself from disaster. If he is a candidate campaigning for election or some other mode of new support, he must assume the role of savior,

casting himself into the role of hero and his audience into that of heroine *

The Educational Audience—Distinct from both the foregoing is that lecture-audience situation which is typical of the classroom. Here membership is to a considerable extent forced—attendance is necessary for the attainment of some distant goal. The person of the lecturer in this situation is not determined by the audience members, and in many cases he need not be entertaining or even interesting. Not perhaps without reason it has long been assumed that the acquisition of knowledge is at best a laborious process. With much less justification it has been also assumed that the average college or university student is sufficiently motivated to make the effort to acquire the knowledge to which he is exposed. Because these assumptions have long been basic to our educational program, there is a tendency to associate effective pedagogy with pedantism. As a consequence, classroom leadership is often little more than nominal. The bird chirping on the ledge outside the classroom window may have more effect upon the audience than does the lecturer.

The classroom lecturer generally secures his position on the basis of qualifications that have little to do with his ability to dominate student audiences. His status as a scholar is usually deemed more important than his skill at expressing what he knows or believes in a convincing and stimulating manner. For those students who have a sincere interest in a subject, accuracy of viewpoint and of presentation is of primary importance; but for other students, establishment of interest is the first pedagogical problem †. Thus far, however, con-

* Whatever its historic antecedents, the modern trial by jury has degenerated into a sort of competition between two conversion-audience leaders. The jury is the audience, and the law and the judge provide the restraints within which action takes place, but the outcome is often more likely to reflect the respective dramatizing abilities of the prosecuting and the defending attorneys than to reflect the weight of factual evidence.

† The importance of the lecturer as a stimulator of student interest is demonstrable. Some years ago it was reported that the best school grades tend to be received by those in the front center of each classroom (C. R. Griffith, 1921), and, if given a choice of seats, students prefer this particular classroom area (P. R. Farnsworth, 1933). Although not all the later studies agree as to what is the region of best grades (F. N. Jones and J. B. Cooper, 1938), sufficient evidence has been gathered to indicate that most classrooms have regions where consistently higher than average grades obtain (M. M. Magoon, 1932, and S. W. Calhoun, 1934). Teachers' observations (M. M. Magoon, 1932), students' reports, and data on abnormally arranged classrooms (P. R. Farnsworth, 1933) show that the optimum position in a classroom tends to be that area toward which the lecturer most often devotes his attentions.

vention has prevented any concerted facing of this fact; and many professional educators are inclined to think of teaching in terms of stereotyped teaching methods rather than in terms of audience leadership. The familiar pedagogical excuse for ineffectiveness—that education is an appeal, not to the emotions, as are the propagandistic efforts of the forceful publicist, but to reason—runs hard against the fact that man is rarely a “rational” animal, whether he be a student in the classroom or a voter at a political rally.

Audience Size and the Hypothetical Listener.—The members of an audience are individual human beings, and up to a point each member reacts to the audience leader according to his particular personality. To the extent that the personalities of the members of the audience vary, the responses that the leader secures will be varied. It is his object, therefore, so to conduct himself that he will amuse, please, convert, or inform as many as possible of his audience members.

In any audience situation the leader—actor or lecturer—addresses a hypothetical listener. This member of the audience is not the average member; *i e.*, his personality is not the average of the personality attributes of all the audience members. The average responsiveness of an audience may remain constant as its number increases, for example, the addition of a person who is incapable of understanding the words to which the average member responds will be offset by the addition of another who can understand more complex words than can the average. But what the leader endeavors to provide is an appeal that will be effective for all the members, not for a nonexistent average member. As audience members increase, the words, gestures, themes, ideas, etc., that will be effective with all, or nearly all of them, become fewer and simpler. Thus, the hypothetical listener toward whom the audience leader directs his efforts becomes, in effect, duller, more stupid, more prejudiced, and less reasonable as the audience increases in size.

With all other factors remaining constant, change in audience size may therefore completely change the problem of audience leadership. The leadership technique that is effective for an audience of ten will not often work when the audience is increased to one hundred; lecturing satisfactorily to an informal group of ten clubwomen is a quite different problem from lecturing effectively to one hundred of the same type of clubwomen. The lecture or speech that will hold the attention of a large audience may seem quite stupid to a small one; the play that is successful in the little theater may be a failure in a large house on Broadway merely because the audience is larger.

Every professional lecturer must speak in terms of a hypothetical listener, and almost the only things that he can be confident will have a positive appeal to the hypothetical listener in an audience of five hundred people are "mother love" and similar stereotypes. Thus, because his hypothetical listener becomes intellectually dwarfed as the audience increases in size, the politician who speaks intelligently and conservatively to a small group may become a blatant demagogue when he faces a large auditorium.

Interaction of Leader and Audience.—If he is to be effective, the audience leader must adjust himself to the audience in the effort to get it to adjust to him. The fact that a play or lecture may be written and practiced before the audience situation arises does not remove the audience from the category of an interactional situation. Some interaction always takes place between even the relatively passive audience and its leader. To be successful in actually acting out the play or in delivering the speech, the performer must adjust himself to the behavior of the particular audience.* Popular lecturers commonly avoid in part the difficulties of predicting audience reaction by having no set speech. They can then be more responsive to the behavior of the audience.

Possibly the most vital single requisite for effective audience leadership is the ability to perceive audience "mood" or "temper." A skilled audience leader is remarkably responsive, not only to the character of the specific audience, but to the dynamic mood changes of that audience. In the theater, applause is a conventional method by which the audience communicates with the players. From the frequency, duration, and intensity of applause an actor may judge the reaction of his audience and so vary his performance. In the course of their travels, the troupers of a generation ago acquired an uncanny skill at reading the "mind" of an audience. Elements other than applause—such as coughing, whispering, rustling of programs, etc.—undoubtedly entered into this communication between audience and players. Since the actor can see little beyond the foot-

* The function of the motion-picture preview is, of course, to obtain advance information concerning the behavior of subsequent audiences. The action must be so timed that nothing of importance will occur during bursts of applause or laughter. Although stage actors can vary their behavior to fit each audience, motion-picture actors must time their behavior once for all. From data reported in *A statistical study of crowd laughter* (F. E. Lange, 1923), it would appear that the duration and periods of applause and laughter are remarkably constant. A later study, however, found the periods much less constant but discovered that "the number of laughs per performance correlated plus .90 with the number of people attending" (J. Morrison, 1940).

lights, he is dependent upon sound for his knowledge of audience reaction. The lecturer, however, can ordinarily see as well as hear the members of his audience. However subtle, the process of audience-leader-audience communication is undoubtedly a matter of leader response to the gestures and sounds made by members of the audience. Unquestionably, too, the actor or lecturer who follows a predetermined course and is not responsive to these communications will tend to be less effective than the one who is guided by the audience he leads.

Audience Interstimulation.—Aside from shifts in body position and changes in facial expression, the typical audience is normally passive; most of the time the members react covertly rather than overtly. Under normal conditions, therefore, there is little interaction among the members of an audience, the interaction is mainly between the audience and the person on the platform or the people on the stage. An unusually loud handclap, however, may shift attention from the stage to a member of the audience. For the moment, that member is leader of the situation. Should others take up his applause, the audience members will be interacting with one another; and a process of interactional amplification will occur. This process is the basis for the practice of planting paid handclappers in an audience to stimulate enthusiasm for a doubtful play and to start applause at the proper moments.* The effectiveness of this process of interactional amplification will be apparent when we come to analyze behavior in abnormal situations.

Audience leaders frequently depend to a large extent upon audience interstimulation for their leadership effects. If they can get the audience to laugh at one statement and to applaud another, they may effect a complete reversal of audience mood. It is in the attempt to make an audience less critical and more receptive that speakers commonly start their speeches with a joke and follow this up with some reference to God and country or to the glorious future of the local community. If the members laugh at the first and applaud the second, the speaker has not only caught their interest but has prepared them to interact more readily with one another in the future.

In the old-time melodrama, music-hall, and vaudeville days it was customary for the audience to take a considerably active part. The villain was hissed; the hero was warned of impending danger, the singer was often accompanied by the audience, and the profes-

* Even the great Caruso almost invariably had hireling handclappers scattered throughout his audiences. They not only started the applause at the times Caruso thought most appropriate but aborted applause that broke out at inappropriate times.

sionally amateur comedian was bombarded with whatever the members of the audience had brought along for the occasion. Their actions contributed to the leadership on the stage and affected other audience members. Audience participation in leadership probably made up in considerable measure for the crudities or inadequacy of the play or skit.

To the extent that members of an audience stimulate one another, the situation moves away from that of the audience type. As long as the predetermined leader can guide audience action, the situation is essentially that of the audience type. Should the audience get out of control—*i.e.*, should some member or members secure leadership more tenacious than that of the actor or lecturer—it becomes a mob.

Density.—From the foregoing it can be seen that audience behavior involves another and hitherto unmentioned factor—density. It is a common observation on the part of audience leaders, both actors and lecturers, that a sparsely filled auditorium makes a “cold” house. All else being equal, a small theater in which every seat is filled ensures a much more responsive audience than does a large one in which the same number of people are scattered about. That the members of the former may be physically uncomfortable does not detract from the fact that they will be more responsive. Evangelists have learned the trick of condensing a sparse audience. If the tent or tabernacle is too large for the audience, the evangelist starts with the plea “Come down front where we can get acquainted, Brothers and Sisters.”

The denser an audience, the more responsive it is and therefore the more easily it is swung toward the mob. Although this fact has been variously explained, the reason for it would seem to be that audience action is a matter of interaction among audience members, the denser the audience, the more its members can interact with one another on the basis of short-range stimuli. At the outset, interaction of audience members involves the substitution of some audience member or members for the appointed audience leader. Some individual must start the applause, laughter, or whatever it is that sweeps the audience. He will be one who is more responsive than are his fellows to the stage or platform leadership. His audible reaction stimulates others, whose responses in turn stimulate still others.

The fact that a man in a sparse audience can be singled out and made conspicuous is an inhibiting factor to his making an overt response to the lecturer or actor. He is therefore less likely to rise to leadership than he would be were he closely surrounded by other

people And even though he should forget himself and applaud, others, also easily made conspicuous in a sparse audience, are not so likely to follow his lead as they otherwise would be Moreover, many interactions of audience members are built up in the first instance on the basis of stimuli that can be effective only at short distances The slight gasp, the chuckle, or the nod of approval that might stimulate a person in the next seat and thence another, and so on through the audience, cannot be effective if no one is sitting in that seat

CHAPTER XX

DISTANT LEADERSHIP SITUATIONS

In a primitive society almost all interactional situations fall into one or another of the types and subtypes discussed in the preceding two chapters. Primitive people are by definition preliterate and are therefore dependent upon gesture and speech for person-to-person communication. The collective behavior of the primitive occurs in situations of direct contact.

Among any literate people, however, and especially in the modern world, the individual often interacts with people at a distance through the medium of the written word, the picture, the telegraph, the telephone, the radio, and the motion picture. The role of such communications in providing symbolic models and thereby contributing to the personality development of the individual has already been discussed at length. We turn now to a consideration of the ways in which two or more human beings may interact on the basis of these distant-contact communications. The situations in which such interactions occur are termed distant leadership situations in view of the fact that the leader of the situation is spatially removed from the members, who react not to his person but to some specific and limited aspect of his behavior, *e g*, his voice or his writing.

The Nature of Publics—The term “public” is commonly used to distinguish the membership of a distant-contact situation from that of a direct-contact situation. Thus the radio comedian is said to have his public, whereas the stage comedian is said to address an audience. This terminological distinction reflects the fact that there are a number of significant differences between distant-contact and direct-contact situations.

In the first place, the membership of a public is ordinarily very much larger than is that of any of the direct-contact situations. The latter are usually composed of a few people, and even the very largest—such as spectacles, prize fights, baseball games, and football games—seldom involve more than a hundred thousand. The smaller publics, on the other hand, include thousands of people, and the larger ones involve millions. This difference in relative size means that the

leaders of publics are much more restricted than are those of direct-contact situations, in the same way as, but to a greater degree than, the leader of a large audience is more restricted than is the leader of a small one

Moreover, the exact size and character of a public is always indeterminate. It is possible to count the members of a congenial group, the members of an audience, etc. But radio advertisers, newspaper editors, politicians, and other leaders of publics can only guess at the numbers and kinds of people who are responding to their leadership.*

Furthermore, the reactions of the members of a public to the leader of it are also indeterminate. When we tell a joke to a group of friends, their responses are immediate and evident; and we can be guided by them. The response of a radio comedian's public to his jokes may be immediate, but they are not evident to him, and the response of an author's public is neither immediate nor evident.† As a result, radio comedian and author, like all leaders of publics, must proceed from point to point on the basis of past experience in the hope that their efforts are achieving the desired results. Because the membership of a public is large but of indeterminate size and character and its

* It is known that between 27 and 28 million American families possess radios. But at what times they use their sets, what stations they dial, and how many in each family listen in cannot be ascertained with any degree of accuracy.

In studying the panic effects that followed the broadcasting of Orson Welles's *The invasion from Mars*, several polling services who were asked to cooperate with the Office of Radio Research disagreed violently, their estimates of the number of listeners to this broadcast ranging from 4 to 12 million. A compromise figure of 6 million was finally agreed upon as "conservative" (H. Cantril, H. Gaudet, and H. Herzog, 1940).

For a discussion of the current methods of measuring the radio public, see "Radio listening and socio-economic status" (K. H. Baker, 1937), *How radio measures its audience* (F. Stanton, 1940); "The use of mail questionnaires to ascertain the relative popularity of network stations in family listening surveys" (P. F. Lazarsfeld, 1940c), *How radio measures its audience four discussions by research authorities* (C. B. S., 1941a), and *Roper counts customers a study of consumer response to 40 CBS sponsored programs* (C. B. S., 1941b).

† The radio comedian can judge the success of today's jokes only by tomorrow's fan mail and next week's Crossley rating of his program, the author can judge the effect of what he writes today only by his royalty statement six months or a year hence, and the politician often has to wait until he is up for reelection before he can gauge the total effect of the many things he has done and said during his term in office upon the varied people who form his constituency. Because of the time lag and of the multiplicity of factors other than the leader's behavior that may enter into the determining of the behavior of publics, the leader of a public may easily wander far afield. For a description and discussion of public-opinion polls as an attempt to circumvent this difficulty, see Appendix note 67.

responses to leadership are indeterminate and may be delayed, the leadership of publics is always more difficult and is usually more ineffective than is that of direct-contact situations

Finally, little if any interaction occurs among the members of a public. Each member reacts to the leadership, and he may be affected by his awareness that he is a member of a public which supposedly has a common purpose. But his reaction is not affected by and does not affect the behavior of the other members. Laughter and applause cannot, therefore, "sweep" the public. The members of a public may subsequently interact with one another on the basis of public leadership, but they will then do so as members of various direct-contact situations—as is the case, for example, when people discuss a radio program or a newspaper editorial. The leadership of a public is not, therefore, facilitated—as it usually is in congenial and audience situations—by member interstimulation.

Multiplicity of Publics.—Political writers frequently describe entire populations as "publics," *e g*, the American public, and some have gone so far as to attempt to describe the "public mind." In point of fact, however, publics are many and transitory. All the people who read a newspaper item, a magazine article, or a book, constitute for the writer thereof his public. All the members of such a public do not, however, react at the same time. People come into and go out of such a public throughout the life of the printed communication—a day or so for the newspaper item, perhaps many years for the book. During the course of a single day, a given individual may enter and leave hundreds of different publics as he reads the editorial page of his morning paper, a man is briefly responding to the leadership of the editor, but he promptly passes on to the sports page, the comic section, the world news, etc., sampling the leadership offerings of the many writers who have contributed to the making of the newspaper. And the newspaper is, of course, but one of the many mediums through which he joins publics. He listens to the radio from time to time; he reads books, magazines, etc.

At any given moment the members of a society will be organized into countless situations of which only a small proportion will be distant-contact in character. Of the latter, there will at that moment be countless specific, however temporary, publics. It has sometimes been estimated that as many as a third of the American people have simultaneously listened to a radio broadcast of great national importance. But such vast aggregations of people under a single leadership are rare and, of course, exceedingly temporary. In the main, even governmental leadership must operate through a vast number of

varied specific situations. The American public may be a suggestive figure of speech. It is not, however, a sociopsychological reality.

The Functions of Publics.—The appearance of publics is historically related to the development of distant-contact means of communication. Every new invention in the field of communications—radio, for example—has either modified other forms of public interaction or has made possible the growth of new types of publics. Functionally, publics seem to serve as supplements to or substitutes for the types of interactional situations discussed in the two preceding chapters; they exhibit in modified character the attributes of these two types. Thus a radio public differs in degree rather than in kind from that direct-contact audience which is its prototype. We shall here examine these differences in degree mainly in terms of the differences in leadership.

MONARCHIAL LEADERSHIP

As agencies of social control, government and religion are still to a slight degree institutional. At times the relation of king to subjects and the relation of priest to flock have been so thoroughly institutional that often a century or more has passed with little or no change in the pattern of their interactions. At such times the antecedents and the interactional processes involved in the distant-contact situations were so much like those of the direct-contact situations that it is unnecessary to describe these aspects of distant-contact institutional situations here. We usually speak of distant-contact leadership under these conditions as monarchial.

Monarchial leadership can, perhaps, be most clearly conceived of as distant and impersonal leadership over the personal leaders of certain face-to-face institutional situations. In the medieval church, the pope was the designated leader of his court; the court provided leadership of the priests, the priests in turn were the leaders of direct-contact situations of a religious order. For over one thousand years the emperors of China were the nominal leaders of their courts; the courts provided leadership for the governmental bureaus, the bureaus issued orders to governmental representatives in the various provinces, and these in turn directed the local magistrates in their direct relations with the emperor's subjects.

We frequently assume that, under the monarchial form of government and under the institutional religion of the Middle Ages, the king and pope decreed and their subjects obeyed. In the vast majority of instances nothing could be farther from the truth. The spheres of both government and religion were institutionally limited. The king and the pope were leaders only in the sense that the patriarch

of the old family was a leader in the institutional situations of the family. This limited character of monarchical leadership is revealed by the fact that historically expansion of both religious and governmental functions was slow and was secured only as other institutions disintegrated.

REGIMENTAL LEADERSHIP

Monarchical leadership is apparently too much restricted and too unenterprising to provide a people with guidance during any severe crisis, such as war. In any event, we find a somewhat different form of leadership appearing in military and naval organization, regardless of the character of the government of which these organizations are a part. In an army or navy, the personnel is more or less effectively trained to automatic obedience to the commands issued by superior officers, who are themselves trained to putting into effect programs of action dictated by their superiors. The entire organization is at least semi-institutional in that it operates on the basis of strong traditions and has something of its own sets of values, concepts of morality, etc. The virtue of this form of organization is that it permits one or a small number of individuals to work out a solution to a problem of collective adjustment and to put this solution into effect with considerable assurance that each individual in the organization will do his prescribed part. It places responsibility for individual initiative in designated and trained leaders and thus makes possible, in theory at least, effective adaptation to changing circumstances. Such leadership is regimental,* it secures its response on the basis of discipline.

In the modern world regimental leadership has been extended beyond the scope of military and naval activities. School children are often regimented, through fire drill, in an attempt to prevent the panic behavior that would otherwise appear should they be caught in a fire in a school building. Workers are sometimes disciplined into unflinching obedience to the commands of their immediate superiors so that the whole business organization will be highly responsive to the leadership of the executive office. Competition among business organizations makes dynamic leadership necessary for survival, and the modern business leader is in a position not unlike that of the commanding officer of a military force. He must maneuver his organization in anticipation of the economic strategy of his competi-

* The leadership of the Roman Church has at times tended toward the regimental rather than the monarchical. This was particularly true of certain of its orders, *e g*, the Jesuits.

tors. Wherever the individual efforts of large numbers of people must be coordinated in the solution of a collective problem, regimental leadership is indicated *

But every regimental system tends in time to become so ingrown and so rigid that the leaders as well as the "privates" come to lack initiative. They then attempt to solve new problems with old formulas. Military organizations are, with few exceptions, notoriously conservative. In World War I, for example, the French and British staffs relied upon military formations and stratagems that had developed around the bolt-action rifle and light artillery. Some two years, perhaps two million unnecessary casualties, and a revolution in the general staffs were necessary before an adaptation to the German machine-gun technique was made. That adaptation, trench or static warfare, became so much imbedded in the culture of the French and British armies that they relied upon it, more than twenty years later, in defense against German tanks and dive bombers, with consequences that have already become history. This tendency for regimental leadership to become unenterprising has appeared in some business organizations, notably the railroads. The American railroads delayed nearly twenty years before making any significant adaptation (streamline, fast freights, etc.) to the rise of truck and airplane competition.

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP

During periods of social change, when institutional forms of political and religious organization are breaking down, individuals rise to the status of leaders more as a consequence of their own efforts than as a result of inheritance or promotion. Social disorders, as we have frequently observed, provide an opportunity for the individual with ingenuity and a domineering personality to take leader status from the institutional personnel and to wield a leadership that is more than nominal. Thus it was the decline of the medieval church

*Lewin and his colleagues have for some years been studying the effects of different "social atmospheres"—of working under different sorts of leadership. In their experiments boys' clubs have been directed by leaders who were either regimental, democratic, or anachistic in their methods of supervision. It was found that boys of the well-regimented clubs were more "frustrated" than were those more democratically governed. Lewin's subjects were American children, reared in a democratic culture. If the experiments had been run on children accustomed to regimentation, the data might have been quite different. The acceptance of regimental leadership would presumably have been "second nature" to German children, so that much less frustration would have arisen (K. Lewin and R. Lippitt, 1938, K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. K. White, 1939, and R. Lippitt, 1939 and 1940).

that made possible the rise to religious leadership of such "upstarts" as Luther and Calvin. It was the disintegration of monarchical governments that made possible the emergence of popular or democratic leaders during the last two centuries. Likewise, it has been the failure of certain democratic governments that has made possible the rise of dictatorial leaders.

For the period following the breakdown of an institutional system and until a new institutional pattern is crystallized, leadership is of a quasi-institutional nature. This leadership secures its position and makes its appeal on the basis of the old institutional factors, but the person of the leader is determined to a great extent by competition, and his domination is limited almost solely by the threat of revolt against his person. Our efforts to establish a democratic form of government are essentially efforts to make quasi-institutional governmental leadership permanent and systematic. We have attempted to limit the forms of competition for leadership and to make revolt against undesired leadership a matter of balloting rather than bloodshed. In a very real sense, then, the democratic plan of government is one in which quasi-institutional distant leadership is made quickly responsive to the members of a "governmental public."

The democratic leader is dependent upon the periodically expressed willingness of the majority of those whom he leads to accept his leadership. It has been historically assumed that his leadership will of necessity follow the course that is most advantageous to the majority of his followers (68). Apparently unanticipated by the theorists was the fact that competition for leadership under these conditions frequently is based upon conventional appeals rather than on actual abilities in constructive leadership.

PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP AS LEADERSHIP TECHNIQUES

Experience has shown that, wherever the personnel of distant leadership is determined by some form or other and to some degree or other of the democratic process, a considerable part of leadership energies will be directed toward maintaining status against the competitive strivings of aspirants for the position. These efforts and the efforts of those who are struggling for recognition take the form of propaganda (69). Political parties, competing business interests, and minorities within such groups as unions, corporations, associations, etc., all resort to some extent to propaganda in the effort to secure or to retain leadership. Furthermore, those in a position of leadership frequently endeavor to stalemate the propaganda of aspirants for their position by what is termed censorship.

The Techniques of Propaganda.—The effort of anyone to convert people to the acceptance of his leadership or the attempt of anyone to “put across” the ideas and practices he represents is in a broad sense propaganda. The thing he represents may be a special political view, a new religious faith, the idea that one commercial product is more desirable than another, the notion that a specific painting, book, or play is worth seeing or reading, or the objectively verifiable but commonly disbelieved idea that patent medicines offer little of profit to any but the maker. When ideas are imparted through schoolroom channels, we term the process pedagogy. Pedagogical techniques may or may not be essentially those of propaganda, and, as in the latter, the ideas imparted may or may not be in accord with scientific belief.

The techniques of propaganda as used in distant leadership situations differ from the techniques of conversion-audience leadership only to the extent that the medium of communication is different. The newspaper, book, or radio public is larger than is the lecture audience, and the symbols used must be simpler (in accordance with the principle of the hypothetical listener). Since the members of a public are spatially separated, there is, at the outset, little possibility of member interaction. And the communication value of gestures is, of course, lost in distant-contact communications, the desired reaction must be secured by words, printed or spoken, supplemented only by graphic symbols.

One advantage that the distant-contact propagandist has over the conversion-audience leader is that his distance and the impersonal nature of his medium permit him to some extent to disguise any personal interest that he may have in the effects of his leadership. This factor of personal interest has frequently been made the basis for a theoretical distinction between propaganda and advertising. It has been argued that the advertiser, a commercial propagandist, always reveals his personal interest and that the members of his public therefore discount everything he says. This fact, the argument runs, makes his efforts quite unlike those of the political, religious, or social propagandist, who commonly disarms his public by pretending a personal disinterest. Dialectical hauseplitting of this sort can have little more than theoretical significance. Advertising may be a special form, but certainly the advertiser's implicit admission that he has a selfish interest in the effects of his efforts does not remove those efforts from the category of propaganda.* It is doubtful whether the average

* Pseudo economists have long claimed that the function fulfilled by commercial advertising is that of educating the buying public to the value of newly developed products. It is of course true that advertising is occasionally a means

man is any more sophisticated in regard to commercial advertisements than he is concerning any other minority-group pressure. He responds to them, if at all, quite indiscriminately.

As with any form of audience leadership, there are techniques of propaganda only in the sense that there are techniques of painting or of novel writing. Propaganda, like conversation, is an art, and, although certain general principles may be discerned (70), their application is largely a matter of individual ingenuity. It is as futile, therefore, to attempt a description of *the* successful propaganda methods as it would be to describe how Rembrandt got his effects and then to put these forth as the rules for good painting.*

His methods may defy complete analysis, but the principles which the propagandist employs are few and simple. He attempts to erect a supercosmic drama in which his person or the idea he represents becomes stereotyped as a kind of hero or, in some instances, as a heroine. The first step in this direction consists in providing his public, through newspaper and other distant-contact mediums, items that make his person fit one of the more or less conventional personality stereotypes†. It makes little difference whether his "person" is a political party, a society for the prevention or preservation of something or other, a business corporation, a package of cigarettes, an idea or philosophic system, or an actual human being. What he must do is to give himself or whatever his leadership stands for a personality,

of acquainting the public with some new technological development and thus of encouraging its application to man's living. But as any disinterested student must realize, the major part of advertising is competitive, *i.e.*, a struggle between industries for customers or a struggle between two or more producers or distributors of a similar commodity. Quite unlike the usual elaborate rationalizations is the following analysis by an advertising man *Our master's voice advertising* (J. Rorty, 1934). See also the article on advertising by L. S. Lyon (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 1, 469-475).

* To know how an effect is achieved does not necessarily assure ability to secure that effect. Some idea of the complexities of the art of propaganda can be gained from the following: *Crystallizing public opinion* (E. L. Bernays, 1934), "The poisoned springs of world news" (G. Seldes, 1934), "The technique of mob rule" (G. Boas, 1935), "The screen enters politics" (R. S. Ames, 1935), "Huey Long and his background" (H. Basso, 1935), and *The politician* (J. H. Wallis, 1935). But by far the best study of the art of demagogic leadership is *Mein Kampf* (A. Hitler, 1925).

† For an excellent summary of the history and development of the technique of directing the formation of stereotypes, see "Publicity" by E. Gruening (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 698-701). Both of the following books on the subject are written by recognized masters in the art of personalizing corporations and of giving good names to men who need and can pay for them: *Ballyhoo: the voice of the press* (S. Bent, 1927) and *Propaganda* (E. L. Bernays, 1928).

one that in the minds of his public can be fitted to the role of hero or heroine in the drama that he is fashioning

At the same time and in the same manner, he must dramatize the need for his leadership by casting his opponent, either an actual or a potential leader, in the role of villain. Again, it makes little difference if this opponent is a political party, a competitive business organization (in this instance the effect is usually secured by inference only), a traditional superstition, a new scientific discovery, a minority group, or even the weather. His task is to blame some real or synthetic personality with the troubles, real or fictitious, of those whom he would lead (71)

It is necessary only to add that the propagandist's drama must have as simple conflict elements, as crystal clear and absolute a dichotomy between hero and villain, and as obvious a climax, as has a children's fairy tale. When the drama is hammered in with such dependence upon repetition and artificial suspense as is used in the children's story, only convention or the counter appeal of opposition leadership will prevent the propagandist's public from responding in accordance with the role in which it has been cast.

Propagandists often throw in two or three villains for good measure, as was the case when Hitler so characterized the Socialists, the Communists, and the Versailles Treaty as well as the Jews during his rise to power in Germany. The stereotyped elements upon which he relied in casting the German people as the heroine for his political drama are exceptionally clear. He flattered them with the idea that they were pure of heart and mind, possessed of all the ancient Germanic virtues, and destined to take their rightful place in the domestic scheme of things, provided only that they would marry the hero, Hitler, who would save them from the composite villain. If subsequent events did not unfold quite according to the romantic tradition, it need only be said that they never do—neither political nor medicinal panaceas live up to their promises.

Effectiveness of Propaganda.—Propagandists attempt to convert a relatively few individuals, who in turn are to convert others by word of mouth. These converts in a sense act as the agents of the propagandist. The rumor process may also contribute to his effectiveness, since what he says may become the basis for rumors. Possibly it is in congenial situations, rather than in those of any other type, that most actual conversions take place. No doubt the propagandist directly influences only those individuals in his public who for reasons growing out of their life experiences are already able to believe. Certainly the direct effects of propaganda can be easily exaggerated.

Leaders, political or otherwise, are a reflection of their milieu; in order to be successful, the propagandist must offer something that the people feel they need. If they are reasonably content with what they have, propaganda will not be very effective. It is therefore to the social conditions that make people susceptible to conversion rather than to propaganda itself, that we must first look for an explanation of political or other leadership that has used propaganda to secure leadership status.

Censorship.*—Censorship operates to prevent opposition propaganda by control of the press and of other distant-contact mediums. The procedure is analogous to the efforts of a conversional lecturer to assure the attendance of everyone at his lecture and a lack of attendance at all other concomitant lectures. Censorship can be utilized only by those who are already in a position of leadership. Methods of control may take such forms as the buying up of an opposition press, the refusing of advertising to those papers which do not cooperate, or governmental dictation to all news organs and news sources. The use by economic and religious organizations of governmental agencies for censorship purposes is a commonplace and takes such forms as suppression of books and plays,† suppression of unfavorable reports, etc.

Counterpropaganda.—The term "counterpropaganda" came into use during World War I to indicate the use of propaganda to checkmate the propaganda efforts of another interest group. Under some circumstances it is more effective and expedient for established leader-

* Almost as much confusion surrounds the use of the term "censorship" as surrounds that of "propaganda" (see Appendix note 69). To define "censorship" as any interference with lines of communication would make practically every parent, teacher, and in fact anyone directly or indirectly concerned with the processes of socialization, a censor, since these people are constantly putting restraints upon communication in the effort to prevent antisocialization. To define "censorship" as a restraint upon the communication of facts or of "rational appeals" is to give the term only subjective application. For references on moralistic censorship see *Censorship and the public library* (G. F. Bowerman, 1931), *Who's obscene?* (M. W. Dennett, 1930), *Censored: the private life of the movie* (M. L. Ernst and P. Lorentz, 1930), *A publisher speaking* (G. C. Faber, 1934), *Banned books* (C. R. Gillett, 1932), *The censor, the drama and the film, 1900-1934* (D. Knowles, 1934), and *Can these things be!* (G. Seldes, 1931).

For material on political censorship see the article "Censorship" by H. D. Lasswell (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 3, 290-294) and the references in Appendix note 69.

† Almost anything that might be communicated has at some time or other been subjected to censorship in some place or other. In the field of literature, we might cite such books as Homer's *Odyssey*, Shakespeare's *Richard the Second* and Doyle's *Sherlock Holmes*. Even *Alice in Wonderland* was once banned by the governor of a Chinese province on the ground that, because it makes animals talk, the book puts them on a par with human beings.

ship than is direct censorship. For obvious reasons the democratic political leader is dependent more upon counterpropaganda than upon censorship to keep himself in power. Much advertising is counterpropaganda that is forced upon a business interest by the propaganda efforts of a competitor. In brief, counterpropaganda arises whenever two propagandist agencies work at cross purposes, one endeavoring to secure leadership by conversion and action or by usurping the *status quo*, the other endeavoring to maintain his leadership in the *status quo* or by conversion to other forms of action.

During the early years of World War I the British endeavored to secure American participation on the side of the Entente. Toward this end they flooded the United States with faked news stories that cast Germany in the role of villain and the Entente in the role of hero. In the attempt to offset this propaganda and to keep the United States neutral, Germany carried out a campaign of counterpropaganda. This latter was strikingly unsuccessful, primarily because the Entente possessed the most adequate channels of propaganda and because the Germans appeared to have great difficulty in understanding American ways of viewing events.

Following World War I, so much was made of the role of propaganda in bungling about our participation that "propaganda" became for us a stereotyped villain.* Propaganda became, in fact, very much the root of all evil. As a consequence, the British refrained, after the outbreak of World War II, from making any appeals to us that could be easily recognized and labeled as propaganda. That they did their utmost, nevertheless, to convert us to the view that our salvation as a nation lay in theirs goes without saying.

DICTATORIAL LEADERSHIP

To the extent that a political leader secures or retains his position of leadership by the use of force, he is a dictator. When the aspirant for political leadership resorts to force in the effort to gain control of a government, he is transcending the established procedures for political advancement under the democratic process. When the elected leaders of a democracy resort to force in the endeavor to make their status permanent, they are exceeding the traditional limits of their office. The former attempt is, in a broad sense, a revolutionary movement, the latter is counterrevolutionary. Even in the more

* The term "propaganda" does not everywhere possess the offensive meaning it has been given almost universally in America. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, has its Sacred Congregation of Propaganda, which it considers as purely educational in character.

democratic societies, there will appear from time to time some resort to force in the endeavor to achieve or to retain the status of political leadership. The intimidation of voters by the hired ruffians of a political candidate is a commonplace example of the former. The use of the city police to assure a satisfactory vote for the mayor is an example of the latter practice.

In a monarchy leadership is determined by traditional factors, usually hereditary. In a true democracy the vote of the electorate determines which of the various aspirants shall rule for each succeeding term, and competition among aspirants is limited to conventional appeals. But when the political elite has, in a very literal sense, battered its way to power, the result is for a time at least dictatorship. No dictatorial clique can, of course, come to power simply because it resorts to forceful means. Unless a significant proportion of the people are so wearied of the established system and its personnel that they can be won over by propaganda to the new movement, the force of the would-be leader will be resisted by the greater force of the established police, army, and navy. Dictatorship is, therefore, a symptom of social disintegration. The conditions that make for the rise of dictators will later be considered as a form of sociopsychopathology.

Once a dictator has come to power, he endeavors to solidify his position by the manipulation of economic appeals and by rapid regimentation of the population. Presumably a true dictatorship would be control of a fully regimented people and would lead by slow degrees to the rigidity and automatic determination of the person of the leader which is characteristic of monarchical leadership. Karl Marx and his followers, however, believed that dictatorship—at least the dictatorship of the proletariat—would be a temporary, transitional phase and that all government would eventually disappear. The social psychologist can only say that so far history has been unkind to all those who have made categorical assumptions regarding government.

RANDOM IMPERSONAL LEADERSHIP

Some forms of distant-contact leadership are similar to that which arises under the mildly competitive conditions found in congenial situations. For some people, personal correspondence may serve as a partial substitute for membership in such situations. The correspondence between two friends constitutes a retarded give and take that is somewhat comparable to that which occurs during an informal conversation. Obviously, however, the art of letter writing is quite distinct from the art of conversation. A second form of distant-contact

interaction that has its congenial elements is the telephone conversation, particularly that of the old party-line character. At one time the telephone was an important medium of recreation, especially for people in rural communities. Housewives on a party line could "get together" for a chat, and at such times they interacted much as they did in face-to-face associations.

The Newspaper.—The random, mildly competitive form of leadership shifting that is characteristic of the congenial situation can also be seen in certain types of newspaper material. The local items in the old-time country newspaper served much the same function for those whom these items concerned as would oral rendition to the neighbors, to the readers these items served much the same function as would hearing of the incidents. The fact that Farmer Brown's cow had twin calves might be an item of conversational leadership for him, either in congenial situations or as disseminated through the local paper. He might get something of the same glow of pride from seeing his name in print and from visualizing the readers as they read the item as he would from the attention that his story would arouse should he tell it in person. Knowing this, editors made a point of working in as many local names in each issue as was possible. Something not unlike the rivalry in a congenial situation existed among those people who aspired to get their names in the paper.

In the modern metropolitan press there is nothing quite comparable to the local items in the old-time country press, although the difference is one of degree only. One of the few places where leadership shifts in a somewhat random fashion is the "Letters to the Editor" section, although here there is a tendency for certain people to be chronic contributors and for the vast majority of readers to contribute nothing. We may, however, say that the reader of an item of this order is reacting to leadership that arose on the mildly competitive basis that is characteristic of the congenial situation. Certainly there are many people who compete to get their names in the paper and some who will do almost anything to provide a story that is certain to secure space.*

Rather than providing an opportunity for reader leadership, the modern newspaper provides printed substitutes for the stories told by conversational leaders in congenial situations. A large proportion of

* Death notices have been occasionally inserted in the newspapers by perfectly live but rather hysterical "corpses", and marriage notices have been similarly published when no marriage is even contemplated except by a would-be bride. When normal activities fail to "make the publication grade," abnormal procedures are undertaken by a surprisingly large number of people.

what we call news is really printed rumor. Most of us read news items for the same reasons that we listen to rumors—to be entertained—although of course we rationalize such reading by saying that we must keep posted on world events.* Aside from the stock-market quotations, the straight factual material that is contained in an edition of the average newspaper would be adequately recorded in an extremely small space. If it were so presented, however, there would be few readers. Barren facts or outright fictions are therefore “written up,” just as in the rumor process the grain of truth or suspicion is dressed up to make a good story. In a sense therefore newspapermen are professional rumor makers. Among them, some have taken as their specialty political rumors, others, financial, local, national, or international rumors, and some few, scandal rumors. These specialists tend to vie with one another for space in the paper, just as in face-to-face situations individuals may compete with one another for a chance to tell their stories.

FUGITIVE PATTERNS

In a society like our own, where instability is characteristic of many aspects of social life, there are numerous quick and violent shifts of behavior—fugitive patterns of action that come and go without apparent cause and in much the same manner as does the rumor story. The leadership responsible for the origin and spread of such patterns is as random and shifting as is that involved in rumor. These fugitive patterns are termed fads, booms, and crazes. Although the three terms are by no means mutually exclusive, the name “fad” has generally been given to the more trifling deviations from normal behavior; the term “boom,” to vital and protracted ones; and the term “craze,” to those which have an intermediate position and the outstanding characteristic of becoming for the moment a primary but superficial concern of the people who are involved.

* Students of journalism are inclined to apologize for the newspaper on the grounds that it is a great educational medium. Although this means of distant-contact communication is undoubtedly a factor in the personality development of the modern individual and a primary agency of propaganda, it functions for the reader more as a recreational than an educational medium. See “Press” by D M Keeser (*Encycl Soc Sci*, 12, 325-343) and *News and the human interest story* (H M Hughes, 1939). Although even the most reputable newspapers contain a large portion of printed rumor, the personalized rumor reaches its purest written form in the various motion-picture magazines. They contain little except highly dramatized stories about trivial (and often fictitious) events and characteristics of the personages in the motion-picture world. See “Inside story” (L McTaggart, 1933).

The Fad.—Hardly a week passes in contemporary America but that some new slang word, catch phrase, verbal inflection, minor modification of dress or mannerism, popular song, dance step, or game makes its appearance and wins popular favor. The spread of the latest popular song can be traced to some extent, and the influence of such mediums as the radio in speeding up its spread is quite evident. There is little possibility, however, of tracing the spread of slang words or dance steps, and the reason why one of the many songs that are plugged by bands should rise to favor while the rest never "catch" is a mystery that tin-pan alley* would give millions to solve. All we can possibly say is that of the countless new modes of behavior that are no doubt invented annually, some few are taken up by individuals here and there and are used as the basis for leadership in their congenial groupings. These then spread or fail to spread in the same way and for much the same reasons that a rumor does. Like a rumor, a fad must be appropriate to the time and place.

At all times the more ingenious members of our society are making bids for leadership either in their professional capacity as writers, actors, painters, etc., or in their capacity as private citizens. Within each professional group there is intense competition for professional leadership. Song writers drum out a hundred or more pieces annually, hundreds of novels are turned off the presses each year, thousands of artists paint countless pictures, while others mold a multitude of statues, playwrights, producers, and actors try out some dozens of new plays, and motion-picture producers grind out their usual schedule of comedies and melodramas. In these fields, essentially recreational, there are of course some recognized leaders—popular authors, song writers, artists, actors, etc.—who may be in rather steady demand. But the leadership of such people plays a relatively small part in the fad. The song that sweeps into wide if brief popularity is socially selected from the many offered, few people know the name of the composer. The best seller is frequently an author's first, and occasionally his last, book. The play that makes theater history may have been a producer's gamble; the actress who rises to sudden fame may do so in spite of and at the expense of another upon whom producers have lavished fantastic publicity, and the motion picture that catches the popular fancy may have been "just another picture" at the outset. In other words, leaders strive for leadership;

* The history of fads in popular music is given in *Tin pan alley: a chronicle of the American popular music racket* (I. Goldberg, 1930) and in Part II of *Radio research* 1941 (D. MacDougald, Jr., 1941).

but from all that they offer, a little is taken and the remainder is rejected or passively tolerated

Occasionally it is possible to trace the unusual popularity of a book or a play to some accident that has given it an exceptional initial impulse or provided it with free advertising. Any one of these may be the "break" that publisher and theatrical producer are always hoping for. At one time it was considered a seal of popularity for a book to be banned in Boston. A war or other disaster will make a book related to the subject timely and may help to assure its success. The absence of anything more important to talk and write about at the moment may mean that a new book or play is given unusual attention in the newspapers and acquires the status of a popular topic of conversation.

In the main, however, there is as yet no adequate explanation for the fact that one of the many books published each year sells in the hundreds of thousands rather than in the thousands* or of the fact that one play becomes a national success whereas a hundred others come and go. As popularity grows, some critics and experts will claim to know just why the book or play was successful. But it is evident that their deduction is an *a posteriori* one, since their knowledge is not put to use in the writing of best sellers or of box-office successes.

The random character of leadership in fads is even more apparent in those fads—such as the slang phrase or the "wisecrack"—which are not subject to commercial exploitation. In Hollywood and New York, our great entertainment centers, there are hundreds of men and women who devote their time to inventing gags for use by comedians. Of the many that are broadcast by radio and motion picture, some few are taken up and have their brief period of popularity.

Most fads have a short life, probably for the same reason that rumors quickly die out. The fad pattern is taken over because it attracts attention to the user. But the more it spreads, the less is its attention-invoking value. At some point in its spread, a fad becomes so commonplace that it will be abandoned in favor of some new attention-getting device. Some words, games, dress items, and mechanical gadgets do, however, have sufficient intrinsic value that, although they are originally diffused throughout the society as fads, they subsequently become a part of the stable culture. In the late twenties

* Berreman has found that initial advertising, particularly that which is directed toward the book dealers, increases the probability of a novel's selling up in the tens of thousands. But he found no explanation for the fact that, of the many books that become good sellers, one or two will go on to become best sellers (J. Berreman, 1939).

the zipper was an exceedingly faddy device and was used primarily as an ornament. As a practical mechanism for closing things it has survived its faddy period. Many of the things that we today use and take for granted—the bicycle, the “juke” box, slacks, etc.—were at one time or another attention-getting fad items. Of those things which we today consider so extremely smart, clever, and up to the minute, a few will survive as utilitarian commonplaces, most, however, will be obsolete tomorrow.

The Boom.—The fad involves some trivial change in behavior that may ultimately become incorporated into the social heritage. The boom, in contrast, is vital and self-liquidating. Like a fire, the boom consumes the substance necessary for its existence and so dies out automatically. Booms usually involve some aspect of economic behavior and generally occur during what the economist speaks of as the prosperity phase of the business cycle. Booms in stocks, such as the one of 1927–1929, are perhaps the most characteristic, but almost any economic good or activity may be the basis for a boom. Land has been boomed from time to time and from place to place. Southern California lands were the basis for a boom in the 1880's and again in the 1920's; Florida real estate was boomed about 1923;* and from time to time most communities get excited about a new subdivision, a race-track project, a local oil-well development, or something of the sort. The gold rush to California in the middle of the last century and to Alaska in 1898 were booms that had vast social consequences. Tulip bulbs were at one time the basis for a most extravagant boom in Holland.† A bulb exchange was established during the height of this peculiar boom, and bulbs sometimes sold for more than their weight in gold.

There is usually some little grain of truth or reason at the basis of the boom. This may be the discovery of *some* gold, a *slight* rise in land value, or the *hope* that some new venture will pay dividends. Spread by and through the rumor process, that grain of truth is soon swollen into a dramatic opportunity for easy and fabulous wealth; and more and more people are led to drop their normal economic activities to join in the new quest. Presumably those who first respond to the boom stories are the less stable and more suggestible members of a community, but constant repetition and external elaboration of the boom story bring about the interactional amplification that has previously been mentioned. Just as few individuals are capable of remaining calm and critical as members of an audience that is wildly enthusiastic,

* See *Boom in paradise* (T. H. Weigall, 1932).

† See *Memoirs of extraordinary popular delusions* (C. Mackay, 1850).

so few people can avoid being caught up in the boom fever. Even as an old platitude may through the audible response of others to it indirectly arouse enthusiasm in a weary listener, the legendary tales that are revived during every boom may indirectly lead even the sophisticated economist to invest his savings in the boom object.

The ideas that are accepted as valid and are made the basis for actions during the course of a boom may seem incredible after the inevitable crash has occurred. But there would seem to be no vaccine that will immunize people against the boom virus.* The boom appears to be a recurrent attribute of the capitalistic system, and each succeeding boom gives gum point to the statement that men learn from history only that they do not learn from history.

The Craze.—Booms generate relatively slowly, but they generally collapse with startling suddenness. Crazes, on the other hand, generate as rapidly as the fad, although they collapse as suddenly as the boom. The area of behavior that is involved in the craze is usually quite limited, but the people who are affected invariably devote a disproportionate part of their time to the craze activity. They figuratively go crazy about some actually unimportant thing. Occasionally the craze involves quasi-economic behavior, as was the case with the "send a dime" craze—a chain-letter method of getting rich that flowered in the spring of 1935†. In the main, however, the craze concerns some new or revived recreational activity.

The miniature-golf craze of some years ago will illustrate these points. During the palmy days of 1925–1929, one of the dominant

* In periods of economic activity the stock-market boom is often sufficiently absorbing to distract people from the lure of other boom possibilities. It is, therefore, in periods of economic contraction that booms follow the most unconventional directions. The years subsequent to 1929, when the public was most averse to speculation in industrial stocks, saw many brief local and national booms. Of local booms that of "amberggris" on the west coast near San Francisco is a good example. Amberggris is a substance once very valuable for the making of perfume. It is thought to issue from the sperm whale and is found occasionally washed up by the sea. In March, 1934, a large lump of material thought to be amberggris was picked up along the west coast by poverty-stricken villagers. The thought of great wealth to be had for the finding sent hundreds of people to the beaches, and for months thereafter everything otherwise unidentified that the sea washed in was "amberggris." None of the finds actually proved to be amberggris, and the sequel to the story was the eventual revelation that technological developments had long since made amberggris of relatively small value anyway.

For a description of boom phenomena in their various historic aspects and a bibliography on the subject see "Boom" by M. S. Handman (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 2, 638–641).

† This was perhaps the most incredible craze of the many that have swept the country in recent years (T. Olson, 1935).

sports was golf. Expensive golf clubs sprang up all over the country, and the ancient Scotch game promised to become America's preoccupation. In 1929 the financial crash left many people with golfing equipment and with some skill at the game but with no opportunity to play. They found an outlet in a vacant-lot form of golf, which had been unsuccessfully sponsored by an equipment manufacturer for some years previously. Within a few months the craze for miniature golf spread over the entire country, and innumerable courses were erected. A few months later grass was growing in the paths of these courses, although millions of dollars had been invested in this craze. At its height, excitement was so great that even one of our saner intellectuals could write in *Harper's Magazine* to the effect that miniature golf was our recreational if not our financial salvation from the depression.

Like the boom, the craze is self-liquidating, the reason for its automatic collapse is, however, found in psychological rather than in economic factors. Ordinarily the primary value of a craze activity is that at the outset it makes an individual stand out from his fellows and thereby gives him notoriety. The moment the craze activity has become general, it loses this attention-getting value, and is then likely to be dropped by everyone. Games that are amusing and interesting may spring into popularity as fads and in time settle down to a steady and lasting life. Such was the history of the jigsaw puzzle. Those games, however, which become overnight the preoccupation of a large number of people seldom have anything more to recommend them than the fact that they are new and popular. This was the case with the game or contest of flagpole sitting, a tragicomedy of the late twenties and early thirties, which fell from popularity as soon as virtually every hamlet in the United States had its national contestant and the flagpole sitter no longer made news. A decade later an equally fantastic craze for public exhibitions of goldfish eating swept through college student bodies. It reached its climax with the eating of phonograph records and then died out, presumably for lack of anything less digestible to eat.

PRESTIGE LEADERSHIP

Systematically Shifting Leadership.—There are some distant-contact situations in which the leadership shifts systematically from person to person in accordance with an established pattern. A radio debate is perhaps most clearly illustrative of this type. In it leadership alternates according to the formula for public debate. Systematic, too, is the shift in leadership that occurs when publications print

alternately articles for and against some controversial question. Less obvious, but none the less controlled, is the shifting of leadership in the trade, technical, and scientific journals. Technicians and scientists more or less compete among themselves for space in the journal of their specialty, but for reasons of policy editors tend to give each of the competitors his turn in the pages of the journal. Shifts in leadership are not, however, always of this systematic character.

Prestige as a Basis for Leadership.—In any field of social life there are some names that make news, and such names may of themselves give a value to whatever the name is associated with. The attention-evoking power of such a name—place or personal—is termed prestige. In some fields—notably scientific medicine and the physical sciences—there is probably a close relationship between the prestige of a name and the scientific merit of the man, for there is general agreement as to what does or does not constitute achievement in these fields. But wherever evaluations are arrived at subjectively, as in art, music, and literature, the accomplishment is judged primarily by the prestige of the name attached to it, thus whether a painting attributed to Rembrandt is good or bad depends almost entirely upon whether it is or is not authentic.*

In face-to-face situations prestige factors operate in many ways, some of which we have already indicated. In distant-contact situations prestige operates to give certain authors, columnists, etc., a steady reader public, regardless of what they may write, to provide motion-picture stars with acclaim, no matter what the vehicle, etc. In radio, for example, it has been long recognized that a Guy Lombardo program will draw listeners from almost all other dance music that is on the air at the same hour.

Fashion Prestige.—The power of prestige factors in leadership is nowhere more apparent than in the realm of fashion. The term "fashion" is often used indiscriminately to refer to currently accepted manners, morals, or modes of dress. It is rather doubtful, however, whether changes in manners and morals originate in some prestige

* For the effect of prestige on the acceptance of paintings see "Suggestion in pictures" (P. R. Farnsworth and H. Beaumont, 1929) and "Further data on suggestion in pictures" (P. R. Farnsworth and I. Misumi, 1931).

Musicians themselves are accepted and rejected in fugitive fashion. A Mendelssohn or a Rossini is taken up by the "right people" who may later focus their interest on other musicians. Thus in 1940 the most "eminent" musicians appeared to be Bach, Beethoven, Wagner, and Mozart, in that order. But at the turn of the century Bach had a relatively low status. The eminence list of that day included Wagner, Mendelssohn, Beethoven, and Schumann, respectively (P. R. Farnsworth, 1941b).

source and spread therefrom to all the members of a society. The processes that make for modifications in manners and morals are subtle and complex. Clothing changes, however, are unquestionably influenced by the prestige of their originators. We shall therefore restrict "fashion" to changes in modes of dress.

The process by which new clothing fashions spread is much the same as that which is responsible for the dissemination of rumors, fads, booms, and crazes.* Wearing clothes of the "latest style" is a bid for leadership in face-to-face situations, and to cling too long to the old marks out an individual for social disapproval and possibly contempt. The leadership process involved in fashion changes is, however, very different from that occurring in the fad, boom, or craze. In the realm of fashion there are prestige leaders, either specific people or places, the names of whom or of which are recognized as authoritative and thus give authenticity to the new modes of dress. Although a fad or craze pattern might be originated by almost anyone, only those clothing innovations sponsored by a prestige name have a chance to become fashionable. Competition for leadership in the dress-fashion field is, therefore, restricted to established designers. From their varied offerings the new—the fashionable—will be "chosen."

Men's Styles.—There was a time when the male was the ornate sex, but since the days of the powdered wig and the pantaloons, no very significant changes have occurred in the number and general character of the articles of clothing worn by men of the Occident. In the course of time, waistcoats have changed to vests; collars have grown lower and have changed from starched linen to celluloid and later to unstarched linen, trousers have alternated between wide and short, narrow and long, and wide and long, coats have shortened, and materials have changed. Sports clothes, including the serviceable slacks, have grown in favor, oxfords have replaced high shoes, and button shoes have become curiosities. Fads, such as the beret, have come and gone. During times of war, civilian clothes have taken on a slightly military tone. But the well-dressed male today wears much the same sort of clothing as did the men of a century ago, in spite of the diligent efforts of stylists to brighten, and some have said lighten, his dress.

* Analyses of changes in fashions can be found in the following publications: *The psychology of dress* (E. B. Hurlock, 1929), *The psychology of clothes* (J. C. Flugel, 1930); *Fashion in literature, a study of changing taste* (E. E. Kellett, 1931), *English dress from Victoria to George V* (D. C. Calthrop, 1934), "A psychological analysis of fashion motivation" (E. Barr, 1934), "The psychology of clothes" (E. Harms, 1938), and *Three centuries of women's dress fashions: a quantitative analysis* (J. Richardson and A. L. Kroeber, 1940).

The minor variations in men's clothing were for long supposed to have originated in London, traditionally the prestige center for male attire. Presumably, also, certain members of the Royal House have been style leaders. But it is easy to exaggerate the importance of London's Bond Street and the part that certain Englishmen have played in the clothing habits of men of the Western world. Styles in youth's and young men's informal wear change, but no one appears to know or to care whether these changes have originated in London, in New York, or in some noted university. Furthermore, for business and dress wear last year's suit is quite likely to be good style for next year.

Women's Styles.—Women's fashions, on the other hand, change with comparative rapidity. Modern women are exceedingly style conscious. Tradition sanctions their use of clothing as a bid for attention, and even today most other means of securing favorable attention—political, financial, and similar achievements—are closed to them. Originally fashion changes were a consequence of the competition among the women of the French court for royal favor. Certain of the more notorious courtesans became accepted as fashion leaders, and the women of other courts—English, Italian, German, Russian—came in time to follow the lead that was set in Paris. After the French Revolution, Parisian clothing leadership drifted into the hands of the designers, whose names, rather than those of their noted clients, became the badge of fashion approval to all the women of the Occident who could afford to be stylish. Paris became synonymous with "right." For over a century all the more important trends originated among Paris *couturiers*. But in recent years the prestige of Paris has been seriously threatened, and the collapse of the French Republic may well have ended it. Interestingly enough, Hollywood is rapidly gaining the prestige that Paris has lost.* At present, the more noted of the motion-picture stars seem to play a role for the average American woman comparable to that which the noted courtesans of France once played for the aristocrats of western Europe.

The Nature of Fashion Leadership.—Thinking that they perceived a pattern or cycle in fashion changes, some observers have concluded that there is a natural law behind the fashion process.† Upon close

* For discussion of the gradual transition from dependence upon the "Designed in Paris" label to the "Designed in Hollywood" one, see "Fashion and the Hollywood handicap" (E. K. McDonnell, 1935). For a description of the attempt of the New York City clothing industry to make "New York Creation" the prestige label, see "New styles in unions" (J. C. Furnas, 1941).

† As far as the authors know the only study of dress fashions that can be justly called experimental is that reported in "Fad and fashion leadership among

examination, the "cycle" in fashion changes turns out to be no more than a reflection of the fact that the possibilities for change are limited. Thus, to cite but one example, if dress lengths are to change from year to year, they must get shorter for a time and then longer for a time. There are no other "directions" in which they can change, and there are absolute limits to how short a skirt can be and still be a skirt and to how long a skirt can be and still permit the wearer to walk. The rise and fall over the course of years may give the illusion of a natural "cycle", but it is only an illusion.

Other observers, finding that any particular woman must follow the style trend or be unfashionable, have concluded that the fashion leaders dictate styles. No doubt a political dictator might—and some few have—by edict set the fashions in women's clothing as in other things. But no clothing stylist, even though fortified by the power of prestige, in any sense "dictates" to the women of America that skirts will be longer, fuller, or whatnot. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that the great designers invariably offer their clientele a number of variations on the current styles. They may attempt to predict from the "trend"—the tendency of more women buyers to purchase this rather than that—whether next season's demand will be for shorter or longer skirts, etc. But even so, no designer would think of gambling on the trend. He (or she) will hedge by offering longer as well as shorter skirts. The style leader is, after all, but one of the factors in a vast and complicated public interaction. Like the popular radio comedian, the stylist will be "listened to." But which of his varied offerings—if any—will be taken up and made the basis for a new clothing style depends upon the members of his public.

Finally, just as the radio comedian must not offend the sensibilities of his public, the clothing stylist cannot expect to gain a following for an offering that offends his public's sense of modesty or of economic expediency. When we reflect upon the cumbersome hoopskirt, the unhygienic corset, the grotesque bustle, and other idiosyncrasies of fashion in women's dress, we might well be tempted to conclude that modesty and utility play a very minor part in clothing leadership and that the prestige of the originator has a dictatorial effect. But there is an ancient saw as true of women and their clothing as of horses and their water. "You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him

undergraduate women" (J. E. Janney, 1941). Here the course of 67 unique clothing patterns was followed among a group of 279 college girls. The patterns were all originated by girls with prestige in other fields. Girls who failed to follow the new dress patterns were in general regarded by their classmates as socially inept.

drink " Fashion leaders lead women to the shops, but what and when the women will buy is quite unpredictable Millions are spent each year in trying to predict the trend of the styles of tomorrow, but within certain obvious limits all we can say of the styles of tomorrow is that they will be determined by the interactions of the publics of tomorrow, and that the course that these latter will take depends upon factors that are as yet too complex for human analysis

CHAPTER XXI

ABNORMAL SOCIAL SITUATIONS

In scientific usage the terms "normal" and "abnormal" imply a quantitative distinction. They do not indicate subjective approval or disapproval.* To science, anything that is commonplace, recurrent, or characteristic is considered normal. This is just as true of the behavior of human beings as it is of the behavior of electrons, atoms, and molecules, of amoebas, insects, and elephants, and of planets, stars, and galaxies. The fact that molecular, insect, human, or planetary behavior may be such that it destroys the things that behave is not a matter for scientific evaluation. If that behavior is characteristic, it is normal.

In the last three chapters, we have endeavored to analyze the more important types of interactional situations that appear to be normal to human societies. In this chapter, we shall consider those situations which are the exception rather than the rule. Like all distinctions in the realm of human behavior, this one is of course a matter of degree. No given situation can be completely characteristic or entirely exceptional.

In our society, some of the normal situations involve random and dynamic changes in behavior—the fad, the boom, the craze, and the fashion. But these changes, although they are not orderly or systematic, are the rule rather than the exception. As individuals, we are prepared to follow the current of such change; this preparation is a part of our present social heritage. Other random and dynamic changes occur in situations that are not socially established and for which the members have not been socially prepared. Such situations are abnormal in that participation involves a denial of what the members have been taught to consider as social realities. For just as the maladjusted individual may in the effort to achieve an adjustment break away from his social training and see snakes where he has been taught to see none, so numbers of badly maladjusted people may during the course of an interaction break away from their social

* An unusual view of the concept "abnormal society" is taken in "An examination of criteria for the determination of normal society" (J. M. Gillette, 1937). It is held that normal and abnormal are merely symbols invented for reasons of wishful thinking.

heritage and follow a new and fantastic road to personal, economic, or political salvation

The Abnormal Situation as Tension-releasing.—Abnormal collective behavior, like abnormal individual behavior, appears to be a method of resolving the psychological tensions that have arisen as a consequence of maladjustment. All the types of abnormal situations that we shall discuss appear most frequently during times of social disintegration and among those elements of the population most adversely affected by such disintegration. The spectacular rise of Father Divine,* of Doctor Townsend, of Huey Long, and of other leaders of "mass movements" during the 1930's was, for example, closely related to the economic hardships caused by the depression; and all drew their followers from segments of the population (Harlem Negroes, destitute elders, "poor whites") that had been most sorely affected thereby. Furthermore, all such "movements" tend to break down with the gradual reestablishment of some semblance of economic normality.

There is every reason to believe that abnormal collective behavior is a symptom of widespread maladjustment, that it is an attempt, however random, to change or escape from the circumstances that bring about maladjustment, and that it serves, if nothing else, to effect some release of accumulated tensions. Apparently the "circus" aspect of the old Roman practice of pacifying the discontented masses with a little bread and much circus was based upon a recognition of the tension-discharging function of certain forms of collective behavior. We today seem to find a gratifying release from the monotony of normal life—itself tension-generating—by occasional participation in some more or less commonplace, but to us as individuals unusual, form of collective activity—such as shouting ourselves hoarse at a political rally, a football game, or a prize fight and dancing, laughing, and drinking ourselves weary at a night club or the like.

THE AUDIENCE FANATIQUE

In some social systems, it has been the practice to hold ecstatic rituals under culturally indicated circumstances. Ordinarily the members of the situation, starting as an audience under the leadership of a magician or priest, gradually become activated until, at the climax of the ritual, they reach a condition in which the usual social restraints upon behavior become inoperative. The primitive war dance, for example, was a magic ritual that was supposed to frighten the guardian

* For a discussion of the rise of Father Divine, the Oxford Group, and the Townsend Plan see *The psychology of social movements* (H. Cantril, 1941).

sprits of the enemy, to appease those of the dancers, and thereby to assure success. What it actually did, of course, was to make the tribal members more responsive to leadership and less responsive to painful stimuli. Through audience interstimulation the suggestibility of each member was increased to the point at which the war chief could secure almost automatic response to his commands. His hysterical followers would obey without regard to their personal safety.

The occurrence of the primitive war dance was institutionalized. In the modern world, the closest approach to an activated audience that is customary, recurrent, and socially prepared for is the auction. In the auction situation the members are pitted one against the other, and a form of interaction that encourages the members to buy things they will not want an hour later or to pay prices they would not have paid at a department store is thereby induced. The interaction of the members of the auction situation is, however, passive and "rational" in comparison with that of the primitive war dance.

Most nearly approaching the degree of activation achieved in the war dance is the interaction that occurs in the audience *fanatique*. With the possible exception of the semireligious* and regular outbursts of such sects as the Holy Rollers and of the Negroes in our deep South, there is nothing recurrent or characteristic about the appearance of the audience *fanatique*. This situation thrives on discontent—economic, social, or physical, but the inception of an audience *fanatique* is almost entirely dependent upon the whim and fancy of evangelical leadership.

Evangelical Meetings.—Typical of the audience *fanatique* is the condition to which evangelists† frequently lead their congregations in "saving their souls" or in "healing" their bodies. The evangelistic harangue makes its greatest appeal to the disgruntled, the thrill-seeking, the unoccupied, the unhappy, and the discouraged members of a community. By the skillful use of the simplest stereotypes, religious and patriotic, the evangelist converts his listeners to the

* Psychological studies of the religious aspects of the audience *fanatique* can be found in the following: *Primitive traits in religious revivals* (F. M. Davenport, 1905), *Speaking with tongues historically and psychologically considered* (G. B. Cutten, 1927), *The psychology of religion* (C. C. Josey, 1927), *A study of religious fanaticism* (N. M. G. Ekdahl, 1929), *The psychology of religious adjustment* (E. S. Conklin, 1929), *A psychological study of religious conversion* (W. L. Jones, 1937), and "Economic distress and religious experiences: a study of the Holy Rollers" (A. T. Boisen, 1939). See also H. W. Schneider's article "Religious revivals" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 363-366).

† A description of the methods of one of the leading evangelists of the century is given in *Sister Aimee* (N. B. Mavity, 1931).

acceptance of the idea that he represents superhuman forces. Since the audience members have seldom been socially trained to the acceptance of this idea, considerable dependence is placed upon audience interstimulation, through which leadership stimuli may be intensified to such a degree that they become psychologically imperative. The evangelist initiates a pattern of interaction among the audience members, guides it toward acceptance of his "divine" or almost divine leadership, and, this accomplished, leads the members of the audience in whatever direction he desires. Few are the individuals who possess the superb showmanship that is necessary to make temporary religious fanatics out of the relatively stolid members who are likely to assemble in tent or temple, but these few are remarkably effective.

Skill in developing audience fanaticism has been directed to various ends. It has been said that the late Billy Sunday often used his skill to divert the attention of striking laborers from their grievances against their employers. He was encouraged to evangelize a community that was torn by industrial strife and thereby to arouse workers to such an interest in saving their souls that they would forget to be concerned about wages and conditions of labor. Under the manipulation of political evangelists, political rallies and conventions have been swung over the rather vague line that distinguishes a conversion audience from an audience *fanatique*.

THE UNCOORDINATED RIOT SITUATION*

The audience *fanatique* follows a specific leader, who guides the interaction into rather well defined and hence predictable channels. The leadership of some abnormal situations, however, is as shifting as is that of the game situation and as unpredictable as is that of the fad, and the pattern of interaction spreads until the actions of all members of the group are quite similar to those of the leader. Such is the nature of uncoordinated rioting, possibly the most senseless and meaningless behavior in which men indulge.

Mimicry in the Brawl.—The key to the character of the uncoordinated riot situation is found in the nature of the leadership process. By analogy, the reactions of the members of the situation to the one

* The term "crowd" has been used so loosely that we shall avoid it here. Martin, for example, uses the term to include relatively noninteracting aggregates of people, certain types of audiences, panic situations, uncoordinated and coordinated riots, and even the pattern of revolution. See *The behavior of crowds* (E. D. Martin, 1920). See also Chap. XIV in *Social learning and imitation* (N. E. Miller and J. Dollard, 1941).

who initiates action are like those of psychopathic individuals who merely repeat what is said to them, but the behavior that is mimicked in such a riot is anything but verbal, and the results are far more displeasing. The leadership action that is mimicked may take almost any form. The process may be illustrated by the relatively common barroom brawl. Perhaps the men are seamen, laborers just out of mine or factory, or a heterogeneous collection of men from various walks of life. Their normal behavior is peaceful enough. They drift in and get a drink, talk with friends or friendly strangers, and then drift out again. But, as every bartender knows, these normally peaceful men may need nothing more than an example to set them to cracking one another's heads for no better reason than that one of their number begins fighting with another. A heated argument between two erstwhile friends which culminates in an exchange of blows may be the relatively innocent starting point for an uncoordinated riot in which many men are injured and considerable property is destroyed.

The moment that overt conflict appears between two men, the bartender or his bouncer* may assume leadership of the men who are assembled around the bar. If he does not and if no one steps in as a self-appointed representative of peace and order, others may mimic the combatants and begin a riot. Audience participation usually starts with a good-humored taking of sides on the part of the non-combative members of the situation, then comes a rapid following of the argument pattern suggested by the combatants and a quick culmination in indiscriminate attack upon one another. The original combatants are leaders only in the sense that they set a pattern to be taken up by those around them. They are not leaders in the sense in which we have previously used the term.

The interaction that takes place in the uncoordinated riot has no focal point, *i.e.*, it is not polarized. Once such a riot has got under way, it is, therefore, usually impossible for any single individual to get the attention of the members of the situation and thus secure control over them. Only physical exhaustion or the introduction of some superior physical force will terminate the situation. In view of this

* The bouncer simply evicted troublemakers by force. Lacking a bouncer, the old-time bartender might "organize" a potential riot into a harmless situation. When two men passed from argument to open conflict, the bartender jumped into the role of referee. By the quick command "Give them room, boys!" and by other proper actions he made a show of the impromptu battle and put his other customers in the role of spectators. The situation then became one of an audience, with the members focalized upon the combatants rather than upon one another.

fact, all those who deal with congregations of men, particularly men of the floating type who are poorly disciplined and more or less mal-adjusted, must be riot conscious and ready to take command of the situation at the first indication of trouble. Dance-hall, saloon, flop-house, and other bouncers are employed to check a disturbance at its inception. If they let open conflict spread from one set of combatants to another, the situation will get beyond control.

Uncoordinated riots may at times be expressive of underlying tensions, as is the case when difficult economic conditions have led to general discontent and uncertainty.* In the towns near which troops were concentrated, café riots among soldiers were an almost nightly affair during World War I. These frequently started between men of different armies, as Americans versus English or Canadians versus English, and between men of different outfits, as artillery versus marines. A brief exchange of insults would lead to overt conflict between two men, and soon every soldier in the place would be striking out for himself. In such a melee whatever group distinction existed at the outset tended to disappear.

Uncoordinated riots usually occur among people who are somewhat accustomed to settling their personal differences by rough-and-ready methods. The waterfront dives in any large port have a heavy incidence of uncoordinated rioting. It must not be supposed, however, that such rioting is a pastime unknown to the "cultured" members of society. Not even the highest class of night club or other amusement place in which people are not organized into an audience is riotproof. Wherever and whenever people congregate and yet lack effective organization, they are capable of following the suggestion of any two who decide to fight it out in public. Effective organization may arise through congeniality, as in a gathering of people in the park on a sunny afternoon, in conventional factors, as at a garden party, or through leadership, as in the audience. Something interesting to do may of itself be sufficient to prevent sus-

* Such rioting has been, for example, an important form of Sunday recreation during the past century for the poor of some of our large cities. See K. Smelhe's article "Riot" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 386-388).

The following are a few of the many vital, widespread, and long-lived riots of American history: the Negro Riots, Philadelphia, 1838, the "Native American" Riots, continuous for three months in 1844, the Abolitionist Riots preceding the Civil War, the "Draft" Riots of 1863 in New York City, the violent rioting that was due to prolonged economic difficulties in the larger cities in the 1870's, and Chicago's destructive Haymarket Riot in 1886.

Characteristic of the uncoordinated riots of recent years was that which occurred in New York's Harlem in March, 1935 (*Time*, April 1, 1935, 12-13).

ceptibility to rioting, as is the case when people are interested in play in an amusement park

THE PANIC SITUATION

Although the other characteristics of a sudden crisis situation are usually quite different from those of the uncoordinated riot, the leadership process may be of the same mimicking order. Abnormal circumstances, such as fire in a theater, listing of a ship at sea, or earthquake affecting people in crowded streets, are unanticipated and are all too often unprepared for. Everyone is more or less startled and aroused for action but is incapable of achieving immediately a pattern of adjustment to the circumstances. Technically we might say that the members of the situation are unprepared to react adequately to the stimuli. They are, for example, familiar with the sight and smell of smoke but not with smoke-in-theater. If by any chance they have previously experienced this latter combination of factors, they will have learned, not to depart in an orderly and systematic fashion from the presence of the noxious stimuli, but to be panic-stricken (W. Trotter, 1940).

A few moments after smoke is evident in a theater, a moment after it becomes apparent that something is wrong with the ship, or the instant after the first quake has passed is the "psychological moment" for the appearance of responses that may be imitated. The attention of everyone is on the new circumstance, everyone is ready to act, and everyone is for the moment restive. Unless leadership steps in and achieves a temporary regimentation (by, perhaps, the forceful command "Stand still"), the first one to act in an imitable way will set the pattern for all.

Theater Panics—Before the days of fireproof theater construction, fires in theaters were not uncommon.* Frequently more people died from being trampled to death than from suffocation or burns. No matter how many or how wide the doors, they might be so much jammed by the pressure of the panic-stricken audience that few people could escape. After the tragic Iroquois Theater fire in Chicago in

* Most panics are initiated in direct-contact situations. A notable exception was that panic set off in 1938 among the war-apprehensive people of the eastern seaboard by the radio broadcast—in reporting form—of a play in which the region was supposed to be under attack by a military force from Mars. In this instance, there was no single leadership pattern that the listeners could mimic. Instead, each direct-contact group formed its own little panic situation. See *The invasion from Mars* (H. Cantril *et al.*, 1940) for a detailed study of this unusual panic.

1903,* theater audiences in this country were so fire-conscious that it was dangerous for an actor to smoke as a part of his characterization, since someone was likely to yell "Fire" and start a stampede for the exits. Years of advertising the impressive but by no means completely effective asbestos curtain were required to make people forget the hazards of a theater fire. It would seem, therefore, that people are often not so much unprepared for crisis as they are prepared for panic. Quite possibly the tales of theater, ship, earthquake, and other disasters help to make the members of a crisis situation susceptible to panic leadership.

The responses of the members of an audience in a theater to the cry "Fire" are of the same order as are the responses of the men in a barroom to the two fighters who set off an uncoordinated riot. The members of the theater audience mimic the actions of the one who overtly expresses his panic and communicate panic one to another, much as they may previously have communicated their appreciation of the program. This panic, which can be objectively described as an effort to get away—to run—is amplified, like applause, through interstimulation.

War and Panic.—The German army, which was the first to apply modern principles of social psychology to military combat, did everything possible to induce panic behavior among the civilians of France during the campaign of 1940. The so-called "war of nerves" was intended to mystify, impress, and weary the populace. It served to prepare the French people for panic reaction to the crisis that came at the first breaking through by the Germans. Using many ingenious devices—such as the planting among the civilian population of traitors who, at the signal, were to set off rumors of impending catastrophe or to provide flight behavior as the pattern of action to be mimicked—the Germans succeeded in filling the roads with hordes of panic-stricken refugees. Further chaos was created by air attack upon these masses, with the result that the French and British military found the roads impassable and could not, therefore, move supplies and troops up to the battle zone.†

Prevention of Panics.—Just as the uncoordinated riot may be checked by the bartender, panic may be checked by effective leadership. The usual technique in the theater in those days when fire was

* Two great fire panics are described graphically in *World's greatest calamities: the Baltimore fire and Chicago theatre horror* (H. D. Northrop, 1904).

† For a detailed discussion of the German army's application of social psychology to military conquest see *German psychological warfare* (L. Farago and L. F. Gittler, eds., 1941).

a real hazard was to keep the play going on as though nothing had happened. If by this means the members of the audience could be held in their seats until they had to some degree become accustomed to the idea of danger, panic could be averted. Sometimes the orchestra would strike up the national anthem, which would almost automatically bring the audience members to their feet and hold them in their places. This technique was most effective. We have all been trained to stand in our places when the national anthem is being played, and when baffled by unprecedented crisis conditions, we usually respond to anything that is familiar.

Theater panics are rare today, but the danger of panic in certain other places has not appreciably diminished. Barring prevention of crises, the only means of preventing panic is to provide antipanic leadership, a provision that is not easily accomplished. It is the legal right and duty of a ship's captain to assume regimental command over his crew and passengers in times of crisis, but this legal right does not of course give him actual power of leadership. Unless the members of a crisis situation have previously been given long regimental training and are, therefore, unfailingly obedient to the commands of the designated leader, antipanic leadership will at best be fragile.

Mutual Aid.—Stories of ship disasters are usually romanticized to fit the women-and-children-first tradition. The fact is that men, particularly the stronger men, are far more likely to survive than are either women or children, although there are authenticated instances in which people under crisis conditions have acted in the most self-sacrificing way. In ship, mine, earthquake, and other sudden crises men have been known to work together at the risk of their individual welfare and even to sacrifice themselves so that the majority might be saved.* Such incidents have been made the basis for the theory of natural group loyalty or mutual aid. For every recorded case of mutual aid there are, however, many of brutal and mutual destruction.

Apparently, the behavior of people under crisis conditions is determined almost entirely by the nature of the leadership that happens to arise. Self-interested leadership results in general panic. Heroic

* The Russian idealist Kropotkin collected some material on panic from rather doubtful sources and made it the basis for the anarchistic argument in his *Mutual aid a factor of evolution* (P Kropotkin, 1922). A detailed analysis of the events that followed immediately upon the great Halifax disaster of 1917 is given in *Catastrophe and social change* (S H Prince, 1920). Certain theoretical implications of the panic situation are presented in "Disaster and the sequence-pattern concept of social change" (L. J Carr, 1932). *The story of San Michele* (A M F Munthe, 1930) and *The psychology of suggestion* (B Sidis, 1898) give accounts of panic situations in which behavior of a self-sacrificing sort occurred.

leadership leads to heroic action, which may or may not be collectively expedient. Too frequently heroic behavior is stupidly melodramatic. It has happened that, when women and children have been given precedence in a ship disaster, the heroic males have packed them into boats and set them adrift without men to man the boats. On the other hand, it has also happened that a leader has arisen—sometimes an inconspicuous member of the crew or an otherwise undomineering passenger—who has organized the people around him in a most efficient manner. Under such leadership in crisis conditions people are capable of Herculean efforts.* But unled, except by the example of a hysterical person, they become maddened beasts. In the crisis more than in any other situation there is need for sane individual leadership. Undoubtedly it was the calm, forceful leadership of Prime Minister Winston Churchill which, more than any other single factor, prevented the rise of panic among the people of the British Isles when, in 1940, the unexpected fall of France and the incredibly disastrous flight from Dunkerque subjected them to the threat of imminent invasion.

A famine, flood, or plague may constitute a crisis and may result in panic. Rapid social changes also precipitate crisis conditions; and if panic is to be avoided, forceful individual leadership must operate to guide people through social transition. It is a social crisis, or what can be made to appear as a social crisis, that makes possible the rise of a political dictator. Furthermore, as we have already suggested, the dynamic character of our present milieu permits, indeed necessitates, the appearance of dominating and dynamic individual leadership in many walks of contemporary life. This line of thought takes us toward the problem of revolutionary leadership, but before considering it, we must turn our attention to two types of situations—coordinated riots and mass movements—which are the materials from which revolutions are fabricated.

COORDINATED RIOT SITUATIONS

The Mob.—The term “mob” usually implies violent overt action, destruction of life and property, and temporariness. We have designated actions of this order in which leadership operates by mimicry as

*The seemingly superhuman strength sometimes to be observed in crisis situations appears to be due at least in part to two factors. The exciting forces, mediated by the sympathetic autonomies, cause the adrenal glands to release more than the customary amount of adrenalin into the blood stream. This compound acts as a whip for added work and prevents the individual from becoming quickly fatigued. Furthermore, when attention is shifted to more exciting stimuli, a hypalgesia (lessening of response to pain) occurs, and a man is not so likely to stop his efforts because of pain as he would under ordinary conditions.

uncoordinated riots In the uncoordinated riot action is undirected In contrast are those situations in which violent, destructive, and transitory action is guided by a single member who is followed rather than mimicked Such situations may be termed coordinated riots and the members of them true mobs *

Lynching.—For most peoples the collective killing of a human being is acceptable only when it is the consequence of institutional procedures, and mob killing is socially disapproved During the early days in the far west lynching was, perhaps, a conventional substitute for due process of the law in dealing with horse thieves and certain other antisocial persons To the extent that such lynching actually served in lieu of usual forms of crime suppression, it can be considered as simply an atypical form of collective behavior But the sporadic lynching of Negroes in the southeast and the rarer lynching of white kidnappers or other public enemies are definitely abnormal patterns of interaction †

The technique of the lynching mob is today almost exclusively American Many lynchings are in a sense protests against the locally unsatisfactory judicial system But they never cure the source of social difficulty and may thus be considered merely as vengeance wreaked upon a symbol of locally undesirable social conditions In certain regions of the United States there is a constant tension between poor whites and equally poor Negroes Although their poverty is traceable to complex social factors,‡ the whites tend to blame them

* The term "mob," like that of "crowd," has been applied to almost every conceivable type of social situation, to the confusion of students of social situations L L Bernard in his article "Mob" (*Encycl Soc Sci*, 10, 552-554) distinguishes between the "purposive and active" and the "confused and random" types of mobs Apparently he has in mind the distinction that we have drawn between the coordinated and the uncoordinated riot Following somewhat the lead set by Tarde, Le Bon devoted considerable attention to what is primarily the coordinated riot type of situation See *The psychology of revolution* (G Le Bon, 1913) and *The crowd a study of the popular mind* (G Le Bon, 1910)

† F W Coker points out that modern lynchings should not be confused with the extralegal punishment of criminals under early frontier conditions ("Lynching," *Encycl Soc Sci*, 9, 639-643) Today lynching is not a substitute for law and order At best it is a social protest against the delays and uncertainties of the processes of the law, at worst it is a brutal form of recreation

All lynchings receive implicitly, if not openly, a degree of social sanction The San Jose, California, affair of 1934 was given favorable mention by many leading citizens and even by the governor of the state And in many parts of the south the whites quite freely express the view that lynching is the only method of keeping their group in power The activities in Nazi Germany purporting to "protect the purity of Nordic blood" are much the same sort of phenomenon

‡ Coefficients of correlation of approximately — .63 have been found between

plight on the Negroes The Negroes provide a villain for the social drama in which the whites find their part a tragic one. The whites are therefore ready to direct the force of all their discontent upon any Negro who gives or seems to give just cause for wrath Should a Negro rape a white girl or should, as occasionally happens, a white girl make the charge simply to gain attention, that Negro may become a tangible villain in the minds of the whites

Ordinarily the first stage in the crystallization of the dramatic form that may be discerned in any Negro lynching is the arrest, by accredited officials, of some Negro male Rumors soon spread among the whites of the community to the effect that they must play an active part as hero. To see that the officials do their duty, men with nothing more interesting to do drift down to the courthouse and there provide an audience for anyone who feels most inclined to speak This may be the father of the girl, a political opponent of the local sheriff, or someone else with a bone to pick He harangues the group, usually upon the need for keeping "niggers in their place," and may deliberately direct his efforts to the formation of a lynching party Whether he does or not, there is always the chance that his audience will become activated and that leadership will be snatched by someone who cries "Let's lynch the black . . . !" All too frequently the activated audience then becomes a mob, responsive to the loudest voice Since many of the members have previously participated in lynchings and all know the technique of lynching, they can follow the leader without difficulty If they blunder and consequently strangle rather than hang their victim, such a detail escapes notice in the excitement of the moment Since they have destroyed but a symbol of their discontent and have in no way changed the cause, they have accomplished nothing except perhaps a further intimidation of the Negroes

Social Disorganization and Mob Violence.—There is a close relationship between critical social circumstances and mob violence Every race, labor, and political riot is preceded by a long period of increasing covert friction between two racial (actually cultural) groups, between dominant employers and subservient laborers,* or

the numbers of lynchings that occurred between 1882 and 1930 in fourteen Southern states and the Ayres indexes of economic activity in those states Between the number of lynchings and the per-acre value of cotton the figure was even higher Hovland and Sears, who gathered the data, interpret them in terms of "displaced aggression" The "poor whites," adversely affected by hard times and unable to improve their lot, relieve their frustrations in aggressive acts against the innocent Negro (C I Hovland and R R Sears, 1940) See also Chap XV of *Social learning and imitation* (N E Miller and J Dollard, 1941)

* In the days of the hard-driving captains of sailing vessels, revolt on the part

between the politically dominant and the politically subordinated. This friction grows out of functional breakdown of the old system of relationships and is usually a concomitant of underlying social changes. Ultimately the time comes when the members of one faction feel that their survival is dependent upon the annihilation of the other. Even then, overt breach may be long postponed for the simple reason that no one member of the disgruntled group can with impunity act as an individual to protect or to regain his "rights." During periods of tension, sporadic one-man wars may occur, but these can be dealt with quickly and easily by the police or other recognized agents of society.

Effective organization of individual discontent is usually precipitated by some rash act on the part of the "enemy." This is the incident that is sometimes mistakenly referred to as the cause. It may consist of refusal to listen to the complaints of the disgruntled, of an added insult—as a lowering of wage scales—or of a savage and enraging burst of gunfire. It need not be important in itself, it is simply the last straw. This final straw precipitates the crisis and makes it possible for leaders to arise—first, perhaps, as conversion-audience leaders rather than as leaders in overt action against the oppressors. In such a crisis a leader may weld the disgruntled into a mob that is capable of intense violence against the common "enemy."

Race and Labor Riots.—Following the northern migration of Negro labor, race riots* occurred in a number of northern cities. White laborers had come to blame their discontent upon the presence of the cheap Negro labor, and when tension became acute, some minor incident precipitated rioting between the two racial groups. In central Europe, rioting against the Jews has long been a favorite device of political leaders. When discontent among the non-Jews threatens the political *status quo*, a pogrom is instigated in the hope that tensions will be dissipated in attack upon the Jews rather than upon the political leaders.

Labor riots† have occurred quite frequently since the advent of industrialism. The riots of poor and embittered laborers in Eliza-

of seamen was a constant hazard. To such revolt the term "mutiny" was applied. F. L. Schuman ("Mutiny," *Encycl Soc Sci*, 11, 166-167) defines mutiny as "protest behavior on the part of subordinates whose normal deferential attitude toward commanders . . . [has] broken down," a definition that applies equally well to revolt against political leadership on land.

* These race riots between Negroes and whites are discussed in *The Negro in Chicago* (Chicago Commission on Race Relations, 1922).

† The great railroad strike of 1877 is described in *Annals of the great strikes in the United States* (J. A. Dacus, 1877). A more recent review of American strikes is given in *Dynamite: the story of class violence in America* (L. Adamic, 1934). See also *Industrial conflict* (G. W. Hartmann and T. Newcomb, eds., 1939).

bethan England provide some of the most depressing pages of Western history. The rise of labor unionism, with its appointed leaders and bargaining tactics, has acted to reduce the danger of sporadic rioting, but in periods of general economic difficulty the unions usually lose their hold upon the workers, and rioting occurs among the more desperate. The labor riot differs from the race riot only in that the "enemy" is more concentrated, consisting as it does of a single employer or group of employers and their hirelings. The police and even the state militia may belong to this last category, in which case the labor riot takes on the appearance of a political riot. The action of rioting laborers is limited only by the ingenuity of the self-appointed leaders and the endurance of the mob. There is no necessary relationship between the ability of these leaders as riot leaders and their skill as military or political strategists. Although prestige may assist a man in securing leadership of rioting laborers, the primary qualities for leadership of any riot are probably a strident voice, inability to think beyond the exigencies of the moment, and a powerful, thus confidence-inspiring, physique.

The organization of people in a riot situation is always subject to quick and unpredictable repolarization. The coordinated riot may degenerate into an uncoordinated one, and it is by no means uncommon for a riot leader to find that someone has usurped his place as leader and that he is being chased rather than followed.

THE MASS MOVEMENT

When a series of abnormal situations arise upon the basis of a fantastic idea or belief, the result is a "mass movement,"* which can be most readily described as a collective flight from reality. Perhaps the most spectacular and prolonged mass movement of recorded history was the medieval Crusades, during which a significant proportion of the population of western Europe migrated toward the Holy Land, inspired by the fixed belief that peace and prosperity would be granted all Christian peoples if the Infidels could be driven from Jerusalem.

Here in America every period of political and economic crisis has fostered one or more mass movements. Many of these have centered around some new interpretation of the Divine will. The witch-

* When, as frequently happens, the movement centers around the person of a single leader—a messiah—it is more properly termed a messianic than a mass movement. See "Messianism" by H. Kohn (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 356-363). The distinction is not, however, adhered to in the sociopsychological literature. Cantril, for example, considers the movement that centered around Father Divine a "mass" movement (H. Cantril, 1941). See also "Acculturation and messianic movements" (B. Barber, 1941).

hunting that swept over the New England colonies during the 1690's is perhaps the earliest on record. During the critical times following the Revolution, a great religious revival occurred among the destitute people of what were then the western parts of the newly organized country. And time after time since, groups of malcontents have gathered around some psychopath who promised to show the way to earthly perfection. Many of our various religious sects were started by such "messiahs" and began as fanatical mass movements. Of these the rise of Mormonism has perhaps been the most startling and had the most profound and lasting consequences.

Although all mass movements have their quasi-religious element—the "idea" involves new and previously unrecognized "laws" of life—not all are concerned with religious salvation. Moreover, even the religious mass movement may be at basis an attempt to solve some pressing economic or political problem. As was mentioned earlier, the economic difficulties that were precipitated by the stock-market crash of 1929 gave rise to a considerable number and variety of mass movements. These involved quasi-religious factors, but all the movements were directed toward the material improvement of the people involved. Thus the followers of Doctor Townsend came to believe that he had discovered a new law of economic life and that he was a worker of economic miracles. His "plan," however, was directed toward providing, through a fantastic pension scheme, all the old people of the country with a high material standard of living. An even larger religious element was involved in the movement that developed around "Father" Divine. This movement sucked in and further impoverished a great many northern Negroes. They joined Divine's "Heavens" under the illusion that he was God and that, once they had entered one of his earthly heavens, they would live in permanent peace and perpetual prosperity.

The economic crisis of the early 1930's precipitated many pre-existing tensions in Europe, too. In Germany limited mass movements had been appearing all through the preceding decade. It was there, for example, that the back-to-nature, so-called youth movement first made its appearance. Repercussions of this particular movement reached America in the form of the nudist cult, a movement based upon the idea that the way to health and happiness lay in removal of one's clothing. But one element of a profound mass movement, nudism in Germany was less significant in itself than as an indication of the discontent of the people and a forerunner of what was to come. With the further sharpening of discontent after 1929, the conditions were propitious for a great politico-religious upheaval, and it was around the person of Hitler and the ideologies of Nazism that

this occurred. Securing its early support on the basis of mass fanaticism, the Nazi party soon pushed on to effect an insidious revolution in German economic, political, and religious life *

THE REVOLUTION

In the wider sense, the revolution is sociological rather than socio-psychological. It is a long series of events through which major changes in a social system may be effected. But the preface to revolutionary violence is usually one or more mass movements, and that violence invariably takes the form of coordinated political riots †. Mass movements and political riots always have their revolutionary implications, although a given mass movement may have no lasting political effects and many riots are necessary before revolutionary changes in a political system can be effected.

Leadership in Revolution.—Revolution is not of itself a change in the social system. It is but a change in leadership, upon which depends the attainment, largely through trial and error, of the change in conditions. The layman is inclined to believe that the presence of radical leaders make for revolution. The fact is that radical leaders simply direct or attempt to direct mass movements and coordinate or attempt to coordinate a large number of riots, both labor and political. The radical is no more the cause of revolution than the rudder is the cause of the motion of a ship. Like the ship's rudder, the radical leader endeavors to direct the surging mass ‡.

Although political riots are generated by malfunctioning of a social system, they are invariably directed toward the destruction of persons

* For an account of the rise of the Nazi party as a social movement see Chaps VIII and IX in *The psychology of social movements* (H. Cantril, 1941).

† The years following the economic crisis of 1929 witnessed a considerable outbreak in coordinated riots. In Germany, Italy, France, England, America, and elsewhere, riots of a politico-economic character were frequent and prolonged. In Paris, for example, general street rioting between communists and socialists, between each of these and the "general public," and between all of these and the police followed the revelations of political corruption in the Stavisky affair (A. Werth, 1934). Severe rioting occurred between labor and the police and between civil servants and the police following a general reduction in wages ordered by the French government in July and August of 1935. In America there were farmer riots (mainly against mortgage foreclosure) during 1933 (C. Hicks, 1934, and N. C. Meier, G. H. Mennenga, and H. J. Stoltz, 1941) and riots accompanying the San Francisco general strike of July, 1934.

‡ It is true, of course, that the professional revolutionist endeavors to excite as well as direct the populace. But if there is no social sore already at the festering point, his efforts will usually be in vain. In a period such as our own, when the struggle for political and economic leadership is intense, it is perhaps natural for men to view with alarm everything they dislike or do not understand. But

or classes of persons, who serve as a symbol of the causes of discontent. Revolting masses do not relate their discontent to the social system itself but to the people who represent that system—police, army, aristocracy, or whatnot. It is the established political and economic elite who are for the masses the tangible “villains” of the drama in which they themselves play a tragic part. The rioting is therefore directed toward a destruction of a symbol of the social system rather than toward reformation of that system. Only when conditions have become so intolerable that revolt follows revolt in disorderly succession, does radical leadership representing a new philosophy of political and economic life become significant. Then and only then may it grasp leadership and direct revolt toward something more fundamental than a change in the personnel of political and economic leadership.*

Once one has escaped from the rather naive idea that radical leaders make revolt and thus revolution, it becomes evident that it is the failure of reactionary leadership to adjust to changing conditions that results eventually in overthrow of such leadership. It was, for example, the traditionalism of the French aristocrats rather than their greedy parasitism which led to the French Revolution and to their downfall. Economic changes had brought about the growth of a new class—the bourgeois or middle—which was refused political recognition. Crushed between economic pressures from behind and the unyielding wall of political traditionalism in front, this class grew more and more discontented. Rioting was precipitated by an incident and spread throughout the industrial cities of France. For many days the movement had a common enemy, the aristocracy, but no single leadership. In time some few men rose to domination here and there, men prepared by training in radical doctrines to coordinate riotous action. They brought a form of order out of chaos and directed revolt toward revolutionary accomplishment. The Russian Revolution followed much the same pattern.† The Nazi Revolution in Germany deviated from the pattern only, perhaps, in that it involved more of

leaders and leadership, whatever their nature, are an integral part of a complex pattern of forces, and propaganda, a name for one of the methods by which new leaders rise to power, cannot be looked upon as the chief villain of the drama of social change. See *The propaganda menace* (F. E. Lumley, 1933).

* Taking ancient Hebrew history as his text, Steffens described what he called a typical revolution in his *Moses in red: the revolt of Israel as a typical revolution* (L. Steffens, 1926).

† See *The Bolshevik revolution* (J. Bunyan, 1934). Suggestive of the socio-psychological aspects of revolution are *Leaders, dreamers, and rebels* (R. Fülöp-Miller, 1935) and *Rebel America* (L. Symes and T. Clement, 1934).

the mass movement and less of mob violence and in that it led so very rapidly and directly into the German endeavor to subjugate other peoples through military conquest

The part played in revolutions, not by the hysterical people who rise to temporary leadership under riot circumstances, but by radical leaders—men trained in some doctrine of social reconstruction—is indicated by what may happen when no such leadership is available. The Taiping Rebellion in China is a case in point. The social confusion in southern China resulting from the impact of Western industrialism aroused a mass discontent, which by 1850 became so intense that local riots against the persons of government officials were frequent. There was, however, no coordinating philosophy and no trained radical leadership. This left the field of revolutionary leadership open to a religious fanatic, who proceeded to proclaim himself a direct representative of the Christian God. Although he had no plan or program for social reconstruction, he had an intense desire to be ruler of the masses. On the tide of sporadic revolt he swept into power and for years ruled insanely over millions of Chinese people. Possibly his rule was no less expedient than was that of the old imperial government, but in time the people were led to revolt against his leadership. * The way was then open for reconquest by imperial troops.

Every harassed government fears the "incident" that will inflame the masses. The incident need not be important in itself. It is adequate if it can be dramatized into a convincing illustration of the fact that the recognized leaders, political or economic, are villains and that the victims of the incident are symbolic heroines to be rescued by the heroic action of the rioters. Thus the execution in America in the summer of 1927 of Sacco and Vanzetti, publicized "martyrs" to communism, was sufficient excuse for violent rioting on the part of Paris malcontents.

If those who are discontented can be quickly provided with a victim, and it makes no particular difference who the victim is or was, the climax may be resolved to the advantage of those whose leadership is threatened. In this connection, it is again pertinent to point out how universally we think and act in terms of the dramatic form. People will return to their homes gratified, as from a satisfying motion picture, after they have lynched a Negro, all ignorant of the fact that the Negro was but a symbol of and not the basis for their previous discontent. Having witnessed or having heard about the defeat of the villain who may have been nothing more than a martyr to the cause of those in power, people who have long been dissatisfied with their

* See *Gordon in China* (B. M. Allen, 1933)

governmental leaders may feel that they will now live happily ever after

RECAPITULATION

The theme of this book is that the human individual plays but a small role on a great and crowded stage and that he plays that role largely in accordance with a socially predetermined script

From his society the individual derives those human attributes which give him social stature and which adapt him to nature and to the human beings who surround him from birth to death. If his society is a stable one, he will be guided at almost every step, undirected trial and error will play little part in what he does, and his experience will include few important errors.

Should his society, however, be a dynamic, changing one like ours, he will be in painful measure thrown upon his own resources. Since undirected trial and error—apparently his only “natural” means of learning—is largely error, he will often fail to make effective adaptations, and his errors may be fatal. Should he, furthermore, by force of social circumstances be one of those few who are expected to provide some measure of individual leadership for others, success will depend upon his happening to lead them in the direction in which they happen to be going. With some striking exceptions, the individual counts for little in the social scheme of things.

In all this the place of a scientific social psychology should by this time be self-evident. Modern social psychology has disposed of that ancient argument against social change—that the particular form which a society takes is an expression of man’s innate and therefore unmodifiable nature. Human nature can be changed, but only as the forms of a society are changed.

Today we are in process of change, and a large measure of confusion reigns. We must nevertheless as individuals endeavor to adjust ourselves to social life. In this endeavor sociopsychological knowledge can be of significant assistance. An understanding of the laws of physics may help the individual to invent an efficient water wheel and will certainly prevent him from wasting his time on a perpetual-motion machine. An understanding of even what little is now known of the character and nature of sociopsychological processes may, in a like way, aid the individual in inventing a more adequate pattern of adjustment to the dynamic world around him than that which a disordered society has provided for his use. Such an understanding should at least prevent him from attempting to evade the realities of social life.

APPENDIX

1 Cooley's contribution to the development of social psychology can be traced through the literature. He wrote clearly and convincingly, and many subsequent writers have often borrowed his terms and his concepts and have frequently credited him as the source of the thesis they have elaborated.

It is possible that George Mead contributed fully as much, but the medium of his contribution was the classroom, and the effect of his teaching is not, therefore, subject to historical analysis. Mead wrote little and that badly. He was, however, an inspiring teacher. During the first quarter of this century he developed in the classroom the same point of view as that which Cooley presented in his books. In fact, Mead seems to have carried his analysis of the processes by which society develops human nature much farther than Cooley did and to have given more stress to the situational nature of individual behavior—to that extent anticipating recent trends in sociopsychological thinking.

Mead's system centered on the process of "imitation." But unlike Tarde, Mead considered imitation descriptive of a process rather than explanatory of its consequences. In his terminology, the child takes on, or attempts to take on, the role of the person he is imitating. This role Mead terms the child's *other* (other self). In the course of time the child will take on in succession a great many specific roles, out of which there gradually emerges a fairly well integrated personality which Mead terms the *generalized other* or *me*. In Chaps VI and VII the present authors discuss the process under the phrase "learning by example."

Mead's system has been published posthumously under the title *Mind, self, and society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist* (G. H. Mead, 1934). For an evaluation of his contribution by one of his more ardent followers, see "The social psychology of George Mead" (E. Faris, 1937b).

2 A notion of the history of twentieth century social psychology can be gained from the following books. They are arranged chronologically in order of their first editions. The chronology will serve to give the student some idea of how recently social psychology has emerged from the preconceptions of the past and a notion of its psychological (*), neurological and psychoanalytical (†), and sociological (§) origins. The list contains the majority of the published works in English which attempt to treat, somewhat broadly, the problem of social psychology. Those by Sprowls and Karpf are studies of social psychology as a science rather than studies in the science.

‡1901 Ellwood, C. A., *Some prolegomena to social psychology*

Doctoral thesis in which it is argued that social psychology must be the psychological interpretation of group (*i.e.*, cultural) phenomena. This concept has set the boundaries for Ellwood's later works on the subject (listed below).

‡1902 Cooley, C. H., *Human nature and the social order*

The modern classic in social psychology. Human nature is considered as a consequence of habits acquired through experience with members of society—thus, as an indirect consequence of the "social order."

- *1908 McDougall, W , *An introduction to social psychology*.
Under the influence of English philosophical and, especially, evolutionary doctrines, McDougall achieved a text that captured the attention of all social theorists and proved convincing to many For a more extended treatment of McDougall's instinct theory with its dash of teleology, see page 20
- ‡1908 Ross, E A , *Social psychology*
A study of the "planes and currents" within contemporary society The influence of Tarde is pronounced, both conformity and nonconformity being described as a consequence of behavior imitation
- *1911 Baldwin, J M , *The individual and society or psychology and sociology*
This book reflects the practical outlook of a pioneer of the school of functional psychology
- ‡1917 Ellwood, C A , *An introduction to social psychology*
A description, rather than analysis, of sociological phenomena such as "social unity" and "social change" Certain psychological terms (e g , the instinctive) loom large
- ‡1917 Bogardus, E S , *Essentials of social psychology*
A brief analysis of "group" phenomena
- *1920 McDougall, W , *The group mind*
Although published after World War I, most of this—a sequel to his *An introduction to social psychology*—was written before that catastrophe Its subtitle well describes its contents *A sketch of the principles of collective psychology with some attempt to apply them to the interpretation of national life and character*
- ‡1921 Gnsberg, M , *The psychology of society*
An analysis of the "Great Society" in psychological terminology, mainly of the old instinctive school
- ‡1922 Freud, S , *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego*
The original psychoanalyst indicates that for him all psychology is a type of social psychology In this book Freud weaves the theories of Le Bon into his psychoanalytic doctrines
- ‡1922 Williams, J M , *Principles of social psychology*
The author defines social psychology as a science of motives of peoples in social relations He leans upon the old instinctive theory and endeavors to explain the conflict aspects of social life by resort to motives, interests, and attitudes, without realizing that he finds their origins in the very phenomena by which he explains them
- *1923 Gault, R H , *Social psychology*
For its time this text contained good summaries of experiments in the socio-psychological field In many respects its viewpoint can be considered as a reaction to the philosophy of McDougall, then accepted
- *1924 Allport, F H , *Social psychology*
For a time the most read psychological text in the field of social psychology. It catered to those who wished to see the application of experimental method.
- ‡1924 Bernard, L L , *Instinct a study in social psychology*
A vigorous denial of the idea that social behavior can be explained as an expression of biological determinants—instincts—and an effort to set up a behavioristic interpretation of social behavior
- ‡1924 Bogardus, E S , *Fundamentals of social psychology*
An expansion of his earlier work with greater stress upon the training of the individual through social experience. Such sociological problems as the cultural

processes, termed diffusion, accommodation, and assimilation, and such "group" phenomena as fads and fashions, crowds, and mobs are considered in detail Throughout, the "individual" remains in the background, the "group" in the foreground

†1925 Ellwood, C A , *The psychology of human society*

An extension of his thesis that social psychology should be "psychological sociology" He claims for the book that it takes up the story of human life where Allport's text leaves off

†1925 Znamecki, F , *The laws of social psychology*

An attempt to reduce to a few principles the complex phenomena of "group" behavior

*1925 Dunlap, K , *Social psychology*

This book can perhaps best be described as an experimental psychologist's views on certain social problems No attempt has been made to canvass the experimental literature

†1926 Bernard, L L , *An introduction to social psychology*

Using, with caution, behavioristic psychology, the author makes a detailed and rather technical analysis of the processes by which the individual acquires out of the social environment (the behavior patterns of the human beings surrounding him) his life adjustment techniques Difficult to read, this book was perhaps the most penetrating analysis from the sociological approach since Cooley's *Human nature and the social order*

*1927 Sprowls, J W , *Social psychology interpreted*

A study and evaluation of the basic concepts advanced by social psychologists

†1927 Young, K , *Source book for social psychology*

Materials drawn from many sources upon a wide variety of topics ranging from individual differences to public opinion

†*1928 Mukerjee, R, and N N Sen-Gupta, *Introduction to social psychology*

In this book an attempt is made to indicate how the mental life of a man is molded by the "group" environment Although approaching from both the biological and psychological angles, it succeeds mainly in being a sociological treatment Social organization is stressed

*1929 Murchison, C , *Social psychology*

The subtitle—*The psychology of political domination*—suggests the contents of the book It is not intended as an elementary text but rather as a treatise on subjects that have not been much affected by experimentation

*1929 Ewer, B C , *Social psychology*

An attempt to weave the ideas of McDougall and Allport into a unitary synthesis

*1929 Kantor, J R , *An outline of social psychology*

A behavioristic text with particular stress on the development of a theoretical position

†1930 Young, K , *Social psychology*

A critical synthesis of the concepts and materials presented in his *Source book for social psychology* The field is considered as a study of the "contents" of human behavior, mainly derived from social experience

*1930 Smith, J J , *Social psychology*

A description largely in terms of "the sentiments" (which are supposedly associated with some of the most obvious of social relationships). Subtitled *The psychology of attraction and repulsion*

‡1931 Folsom, J K, *Social psychology*

A continuation of the Cooley thesis but with considerable stress upon motivational analysis. Evidence is drawn from a wide range of sources to support the contention that individual behavior grows out of social experience.

‡1931 Krueger, E T, and W C Reckless, *Social psychology*

An analysis, mainly in terms of W I Thomas' "wishes," of the social behavior of the individual. It represents the then-current social psychology of the so-called Chicago school of sociologists.

*1931 Murphy, G, and L Murphy, *Experimental social psychology*

This large book (709 pages) stresses the experimental aspects of social psychology. Child study is given far greater attention in this than in most of the texts of this list. The book has little "plot" but is the best compendium in psychological literature of those experimental studies which have a more or less social slant.

‡1932 Karpf, F B, *American social psychology*

A detailed and critical analysis of the basic concepts that have been advanced by social psychologists, both here and abroad, with consideration of their historical setting and the relation of each concept to the field as a whole.

*1934 Dunlap, K, *Civilized life*

This is essentially a revision of Dunlap's earlier text.

‡1934 Myerson, A, *Social psychology*

Two main theses are stressed by this neurologist: "The first is that the visceral-organic structure of man is basic to the understanding of psychology. The second thesis is that apart from his group a man is a mere potentiality. He is developed in a milieu that fosters, modifies, or destroys his capacities."

‡1934 Brown, L G, *Social psychology*

This book is a "natural history of human nature." The illustrative material is derived from actual student experiences yet is presented in such a form as to indicate the essential unity of the behaving human being.

*1935 Murchison, C, ed, *A handbook of social psychology*

This text, edited by a psychologist, contains eight chapters on the infrahuman, four on racial psychology, and one each on language, sex, age, magic, material culture, the physical environment, attitudes, social maladjustments, human populations, and the influence of social situations on the behavior of the child and of the adult.

*1936 Brown, J F, *Psychology and the social order*

A follower of the topologist, K Lewin, rewrites social psychology in terms of field theory. There are sections devoted to sociology, psychology, and political science.

*1936 Gurnee, H, *Elements of social psychology*

Following the thesis "Social psychology is, after all, *psychology*," Gurnee stresses the experimental aspects of the field.

*1936 Freeman, E, *Social psychology*

The stress throughout is on the side of social applications. An environmentalistic bias is acknowledged.

*1937 MURPHY G., L Murphy, and T M Newcomb, *Experimental social psychology*.

The 1931 edition has been rewritten with a broader definition of the word "experimental" in mind. Newcomb has major responsibility for an extensive section on attitudes.

*1938 Katz, D , and R L Schanck, *Social psychology*

An attempt to conceive of the entire field "within the bounds of the experimental tradition " The book reflects but goes beyond the theoretical framework of F H Allport's *Social psychology*

†1938 Reinhardt, J M , *Social psychology*

The area treated is limited to "the individual personality and modes of adjustment which arise as a result of experience in the socio-cultural environment "

*1940 Bird, C , *Social psychology*

The aim of this book has been "not to assemble researches but rather to clarify, and if possible show the solutions for, social problems through the medium of research "

*1940 Klineberg, O , *Social psychology*

Particular emphasis is placed on attempted integration of ethnology, comparative sociology, and psychology

*1941 Britt, S H , *Social psychology of modern life*

The author, who has long urged more cooperation between sociologists and psychologists, has aimed his book at both groups and at the lay public as well

†1942 Krout, M H , *Introduction to social psychology* This elementary text reverses recent trends in social psychology and attempts a "psychological" approach to what are usually considered sociological problems

The following list contains a number of references in English to thought-provoking articles and books that have appeared during the past decade

"Textbooks in social psychology" (D Snedden, 1932)

"Experimental social psychology" (A S Edwards, 1932)

"Social psychology as an experimental science" (O A Oeser, 1932)

"Ejective consciousness as a fundamental factor in social psychology" (M F Washburn, 1932)

"Recent trends in American social psychology" (H Cantril, 1933)

"Studies in the social psychology of science" (R Muller-Freienfels, 1933)

"The social psychology of everyday life" (H Cantril, 1934)

"Problems of social psychology" (S Dawson, 1934)

A manual of exercises and experiments in social psychology (W Dennis, 1934)

"The present status of social psychology in America" (K L Smoke, 1935)

"Field work in social psychology" (E J Lindgren, 1935)

"Pareto and experimental social psychology" (C Murchison, 1935b)

"Social psychology a philosophical analysis" (A B Gibson, 1936)

"The place of aesthetics in social psychology" (H S Langfeld, 1936)

"What is social psychology?" (M L Lemmon, 1936)

The nature of human nature, and other essays in social psychology (E Faris, 1937a)

"The role of individual psychological differences in social psychology" (C C Miles, 1937)

"Methods and assumptions of field work in social psychology" (O A Oeser, 1937)

"Past and present trends in the methods and subject matter of social psychology" (S H Britt, 1937)

Social psychology of education (A O Bowden and I R Melbo, 1937)

"The need and opportunity for experiment in social psychology" (J F Dashiell, 1937)

"Introduction the Hanover round table—social psychology of 1936" (F H Allport, 1937b)

- "Administrative and professional vocations as fields for social psychology" (E S Robinson, 1937)
- "German science of character" (C Spearman, 1937)
- "Some remarks on social psychology" (S E Asch, 1939)
- "The current situation in social psychology" (J R Kantor, 1939)
- "The research task of social psychology" (G Murphy, 1939)
- "The psychology of social culture" (H W Wright, 1939)
- "Current research in social psychology" (H B Lewis, 1939)
- Human nature writ large a social psychological survey and Western anthropology* (F Creedy, 1939)
- "The image of the other man, a study in social psychology" (G Ichheiser, 1940)
- "The problem of the concept in social psychology" (H Blumer, 1940)
- "Review of current social psychology" (S H Britt, 1940)
- "On the data of social psychology" (S Q Janus, 1940)
- "The methodology of social psychology" (G Y Rusk, 1941)
- "Important developments in American social psychology during the past decade" (L S Cottrell, Jr, and R Gallagher, 1941)

A perusal of the articles and books listed below will give a picture of contemporary social psychology in the non-English-speaking world

- "Zur Sozialpsychologie des Volkshochschulhorers" (L Radermacher, 1932)
- Elementares Lehrbuch der Sozialpsychologie* (W Hellpach, 1933)
- "Der Gegenstand der Sozialpsychologie" (L H A Geek, 1934)
- "Wirkliche Sozialpsychologie" (W Hellpach, 1935b)
- "Psychologie des Gemeinschaftslebens" (F Krueger, 1935)
- Sociale Psychologie* (C A Mennicke, 1935)
- Introdução á psicologia social* (A Ramos, 1936)
- "Massenpsychologische Probleme in der Schulklasse" (E Buxbaum, 1936)
- Einführung in die Völkerpsychologie* (W Hellpach, 1938)
- "La psychologie sociale expérimentale" (W Drabovitch, 1938)
- "Grundgedanken zur vergleichenden Völkerpsychologie" (A Blau, 1938)
- "Una nuova valutazione del comportamento sociale" (A Marzi, 1939)
- Psicologia del comportamento sociale* (A. Miotto, 1939)

Articles related to problems of social psychology appear occasionally in a number of the sociological and psychological (and, on rarer occasions, in educational and clinical) journals. The following journals are devoted wholly or in large part to this field

- Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* (founded in 1906)
- Journal of Social Psychology* (founded in 1929)
- Character and Personality* (founded in 1932)
- The Public Opinion Quarterly* (founded in 1937)
- Sociometry* (founded in 1937)

3. The majority of studies of family lines do not yield evidence at all pertinent to the nature-nurture controversy. It would appear that for many researchers in this field the problem is solved in their own minds before they begin their analyses of family lines, *i.e.*, they assume as true that which the subsequent analyses are expected to prove. They fail to see that, with their techniques so crude and clumsy and the problem so intricate, little factual information bearing on the nature-nurture controversy can possibly emerge. When a researcher has, for

example, calculated the number of musicians in each generation of the Bach family, he has offered no data to show why the Bachs were musical at one period and not another. Was the subsequent disappearance of musicality in the Bach family the resultant of "wrong" matings, a change in the economic status of musicians, of both factors, or of neither? Family studies do not give the answer. The mere fact that distributions of musical and nonmusical personages may vaguely resemble the geneticists' distributions of black and vestigial fruit flies has little or no explanatory value.

4 The fact that folklore and fable contain many references to feral man suggests that feral man has long intrigued the layman as well as the theorist. A recent wave of interest has led to articles on a "baboon boy" from South Africa and a book that describes two "wolf girls" from India. The existence of the "baboon boy" has already been denied even by its American advocate (J. P. Foley, Jr., 1940a and 1940b). But the existence of the "wolf girls" is still accepted by at least one child specialist, who has written a popular and extremely naive book on the subject (A. Gesell, 1941). Reviews of this book make it quite clear that others are more skeptical of the evidence. The inconsistencies in the reports on these Hindu girls are enormous. Moreover, no scientist was able to examine the girls while they were still alive. The scientific world was kept for years in ignorance of their very existence—because their discoverer and protector, a missionary, did not wish to lessen their matrimonial possibilities! For other articles on the subject of feral man see "Jungle children" (G. M. Stratton, 1934c), "Feral man and extreme cases of isolation" (R. M. Zingg, 1940); "The significance of feral man" (W. Dennis, 1941), and "A reply to Professor Dennis" (R. M. Zingg, 1941). Of the several scientists interested in Hindu "wolf girls" Zingg is one of the few who are still hopeful of their authenticity.

Although there are no authentic cases of feral man, there are cases of children who have been reared by foster parents who are brighter or duller than their own parents. During this century a considerable number of foster-children studies have been undertaken. The better controlled of these experiments agree with one another. As one reviewer phrases their findings: "When children of *school age* are given one of the more modern revisions of the Binet Scale, such as the Stanford or the Kuhlmann revision, under standard conditions and by competent examiners, most of the intelligence quotients thus earned will show only small fluctuations upon retesting with the same scale after intervals varying from 1 to 6 or 7 years. Considering all the evidence, it is safe to say that 50 per cent of the elementary-school children will not change their standing by more than 5 points of IQ in either direction, while the remaining 50 % will show somewhat greater variation" (F. Goodenough, 1940, p. 357).

It should be possible, theoretically at least, to disentangle the interwoven strands of nature and nurture by holding one constant and varying the other. Thus, we might equate environments and vary hereditaries, or vice versa. But the first of these is not the easy task it might seem to be. For by what procedure can we prove that the environments that have surrounded two people from birth have been identical? Those measures of environment that are available—tests of socioeconomic status*—yield rough approximations only. The environmental

* For a review and extension of the works on socioeconomic status see *The measurement of urban home environment* (A. Leahy, 1936). See also "The measurement of socioeconomic status" (G. A. Lundberg, 1940) and "Measurement of social status" (L. D. Zeleny, 1940).

stimuli that have impinged upon a person during his lifetime are so many that they are beyond all present possibility of calculation. Certain of these stimuli greatly affect the human animal, whereas others affect him relatively little. But the weights that should be assigned to these stimuli and their relative values as behavior modifiers can still only be guessed at. And since we cannot evaluate with any degree of assurance the environmental forces that surround any one person, we cannot hope to learn with exactitude whether or not they are the equivalent of the stimuli that have made up the environment of another human being.

Equating heredities and varying environments is almost as difficult. Blood relatives resemble each other in intelligence and personality more than do people selected at random from the population at large. The former are more alike in genetic structure than are the latter unrelated groups. Similarity in heredity, however, tends to be paralleled by similarity in environment. Thus, by and large, relatives tend to have been subjected to more of the same sorts of environmental pressures than have nonrelated people. The only persons with presumably identical heredities are pairs of identical twins. Yet, unfortunately, these exceptional folk when reared together tend to have the most similar environments of all mankind (P. T. Wilson, 1934).

To circumvent this difficulty, a number of studies have been made of identical twins reared apart (H. H. Newman, F. N. Freeman, and K. J. Holzinger, 1937, and I. C. Gardner and H. H. Newman, 1940). So far only about a score of pairs have been located, and many of these have unfortunately had quite similar environments. The resemblances in intelligence between identical twins reared apart seem to be intermediate between those of fraternal twins and of identical twins reared together (Q. McNemar, 1938). For further references on the nature-nurture issue see the many articles of *The 39th yearbook of the national society for the study of education* (G. M. Whipple, ed., 1940) and "Heredity and environment: a critical survey of recently published material on twins and foster children" (R. S. Woodworth, 1941).

5. Unfortunately the relative strengths of human drives cannot be measured like those of animal drives. If one desires to test an animal that has been deprived for some time of both food and water, one can place it in a box surrounded by an electric grill. To the right of the grill will be placed food and to the left water. The number of the grill contacts and crossings (during which the animal is electrically shocked) will furnish a rough measure of the relative strength of each drive, or so believe certain of the animal psychologists (C. J. Warden, 1931). A number of other laboratory devices are also at hand for measuring animal drives. See "A comparative study of sexual drive in adult male rats as measured by direct copulatory tests and by the Columbia obstruction apparatus" (C. P. Stone *et al.*, 1935).

6. Adler has rejected the Freudian assertion that "psychical" processes derive all their energy from sex and has attributed all such processes to attempts to compensate for some sort of physical, social, or moral inferiority. Thus, says Adler, the musician enters the field of music because he is stimulated by a defective auditory equipment, the artist enters his profession spurred on by color weakness, the behavior of the cripple is aimed at attention getting as a compensation for his defect. But research has not shown musical students to be defective along auditory lines (P. R. Farnsworth, 1941a) or artistic children to be color weak (S. Atwell, 1939). And although the personalities of some cripples are abnormal because of their unfortunate condition (B. B. Rosenbaum, 1937), many cripples show little personality distortion that is attributable to their deformities (R. C.

Kammerer, 1940) Adler has been a little too eager to prove his case by citing instances that seemed to him to fit his theory—a deaf musician, an orator who stammered at one time, a professional strong man who has been a consumptive, etc. No one doubts that a defect may spur a given individual to action. But that all spurs to action occur as compensations for defects of some sort, only Adlerians believe (A. Adler, 1917). Dollard has made the interesting observation that the Adlerian principle of overcompensation for felt inferiorities is peculiarly bound to our own competitive culture. Since it functions far less among other groups, it cannot be considered a general principle for social psychology (J. Dollard, 1935).

7 From physical chemistry has come the term “sublimation,” a much used concept in psychoanalysis. Except on rare occasions, says Freud, one’s biological drives cannot be expressed in crude form, since they conflict with the social patterns. So they become sublimated, expressed in a new line of activity that is regarded by the social group as being on a more acceptable level. A blocked sex impulse reappears in artistic creation, in managerial ability, or in world domination. The proofs for these contentions supposedly lie in the freely associated material brought to consciousness through the procedure of psychoanalysis. But, as a matter of fact, the so-called “free associations” of the patient are actually rigorously controlled and directed by the analyst. The latter, who of course was himself psychoanalyzed (converted to the ism) some time before, suppresses and dismisses those associations that are not useful to his theory and waxes enthusiastic over all that have to do with sex (C. Landis, 1940 and 1941). The proof, then, becomes little more than the announcing of a theory for art* or some other activity that was already present in the mind of the analyst. The analyst obviously received it from his father confessor, who in turn obtained it directly or indirectly from Freud. The concept of sublimation is, therefore, a dogma that is taken on faith by all good Freudians but is of little value to the social psychologist.

The psychoanalytic mechanism of sublimation holds that adult motives are reducible to biological urges (often sexual or eliminative) and that the motive power for adult activity is the energy of the urge that is now expressed in disguised form. In opposition to this view is one known as the functional autonomy of motives. Gordon Allport,† its most convincing proponent, regards adult motives as “infinitely varied, and as self-sustaining, *contemporary* systems, growing out of antecedent systems, but functionally independent of them. Theoretically all adult purposes can be traced back to these seed-forms in infancy. But as the individual matures the bond is broken. The tie is historical, not functional.” (G. W. Allport, 1937, p. 194.)

To clarify the implications of these two views, let us contrast the manner in which each would “explain” the peculiarities of the miser. Certain psychoanalysts would trace the miser’s dominant motivation and that of his polar opposite, the spendthrift, to an abnormality of bowel control in early infancy. But one who holds to the functional autonomy of motives, although admitting that all adult motives are built on earlier ones, would institute clinical studies to find the

* Some art does of course have a sex motivation. See “Double meaning in the popular Negro blues” (G. B. Johnson, 1927).

† His doctrine has recently been attacked by a follower of McDougall (P. A. Bertocci, 1940). For Allport’s answer see “Motivation in personality: reply to Mr. Bertocci” (G. W. Allport, 1940).

pertinent factors responsible for these peculiarities of monetary behavior. A number of such clinical studies have been made. They all agree in showing that miserly* and spendthrift behaviors are associated with a large number of environmental variables, bowel difficulty in infancy being only one of the many.

The doctrine of sublimation is a reflection of a particularizing tendency seen especially among practical people—and psychoanalysts are practical therapists, not scientists. Man is forever on the lookout for a single or type explanation for every happening he cannot immediately understand, it is therefore disturbing to find that two superficially (phenotypically) similar behaviors can be "caused" by quite dissimilar events. But whether we want to or not, we are forced to accept the fact that the bases of social motivation are many and varied.

8 At least three other phenomena, in addition to "feeling states" are designated by the term "emotion"†. Some writers use the term "emotion" to refer to covert responses, to any considerable change in the metabolic condition that lasts but a short time. These responses may or may not be perceived by their possessor. Others use the term to refer to the rather immediate and relatively untutored overt activity that accompanies the visceral disturbances, although this activity more commonly receives the title "natural expression of emotion". These expressions differ so markedly from person to person even under rather similar conditions that only a few patternlike forms can be seen (R. C. Davis, 1934, and N. L. Munn, 1940). An exception occurs in the case of the startle responses, which have a rather uniform pattern‡. The term "emotion" is also used to refer to the staged or stereotyped expressions that serve as symbols but differ from society to society (see Chap. V).

9 In recent years psychologists, particularly Gesell of Yale and his students, have attempted to study maturational factors by the aid of an ingenious technique known as co-twin control (A. Gesell and H. Thompson, 1941). One member of a pair of young identical twins is made the experimental subject, and his pair-mate the control. While the former is being subjected to a specific training regime, the latter is receiving no special training. The time needed for the experimental subject to learn the task is noted. At a later date the control subject is put through a similar training regime, and the time necessary to learn the task is recorded. If this older child needs a shorter training period than did his twin, the timesaving

* One miserly person recently studied was found to be overcompensating for a background of "proud" poverty. Although the importance of money had been continually played down in his family, the need for it had been painfully clear to him. By the time money did begin to "roll in," his habits of extremely frugal living had become well established. He could spend his fortune in reverse only; he lived to accumulate wealth which he frankly admitted he could not force himself to spend. Incidentally, the records obtained from his mother showed that no eliminative difficulty had occurred during infancy.

† For references on the feelings and the emotions see *The psychology of pleasantness and unpleasantness* (J. G. Beebe-Center, 1932); *Emotions and bodily changes*, etc. (H. F. Dunbar, 1935); "Recent developments in the field of emotion" (W. A. Hunt, 1941); *Emotions: their psychological, physiological and educative implications* (F. H. Lund, 1939); and *Psychology of feeling and emotion* (C. A. Ruckmick, 1936).

‡ The "natural expressions" of startle are described in *The startle pattern* (C. Landis and W. A. Hunt, 1939).

will undoubtedly be due in part to greater maturation. In any such experiment, however, there are probably many other factors, such as motivational and personality differences caused by the earlier training of one of the twins and incidental training, a carry-over from somewhat similar types of behavior. Thus the control twin may develop inferiority feelings because he is kept from learning to perform the tricks his experimental twin can do. Or he may transfer some of his incidental earlier training to the new problem. In one of the earlier maturational studies the experimental twin was taught to climb stairs. But the researcher could not keep the control twin from climbing on boxes, stools, and the like, all of which aid ability to climb stairs. For crude, demonstrational purposes the co-twin technique is, however, useful.

Other titles on maturation can be found in "Learning I. The factor of maturation" (C. P. Stone, 1934). See also *Developmental diagnosis* (A. Gesell and C. S. Amatruda, 1941).

10 As is true of so many issues, whether or not there are animal societies depends in great degree on the definitions used. If one is interested in stressing continuity in human and animal worlds, a definition of "society" must be proposed that will embrace at the very least the social activities of the apes and the social insects. But if, on the other hand, one is desirous of playing up the hiatus between man and the subhuman animals another sort of definition is necessary.

In *The emergence of human culture* Warden has contended that only man can be said to possess a genuine society. To support this conclusion he has proposed as criteria for society (a) invention, (b) communication, and (c) social habituation—acquired social organization (C. J. Warden, 1936). There are, of course, instances of animal behaviors that meet each of these criteria to some slight degree. But the completeness of man's social organization is missing. For another attempt to discover what human implications are derivable from animal organizations, see *The social life of animals* (W. C. Allee, 1938).

11 Failure to distinguish conceptually between the natural (biological and physical) forces that act as limitations upon man as a social being and the social heritage that makes him social has led many social scientists into the pessimism of a cul-de-sac. *Civilization and climate* (E. Huntington, 1915) and *The biology of population growth* (R. Pearl, 1925) are noteworthy examples of this failure and the fatalistic viewpoint to which it leads. In these books man is seen as the helpless victim of inexorable natural forces—of climate and of a "nature-determined" birth rate, respectively. The distinction in function between social and biological factors is set forth in "The nature of human nature" (E. Faris, 1926b) and "The relation of biology and sociology" (E. B. Reuter, 1927b). Herrick, a biologist, critically examines the idea that biological factors determine the character of social life in *Fatalism or freedom* (C. J. Herrick, 1927).

Because their own society is a rapidly changing one, contemporary sociologists have concentrated upon the phenomena of change and have endeavored to discover the process or sequences by which social changes have come about. The survey reported in *Recent social trends in the United States* (President's Research Committee on Social Trends, 1933) was an effort to find where we are going socially by analyzing historically how we have arrived where we are.

The following are notable efforts to discern a basic pattern, or a number of basic processes, in the changing character of the social heritage under which we live. *Social change with respect to culture and original nature* (W. F. Ogburn, 1922), *Cultural evolution* (C. A. Ellwood, 1927), *An introduction to the science of sociology*

(R E Park and E W Burgess, 1924), *Cultural change* (F S Chapin, 1928); *Social process and human progress* (C M Case, 1931), and *The technique of social progress* (H Hart, 1931)

12 One aspect of status that has recently been studied is that of occupational prestige. Some occupations are considered as more honorable, more admirable, and more worthy of prestige than others, but no universal agreement as to the proper rankings exists. Laymen in the U S S R regard the businessman and the priest as less worthy than we do in America (J Davis, 1927). All good democrats give the military man less prestige during peacetime than during periods of active warfare.

Examining a minuscule aspect of the problem of status, Coutu tested in 1934-1935 the professed attitudes of three groups of college students—law, medical, and engineering—toward twenty white-collar occupations. Each student group gave its own prospective occupation the highest rating. Because medicine received second place in the ratings of the two nonmedical groups, it achieved top position in the combined ratings. The engineers bunched their ratings together, even their lowest occupation received many prestige votes. The medical students, on the other hand, so spread their ratings that the position of college professor, which came third on their scale, had a prestige score similar to that received by osteopathy, which ranked at the bottom of the engineering scale. No other occupation was considered by the medical students as at all close to medicine in occupational prestige. If such an attitude is common among physicians, it may account in part for their traditional hostility toward socialized medicine. It is likely that any change in the management of medical affairs would lower the prestige attached to medicine (W Coutu, 1936). See also "Social distance between occupations" (F Wilkinson, 1929); "The relative social prestige of representative medical specialties" (G W Hartmann, 1936a), "Social prestige values of a selected group of occupations" (C W Hall, 1938), "The attitudes of college women toward women's vocations" (R B Stevens, 1940), and "Analysis of a prestige frame of reference by a gradient technique" (C E Osgood and R Stagner, 1941).

Status has been termed the "pseudo quality" of a man's personality; the impression he makes on others, the "sham quality", and the inherent core of his personality, the "real quality" (G Ichheiser, 1941).

13. Failure to realize that the term "society" symbolizes an abstraction derived from very real phenomena has frequently resulted either in implied denial of society's existence or mystical interpretations of its character. The former error is in part responsible for the uncritical material given in many of the popular biological treatises. Biological speculations to the contrary notwithstanding, man does not behave in a social order as he would on Robinson Crusoe's island. The second error has been more serious. European scholars in particular have been guilty of conceiving of society as if it were a definite entity. Stripped of their impressive terminology, all such concepts are revealed as comparable to Hitler's "Germanic Spirit". Kant (I Kant, 1929) and more particularly Hegel (G S Morris, 1892) set the pattern for this type of metaphysical thinking. To Hegel the state was an embodiment of the society's "soul". Wundt's elaborate analysis of "folk psychology" (W Wundt, 1916) implied a somewhat similar concept. From a different approach McDougall in *The group mind* (W McDougall, 1920) has been thought by some students to arrive at a similar concept of society.

Use of the "organic analogy" in conveying the idea that men do not behave irrespective of the behavior of their fellows has frequently led to the unwarranted

assumption that sociologists accept as valid the above-mentioned mystical interpretations. Although one English sociologist leaned toward it (L T Hobhouse, 1911), few American sociologists have followed the Hegelian tradition.

The organic analogy is a comparison of some of the processes of human interrelations with those of an organism, generally the human body. Spencer made great use of this analogy (H Spencer, 1893-1897), and Cooley a cautious use. Certainly there is much to commend it as a communicative device. We may compare the unity of society with the unity of the human organism. The way in which events that transpire on the stock exchange in New York are communicated to San Francisco, there to affect the behavior of men, may be likened to the way a man's feet may respond to visual stimuli from an onrushing motorcar. The complex social phenomena that result from communication between human beings can be compared to the coordination of body movement and processes through neural communication. A similar comparison may be made between the transportation of goods and persons within society by railroad, motorcar, and steamship and of tissue food supplies and wastes within the organism by the blood stream. The analogy is especially fruitful in conveying ideas of how intimately the parts of the social pattern are related and of how the individual's welfare is bound up with the total. It is true of society, as it is of the human body, that to take it apart destroys the essential and distinctive attributes of the entity—that which in the human body we term life. Just as we do not necessarily have a living organism merely because we have ten fingers, ten toes, two legs, two arms, one head, and one torso, we do not have a society simply because we have twenty men. If we are to have a society, the men, like the parts of the organism, must be interrelated. Furthermore, just as the hand cannot live if the body dies, the individuals may not survive if the society actually disintegrates.

But the organic analogy, like all analogies, is in danger of being taken too literally. Traditionally it has been assumed that the human organism possesses, during life, a superorganic entity called the "soul," which is presumed to be the embodiment of the life "stuff" and the director of life activities. Those who speak and write as though society were an entity, rather than an abstraction from entities, carry the analogy to its illogical conclusion. There is, we now believe, no need of transcending the mundane and entering into mysticism to explain social phenomena. The psychologist no longer bothers about the human soul but leaves this problem to the theologian. The sociologist is likewise not concerned with the "soul of society." See *Social organization* (C H Cooley, 1923, Chaps I, II, and XXXIV).

14 It is common observation that changes within the body tend to accompany sudden and striking alterations of the environment outside the body. Under certain conditions of environmental change it often happens that an individual's blood vessels dilate or constrict, that swallowing becomes difficult, that feelings of suffocation exist, and that fainting with its attendant redistribution of blood occurs. So it is no wonder that from the earliest days of the scientific era, and even before, men have tried to measure these visceral changes and to see social significance in them. Instruments have been constructed for the measurement of blood pressure, blood volume, rate of heartbeat, body temperature, metabolic level, blood quality, skin resistance to slight electric currents, acidity of body fluids, ratio of the length of expiration to the length of inspiration, the character of the electric currents generated by the muscles and nerves, and a number of other body conditions,

The research so far undertaken shows that the relation between change of opinion and the several measurable aspects of body condition is slight. A fairly consistent, though small, relationship does, however, exist between conflict and frustration on the one hand and body state on the other, *i.e.*, conflict situations are mirrored slightly in covert changes. Presumably the frustrating circumstances bring about emotional upsets, the visceral aspects of which can be measured. But no other relationships have been so far discovered. See "A study of the autonomic excitation resulting from the interaction of individual opinion and group opinion" (C. E. Smith, 1936), "The measurement of emotions aroused in response to personality test items" (G. S. Speer, 1937), "The measuring of attitudes toward war and the galvanic skin reflex" (S. N. F. Chant and M. D. Salter, 1937), and "Some physiological changes during frustration" (H. Jost, 1941).

It is possible that overt habits may be paralleled in some covert manner. McDougall felt so certain that such was the case that he postulated a chemical unknown to account for the extremely seclusive, nonsocial, and shut-in type of personality deviation which is known popularly as the introverted temperament (W. McDougall, 1929). Subsequent experiments, however, have been unable to show that introverts, no matter how defined, are substantially different from extroverts, their polar opposites, in any measurable physiological characteristic. Nor can any other personality deviants of the milder sorts be singled out with any facility on the basis of unusual bodily condition. See *The physiological psychology of introverts and extroverts* (L. P. Herrington, 1930), "Some relationships between personality and body chemistry" (G. J. Rich, 1933), "The inter-relations of certain physiological measurements and aspects of personality" (K. T. Omwake, E. S. Dexter, and L. W. Lewis, 1934), "The biochemical variability of the individual in relation to personality and intelligence" (H. Goldstein, 1935), "An experimental study of personality, physique, and the acid-base equilibrium of the blood" (J. A. Hamilton and N. W. Shock, 1936), and "The patellar reflex and personality" (J. P. Guilford and R. C. Hall, 1937).

From time to time there has been considerable hope that the study of brain potentials (free electrical currents) would yield information of use in ascertaining personality deviants. But so far, except with epileptics (W. G. Walter, 1939), there has been little success. See "The relationship between brain potentials and personality" (A. B. Gottlob, 1938), "A note on the relationship between 'personality' and the alpha rhythm of the electroencephalogram" (C. E. Henry and J. R. Knott, 1941), and "Electrical activity of the brain" (H. H. Jasper, 1941).

The effects of sex hormones on adolescent interests and attitudes constitute at present a promising field of research. Boys of high hormone activity show more interest in heterosexual activity, personal adornment, and strenuous competitive sports than do adolescents of low hormone activity (R. T. Sollenberger, 1940). For the effects on overt behavior of glandular malfunctioning, see "Endocrine function and personality" (D. J. Ingle, 1935) and "Pituitary disturbances in relation to personality" (L. A. Lurie, 1938).

15. Some years ago J. B. Watson so oversold his extreme behavioristic views that all behaviorism was identified in the popular mind with Watsonism, and all students of human behavior were thought to preach the same incomplete psychology. Many a person outside the field of professional psychology believed that psychologists dealt only with overt activities. But nothing was farther from the truth. Covert activity was explicitly recognized, even by the majority of behaviorists, and the delayed reaction was much studied. Present-day psychologists also include covert activities in their theoretical systems.

Hull, a modern behaviorist who is interested in symbolic logic, has a number of covert parts to his system. The "excitatory potential" and the "stimulus trace" are typical. Hull's statement on the "stimulus trace" can be taken as illustrative: "The concept *stimulus trace* has substantially the status of a symbolic or logical construct. While there are physiological indications that the expression represents an entity which may ultimately be observable in some indirect manner, for the present purposes it may be regarded as unobservable" (C. Hull *et al.*, 1940, p. 23).

Tolman, who occupies a mid-position between behaviorism and Gestalt psychology, discusses covert behaviors under the name "behavior determinants." These are "the intervening variables to be conceived as functioning between the initiating (independent) causes of behavior on the one side of the equation, and the final resulting behavior on the other side of the equation" (E. C. Tolman, 1932, p. 438).

The original topological psychologist, Lewin, also has a classification of behavior which approximates that of the overt-covert. According to Lewin, an individual has an outer region, motor and perceptual (speech and gestures occur here), and an inner core, the inner-personal regions. "Needs or other states of the inner-personal regions can influence the environment only by way of a bodily action, that is, by way of a region which one can call the motor region" (K. Lewin, 1936, p. 177).

16 Direct study of many of our most important nonsymbolic behaviors, such as war activities and interracial responses, is difficult if not impossible. War behaviors cannot be brought into the laboratory for analysis. And even an ever-present companion could gather but scanty data on a person's reactions toward the members of some particular race. The social psychologist can only measure opinions concerning future war behaviors (A. E. Traxler, 1935; C. T. Pihlblad, 1936, and J. Zubin and M. Gristle, 1937), in the hope that these symbolic opinions will reflect the more important later nonsymbolic activities. Similarly he tests opinions on the several national and culture groups (G. E. Bryant, 1941), in the hope that through these he can forecast what will happen in later interracial contacts. Measures are sometimes made of opinions that have no nonsymbolic parallels. Thus, a subject may be asked his opinion about the nature of the Deity or about the possibility of experiencing the Divine Presence (R. D. Sinclair, 1928).

Opinions are sometimes measured by ratings (E. Monjar, 1937), by rankings (S. E. Asch, H. Block, and M. Hertzman, 1938) or by comparisons. Thus to measure student opinion regarding the efficiency of the men who have served as President of the United States, one might have the students rank the names of these men from best to worst, rate them on a five-point scale from excellent through good, average, and poor to very poor; or compare each name with every other name. The last-mentioned procedure, that of paired comparisons,* would be too time consuming for use in a study involving all the presidents. It has, however, been used in a study involving ten presidents (L. W. Ferguson, 1936). These three simple techniques for measuring opinions all yield essentially similar data.

Opinions have also been measured by the autobiographical method (S. A. Stouffer, 1930), the interview method (R. T. LaPiere, 1928; B. J. Breslaw, 1938; R. C. Oldfield, 1941; W. V. D. Bingham and B. V. Moore, 1941; and L. W. Doob, 1941), and the questionnaire method (E. E. Ghiselli, 1939). If the phrase

* If N is taken as the number of items to be compared, the number of comparisons will equal $N(N - 1) - 2$.

"Japanese Exclusion Act" is presented to a member of the Japanese race and he is allowed to check one of the possibilities of response—insult, unfortunate, necessary, desirable, doesn't go far enough, etc.—a rather good measure of his opinion of the act will be obtained (G B Watson, 1929b). Conservatism in opinions has been tested by tabulating agreements to statements—such as "In teaching the vital problems of citizenship, teachers should so impress on the students the approved opinions in these matters that life's later experiences can never unsettle or modify the opinions given" (M H Harper, 1927). See also, the following references "Radicalism-conservatism in student attitudes" (E Nelson, 1938), "Responses of a group of gifted children to the Pressey interest-attitude test" (R L Thorndike, 1939), and "Children's thinking about nations and races" (H Meltzer, 1941a).

The opinion-scale method is not markedly different from that of the questionnaire. The former usually contains fewer questions, and, unlike those of the questionnaire, the question items have agreed-upon values. The early Bogardus test of "social distance," for example, was a questionnaire of only seven questions, each having an arbitrary weight (E S Bogardus, 1928). The person whose opinion was desired was presented with a list of races on which he was to indicate, by checking one or more of the seven questions, his willingness to associate with the members of each of the races listed. In this manner social distance was supposedly measured. It was assumed that admission of the members of a particular race "to my club as personal chums" has a social-distance value equidistant between that of "admission to close kinship by marriage" and that of "admission to my street as neighbors." It was similarly assumed that the scale value of the last-mentioned item fell exactly between that of the "club" item and that of "admission to employment in my occupation in my country," etc., and thus, if the "club" item were given an opinion weight of 2, the "kinship" item would deserve a weight of 1, the "street" item a weight of 3, and the "occupation" item a weight of 4. The assumption that the scale steps should be values of 1, 2, 3, and 4 is not, however, a proof that these are fitting weights.* The Thurstone scheme of "attitude" measurement (L L Thurstone and E J Chave, 1929), with its provision for less arbitrary opinion weights, has met with a warmer reception from measurement-minded social psychologists.

In the construction of a war scale fashioned after the Thurstone pattern,† first, comes the collection of a large number of statements (items) about war. These are then rated by a sizable group of intelligent, but not necessarily unbiased, judges (L W Ferguson, 1935, and R Pintner and G Forlano, 1937a). The rating table is divided into 11 sections, number 1 for the most pacifistic opinions, and number 11 for the most militaristic. The judges sort the war items into these sections. Those items which are consistently sorted, *i.e.*, which have similar meanings to all judges, are kept. The median of each item's sortings becomes its

* For a revised edition of the social-distance scale constructed by a modern system of weights, see "A social distance scale" (E S Bogardus, 1933). For a check on the validity of the social-distance technique see "Checking the social distance technique through personal interviews" (G Hendrickson and R Zeligs, 1934). See also "A social distance test in the Near East" (S C Dodd, 1935).

† In the psychological literature the Thurstone scales have in the past been usually referred to as attitude scales. The term "opinion," favored by the sociologists, is, however, now gaining general acceptance.

scale or opinion value. If the value is large, the item has a militaristic value, if small, a pacifistic one. Thus the statement "There can be no progress without war" is militaristic in sentiment and has a scale value of 10.8 (1941 Stanford norms). Near the pacifistic end of the continuum is the statement "The evils of war are greater than any possible benefits" with a value of 1.5. A neutral statement is "Defensive war is justified but other wars are not" (scale value 6.4). The statements are now ready to be offered to the individual whose opinions are to be tested. If he agrees with statements whose adjudged scale values are large, he is a militarist, if he checks items with small values, he is a pacifist.

There are now available commercial scales for measuring opinions on communism, patriotism, the United States Constitution, law, censorship, reality of God, treatment of animals, evolution, birth control, and capital punishment, on affection-aversion for parents (R. Stagner and N. Drought, 1935), on the Dies Committee (A. H. Howard and J. C. Eberhart, 1940), etc.

Modifications of the Thurstone technique have been proposed by a number of opinion testers (R. H. Seashore and K. Hevner, 1933, C. Kirkpatrick, 1936b, and M. Ballin and P. R. Farnsworth, 1941). Generalized or master scales, which can be applied to any one of a given class of objects or values, have been developed with somewhat questionable success (H. H. Remmers and E. B. Silance, 1934, D. M. Thomas-Baines, 1936, and M. Dimmitt, 1936). In certain of the newer opinion tests statements of opinion like the illustrations given above have been replaced by descriptions of behavior situations—such as, "If my continent were invaded I would immediately take up arms" (A. C. Rosander, 1937, E. G. Williamson and J. G. Darley, 1937, C. R. Pace, 1939, 1940, F. H. Allport and G. A. Hanchett, 1940, and D. D. Day and O. F. Quackenbush, 1940). A simple five-point rating scheme, proposed by Likert (G. Murphy and R. Likert, 1938, and D. C. Miller, 1940), has the reputation of being as useful a tool as the more time-consuming Thurstone procedure. This position, however, has been disputed (L. W. Ferguson, 1941).

Groups of opinion scales have been factor-analyzed in an attempt to purify the tests and to find smaller batteries with which to replace the large ones now in use (H. B. Carlson, 1934). In one such study, ten opinion scales were reduced to two or three by the procedure of factor analysis (L. W. Ferguson, 1939a). In another, thirteen opinion and adjustment scales were reduced to five (J. G. Darley and W. J. McNamara, 1940). In other studies, the attitudes of parents and children have been compared, the greatest resemblance in attitudes is found between the spouses, and the smallest between father and children (T. D. Peterson, 1936, T. Newcomb and G. Svehl, 1937, M. M. Smith, 1938, and H. H. Remmers and L. D. Whisler, 1938). The opinions of one sample of close friends were found to correlate 24 ± 07 (C. N. Winslow, 1937).

Opinion studies on college students and on the several economic, social, and age strata are numerous. Typical are the following: "Attitudes of economic groups" (A. W. Kornhauser, 1938), "The Thurstone attitude scales II. The reliability and consistency of younger and older intellectual peers" (I. Lorge, 1939), "Liberalism, optimism, and group morale: a study of student attitudes" (L. D. Whisler and H. H. Remmers, 1938), "Certain factors related to liberal and conservative attitudes of college students: parental membership in certain organizations" (P. J. Fay and W. C. Middleton, 1940d), "An analysis of attitudes toward fascism and communism" (D. Katz and H. Cantril, 1940), "Attitude homogeneity and length of group association" (M. Smith, 1940), and "A comparison of the

public attitudes of 711 eminent business executives with those of 65 distinguished 'progressive' educators" (G W Hartmann, 1941a)

Opinion scales, particularly those of the Thurstone variety, have been much employed in measuring opinion shifts. In the main, the data agree with common-sense observation. Opinions can be altered, at least for the period of a year, by reading and study, by hearing lectures and debates, by viewing movies, and through field trips to institutions (B M Cherrington and L W Miller, 1933, S P Rosenthal, 1934, W J Boldt and J B Stroud, 1934, W K C Chen, 1936, F H Knower, 1935 and 1936, R M Bateman and H H Remmers, 1936, L A Kirkendall, 1937, M Smith, 1937, V Jones, 1938, R Bugelski and O P Lester, 1940, L W Doob, 1940, L J Epstein, 1941; H M Mason, 1941, and S H Britt and S C Menefee, 1941)

But just what these changes in symbolic behavior mean when they are translated into nonsymbolic terms is not known. Do the symbolic tests provide a measure of the preparation to respond to the concrete situations that are symbolized in the tests? Apparently in a few instances they do. But in the majority of instances proof is impossible to obtain, and in some instances they definitely do not. It has, for example, been shown that the child's verbal attitude toward honest or dishonest behavior (his symbolic opinion) is of little or no value in forecasting what he will do when he is put up against a real classroom experience in which dishonest behavior is a possible solution to his difficulties (S M Corey, 1937b). From consideration of the data one is led to suspect that opinion tests actually measure ideologies far more successfully than they forecast nonsymbolic behaviors (R T LaPiere, 1938b). Criticisms of opinion testing and reviews of the current articles in the field have been appearing periodically (G W Allport and R L Sehanck, 1936, S M Corey, 1937a, D Katz, 1937, L W Ferguson, 1939b, E Nelson, 1939, H S Tuttle, 1940, D Day, 1940, H W Dunham, 1940; R K Merton, 1940, and D D Day, 1941)

The term "interest" has been applied to certain other forms of symbolic activity, particularly those in which a selection between two or more alternatives is to be made. The most extensive work on the subject centers in the laboratory of E K Strong, Jr, who has developed the Vocational Interest Blank (E K Strong, Jr, 1931, 1933, and 1934a, H D Carter, M K Pyles, and E P Bretnall, 1935; J S Kopas, 1938, S G Estes and D Horn, 1939, D E Super, 1940, and R K Campbell, 1941). See also *The interests of young men* (D E Sonquist, 1931), *The psychology of wants, interests, and attitudes* (E L Thorndike, 1935); "Liking and disliking persons" (W F Thomas and P T Young, 1938); "The place of interests in vocational adjustment" (J G W Davies, 1939), "Economic problems and interests of adolescents" (P. M Symonds, 1940), and *Interest inventory for elementary grades (for grades 4, 5, and 6) Form A* (M Dreese and E Mooney, 1941)

17 The term "symbolic" as used in the text must not be confused with that of "symbolism" as used by either sociologists or psychoanalysts. (See E Sapir's article "Symbolism," *Encycl Soc Sci*, 14, 492-495.) Sociologists and anthropologists often use the term "symbolism" to refer to social practices that have lost much of their original significance and remain only as symbolic of their former meaning (J. H Mueller, 1938). Thus the American Thanksgiving Day is sociologically symbolic of the great harvest feast and thanksgiving which was practiced, with religious significance, by certain of the American Indians. Sociopsychologically, however, Thanksgiving Day practices are not all symbolic. Whereas the speeches and editorials broadcast on this day are symbolic behavior, much of

the action that transpires is nonsymbolic. It is doubtful, for example, whether the vast quantities of food consumed on this occasion now have much symbolic meaning for the eaters, although to the early Indians there may have been a symbolic aspect.

In the justification of some of their practices and theories the psychoanalysts have resorted to a "symbolic" interpretation of dreams and other psychic phenomena. It is assumed that, because of the psychic "censor," taboo drives are converted into symbolic manifestations which can then escape from the "unconscious." Thus a phobia for steam engines might be interpreted as a morbid "fear of father," the engine being symbolic of father. For purposes of psychotherapy such reasoning may have its values. But the psychoanalytic concept of symbolization has very little in common with the sociopsychological distinction between symbolic and nonsymbolic behavior.

18 A most interesting "tentative classification of expressive movement" is presented in *Studies in expressive movement* (G. W. Allport and P. E. Vernon, 1933, pp. 32-33). Although the list is far too long to present here, one small section is offered. (By permission of the authors and The Macmillan Company, publishers.)

"Communication and *Mimik*

A Talking

- 1 Attributes of voice
 - soft or loud
 - dull, sharp, shrill, nasal, or hoarse
 - smooth, melodious, sonorous
 - rapid, moderate, or slow
 - constant or variable
 - changes swift, gradual, periodic
 - dropping voice at end of sentence
 - rising inflection throughout sentence
 - uneven accentuation of words, staccato
 - even accentuation of words, legato
- 2 Style or type of speech
 - loquacious, taciturn
 - frequent or infrequent talking
 - circumstantial or meager
 - clear or confused
 - rich or poor in vocabulary
 - favorite words and expressions
 - aphasias, pauses, stammering, etc.
 - hisping or other mannerisms
 - long or short sentences
 - complete or clipped phraseology
 - number of interjections
 - style of retelling
- 3 Motor attitudes during conversation
 - much or little synkinesis [auxiliary movements]
 - imitative and sympathetic response to speaker
 - expressionless attention
 - inattention or impatience
 - following speaker with eyes"

In the same vein, analyses are made of the possible expressive movements in walking, standing, laughing, weeping, dancing, running, etc

19 A number of experimenters have attempted to verify the belief that radio lecturers and other speakers who are not seen can give to their listeners, directly or through their phonographic recordings, some idea of themselves. The analyses show that the audience has rather clean-cut stereotypes as to how certain people—old persons, truthful people, fat men—normally talk. These beliefs have sufficient validity to make judgments of body build, type of occupation, intelligence, and personality characteristics (interests, degree of dominance, truthfulness, etc.) a little better than pure chance (T. H. Pear, 1931; G. W. Allport and H. Cantril, 1934; H. C. Taylor, 1934; R. H. Manson and T. H. Pear, 1935; R. Stagner, 1936*a*, P. Eisenberg and E. Zalowitz, 1938; J. H. Caro, 1939; P. F. Fay and W. C. Middleton, 1939*a*, 1939*b*, 1940*a*, 1940*b*, 1941*a*, and 1941*b*). Listeners are apparently unable to judge how much fatigued a speaker thinks he is (P. J. Fay and W. C. Middleton, 1940*c*).

20 The gestures that accompany verbal expressions are not only visual but are tonal as well. Speech and song are made by air waves that are capable of almost infinite variation. Thus the highly trained actor can read the same selection into a recording device in five different manners—to represent anger, contempt, fear, grief, or indifference (G. Fairbanks and W. Pronovost, 1938 and 1939). The singing of even a single note may be varied so as to elicit several different moods in others (M. Sherman, 1928). Music, tonal material arranged in patterns, has its gestural effects which are quite distinct from those given by the libretto. In bugle calls and in African signal drumming musical gestures become almost a language. In general, however, their function is to create moods in the listener. See Appendix note 32.

21 By a clever technique, Dunlap has demonstrated rather conclusively that the mouth muscles play a greater part than do the eyes in determining the so-called emotional effect of facial expressions. A number of individuals were photographed while they were subjected to situations that tended to arouse genuine emotions. The photographs were cut horizontally (through the bridge of the nose). Other subjects were then requested to judge what emotions had been aroused. They viewed not only the separate halves and the unmutated photographs but composites in which a mouth portion (lower half) was attached to the wrong eye portion (upper half). When identical eye photographs were attached first to "smiling" lips and then to "surly" lips, the "smiling" eyes of one composite became "surly" eyes in the second (K. Dunlap, 1927). Howells also has shown the mouth to be more expressive than the eyes (T. H. Howells, 1938). Perhaps the highwayman of wild-west days with his handkerchief over his mouth was wiser than the eye-masked bandit of our day.

In another study subjects were shown two sets of pictures, one of the face only and the other showing the face, shoulders, arms, and hands of a young woman. It was found that shoulders, arms, and hands contribute much to the expression of emotions (L. W. Kline and D. E. Johannsen, 1935). See also "Written composition and characteristics of personality" (F. H. Allport, L. Walker, and E. Lathers, 1934), "Involuntary self-expression in gait and other movements: an experimental study" (W. Wolff, 1935), "Expressive movements related to feeling of dominance" (P. Eisenberg, 1937*b*), "A study of the judgment of manual expression as presented in still and motion pictures" (L. Carmichael, S. O. Roberts, and N. Y. Wessell, 1937); "Experimental studies of the symbolism of action and voice."

I A study of the specificity of meaning in facial expression" (D. Dusenbury and F H Knowler, 1938), "Judging personality from expressive behavior" (S G Estes, 1938), and "Character and mentality as related to hand-markings" (C Wolff, 1941) Husband was unable to deduce anything concerning his subjects' personalities from analyses of their photographs (R W Husband, 1934)

22 A fine example of the relations of socialized behavior and gesture can be seen in handwriting In fact, analysis of handwriting specimens was employed in the Downey *Will-temperament test*, one of the earliest of the tests that purported to measure the more social aspects of man's make-up, his personality (R S Uhrbrock, 1928)

By an analysis of handwriting many graphologists can determine the sex of the writer with at least slightly better than chance successes Allport and Vernon gave handwriting the apt title "crystallized gesture" They have carefully searched the literature for data that show the relation of such gesture to personality and have themselves experimented in this field They have found that the elements of handwriting (size, speed, point, and grip pressure) "correlate with many attributes of movement selected from widely different performances [walking, counting, tapping, estimation of weights, handshake, etc] The pattern of handwriting, its total graphic character, was found, likewise, to be interlocked with other expressive behavior Judgments made from script and judgments made from the direct observation of behavior showed a definite, though not perfect, correspondence" (G W Allport and P E Vernon, 1933)

See also "The measurement of handwriting considered as expressive movement" (O L Harvey, 1933), "An additional study of the determination of personal interests by psychological and graphological methods" (H Cantril and H A Rand, 1934), *Graphologie* (L Klages, 1935), *Graphologie als Wissenschaft* (A Wenzl, 1937), "Judging expressive movement I Judgments of sex and dominance-feeling from handwriting samples of dominant and non-dominant men and women" (P Eisenberg, 1938), "The ability of untrained subjects to judge neuroticism, self-confidence, and sociability from handwriting samples" (W C Middleton, 1941b), and "A comparison of the diagnoses of a graphologist with the results of psychological tests" (D E Super, 1941)

23 Among the many theories of the origin of language elements is the onomatopoeic—sometimes called bow-wow—theory, which holds that many words have come into the several languages as imitations of natural sounds For certain words—buzz, cuckoo, and the like—this theory seems tenable, but its usefulness—how far it can be extended in an explanatory way—is limited Most students of language now feel that most words cannot be accounted for by this theory

For a consideration of experiments that throw light on language changes of a phylogenetic sort, see "A technique for the experimental investigation of associative interference in artificial linguistic material" (E A Esper, 1925), *Speech its function and development* (G A de Laguna, 1927), "Studies in linguistic behavior organization I Characteristics of unstable verbal reactions" (E A Esper, 1933); *The psycho-biology of language* (G K Zipf, 1935), "Forschung zur Sprachtheorie. Einleitung" (K Bühler, 1935), "The psychology of language" (D V McGranahan, 1936), and "An appraisal of psychological research in speech" (W. E Utterback, 1937)

24 Scientists interested in the great ape cannot tell us with any degree of certainty the causes for his failure to learn to speak the human languages Apes do appear to possess a few differentiated emotional cries, but these can hardly be

said to form a language and are not a product of apes' relations with the human languages. The anthropoids understand well, and many appear to possess mental ages far above that necessary for articulate speech, but, so far, the most strenuous efforts to train apes to speak have yielded a very few words, at best. Apes would appear to be visual rather than auditory imitators. Their mental development for a time seems to progress much like that of human beings. But after a few years they lag farther and farther behind the human child, largely, it is believed, because of their lack of overt language (W. N. Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg, 1933). See "Chimpanzee intelligence and its vocal expressions" (R. M. Yerkes and B. W. Learned, 1925), *The great apes* (R. M. Yerkes and A. W. Yerkes, 1929), and "Gorillas in a native habitat" (H. C. Bingham, 1932).

When engaged in cooperative work in the laboratory, apes can be taught to signal to each other. This form of communication, however, does not indicate the nature of the task to be done but is merely an order to "do something for me" (M. P. Crawford, 1937).

25. Korzybski has founded a philosophy of language and a system of mental hygiene on the fact that verbal symbols are frequently empty or have twisted meanings (A. Korzybski, 1941). Confusion over symbols is thought to induce anxiety neuroses. Mental patients are taught to shift their attention to verbal symbols whose semantic values are clear and obvious. For the psychopath, words too often have taken on purely personal meanings—they do not indicate to him what they mean to the more normal portion of the population.

A system of language training related to the Korzybski philosophy is now in operation in a number of American high schools and colleges (S. I. Hayakawa, 1941). Word usage in journals and books is studied. Words having personal-emotional (connotative) meanings are culled and replaced by others having agreed-upon (denotative) semantic value. Thus the statement "Huns steal bread lands tilled by puppets of the bloody Stalin" becomes, perhaps, "German soldiers have now captured certain of the wheat lands of the U S S R." The theory behind this educational philosophy is that engaging in such analysis will improve the student's efficiency in thinking. This hypothesis is an intriguing one but difficult to prove or disprove. See also "The effect of stereotyped words on political judgments" (S. C. Menefee, 1936).

26. Language development would seem to be closely related to general intelligence. From knowledge of his vocabulary one can predict a child's I. Q. with great accuracy. Language undoubtedly has its genetic basis, but quite obviously it is socially developed. It has been found, for example, that the occupational status of the parent is related to the length of sentence that the preschool child employs. Children whose parents belong to the professional classes are as a rule far better in this phase of language development than are those whose parents are of the lower classes (D. McCarthy, 1930). Goodenough found a parallel between talkativeness of preschool children and occupational status of their parents. As the occupational status decreased, so did the talkativeness (F. L. Goodenough, 1930). Moreover, it has been shown that the correlation between a child's mental age and the education of his parents is negligible until the child is eighteen months of age, when a big increase in the correlational value occurs. It is at this age that language becomes an important tool for the child (N. Bayley, 1933 and 1940).

Because "only" children associate with adults far more than do children with siblings, it is to be expected that their linguistic development will, on the average, be superior. Furthermore, since twins learn to respond to each other's gestures,

their need for speech is less, and then linguistic development should therefore be relatively slow. Observations bear out these deductions (E. A. Davis, 1937).

27 During the process of babbling, the child stimulates his own ears and the kinesthetic receptors of his voice-box area. In time a circular response is elicited in which a reaction, for example, the babbling of "da," serves as the stimulus for the repetition of that response, for the continued babbling of "da-da-da." If the parent says "da," the response will be further facilitated. Parrots who repeat what they hear or have heard on previous occasions, are at this stage of vocalization. Their vocalizations are not, however, truly linguistic, as is shown by the fact that these birds are as likely to say "Polly wants a cracker!" when gorged with food as when hungry. True language does not exist until vocal response is associated with some object, process, or symbol of these.

For accounts of the development of language in the child see *The symbolic process and its integration in children* (J. F. Markey, 1928), "Language" (E. A. Esper, 1935), and "Research on speech sounds for the first six months of life" (O. C. Irwin, 1941).

A number of studies have been made of the conditions under which social and nonsocial (egocentric) varieties of speech occur. In social speech the child questions, answers, commands, requests, criticizes, and the like. In egocentric speech he talks to himself, although some other person may be talked to but ignored if he answers. The actual percentages of these two varieties of speech for different age groups and social groups are not known. Piaget reports that they are equal (J. Piaget, 1926), whereas McCarthy reports that egocentric speech is present in only 3 to 6 per cent of her children's responses (D. A. McCarthy, 1930). Since these two authors were dealing with different societies (French-Swiss and American respectively), cultural differences may account in part for the discrepancy. Lack of objectivity in recording, divergencies in interpretation, and other factors probably share the responsibility. See also "'Egocentricity' in adult conversation" (M. Henle and M. B. Hubbell, 1938).

28 Much has been written about the causes of speech defects, but, except for defects resulting from obvious anatomical difficulties (such as cleft palate, which results in an unmistakable voice quality), little is really known. Speech specialists and psychologists are, however, giving the matter their serious attention and have so far developed many systems of therapy.

Views on the causes of stuttering and stammering oscillate between the physiogenic and the psychogenic. One group of therapists believe that speech defects are associated with left-handedness, and advice is frequently given that a naturally left-handed person should not be forced into right-handed behavior. Unfortunately, it is not known whether people are ever naturally left-handed, right-handed, or ambidextrous. It is true that the typical stutterer has more left-handed relatives than does the average normal speaker. But whatever vocal ill effects appear after a forced change from left- to right-handed behavior may quite possibly be due to the abrupt change in manual habits and might conceivably occur if a right-handed child were as speedily forced to become left-handed. There is considerable argument about the advisability of attempting to change a child's handedness. The sensible procedure, therefore, would be to attempt a very slow change, or preferably to allow the child to remain as he is, since there is no evidence for the popular belief that the left-handed are inferior in various ways to the right-handed. In fact Ruch (F. L. Ruch, unpublished data) has found that the left-handed are similar to the right-handed in scholarship, intelligence, emotional stability, and

degree of contrariness Even Travis, who for some time held to a theory of cerebral dominance, did not hold that speech troubles are associated with left-handedness as such He felt that the trouble is more likely to arise (as in ambidexterity) when neither side of the brain has dominance, *i e*, when there is a "relative lack of unilaterality of motor lead control" See *Speech pathology* (L E Travis, 1931); "Stuttering and the concept of handedness" (L E Travis and W Johnson, 1934); and "Theories of handedness" (A Schiller, 1935 and 1936)

The psychological causes of speech defects are stressed in the following "Stammering a psychoanalytical interpretation" (I H Coriat, 1928), *Stammering and allied disorders* (C S Bluemel, 1935), and *For stutters* (S Blanton and M G Blanton, 1936) Travis himself has now adopted a more psychogenic view "Stuttering," he says, "is a defense created with extraordinary skill and designed to prevent anxiety from developing when certain impulses of which the stutterer dares not become aware, threaten to expose themselves" (L E Travis, 1940)

29 In *Experimental social psychology* (G Murphy, L B Murphy, and T M Newcomb, 1937, pp 181-187) a distinction is made between three at least quantitatively different uses of the word "imitation" The first is on the order of the conditioned response, the person does not know what he is "imitating" but "unconsciously" associates certain phenomena The responses that occur as one learns to talk would perhaps fall into this category, as would "unconscious imitation" of handwriting In one study (D Starch, 1911) people were given examples—one typewritten and three written by hand with varying degrees of letter width and slant—and were told to copy them in their own normal handwriting Practically all unwittingly modified their handwriting style in conformity with the written models, either in slant, in letter width, or both This use of the term "imitation" would apply also to the "circular" response Among the insane and those of low mental age there is a tendency for many socially stimulated acts to be of the circular order, *e g*, when asked a question, a person may not answer but may simply repeat the question in whole or in part The phenomenon is termed "echolalia" or "echophrasia" and is a type of imitation (The more general term for echolike behavior is "echopraxia") It is probable that many of the phenomena more generally included under the topic "suggestion" also fit this use of the term "imitation"

The second use of the term—and that followed by the present writers—occurs in "imitation after a trial-and-error period" There is, characteristically, a long preliminary practice period necessary before imitation is possible The musically untrained schoolboy cannot imitate Fritz Kreisler He must first become an extremely proficient violinist Likewise, to copy the behavior of any model, one must already have acquired certain of that model's abilities The necessity for a long preliminary practice period prevents imitation of many of the models one might wish to use

The third use of the term is in "deliberate" imitation, "Where the thing to be imitated has been learned already, sudden and effective imitation without trial and error may, of course, appear" (p 187) This is the common-sense use of the term "imitation"

It might be well to add that frequently what is labeled imitation is not imitative at all The sound of a "missing" airplane motor may so arouse the curiosity of a number of people on the street that all may look up in search of the plane There may be little or no imitation, one of another, but merely a common source of stimulation Similitude of behaviors does not necessarily mean that imitation has

occurred. Even in the jungle monkeys commonly use their hands in ways that look almost human, and many an egotistical human being has exclaimed at their "imitation" of human ways. Yet it would be just as sensible to speak of man's "imitation" of monkey ways. The similarities in the two sets of behaviors are largely functions of similarities of structure.

30 A distinction should be made between the social functions of play and the reasons for the origin of play. The former can be quite clearly perceived, the latter must remain in the realm of pure speculation, although some theories are more plausible than others. Thus, to regard play as having arisen in order to prepare the child in some respects for life's problems is merely to call attention to the social utility of play. The theory that play is the expression of an instinct possesses the same fallacy inherent in the more general instinct hypothesis. To regard play as a recapitulation of certain of the habits of the race in the past is hardly in keeping with the facts. Youngsters do not necessarily go through a soldier stage or an Indian stage or any other specific stage in their play development. The type of play is determined by social and mental-age factors. The recapitulation theory can also be condemned as contrary to the teachings of present-day biologists, who do not credit the Lamarckian doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The theory that play arises because youngsters have excess energy that must be expended is no more than doubtful biological speculation. We know that the healthy youngster does play if given the opportunity and that he will frequently continue when psychologically fatigued. But just what his neurological state may be—whether or not his excess nervous energy (if any) is consumed—has not been determined. Because of the difficulties in finding the reasons for the origin of play, it is more fruitful to consider the social-utility aspects of play. Indeed, the origin of play is really an anthropological rather than socio-psychological question. See E. S. Robinson's article "Play" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 160-161).

The play activities of the American child have been extensively studied by Lehman and Witty. Their data have been published in *The psychology of play activities* (H. C. Lehman and P. A. Witty, 1927) and in numerous articles.

Child psychologists have made many observational studies of the play activities of children of different ages and cultures. Buhler's work on Austrian infants (C. Buhler, 1931) indicates that rather definite toy preferences begin at about the eighth month and that attention devoted to the toy will vary from a very short period in the six-month-old child to twenty minutes or more in a year-old child. The play of preschool and school children has been carefully observed in America and in other countries, especially in Russia, where comparisons have been made between children of communistic and those of reactionary groups. In America normal children have been compared with brighter and duller children, and sex and racial differences in play activities have been observed. Considerable attention is now being focused on the possibilities of diagnosing and curing personality abnormalities through the analysis of play activities.

The following references are representative of the many now available. *The child and play* (J. E. Rogers, 1932), *Play behavior and choice of play materials of preschool children* (D. Van Alstyne, 1932), "A study of the beginnings and significance of play in infancy. II" (C. W. Valentine, 1938), *Play therapy in childhood* (C. H. Rogerson, 1939), "The development of certain motor skills and play activities in young children" (T. D. Jones, 1939); "A method for the study of personality reactions in preschool age children by means of analysis of their play" (J. L.

Despert, 1940); and "Toward a social psychology of human play" (S H Britt and S Q Janus, 1941)

31. The perennial quest for the roots of ambition has recently reappeared under the heading "level of aspiration." This latter concept has a variety of definitions, and not all the current aspiration studies deal with similar phenomena. For Hoppe, an early German worker in this field, the "level of aspiration" referred to the individual's expectations, goals, or claims in regard to his own future achievement in a given task (F Hoppe, 1930). Many of the later experimenters followed Hoppe in defining the concept in subjective vein. Gardner and a number of others, however, now regard the term as referring to the objective indications—the statements and other overt acts that the person makes regarding his future performances (J W Gardner, 1940a).

Fortunately, many of the recent findings stand out with sufficient clarity to transcend the difficulty of definitions. It has been found that good performers set their goals relatively lower than do poor performers. There is thus a tendency for all levels of aspiration to come together (H H Anderson and H F Brandt, 1939). Children successful in their schoolwork are more alike in their aspiration levels than are those who are less successful. The latter's responses scatter far more, and understandingly so, for there are probably more reasons for lack of success than for success in schoolwork (P S Sears, 1940). Aspiration level, variously defined, has been correlated with a variety of personality tests, but all the correlations are so low that they have no social significance (R Gould and N Kaplan, 1940, and J W Gardner, 1940b).

In several experiments the relation of the frame of reference to the level of aspiration has been studied. As might be expected, great differences in the level of aspiration are found between those situations in which the subject is told frankly his actual scores on a certain test, those in which he is led to believe that certain fictitious scores are his own, and those in which he is given the true or fictitious scores of others to be taken for reference. Thus if the subject is told that a certain score is the average made by a group of WPA workers, the effect will be different from what it would have been had the subject been led to believe that the score represented the average of the performances of a large number of college professors (D W Chapman and J Volkmann, 1939, J W Gardner, 1939, R Gould and H B Lewis, 1940, and M Hertzman and L Festinger, 1940). There is still considerable doubt as to the temporal stability of the level of aspiration. See also "An experimental analysis of 'level of aspiration'" (R Gould, 1939); "Shifts in aspiration level after success and failure in the college classroom" (L A Pennington, 1940), "Judgment and the level of aspiration" (W McGehee, 1940), "Level of aspiration as affected by relative standing in an experimental social group" (E R Hilgard, E M Sait, and G A Magaret, 1940), "Estimates of past and of future performances as measures of aspiration" (E R Hilgard and E M Sait, 1941), "Recent studies of the level of aspiration" (J D Frank 1941); "Differential effect of a social variable upon three levels of aspiration" (M G Preston and J A Bayton, 1941), and "Some sociological determinants of goal strivings" (R Gould, 1941).

32. In several places in the text we have stressed the importance of the stage play as symbolic behavior. Unlike the motion picture, the stage play usually has a selected audience, since its patrons, in our society at least, are largely adults. Thus the censoring of the stage play has not excited as much attention as has the censoring of its rival, the motion picture. Suffice it to say that, where censoring

of the stage play has existed, it has had neither logical nor experimental justification but has been based upon religious convictions or has been enforced for political or personal gains

Although much has been written concerning the absurdity of censoring motion pictures, those who believe that such censorship is a socially desirable policy have offered little data to substantiate their belief. Up to the present, the attempts to ascertain what effects motion pictures have on children's behavior, although numerous and often expensively conducted, have been so superficial that they deserve only passing mention. The sociological studies in which tabulations have been made of the frequency of motion-picture attendance, the type of plot preferred, the amount of money spent, etc., may make interesting reading; but they are largely irrelevant to the censorship question, for they do not disclose causal factors. It may be interesting to know that 24.4 per cent of delinquent boys attend the movies five or more days a week, whereas of the more moral boys only 1.2 per cent attend as often. But whether motion-picture attendance is the cause or merely a symptom of delinquency is not evident. This issue is almost identical to that which has so long worried psychiatrists. Does alcohol cause certain people to become insane? Or is alcoholism symptomatic of their more basic psychopathy? Psychiatric belief, at the present, leans toward the latter view, recognizing, it is true, that a drinking bout may furnish the stimuli necessary to set off some particular spell of insanity.

The motion pictures can furnish models only for those who have gone well along the road toward crime. For those already delinquent, frequent attendance is symptomatic, but for the nondelinquent, it can probably furnish but the slightest of pushes toward delinquency, although it may cause considerable emotional excitement. It should be obvious that the questioning of delinquents concerning "what they got from the movies" cannot hope to yield data of much scientific worth. Few people know why they behave as they do. With the exception of the attitude studies, it would appear that the only types of experimental procedure that show promise of yielding valid data are those developed by Renshaw and others (S. Renshaw *et al.*, 1933) on the effect of motion pictures on sleep and by Dysinger and Ruckmick (W. S. Dysinger and C. A. Ruckmick, 1933) on galvanometric changes brought about by observing motion pictures, and as yet, the data resulting from these procedures are far too limited to warrant general conclusions. A number of those working on motion-picture problems, especially Forman in his popularization of the issue (H. J. Forman, 1933), appear to have been motivated by a desire to prove that motion pictures have exerted a bad influence rather than by the scientific wish to see the problem solved in a cool and unbiased manner. See *Children and movies* (A. M. Mitchell, 1929), *Movies and conduct* (H. Blumer, 1933), *Movies, delinquency, and crime* (H. Blumer and P. M. Hauser, 1933), *Motion pictures and youth* (W. W. Charters, 1933), *Getting ideas from the movies* (P. W. Holaday and G. D. Stoddard, 1933); *The social conduct and attitudes of movie fans* (F. K. Shuttleworth and M. A. May, 1933), *Film und Jugend* (A. Funk, 1934); "Influence of motion pictures on moral attitudes of children and the permanence of the influence" (V. Jones, 1934), "Moulding of mass behavior through the motion picture" (H. Blumer, 1935); *Attendance at motion pictures* (E. Dale, 1935a); *The content of motion pictures* (E. Dale, 1935b); "The motion picture experience as modified by social background and personality" (P. G. Cressey, 1938), *America at the movies* (M. Thorpe, 1939), and "The reactions of sixth grade children to commercial motion pictures as a medium for character education" (C. D. Cooper, 1939).

On occasion architecture and sculpture possess symbolic value. But, although a building may call up associations with other lines, shapes, and angles (certain lines, for example, may seem to be reaching heavenward), the degree of symbolic meaning scarcely reaches the point where much behavior modeling can occur. Moralists have little to fear in this regard, although their Freudian friends may frighten them with talk of the unconscious sexual significance of the church door, the steeple, spire, and the like. Sculpture is, however, a different matter. The human body can be copied in almost any desired pose or with any part augmented. To one observer a statue may be merely a naughty nude, whereas to the artist it may signify the pioneer spirit of the west, freedom of speech, or whatnot. The possibilities for symbolism are enormous, as a matter of fact, there is even some possibility of patterning one's poses and attitudes after those suggested by a statue. But, whereas the poet or novelist can tell a story—a connected sequence of events—the sculptor can offer only a single scene. The scene will not be understood unless the observer comprehends the sculptor's system of symbols.

Much the same can be said of pictorial art. If an observer is not initiated into the artist's system of symbols, he will react to a picture as he would to a somewhat similar life scene removed from its proper setting. Whatever elements of beauty he perceives depend upon his own associations. For this reason, the unsophisticated layman may laugh loudly at the several artistic isms and wonder, perhaps with some reason, whether even the artist's coterie of friends can get meanings from his paintings. But paintings may be suggestive in the sense that they can, to some extent at least, aid in the presentation of models. Paintings of emaciated saints might, for example, help in inducing some already hyperreligious psychopath to diet or to starve himself. Even the memory of a recently seen photograph of a leper might keep one from shaking hands with the leper one sees in the Orient. But it hardly can be expected that the picture of a Catholic saint will alter much the behavior of little Protestant boys. Nevertheless, one of the authors once observed great parental excitement following the use in a school of an otherwise innocuous book that contained one such picture. In their emotional excitement the parents failed to see that the saintly picture had no model value for their children.

Historians tell us that the early Christians, in the fear that pagan music might somehow destroy their Christian morals, succeeded in destroying almost all the historical documents that described pre-Christian music. The idea that music and Satan were somehow connected has kept recurring throughout the centuries, and, until quite recent years, even the kindly Quakers feared the effects of music. But just what music could conceivably do to morals or, for that matter, to any other part of one's character, is difficult to see.

Through his music the African signal drummer could, of course, pollute the air with improper messages or even descriptions of human beings who might conceivably serve as models for the youth of his tribe (R. T. Clarke, 1934). But most music is not so highly symbolic, even when it is accompanied by words. Just as in poetry, the words need not bear the precise symbolic value they would possess in ordinary conversation. Poetic license is the rule, and exactitude of meaning is often sacrificed in the cause of rhyme and meter. On occasion, the words may have one set of meanings for one group of singers and another for other singers or for the librettist. Thus the Negro spirituals frequently contain words that have vulgar meanings for the Negro; but to the white men who now sing them they have quite respectable connotations (G. B. Johnson, 1927).

We do, of course, associate so closely the words and music of many songs that the music alone may call up a symbolism previously associated solely with the words. We may recall the conditions under which a song was written, or perhaps we have been told for what type of celebration it was intended. Again, the music may be associated with a dance and receive the latter's meaning. Thus in the Dutch East Indies and in many another land dance steps have quite definite symbolism. Even in our own culture, the commercial type of jazz music with its simple structure and rather primitive monotony has, for many people, come to be associated with the dance hall and all that is allied to it, whereas the so-called "better" music has been linked with the concert hall or the opera (J. D. Eggen, 1926). Given the proper setting, then, music may aid in the formation of either "good" or "bad" models.

But that music per se has a symbolic value does not follow. Some music, undoubtedly, has some meaning. In our own society, for example, slow music of a minor mode tends to mean sadness, and that of a major mode with quicker tempos frequently implies joy. To most people of our part of the world music that resolves well seems finished, at rest, that which is left unresolved appears so unfinished that the story has been repeatedly told of musicians who could not be restrained from rushing to the most readily available piano to complete unfinished resolutions. There are numerous other musical patterns in this and in other societies which somewhat similarly show a trace of symbolism. Yet, in the main, the amount of symbolism is so small in comparison with verbal or gestural behavior that we usually think of music as essentially nonsymbolic.

A few theorists believe that much of what is ordinarily taken to be meaning in music comes, not from other associations, but from the inherent structures of musical forms. "High" tones are not called high because of association with high resonance in the human head or the "upward strains" one gets from trying to sing "too high," but because of an inherent quality of highness that is attached to notes of greater frequency. The issue is too much in the realm of philosophical speculation to warrant further treatment here. See *The meaning of music: a study in psychological aesthetics* (C. C. Pratt, 1931).

Although it is a part of the ritualism of some symphonic music to pretend that each composition "tells" a specific story, it is actually the program note or the announcer who is the narrator. The composer may have been motivated by a love of communism, by the visceral drives that arise in neural syphilis, or by the exuberance of youth, for all the listener can tell from the music itself, and there is no way to read the "message" that is supposedly being told. The listener cannot even be certain that the composer is earnestly endeavoring to tell him something. He may be "pulling his leg," as it were, for there is no sincerity test or any other measure to tell us what is good in music. About all the composer can "get across" is a variety of vague moods, except when he uses some musical form that has a definite meaning in a specific culture, such as the military march. To say that music tells a real story is palpably absurd. Its effect on a person depends upon that individual's associations with the particular type of music in question. If he has had no association with it, he may be charmed with the innovations or angered by the lack of familiarity, but he is either deluded or tampering with the truth if he says he "understands just what the composer is trying to say." See "Variations in melodic renditions as an indicator of emotion" (H. H. Roberts, 1927), *The effects of music* (M. Schoen, ed., 1927), "Musical symbolism" (F. L. Wells, 1929), "Wohnt der Musik ein bestimmtes Ethos inne?" (W. Lurje, 1933), "Factors

determining the characterization of musical phrases" (R H Gundlach, 1935), "The emotional effect of intervals as found in a study of the melodies of art songs" (T V Van Vliet, 1935), "The affective value of pitch and tempo in music" (K Hevner, 1937); "Studies in expressiveness of music" (K Hevner, 1939), "The affective character of music" (C P Henlein, 1939), "The effect of register and tonality upon musical mood" (M G Rigg, 1940a), and "Speed as a determiner of musical mood" (M G Rigg, 1940b)

33 The idea of general faculties of memory, imagination, discrimination, perception, reasoning capacity, and the like, although still held by the layman and by an occasional educator, received its psychological death blow at the hands of E L Thorndike and R S Woodworth in 1901. Since then the idea has been kept rather successfully buried by other experimenters. In place of these hypothetical general faculties, it has been shown that man possesses rather specific abilities. He may have a good memory for faces but a poor one for names, etc. The transfer-benefits one gets from one school subject to another seem to come not from an improvement in one's memory, reasoning ability, or imagination but from the carry-over of specific methods and rules of procedure and from similarities in the materials learned. See *The psychology of learning* (E R Guthrie, 1935).

In addition to rather specific abilities, such as a memory for names, man has been thought by some to possess at least one fairly general, unitary, or common factor or ability. For this presumed ability the term *g* (general intelligence) was proposed a number of years ago. Of late, several somewhat less general factors have been postulated. The list now includes *p* (perseveration), *w* (will factor), *c* (opposite of perseveration), *f* (surgency), *e* (emotionality), *n* (jumpiness), *gd* (pressure toward action), *d* (depression), *s* (shyness), *t* (meditative thinking), *r* (happy-go-lucky quality), *a* (alertness), *lt* (thinking that is of the problem-solving kind), and a number of others. The list is steadily growing.

Care should be taken to distinguish these factors from the faculties of an older day. A faculty was conceived to be a natural capacity of the organism, independent of the situation and other environmental variables. Factors, on the other hand, derive from statistical manipulations (factor analysis). Each factor is a function of the clusterings of responses to a particular group of test items. Thus the fact that a large number of tests that are intended to measure the voluntary aspects of behavior have been found to yield consistently positive (even though relatively small) intercorrelations has led to the proposal of a *w* or will factor. See "The factor theory in the field of personality" (L G Studman, 1935), "Temperament tests in clinical practice" (R B Cattell, 1936), "The factorial analysis of emotional traits" (C Burt, 1939), "Personality factors D, R, T, and A" (J P Guilford and R B Guilford, 1939a); "Personality factors N and GD" (J P Guilford and R B Guilford, 1939b), "The general factor in correlations between persons" (M Davies, 1939), "Contributions concerning mental inheritance. II Temperament" (R B Cattell and E V Molteno, 1940); "A factor analysis of forty character tests" (H E Brogden, 1940), "Factor analysis in the establishment of new personality tests" (J G Darley and W J McNamara, 1940), and "Patterns of behavior of young children as revealed by a factor analysis of trait clusters" (K M. Maurer, 1941).

34. Psychologists and psychiatrists have long employed association tests by which they have hoped to render the covert behavior of their subjects overt in character. In the simpler sorts of association tests the subject is presented with lists of words and is asked to give the first associations that come to mind. The

latter are evaluated in a number of ways—for speed of reaction, quality and commonality of response, etc (G H Kent and A J Rosanoff, 1910) One modification of this type of test uses skeletal vowel patterns instead of words (B F Skinner, 1936, W K Estes, 1940, and D Shakow and S Rosenzweig, 1940) Another modification consists of cloud pictures—fantasy stimuli of a meaningless type (W Stern, 1937) In still another, many moving colors on the order of those of the famous clavilux or color organ are used (N Cameron, unpublished data)

So far the best known of the association tests is that which has been developed by the psychiatrist Rorschach His test consists of a set of ink blots, some in color These are supposed to elicit a wide assortment of verbal associations into which the subject projects his troubles The procedure has become the basis for a cult,* and its leaders make extravagant claims, *e g*, that they can test intelligence, extroversion, and almost everything else that any other test can measure The validity of the Rorschach test is, however, still uncertain, and arguments about standardizations and interpretations are still raging (S J Beck, 1937, and B Klopfer *et al*, 1939) For a study that uses Rorschach and other projective techniques, see *Explorations in personality a clinical and experimental study of fifty men of college age* (H A Murray, 1938) See also "Projective methods in the study of personality" (P M Symonds and E A Samuel, 1941), *The Rorschach technique* (B Klopfer *et al*, 1942), and *The clinical application of the Rorschach test* (R Bochner and F Halpern, 1942)

35 The life-history method is the name given to a variety of techniques that deal with personality by attempting to obtain an over-all view of the subject's life experiences The use of the method has been stimulated by Dollard who sets for it the following criteria "1 The subject must be viewed as a specimen in a cultural series 2 The organic motors of action ascribed must be socially relevant 3 The peculiar role of the family group in transmitting the culture must be recognized 4 The specific method of elaboration of organic materials into social behavior must be shown 5 The continuous related character of experience from childhood through adulthood must be stressed 6 The social situation must be carefully and continuously specified as a factor 7 The life history material itself must be organized and conceptualized" (J Dollard, 1935, p 8)

Sociologists, clinical psychologists, and even psychoanalysts have followed at least the majority of these criteria Among the more important life-history studies are *The jack-roller* (C R Shaw, 1930), *The natural history of a delinquent career* (C R Shaw and M E Moore, 1931), "Prediction from case material to personality test data a methodological study of types" (L M Hanks, 1936); *The study of man an introduction* (R Linton, 1936), *Brothers in crime* (C R Shaw *et al*, 1938), "General methods case study" (W C Olson, 1938), "The reliability of life-history studies" (D Cartwright and J R P French, Jr, 1939); *Minor mental maladjustments in normal people based on original autobiographies of personality maladjustments* (J E W Wallin, 1939), "How shall a life-history be written?" (N A Polansky, 1941), and "Personality under social catastrophe ninety life-histories of the Nazi revolution" (G W Allport, J S Bruner, and E M Jandorf, 1941)

When a person can be observed for a long period of time, a systematic collection of anecdotes concerning him may be of considerable value Anecdotal records should, however, be used only as an adjunct to other methodologies, particu-

* The Rorschach cult has its own journal, *Rorschach research exchange*.

larly that of the life history (A S Barr, 1941, and A M McClelland and R L McManus, 1941)

Biographical analysis is a variety of the life-history method Although the writing of most biographies is biased (F Baumgarten, 1937), biographical analysis will yield much if the checks employed in all good historical research are applied Thus one analysis of biographical data yielded good evidence that the mental health of fifty of the greatest men of history was normally distributed Although these men of genius may have had many anxieties and other psychoneurotic symptoms that did not get into the records, they displayed no more psychotic symptoms than fifty ordinary people chosen at random would show (C C Miles and L Wolfe, 1936) See also "The evaluative attitudes of Jonathan Swift" (L W Ferguson, 1939c).

36 The symbolic nature and the value of thought can be illustrated by the behavior of two men playing chess Each move that each makes is preceded by a calculation of the consequences Because there are always a number of possible alternatives, each alternative must be considered in terms of its consequences, so that the most favorable or the least disastrous move may be selected This calculation cannot be worked out by nonsymbolic trial and error, since, once a chessman is moved, the player cannot retract his decision on the grounds that it was merely a trial that proved to be a failure He must do the trying out symbolically and, in the main, covertly

An inexperienced player may ponder the results of each possible move His lips may move slightly as he verbally traces out what his opponent might do should he move this chessman that way Possibly he even mutters, "Now, if I move my King there, you could then " His hand may at times hover above a chessman, which he may pretend to move in order more clearly to follow out the consequences of the contemplated act Thus, by laborious trial and error, he works out a solution to the problem That trial and error is, however, symbolic, he talks about the trial moves, and he imagines the chessman moved into place and what his opponent may then do Not until he has found a symbolic solution to the problem does he translate one of these trial moves into nonsymbolic action

Even the more skillful player presumably goes through a trial-and-error process before he acts nonsymbolically The more skillful player, however, does this rapidly and covertly, he uses a thought short cut Although imagination of a visual character may enter into this process—in his "mind's eye" he may see the chessmen moved into place—it is possible that covert speech, in which the "feel" of the muscular positions involved serves for the words themselves, is more important.

37. From the sociological standpoint the most fruitful application of motivational terminology is perhaps that which has been made by Thomas and others who have followed his example Impressed with the difficulty of classifying the behavior of human beings in terms of behavior units, he has suggested in *The Polish peasant* that all the varied actions of men might be divided into four mutually exclusive motivational categories the wish for security, the wish for new experience, the wish for recognition, and the wish for response (W I Thomas and F Znaniecki, 1918-1920) * Such a division is, however, but one of the many possible ways of

* Following the Thomas-Znaniecki classification of wishes, Krout requested of his subjects a week's record of their activities The time devoted to the expression of a wish was thought to measure only the extent to which an individual manages

classifying what man does; the four wishes do not explain why man does what he does. Dunlap's motivational classification into several "desire" categories* probably serves his followers quite as well, since, however, Thomas's classification has received far more attention, it will be discussed at some length here.

The *wish for security* may be used to describe all actions that contribute or appear to contribute to the maintenance of things as they are. Thus the efforts of a man to curry the favor of his employer in order to retain his job, his efforts to retain his wife's affections, or his efforts to prevent a political revolution would be classified under this category.

No doubt a considerable block of human behavior can be interpreted in this way. Men tend to resist changes. Much of the social history of the later Middle Ages is the story of the efforts of a majority to prevent a small minority from introducing novel things and methods. The struggle of early science was the struggle against the characteristic conservatism of men. Even today we tend to cling to old social precepts, however willing we are to accept the newest mechanical gadget.

Whenever a man's economic, physical, or social welfare is threatened, he takes a defensive position, struggling as best he knows how to retain or to regain his customary economic and physical status. From another point of view, it may be said that he has learned to fear, and hence to try to avoid, any threat to his status. Status is, of course, entirely relative to the individual. The man who is accustomed to three good meals a day, a sizable apartment, unlimited credit, and a large balance in the bank will consider these things essential to his security. The man on the dole may feel a need only for his weekly stipend.

Life, fire, sickness, and other insurances constitute one of the most tangible expressions of man's wish to stay secure. Much of the antagonism and abuse showered upon those who would change things—whether it be a change in the system of government, industry, the family, or simply a change in street names—can also be thought of as belonging in the same category.

All man's conservatism—and it runs through much that he does—is traceable to the fact that, once he has learned a reasonably effective pattern of life adjustment, any external changes that may make that pattern less effective are distressing. The efforts, then, that a man makes to prevent such change may be described as an expression of his wish for security.

The *wish for new experience* is the antithesis of the wish for security. It may be used to describe those actions that disturb the *status quo* of the individual. Thus, the fact that a man takes a vacation, quits his job, divorces his wife, or joins a revolutionary political party would be described as an expression of his wish for new experience.

Much of present-day human action may be classed as anticonservative or radical †. With the ordinary man this kind of action may take such forms as an

to express his wishes and not the intensity. The wish for security was found to lead the list, those for response and recognition occupied a middle position, and that for new experience came last (M. H. Krout, 1934).

* Dunlap's nine desires were the alimentary, the excretory, the desire for protection, for activity, for rest, for preeminence, for conformity, the amorous, and the parental desire (K. Dunlap, 1934).

† Radicalism in religion and economics has been much studied since the pioneer work with Watson's test of "fair-mindedness" (G. B. Watson, 1925). Later

occasional vacation from the humdrum routines of home, office, and club, an occasional change of suit or tie, or an occasional change of house or apartment. Some individuals, however, would seem to be inveterate adventurers. They are explorers of distant and little known lands. Perhaps they explore the new by rising to the stratosphere or sinking deep into the ocean, perhaps they explore the world of the scientific laboratory, finding new facts and constructing new theories, perhaps they are explorers of a possible social future—adventurers in social reconstruction, who may or may not be adventurous along other lines.

All activities that are deviations from social norms may be classified as expressions of the wish for new experience. On the negative side this would seem to imply a boredom with the *status quo*, an effort to escape the fatigue that arises from repetition of a single action pattern. It should be observed, however, that even the most adventurous want the "new" to be composed largely of old and recognizable elements. Things that are too radical are usually disturbing rather than stimulating. To be commercially successful, a new piece of music, a novel, or a joke must ordinarily be no more than an old one re-dressed.

Although the distinction between the first two of this fourfold classification is obvious, that between the second pair, recognition and response, is not so apparent. The *wish for recognition** can perhaps be imputed to such activities as a man's flattering an employer in order to get a better position, his taking a correspondence-school course in salesmanship in order to improve his value to his employer, his marrying above his social position, or his becoming a Democrat in the hope of securing a political position. In other words, this wish is used to describe all those actions which lead to increased social and economic prestige for the individual. There are, in addition, many actions that can have little value in themselves; their chief significance to the one who acts is that they serve as a means of drawing the favorable attention of others. Sometimes termed "rivalry," actions of this order are invariably competitive. Although the behavior itself might be described as a consequence of the wish for recognition, we frequently speak of the person who endeavors to assert his superiority in competition with others as an egotist. Illustrative of the forms of behavior that may be described as egotistical are temper tantrums, childish pounding on the piano while guests are present, and buying a new car even though the old one functions well and economically.

In certain types of activity, men seem to work most efficiently under competitive conditions. Utilization of the "competitive spirit" in an effort to intensify work and play efficiency is a commonplace of everyday life. The fact that a man runs his fastest on the track when he is competing with others rather than with his own past scores may be described as motivated by his wish for recognition, so, too, may the fact that a woman puts on her best and newest dress to attend a party,

studies have shown that the radical is likely to consider himself rejected by his parents; that he is more subject to inferiority feelings, and that he is considered more pessimistic, more handicapped in social relations, and more equipped with special aptitudes than is the conservative (M. H. Krout and R. Stagner, 1939). The radical is also apt to be slightly brighter, more dominant, better informed (E. S. Dexter, 1939), and economically poorer (R. H. Gundlach, 1939). See "A study of the influence of political radicalism on personality development" (S. Diamond, 1936).

*See "Adjustment problems of university girls arising from the urge for recognition and new experience" (S. H. Jameson, 1941).

that she wants to keep up with the trend of fashion, or that in a group of other women she talks rapidly in an unusually loud tone of voice. In a like way have been classified the efforts of a man to become known as the "best man on the job" or "the life of the party", those of the army private to become a lance corporal, those of the multimillionaire to get an appointment to the court of St. James; or those of the dictator to increase the number of his subjects.

In some societies there is little opportunity for the individual to change his social status, and in these there would be less occasion than in our society to speak of a wish for recognition. Whenever social recognition is a matter of birth, competition cannot appear between members of different class, sex, or age groups. In our dynamic and highly competitive society, a great deal of human action would seem to have no other objective than that of asserting the individual's superiority over his associates. We are, in a sense, a society composed of egotists, each endeavoring to rise above the others. Many of our actions may therefore be aptly described as an expression of the wish for recognition.

The actions of a meek man who timidly strikes up a conversation with the one who shares his seat on the train should not be described as the result of egotism or a wish for recognition. His behavior is a noncompetitive form of action, which may be termed "communalism." He may listen earnestly to whatever the other has to say, express opinions of his own only when the other lapses into silence, and likewise reveal a hunger for companionship upon any basis. Man is often spoken of as a gregarious animal—a reference to the fact that men tend to form small communal groups.

In an integrated society, the individual's membership in various social groups is so automatic as to arouse little comment. He belongs. His life is organized, and one phase of that organization is the response he receives to his presence by the members of his various social groups. He does not need, therefore, to seek out companions. People who are accustomed to the comparatively isolated life of modern urban communities are inclined to feel irritated at the constant presence of intimates—which was characteristic, for example, of life on the old-fashioned farm. They may feel a lack of privacy under such conditions. Removed from his usual surroundings, however, even the most self-sufficient urbanite will commonly seek out people with whom he can communicate.

The tendency for people to draw together whenever they are faced with extraordinary circumstances has been described as the result of the *wish for response*. When the fog grows dangerously thick and a sense of uncertainty pervades the passengers on a ship, former social barriers often drop away, and the passengers form close intimate groups. Apparently this sort of thing is but an adult parallel to the child's trick of running to mother for "comfort" when he is overtired or when he is disturbed by some unusual noise or event.

In the modern world many people who as children lived in intimate companionship with others may find themselves removed in later years from such membership. They feel lonely and, as an effort to reestablish themselves, may become joiners. The man who hangs around a low-class poolroom, bar, dance hall, or "rummy" club may be said to evidence a wish for response, so, too, may his social superior who sits and chats idly all afternoon in his luxurious club and goes the rounds of night clubs after dinner. At times the use of books, motion pictures, and the radio may be similarly described. Ours is a busy, unstable society, in which the individual is frequently denied the companionship that was his in childhood and youth.

38 There are at least two types of overt activities that are themselves poorly verbalized, and surely the accompanying covert behaviors must be even less verbalized. First there are those overt activities which are learned during the preverbal period, the period before speech habits are well established. During the first year or so the child must acquire many habits, and no set is more difficult to establish than that having to do with the control of the bladder and the alimentary tract. Yet no other training is perhaps so clumsily handled. The child is not encouraged to discuss his difficulties. Only signs and baby talk are allowed, and after a time even these are curtailed without adequate explanations. With a hush-hush atmosphere ever present, no frank ironing out of difficulties is possible. In fact failure of eliminative control, as in enuresis, is sometimes employed by the child to control his parents. They call in first an internist and later a psychiatrist, give the enuretic special attentions, and augment his ego in many other ways. It is, therefore, no wonder that there arises a variety of poorly verbalized and un verbalized covert behavior paralleling excretory difficulties—anxieties, long-continued moods, and the like. Many psychoanalysts are so much impressed by the possibilities for major frustrations that they trace many important complexes of later life back to these poorly verbalized moods and attitudes that are said by the analysts to reside in a semimystical unconscious. The term “unconscious” is, however, a misleading one, it is likely to lead the layman to believe that these early habits are kept intact in a magic box of some sort, and to imply that these early habits continually attempt by fair means and foul to escape from their place of confinement. It would be more scientific to say that there exists a poor integration of habits, both overt and covert.

Later in the child's life, but earlier than the older books on child psychology would admit, the beginnings of sex play appear. In our somewhat prudish culture such activity is not looked upon as normal. Again the hush-hush attitude appears with prohibition of both the more obvious activities and the few words used to describe them. Again the stage is set for covert conflicts. To the credit of the psychoanalysts it must be said that they have been among the first to appreciate the frustrating nature of such suppressions. Unfortunately, however, certain of the analysts have regarded early sex and eliminative troubles as basic to all later mental troubles. This particularistic sort of explanation, this bringing of all troubles back to a few childish upsets, cannot of course be accepted, but the importance to later adjustment of the poorly verbalized, overt activities of childhood and of their covert accompaniments must not be ignored.

39. The concept of negative and positive identification assists in the analysis of such differential responses as those of humor and tragedy and those of sentimentality and pity. Without this concept, the distinction between the humorous and the tragic situation in the play, the motion picture, and the written story is a baffling one; for the clue lies not in the situations but in the identifications made by the one who finds the situation either humorous or tragic. The situations themselves are highly conventionalized, we laugh at that which we have been taught to laugh at and cry about that which is conventionally a cause for tears. But frequently there is no consistent outward difference between situations that the audience considers humorous and those that the audience feels tragic. The embarrassed country boy in the fashionable salon of a great metropolis can be an object either of humor or of tragedy. The man who trips and falls downstairs to land at the proud dowager's feet may be either a laughable buffoon or a heart-rending unfortunate. Apparently, therefore, it is not the situation per se that makes for

the difference in the reaction of the audience, but the way in which and the extent to which the members of the audience have identified themselves with the central character

In witnessing a play or motion picture or in following the narrative of a story, one tends to identify oneself positively with one or more of the characters. In accordance with the dramatic formula, the observer is generally given a hero with whom to make a positive identification and a villain with whom to make a negative identification. Vicariously, the observer can then enjoy the successes of the hero and the misadventures of the villain, an enjoyment intensified by contrast with the occasional vicarious anguish induced by the difficulties of the former and by the achievements of the latter. In the happy-ending type of story, the hero and heroine finally outwit and defeat the villain. In tragedy, however, the villain is frequently an impersonal force—nature or the social system. Thus the success of the villain does not greatly add to the displeasure that the observer feels at the hero's defeat, since the observer is in a sense resigned to victories of nature over man.

In comedy the observer is led to reverse his usual identifications with the dramatic characters, so that the events that would otherwise be tragic become funny. To accomplish this reversal of identification, the hero, although a tragic figure, is made so unpersonable that the observer will make no positive identification and may make some negative identification with him. To attain this end, comedians are always "comic," *i.e.*, of an appearance that precludes positive identification on the part of the observer. The comic effect is probably heightened when the misfortunes of the comedian are caused by a villain with whom the observer can make a degree of positive identification. Thus in comedy we laugh when the good-natured thug hits the ridiculous policeman over the head with a playful piece of lead pipe, whereas in tragedy we are agonized when the horrible thug hits the noble policeman over the head with a vicious piece of lead pipe.

40 Even though we were to accept, contrary to all evidence (see Appendix note 42), the idea that races can be satisfactorily separated one from another on the basis of anthropological measurements, it would be impossible to accept the thesis of the biological determinists. There is no scientific evidence that one particular "race" is biologically better than the others. In "A study of psychological differences between 'racial' and national groups in Europe," Klineberg found no significant differences in "intelligence" between Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterraneans (O. Klineberg, 1931-1932). Nor was any national group consistently superior. One of his French groups was, for example, among his best, whereas another was low.

The questionnaire studies reported in "Emotional reactions connected with differences in cephalic index, shade of hair, and color of eyes in Caucasians" (G. M. Stratton, 1934a) are claimed by their author to demonstrate emotionality to be an innate characteristic, found most strongly in Mediterraneans, less in Nordics, and still less in Alpines. It is the view of the present authors, however, that Stratton's data do not justify the conclusions he draws. The nature-nurture issue cannot be studied satisfactorily by so simple and crude a device as the questionnaire (see Appendix note 16).

In America large differences in Binet intelligence and in other abilities have been found among the several European nationals. But the impossibility of divorcing the effects of education and opportunity and the lack of a technique for determining how typical these people are of their respective "races" make doubtful

any conclusion as to native differences (G H Estabrooks, 1928) Franzblau, who has compared Danes and Italians in both America and Europe, found that, although the American groups show the expected differences in favor of the Danes, the European groups show no significant differences (R N Franzblau, 1935) Such studies certainly indicate that the burden of proof should be upon those who maintain that the "racial" differences found between various national groups in America are innate

When Amerindians and Negroes are compared with whites, the factor of differential social status inevitably intervenes No one knows the effect that his inferior social and economic opportunity has on the Negro's intelligence Certainly it must be considerable Urban residence, for instance, has been found to be an important variable in the formation of Negro intelligence In general, the longer the urban residence, the higher the intelligence is likely to be (O Klineberg, 1935b) Amerindians and Negroes generally score lower than do whites, the Chinese and Japanese, on the other hand, compare quite favorably with European immigrants as a group and are far superior to certain of those from the south and east of Europe.

Personality tests have so far shown few consistent "racial" differences, and when slight differences do appear, it is well nigh impossible to interpret the data See "Personality differences between Negro and white college students, North and South" (J R Patrick and V M Sims, 1934) and *Thus be their destiny the personality development of Negro youth in three communities* (J H Atwood et al, 1941)

The most striking aspect of the problem of "race" is not that an occasional difference is found but rather that there is such an enormous overlap between groups On a particular test 40 per cent of a so-called "inferior" race will frequently achieve better scores than that made by the median of a so-called "superior" race And from every large "race" have come many individuals who on the basis of any criterion have contributed much to the world Their "intelligence" and other personal qualities invite the closest of scrutines Often their status is won in spite of the bitterest of opposition—gained in the presence of social and economic pressures that would not have been invoked against a member of a favored race

For reviews of the studies on racial differences, see *Race psychology* (T R Garth, 1931), *Race differences* (O Klineberg, 1935a), *Race science and politics* (R Benedict, 1940), "Race problems in America" (R Benedict, 1941), and *Scientific aspects of the race problem* (H S Jennings et al, 1941)

41. The literature based upon the Aryan myth is as broad as it is shallow The most notorious of the books on this subject that have appeared in English in recent times is, perhaps, *The rising tide of color against white world-supremacy* (T L Stoddard, 1920) Next in rank order is probably *The passing of the great race* (M Grant, 1921) Many temperate and cautious attacks upon the problem of racial differences have, however, been made Among these are the following *Race differences* (O Klineberg, 1935a), in which the attempts to find biological explanations for racial differences in behavior are examined and the idea of biological causation is ultimately rejected, *The racial basis of civilization* (F Hankin, 1926), and *Race and civilization* (F Hertz, 1928)

That much of the variation in the performances of the members of different groups is of social origin seems certain That the problem is a complex and unsettled one is also true See, for example, the detailed studies of racial mixture in *The mulatto in the United States* (E B Reuter, 1918), *The American race problem*

(E. B. Reuter, 1927a), and *Race mixture* (E. B. Reuter, 1931). These studies will indicate why, as M. J. Herskovits says ("Race mixture," *Encycl Soc Sci*, **13**, 41-43), there can at present be no unanimity upon the psychological or social results of racial crossing. See also *American minority peoples* (D. R. Young, 1932a), *The tragedy of lynching* (A. F. Raper, 1933), *Race relations: adjustment of whites and Negroes in the United States* (W. D. Weatherford and C. S. Johnson, 1934), "Intra-race testing and negro intelligence" (P. A. Witty and M. A. Jenkins, 1936), *The marginal man: a study in personality and culture conflict* (E. V. Stonequist, 1937), *The Negro family in the United States* (E. F. Frazier, 1939), *Children of bondage* (A. Davis and J. Dollard, 1940), and *Negro youth at the crossways* (E. F. Frazier, 1940).

42 The people of the world cannot be classified on objective biological grounds into mutually exclusive groupings. Nevertheless, we think of people as belonging to some specific race, which we consider as a biological unit, and we frequently act upon this subjective classification. The term "race" has, thus, sociopsychological if not biological significance. For the impossibility of making a biological classification, see F. Boas's article "Race" (*Encycl Soc Sci*, **13**, 25-36).

The confusion existing between the concept of "race" and that of "cultural similarity" is well illustrated in lay thinking about the Jews. To most gentle laymen "a Jew is a Jew," and it makes very little difference whether the individual's ancestors came from Russia or from Spain. Yet to the specialist in races this is a vital difference. The Russian Jews have practically nothing in common with the Spanish Jews, as blood tests and many other types of measurement show. The two groups have a religion in common—in tradition, if not in fact, and both are often persecuted and socially isolated. It is these cultural factors that cause their being considered Jewish, and so non-Aryan. Genetically speaking, Russian Jews and Spanish Jews come from quite different stocks, each of which is in many respects similar to the group near which it has lived for many centuries.

43 Two sorts of studies have been used in the endeavor to verify the assumption that occupational status is directly related to inherent potentialities.

In the first type of study the intelligence of the children of the members of various occupational groupings is compared. The average intelligence-test score of children of professional men is found to be higher than is that of the children of business and clerical groups, and the mean score made by the children of the latter groups is found to be higher than that made by the children of semiskilled workers, farmers, and unskilled workers. See "Mental capacity of children and paternal occupation" (M. E. Haggerty and H. B. Nash, 1924), "The relation of the intelligence of pre-school children to the occupation of their fathers" (F. L. Goodenough, 1928), "Parental occupations and children's intelligence scores" (A. M. Jordan, 1933); "The intelligence of Negro college students and parental occupation" (H. G. Canady, 1936), "Socio-economic status and intelligence: a critical survey" (W. S. Neff, 1938); "Intelligence as related to socio-economic factors" (J. Loewinger, 1940).

If the intelligence-test scores could be proved to be a function solely of innate potentiality, such data would indeed prove that class position and native intelligence are closely related. But in view of the fact that we do not know to what extent the tests measure differences in innate ability and to what extent the test scores reflect differences in educational and occupational opportunity and other social factors, we cannot go far beyond the simple statement that children of the higher classes achieve a higher average score on a particular intelligence test than

do those of the lower occupational classes. The overlapping between the several groups is enormous, in fact, it is frequently so great that fully a third of the children whose fathers belong to a low occupational class will have scores above the average of the children whose fathers are from the next higher class.

In the second type of study, the members of various occupational groups are tested. This procedure also yields a hierarchy of "tested intelligence." Fryer in "Occupational-intelligence standards" (D. Fryer, 1922) demonstrated that engineers who were given the Army Alpha test had a mean score slightly higher than that of clergymen, and that the mean score of these latter was slightly higher than that of accountants, physicians, etc. Other analyzers of the army data have found a similar hierarchy. But here again, several environmental factors—formal education, occupational opportunity, and the like—will work unevenly over the various occupational levels and will make futile any attempt to disclose an organic basis for the measured difference.

Those who are anxious to prove that our present economic system is the best of all possible ones will, nevertheless, argue that class positions are today and were always a reflection of biological status. In so doing, they completely ignore the factors of differential opportunity. One of the worst examples of such rationalization can be found in *American business leaders* (F. W. Taussig and C. S. Joslyn, 1932). The eugenists, too, have often been guilty of making the a priori assumption that social status is a consequence of biological status. See *Racial hygiene* (T. B. Rice, 1929) and a criticism of this book in a review (E. B. Reuter, 1930). Note also the use of this rationalization in *Social mobility* (P. Sorokin, 1927) to "prove" that social revolt is socially unjustified.

For an understanding of the way in which differential social circumstances operate to produce different human "types" of the class order see the following, which will indicate something of the way in which the "other half" live, no matter what half the reader represents. *The ghetto* (L. Wirth, 1928), *The Gold Coast and the slum* (H. W. Zorbaugh, 1929), "Five generations of a begging family" (H. W. Gilmore, 1932), and A. Livingston's "Theory of the gentleman" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 6, 616-620). To those who still believe that the "four hundred" are as socially important as they think themselves to be, *The theory of the leisure class* (T. B. Veblen, 1926) will prove a good antidote.

44. From mental-test data concerning sex differences in emotional response no definite conclusion emerges. Flemming in "Sex differences in emotional responses" (E. G. Flemming, 1933) claims that his male and female subjects possessed quite similar "interests," "worries," and "ideas concerning what things are wrong" (as shown by scores on X-O tests). Miles and Terman, however, report in "Sex difference in the association of ideas" (C. C. Miles and L. M. Terman, 1929) certain rather consistent sex differences in associations of ideas. Women seemed to give the more introverted, evaluating types of responses. Willoughby reports sex differences which he believes reflect "chiefly differential environmental pressures brought to bear on the individual from within and without at the different periods of life, rather than congenital factors" (R. R. Willoughby, 1935). From his questionnaire data Stratton deduces that women's fear reactions are markedly more intense than are those of the other sex. He believes that personal history of disease increases the intensity of the fear response for women but not for men (G. M. Stratton, 1934b). See also "Some highlights in the literature of psychological sex differences published since 1920" (W. B. Johnson and L. M. Terman, 1940) and "Studies of sex differences. II" (E. B. Skaggs, 1941).

Anthropological studies have done much to discourage the assumption that sex differences in behavior have their origin in the biology of sex. Mead claims that there is little correlation between the relation of sex and personality in the three primitive societies that she has compared in *Sex and temperament*. The Arapesh seem to have no temperamental differences between the sexes, to place a high value on nonaggressiveness, and to recognize no strong sexual urges. On the other hand, among the Mundugumor, a violent people, father and son often compete for the same woman, and the women look upon sex activity with the same violent interest as do the men. In contrast to both of these are the Tchambuli, whose men are artistic and "feminine" according to our standards and whose women dominate and are most active in the economic life of the community (M. Mead, 1935).

Now on the market is a test of masculine and feminine attitudes and interests (L. M. Terman, C. C. Miles *et al.*, 1936). The test was developed by the process of finding items that would differentiate certain high-school, college, and adult females from males of comparable scholastic and chronological age. The test is given ostensibly as a measure of interest with the real purpose obscured. The reason for this deception lies in the fact that a person could intentionally answer the test so as to make his score more masculine or more feminine (E. L. Kelly, C. C. Miles, and L. M. Terman, 1936). The test results show that many so-called "he-men" receive scores that are no more masculine than those obtained by less "masculine" men*. Similarly, many women who are considered extremely "feminine" do not tend to score significantly more feminine on the test. As the sexes achieve more scholastic interests, their scores tend to meet. Thus, scores achieved by college professors, priests, and authors tend to be more feminine than those made by businessmen. A scoring key for Strong's *Vocational interest blank*, which distinguishes boys from girls on the basis of "affirmed likes and dislikes," is described in "Sex differences in occupational interests of high school students" (H. D. Carter and E. K. Strong, Jr., 1933).

45. In the Hartshorne-May (C. E. I.) study of honesty (H. Hartshorne, M. A. May *et al.*, 1928-1930, and H. Hartshorne 1932) the ethics of a large number of children were tested in school and other situations. The techniques included both paper-and-pencil tests and observational methods. The intercorrelations between the several tests of honesty were very low. It was found that almost any given child may cheat one day but not the next, that he may cheat when he is in a classroom where cheating is the expected behavior, but be honest when he is in classrooms where higher standards of ethics exist, and that whenever cheating is made easy (*e.g.*, by the presence of erasers and the absence of the teacher), the typical child may cheat. From data such as these many have concluded that honesty is highly specific. See "A study of the honesty of prospective teachers" (B. E. Atkins and R. E. Atkins, 1936), "The problem of student honesty" (F. W. Parr, 1936), and "Honesty is relative" (L. Omwake, 1939). Tests of cheerfulness also have been found to intercorrelate poorly (P. T. Young, 1937). With tests of conservatism, however, the intercorrelations are considerably higher (T. F. Lentz, 1938).

* The work of Gilkinson indicates that there is no single objective criterion of physical masculinity. He found extremely low intercorrelations between pitch level of the speaking voice, hip and shoulder dimensions, and distribution of hair over the body (H. Gilkinson, 1937).

Although trait-test intercorrelations are generally very low, they are rather consistently positive. This fact has been used by Maller as an argument for generality rather than specificity of traits (J. B. Maller, 1934). It is, of course, always possible to ignore the specificity-generality problem and, from averages of the data, to consider general trends. Thus it can be shown that children from the higher income levels are the more honest (*i.e.*, they average higher on the several honesty tests) and that children in the higher grades are the least truthful and the most tactful (B. J. Horton, 1937). For a survey of the current literature on traits see "Topical summaries of current literature: personality traits" (C. Schettler, 1939). See also "Faculties *versus* traits, Gall's solution" (H. D. Spoerl, 1936); "The concept of traits" (H. A. Carr and F. A. Kingsbury, 1938), and "Some antecedent concepts of personality trait" (C. Schettler, 1941).

46 At the beginning of the century, Terman reported his pioneering work on school leaders in "A preliminary study of the psychology and pedagogy of leadership" (L. M. Terman, 1904). A few of the more important qualities possessed by the child leaders of his day deserve mention here. As Terman described them, these children were less selfish, more daring, greater readers, better in schoolwork, less emotional, more fluent speakers, of "better" parentage, "better" looking, of larger size, better dressed, and more conspicuous in some respect. Several contemporary Russian investigators have been working on projects similar to that initiated by Terman. Their data would probably prove of great value could they be shown to be truthfully reported.* For a typical foreign study see "*Essai d'une étude sur les enfants meneurs*" (E. Chevaleva-Ianovskaia and D. Sylla, 1929). For more recent American data see "Leadership among adolescent boys" (E. D. Partridge, 1934). See also "Measurement and prediction of leadership" (D. P. Page, 1935) and "Characteristics of group leaders" (L. D. Zeleny, 1939).

The interesting observation that, at least in the case of children, there must not be too great a disparity in I. Q. between a leader and those led appears in *Gifted children: their nature and nurture* (L. S. Hollingworth, 1926). Children with extremely high I. Q.'s are likely to become leaders of youngsters of high I. Q.'s but not of children with average I. Q.'s. Those of high I. Q. tend to be the leaders of these latter.

Almost two decades ago two German investigators attempted to get at the qualities of leadership merely by asking school children just what it was that made leaders out of certain of their classmates (A. Leib, 1928, and K. Broich, 1929). Practically all the traditionally "approved" traits were mentioned. Since the answers in such studies must certainly reflect the culture of the times, one wonders what kinds of reports would be obtained at present in Nazi Germany. One might guess that the "quality of democratic leadership" would not now be mentioned.

In any attempt to study the personality of college leaders, a major difficulty arises from the fact that the school system usually sets some minimum standards of academic achievement for student leaders. In many institutions the student must make grades above a certain level and must keep at this point in spite of the time-consuming nature of his extracurricular activities, for which no grade credits are given. Other institutions may have lower standards, they may even subsidize

* It should be noted that, wherever dictatorships are functioning (it matters little whether they be left or right), materials that bear on social relations are likely to be censored and warped. Clearly, then, such data cannot be accepted unskeptically.

their athletes openly or secretly or bring pressure on the faculty to "give" good grades to these college leaders, a procedure that cannot help having its effect in the molding of personality. In some instances, the leader himself is able to high-pressure the faculty so that he receives better marks and ratings than he deserves. Then, too, the well-known "halo" and "hearsay" effects may enter in. If a teacher knows that a given student is a leader along one line, the halo or prestige so engendered may cause the teacher to rate this leader as something of a leader in other lines. A comparable effect may result from rumors about this person's conquests in other fields (hearsay effect) *

Several investigators have, nevertheless, attempted studies of leadership among college students. See "A study of the personality of student leaders in colleges in the United States" (A. O. Bowden, 1926), "An analysis of qualities associated with leadership among college students" (E. C. Hunter and A. M. Jordan, 1939), and "A statistical study of leadership among college women" (M. D. Dunkerley, 1940). High-school leadership has been somewhat similarly studied. See "Measuring leadership" (E. H. Morris, 1930), "A factor analysis of the personality of high school leaders" (E. G. Flemming, 1935), and "Leadership in the high school" (W. H. Reals, 1938).

From the sociological viewpoint, leadership has been discussed at considerable length in *Leaders and leadership* (E. S. Bogardus, 1934), *Leadership or domination* (P. Pigors, 1935), and "A study of the leadership process" (A. J. Murphy, 1941).

47 F. H. Allport and G. W. Allport have published a test of aggressiveness or social dominance which attempts to measure what a subject thinks he would do in certain social situations. The scores on this ascendancy-submission test correlate slightly (.30 to .35) with the subjects' and their associates' ratings of dominance (G. W. Allport, 1928). There appears to be no relationship between the scores of mothers and daughters, of fathers and daughters, or of husbands and wives (M. N. Crook and M. Thomas, 1934). This A-S test, as it is called, has been revised. See "Ascendancy-submission test—revised" (R. O. Beckman, 1933).

The personality inventory (R. Bernreuter, 1935) is composed of a single list of questions that can be scored with six sets of weights. One set gives the equivalent of the Allports' ascendancy-submission test and is called by Bernreuter the "B 4 D test." Scores on this test have been found to check well with data gathered by the interview technique (R. Stagner, 1934). When first starting their academic careers in America, foreign students in American colleges generally rate themselves as highly submissive but gradually change their ratings toward the dominant end of the scale. See also "A study of the consistency of dominant and submissive behavior in adolescent boys" (E. A. Schuler, 1935), "Some relations between family background and personality" (J. Carpenter and P. Eisenberg, 1938); "Dominance, personality, and social behavior in women" (A. H. Maslow, 1939); and "An examination of the concepts of domination and integration in relation to dominance and ascendancy" (H. H. Anderson, 1940).

Examples of the relation of dominance to cultural factors can be seen in the several studies on conversation. Those by Moore (H. T. Moore, 1922) and those

* Of course, such spurious elements in our judgments occur outside as well as inside the classroom. Because a man is an authority in one field, we listen to him with bated breath while he talks in a field about which he knows next to nothing. The specialist in one line is regarded by the mass of people as being an expert in many other fields.

by Landis and Burt (M H Landis and H E Burt, 1924) apparently indicate that in America in "man and woman" conversations there is a tendency for the woman to adapt her interests to those of the man. Observations in London, on the contrary, seem to show that the Englishman adapts his conversation to that of his female companion (C Landis, 1927). See also "Sex differences in conversational interests" (S M Stoke and E D West, 1931), "Sex differences in conversation" (J S Carlson, S W Cook, and E L Stromberg, 1936), and "Conversation as a reflector of social change" (W J Baker and D McGregor, 1937).

Dominance is a pattern of behavior that exists even among the lower animals. Among many species the following sets of variables are closely tied to dominance: relative size, strength, health, and age, conditions attending the first meeting of the animals in question, sex (although in most species the male is dominant at all times, among the chimpanzees the female is dominant during oestrous), familiarity with the territory and "ownership", and special friendship with a more dominant animal. Among the subhuman primates, submission is often shown through the assumption by males of female sexual postures. See "The experimental measurement of a social hierarchy in *Gallus domesticus*" (C Murchison, 1935c), "Observations of dominance-subordination in cats" (C N Winslow, 1938), and "Companionship preference and dominance in the social interaction of young chimpanzees" (V Nowlis, 1941).

With humans, dominant behavior appears very early. It shows itself in the infant's reactions even while he is in the crib. Buhler claims that at this stage the older of two infants (older by three months or more) usually dominates the younger (C Buhler, 1933). Soon, however, enormous numbers of social factors enter, and these operate during the remainder of life to give each human that degree of dominance he will exhibit in each subsequent social situation. See also "An experimental study of ascendant behavior in preschool children" (L M Jack, 1934), "The modification of ascendant behavior in preschool children" (M L Page, 1936), "Domination and integration in the social behavior of young children in an experimental play situation" (H. H. Anderson, 1937a), and "An experimental study of dominative and integrative behavior in children of preschool age" (H H Anderson, 1937b).

The phenomenon of dominance overlaps and often becomes identical with rivalry. Both clinical and common observation show that rivalry exists in animals (T Schjelderup-Ebbe, 1922, and C N Winslow, 1940) and in young children (E V Berne, 1930, P J Greenberg, 1932, E A Graves, 1937, and T H Wolf, 1938).

One of the best of the strictly experimental studies is that reported in *Experimentelle Massenpsychologie* (W Moede, 1920). The willingness of boys twelve to fourteen years of age to withstand so-called "intolerable" pain when alone was compared with their willingness to do so in the presence of others. Willingness to withstand pain was greatest when pairs of boys competed. In a further study, Moede found that children of poor ability in various tests profited on the average relatively more from rivalry than did children of better ability, and that boys would squeeze more vigorously on a dynamometer in front of others and especially when paired with a competitor. But sweeping conclusions regarding the value of competition must not be drawn from the findings of such studies. Triplett has demonstrated scientifically what common sense has long suggested—that certain subjects may be so overstimulated by competition that their work suffers (N Triplett, 1898). Studies that show that girls are less competitive than boys are of

local significance only With a shift in attitudes girls might become the more competitive (F Baumgarten, 1922) In "The influence of competition on performance an experimental study" (I C Whittemore, 1924) Whittemore claims that quality of work is frequently adversely affected by competition and offers data to substantiate his claim

In "Cooperation and competition an experimental study in motivation" (J B Maller, 1929) it is rather clearly shown that competitive effects are greater when children choose their own competitors than when teams are selected for them The intensity of motivation appeared to be related to the character of the work situation in the following order (from most motivation to least) (a) work for one's own sex, (b) for oneself, (c) for one's team, (d) for one's class, (e) for a group assigned by teacher See also *Competition and cooperation* (M A May and L W Doob, 1937), *Memorandum on research in competition and cooperation* (M A May et al, 1937); *Cooperation and competition among primitive peoples* (M Mead, 1937), "A study of competitive and cooperative behavior by the short sample technique" (E A Graves, 1937), "Variability as a measure of competitive behavior" (J Vaughn and E Geldreich, 1938) and "The experimental psychology of competition" (J Vaughn and C M Diserens, 1938)

Studies have been made that show the effects on level of performance of praise and blame, of verbal suggestions, of material rewards, and of knowledge of improvements in scores—all of which are closely related to rivalry The findings of these studies are, on the whole, in line with common sense But, insofar as each experimental situation tends to be relative, it is impossible to assess the comparative values of the various methods of stimulating achievement, except, perhaps, for particular social situations Typical of the many articles in these fields are "An evaluation of certain incentives used in school work" (E B Hurlock, 1925), "Praise and censure as incentives" (T H Briggs, 1927), "The use of group rivalry as an incentive" (E B Hurlock, 1927), "Attitude in relation to learning" (E B Sullivan, 1927), "Practice versus motivation" (P M Symonds and D H Chase, 1929), "A preliminary experiment to quantify an incentive and its effects" (C J Leuba, 1930), "An experimental study of efficiency of work under various specified conditions" (P A Sorokin et al, 1930), "Reward and punishment" (E R Guthrie, 1934), "The effect of verbal suggestion on output and variability of muscular work" (C W Manzer, 1934), and "A further study of the function of reward" (H Wallach and M Henle, 1942). For references on social facilitation and attempts to differentiate it experimentally from rivalry, see Appendix note 62, for references on level of aspiration, see Appendix note 31

48. There is no test or rating scale that will automatically classify an individual as an introvert or an extrovert Test scores fall along a reasonably "normal" curve, the peak of frequencies being at some mid-point, which one psychologist terms the "ambivert" region The introvert and extrovert regions of the curve are merely the extremes or tails of the distribution So far as the authors know, only one test of introversion is claimed to yield a bimodal (two-peaked) distribution curve (C A Neymann and K D Kohlstedt, 1929) A number of experimenters believe that this conclusion must have been reached through error, for none of them has found any bimodality in his own test data

The psychoanalyst Jung is accredited with the introduction of the terms "introversion" and "extroversion" to psychologists, a number of whom, being test-minded, proceeded to construct a variety of tests based on some modification of Jung's ideas Unfortunately, the several testers did not agree among them-

selves, and the various introversion-extroversion tests that have been developed do not correlate well one with another (R M Collier and M Emch, 1938) The Guilfords, in fact, found that in a typical introversion test at least eighteen group factors appear to be involved (J P Guilford and R B Guilford, 1934) The most important of these factors have been labeled *D* (depression), *S* (shyness), and *T* (thinking of a meditative sort) Another factor, *A* (alertness), seems to be what Jung was attempting to measure (J P Guilford and R B Guilford, 1939a) None of these factors appears to be related to body form (W B Pillsbury, 1939)

In the construction of tests of introversion it has been a common practice to borrow items from existing questionnaires One questionnaire that has been much used in this manner is the R S Woodworth *Personal data sheet* (S I Franz, 1919) Typical of the many paper-and-pencil tests now on the market are the following Bernreuter's *B 3 I Scale* (R G Bernreuter, 1935), the McDougall items to measure introversion (R W George, 1936), the *Wisconsin scale of personality traits* (R Stagner, 1937), the *Neymann-Kohlstedt diagnostic test for introversion-extroversion* (C A Neymann and K D Kohlstedt, 1929, and A R Gilliland and J J B Morgan, 1931), the *Minnesota personal traits rating scales* (E Headdreder, 1926); and Conklin's *Study of likes and dislikes* (E S Conklin, 1927) Guthrie has offered a test of campus information or gossip as a possible measure of introversion (E R Guthrie, 1927, and F B Davis and P J Rulon, 1935) Marston has attempted to measure introversion both by questionnaires and by observations on nonsymbolic behaviors (L R Marston, 1925) Although the foregoing and other tests are still being used extensively, their validity is doubtful In dealing with the practical problems of personality adjustment the tests are rarely found to be of value (G S Speer, 1936), although certain of their items are occasionally useful At best, any single test can tap but a tiny area of life experience, and even that area is exclusively symbolic

The traits of inadequacy and inferiority have been much discussed by the psychoanalysts Although sexual difficulties, organ inferiorities, and other physical troubles have often been deemed causative factors, data of an experimental character are almost entirely lacking But see "Organic inferiority and the inferiority attitude" (H F Fatterson, 1931) Fatterson found low but positive correlations between the total number of the subject's recorded physical defects and his inferiority rating Some of the other tests of inferiority feeling are. *Character sketches* (J B Maller, 1932), the *PN* (R B Smith, 1932), selected items (R K White and N Fenton, 1932), the *Personal attitudes test for younger boys* (L Sweet, 1929), and M E Smith's schedule (M E Smith, 1938) See also *The craving for superiority* (R Dodge and E Kahn, 1931) and *That inferiority feeling* (J S Hoyland, 1937)

For more general references on measurement see "The measurement of personality" (L M Terman, 1934), "Can the 'total personality' be studied objectively?" (P E Vernon, 1935), *Methodology of social science research a bibliography* (D C Culver, 1936); "Quantitative methods in social psychology" (G A Lundberg, 1936), "Discussion [of Lundberg, Quantitative methods in social psychology]" (W Waller, 1936); *The prediction of personal adjustment* (Paul Horst, 1941); "A technique for correlating measurable traits with freely observed social behaviors" (C C Peters, 1941); *The 1940 mental measurements yearbook* (O K Buros, 1941); "Applications of personality and character measurement" (J W M Rothney and B A Roens, 1941); "Current construction and evaluation of personality and character tests" (A E. Traxler, 1941), and *Social research* (G A. Lundberg, 1942).

49 One of the earliest experiments in stereotyping was that reported in *Quantitative methods in politics* (S A Rice, 1928). A list of descriptive terms including "premier," "financier," and "bolshevik" and nine photographs including those of a premier, a financier, and a bolshevik were presented to over one hundred students, who were asked to select the proper designation for each photograph. There was considerable agreement among the students as to the designation to be attached to each of the several photographs, and the students agreed quite well ($r = .84$) with the members of a farmer's grange. Unhappily, however, neither the students nor the grangers were correct in the designations. For example, the bolshevik pictured had a Van Dyke beard, a winged collar, and a mustache (not of the wild and woolly kind), and this configuration was labeled United States Senator by many of the students and grangers. With essentially the same technique Litterer secured almost identical results (O F Litterer, 1933). See also "Judgments of occupations from printed photographs" (L Gahagan, 1933).

At the University of Nebraska the students' "teacher" stereotype was a person of "stern, dignified, reserved appearance" (K H McGill, 1931).

That we train our children into the acceptance of stock stereotypes is well shown by Meltzer's study of 200 problem children (H Meltzer, 1932). In answer to the question, "Who is the greatest man who ever lived?" 72 per cent gave the names of either Jesus, Washington, or Lincoln. Sixty-four per cent gave the names of either Washington or Lincoln. In answer to the question, "Who is the greatest man living?" 56 per cent of the votes were received by three names. In view of the very large number of men who might have been named, such concentration on a very few is clear evidence that the replies to the questions were in the nature of stereotypes.

The well-known fact that the typical voter casts his ballot for a party name—a stereotype—rather than for a party platform was ably demonstrated in a study of the voters of Centre County, Pennsylvania, in 1934. Although 55.5 per cent were anxious to support "a program of socialization with its promise of enhanced status to the working-class population and a corresponding reduction in the power of the privileged groups through a 'redistribution of wealth'"—the platform of the socialist party—that party polled very few votes. Sixty-one per cent of the voters claimed to dislike the party—really the party name (G W Hartmann, 1936b, p 338). See "Fascist attitudes an exploratory study" (R Stagner, 1936b).

That the cartoon can be used to influence stereotyping is shown in "Cartoons as a means of social control" (E Hines, 1933) and "Shifts in attitude caused by cartoon caricatures" (R Asher and S S Sargent, 1941).

For a suggestion of Nazi attempts at stereotype building see "Pathological Nazi stereotypes found in recent German technical journals" (E Lerner, 1942).

50 In a careful checkup of the claims of the older physiognomists, two investigators studied the relation of 122 physical measurements to such matters as intelligence, frankness, will power, judgment, ability to make friends, originality, leadership, and impulsiveness. The correlations ran very close to zero (G U Cleeton and F B Knight, 1924). This does not mean, however, that we can get nothing from a study of the face. It can, for example, be shown that the relative position on a Binet intelligence scale of the members of a group of youngsters of the same chronological age, but of different mental age, can be estimated with some degree of accuracy. Just what cues are operative in the judgments is not clear, although it appears that the eyes are more important than the mouth and that the expression of the face is more important than are its static measurements.

In the classes of one of the authors the pool of the estimates of a group of forty students invariably correlates with the ranking of the true mental ages of children whose photographs are viewed at about 56. The forecasting value of a correlation of even this size is not, however, great.

Husband has shown the fallacy that underlies the use of the photograph as an indicator of personality (R. W. Husband, 1934). The photograph is, however, commonly used in this way by many businessmen and by members of college-entrance boards.

For a survey of the work on the relation between physical and mental characteristics see *Physique and intellect* (D. G. Paterson, 1930).

Paterson and Ludgate have checked the pronouncements of the physiognomist Blackford about blondes and brunettes by asking each of ninety-four judges to select from his acquaintances two pronounced blondes and two pronounced brunettes and to rate them with respect to each of Blackford's so-called blonde and brunette traits. The results indicated that the percentage of brunettes thought to be possessing what Blackford claimed were blonde traits was approximately as large as the percentage of blondes thought to be possessing the allegedly blonde traits. Similar results obtained for the brunette traits (D. G. Paterson and K. E. Ludgate, 1922).

A. L. Evans correlated the precise degree of convexity of profile of each of twenty-five members of a university sorority with a series of character ratings (optimism, activity, ambition, will power, domination, and popularity). The average of her correlations was .01. The values ranged from $- .27$ to $+.39$ with relatively large probable errors.*

51. For a discussion of the long-standing attempt to classify body types into two or three categories see "The significance of the physical constitution in mental disease" (F. I. Wertheimer and F. E. Hesketh, 1926). Kretschmer was only following the tradition when he set up his pyknic and asthenic types (E. Kretschmer, 1925). His pyknic type possesses short legs, a thick neck, and a relatively barrel-shaped trunk; his asthenic or leptosomic possesses long extremities and a relatively small trunk. A subgroup of the latter is the athletic—people who have a more symmetrical development of limbs in relation to trunk. Another subgroup later added is the soft-athletic—people who are tense-muscled, angular, and wiry, with scanty fat and muscle (S. Behn and C. Fervers, 1938). Finally there is the dysplastic type—those inconsiderate people who do not fit into any of the main categories. According to Kretschmer, sufferers from manic-depressive insanity (cyclothymes or circulars) are prone to be of the pyknic build, whereas those who are classified as schizophrenes (suffering from dementia praecox) are far more apt to be asthenics.

Although a number of investigators have thought that their data on insane and criminal populations substantiated Kretschmer's contentions at least to slight degree (E. M. L. Burchard, 1935), other investigators can find no relation between variety of psychosis and body type (E. F. Wells, 1938). One of the most extensive of the American studies on normal groups, "An experimental study of constitutional types" (O. Klineberg, S. E. Asch, and H. Block, 1934), failed to provide evidence that could be construed as favoring Kretschmer's views. Lack of evidence has not, however, prevented Kretschmer from developing a theory that embraces normal personality. Thus, according to his "system," those of our

* These data are reported by A. L. Evans in *Aptitude testing* (C. L. Hull, 1928).

poets who are realists and humorists fall into the category cyclothymes, whereas the pathetics, romantics, and formalists fall into the category schizothymes. Similarly, of our leaders, the jolly organizers, the tough "whole-hoggers," and the understanding conciliators fall into the cyclothymic group, whereas the pure idealists, the despots, the fanatics, and the cold calculators fit into the schizothymic classification. See also "The relationship between characteristics of personality and physique in adolescents" (P S Cabot, 1938).

Another German type-psychology is that of Jaensch (E. Jaensch, 1930). Quite well known is his work on eidetic (photographic) images—mental images so peculiarly vivid that the possessor feels them to be practically on the intensity level of his perceptions. Jaensch has divided people who have such images into several subtypes—the *B* type, *T* type, etc.—and has studied their peculiar biologies. In the expansive manner of contemporary German philosopher-psychologists, Jaensch and his followers have attempted to explain a fair share of the world's cultural difficulties and differences on the basis of these subgroups (K Metelmann, 1934, K Rau, 1936, F Reuther, 1937, and W Héraucourt, 1938). Although a number of Americans have been interested from a research standpoint in eidetic imagery, they have not attempted to use imagery types as a basis for explaining all cultural and personality differences.

The philosopher Spranger considers the following to be man's basic interests or motives in personality: theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and religious (E Spranger, 1928). To find the relative prominence of these six categories among the members of the various socioeconomic groups, Allport and Vernon have constructed a standardized questionnaire (P E Vernon and G Allport, 1931) of 120 questions, 20 of which refer to each of the six values. For other studies on the Spranger types see "A study of Spranger's value-types by the method of factor analysis" (W A Lurie, 1937), "The measurement of interest values" (E M Glaser and J B Maller, 1940), and "A factorial analysis of interests and values" (L W Ferguson, L G Humphreys, and F W Strong, 1941). It should be noted that Spranger's typing is somewhat more realistic than that of Kretschmer.

The psychiatrist H. Rorschach has proposed a typology consisting of extratensive and introvertive types. As tested these do not appear to overlap with either the major types offered by Jaensch (D Bryn, 1936) or the introvertive-extrovertive classes of Jung as measured by Guilford (G Brown, Jr, 1941).

The most recent outbreak of typology is described in *The varieties of human physique* (W H Sheldon, S S Stevens, and W B Tucker, 1940). In this system there are three first-order components—endomorphism, mesomorphism, and ectomorphism (roughly, the fat, the muscular, and the bony) as well as several second-order variables. In their book the authors state their belief that correlations of considerable magnitude will be found between their type measurements and personality characteristics and promise a second volume in which the crucial data will appear. See "A note on Sheldon's method for estimating dysplasia" (J Zubin and M Taback, 1941) and "The correlation between components of physique and scores on certain psychological tests" (I L Child and W H Sheldon, 1941).

See also "Personality tendencies and physique" (N W Morton, 1936), "Body form and success in studies" (W B Pillsbury, 1936), *Les types humains* (E Schreider, 1937), "Típi pszichici" (B Révész, 1938), "Suggestibility in different personality types" (B J Lindberg, 1940), and "'Personality' differences as

described by invariant properties of individuals in action" (E D Chapple, 1940)

The attempt to separate people into two or more types has not been successful. The procedure involved in constructive typology is of a different order and gives much greater promise. A cluster of behavioral characteristics, regarded as an "ideal" type, is associated with a particular set of socioeconomic conditions. The investigator tries to locate somewhat similar conditions in other times and cultures and to find an approximation of his "ideal" type in operation. Let us take as illustration the following cluster of characteristics—a closely knit, out-group people whom the in-group members regard as penurious, extremely shrewd traders with Shylock characteristics. This cluster of characteristics or "ideal" type obviously fits the Jewish trader. It fits about equally well the Parsee trader of the west coast of India, the Chinese trader of the Dutch East Indies, the lace-selling Armenian peddler in America, the border Scot* of the sixteenth century who peddled his wares throughout northern Europe, and the Egyptian Greek of the seventh century B C. Such a configuration of behavioral characteristics has been termed the "marginal trader" type (H Becker, 1940, and H E Barnes, H Becker, and F Becker, 1940). The importance to social psychology of this sort of historical research rests in its clear demonstration that behavioral characteristics are not tied to a particular race but to a social setting.

52 Out of the mass of endocrinological researches there have emerged a few fairly well substantiated findings that bear on the subject of "types"

a Associated with hyperthyroidism (oversecretion of the thyroid gland) are the symptoms of anxiety, restlessness, and emotional irritability that are often shown by those suffering from exophthalmic goiter. In *The physical basis of personality* (C R Stockard, 1931) Stockard has attempted to prove (with practically no evidence) that the hyperthyroid or linear type, showing early puberty and a dolichocephalic head, occurs in marine climates and along coastal plains.

b Associated with hypothyroidism (undersecretion of the thyroid gland) are those low-intelligence conditions known as cretinism and myxedema. Cretinism, resulting in a particularly pudgy, stunted build, is a congenital condition. Myxedema is a somewhat similar hypothyroid condition that occurs in adult years and results in both mental and physical sluggishness.

c Hyperpituitarism is associated with gigantism (or gigantism) and acromegaly. Certain giants seem to have normal personalities, others to be lazy and self-satisfied. With those who are maladjusted, it is impossible to ascertain the relative responsibility of the endocrine glands and the environmental factors elicited by the giantism. The sufferer from acromegaly usually lacks initiative and is apathetic.

d Hypopituitarism is associated with dwarfism. As with gigantism, it is impossible to know whether the peculiarities of personality that are occasionally exhibited by dwarfs are conditioned by the glandular defect or by environmental factors.

e Few physical "types" are found to be associated with malfunctions of the other glands of internal secretion. Mongolian imbecility is thought by some to be the result of a polyglandular disturbance, but little factual information is available. The eunuch, or castrated male, has been recognized as a type for centuries. Associated with his gonadal defect are a voice quality (important for many years

* Even today Jewish and Scottish jokes resemble each other in their stress on penuriousness and shrewdness.

in the church, since it allowed him to remain a soprano) and alterations of personality. One cannot, however, be certain that these alterations of personality are due even in large part to his glandular defect, for in most cultures the eunuch is set apart from his fellows and is subjected to quite different treatment.

The endocrinological aspects of personality are discussed at some length by Campbell in *Human personality and the environment* (C. M. Campbell, 1934). A psychiatrist, Campbell attempts to view the interrelations of the organism not only with its internal but with its external environment. See also "Endocrine function and personality" (D. J. Ingle, 1935), *The tides of life: the endocrine glands in bodily adjustment* (R. G. Hoskins, 1933), and Appendix note 14.

53 The Samoan girl reaches and passes through adolescence without visible strain. In this society, puberty does not occur, as it does with us, at a time when the girl's life habits are in the process of being uprooted or when the girl is being forced to shift rapidly to new modes of behavior. Although tremendous shifts occur, they take place some years before, and again some years after, but not during puberty (M. Mead, 1928).

According to Brooks youngsters from sixteen to nineteen show a slightly greater tendency toward instability than do those from twelve to fifteen, who are closer to the onset of puberty (F. D. Brooks, 1929). This finding is contrary to the doctrines of the early educators of the G. Stanley Hall group, who believed that adolescence could be clearly differentiated from preadolescence by the appearance of various types of crisis behavior and that this behavior was of biological rather than social origin. In *The spiritual life* (G. A. Coe, 1900), in *The psychology of religion* (E. D. Starbuck, 1899), and in other sources are described the violent religious conversions that in the days of our grandfathers commonly took place around the beginning of the adolescent period. More recent studies, notably those reported in *The psychology of religious awakening* (E. T. Clark, 1929), have shown that the old-fashioned type of sudden conversion is no longer associated with adolescence insofar at least as American youth is concerned.

A number of attempts have been made to verify the theory that girls tend to withdraw from social contacts—that they tend to develop a "negative phase"—shortly before menarche (H. Hetzer, 1927). A fairly recent study (E. B. Hurlock and S. Sender, 1930) concludes that, when such a phase appears, environment and not the "soon to be reached condition of sex maturity" is responsible. Girls from good homes seldom show such a phase.

Using questionnaire techniques, Willoughby conducted research that led him to the conclusion that insofar as emotionality is concerned "the male trend is . . . more smooth than the female, which shows evidences of peaks of emotionality in early maturity and old age and relative freedom from emotionality in adolescence and middle life" (R. R. Willoughby, 1935, p. 728).

The social factors that make for considerable adolescent difficulty in contemporary society have been studied from many angles and with rather uniform results. See *Sex freedom and social control* (C. W. Margold, 1926), *The child and society, an introduction to the social psychology of the child* (P. Blanchard, 1928); *The child in America* (W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, 1928); *Adolescence studies in mental hygiene* (F. E. Williams, 1930); *Personality in its teens* (W. R. Boorman, 1931); *Adolescent psychology* (A. H. Arlitt, 1933); *Sex in childhood* (E. R. Groves, and G. H. Groves, 1933); *Russia, youth, and the present-day world* (F. E. Williams, 1934); *Principles of adolescent psychology* (E. S. Conklin, 1935), "Sexuality in the second decade" (R. R. Willoughby, 1937a); "Social distance in adoles-

cent relationships" (J R Runner, 1937), *Youth and sex a study of 1300 college students* (D D Bromley and F H Britten, 1938), *Social psychology of adolescence* (E D Partridge, 1938), "The California adolescent growth study" (H E Jones, 1938), *Personality in formation and action* (W Healy, 1938), "Evaluations of adolescent personality by adolescents" (C M Tryon, 1939), *The psychology of adolescence* (K C Garrison, 1940), *Emotion and conduct in adolescence* (C B Zachry and M Lightly, 1940); "The problem of adolescence" (H Yellowlees, 1940), *Predicting the child's development* (W F Dearborn and J W M Rothney, 1941), "An analysis of adolescent adjustment problems" (E M Howard, 1941), and "A survey of recent studies in the measurement of personality, attitudes, and interests, of adolescents" (W U Snyder, 1941) For an excellent general survey and extensive bibliography see M Van Waters' article "Adolescence" (*Encycl Soc Sci*, 1, 455-459)

The new point of view concerning the origin of adolescent difficulty has led to an attack upon the sex ideals that are instilled in most of our children For an analysis of the problem of changing sex morality see M A Bigelow's article "Sex education and sex ethics" (*Encycl Soc Sci*, 14, 8-13)

54 Possible declines in the physical capacities of older people are masked to some extent by the enhanced motivation that frequently appears If there were some technique by which all age groups could be forced to work at their tasks with similar enthusiasm and persistence, age declines might be more pronounced than those now reported It should be kept in mind, therefore, that what is called "capacity" (what the person can do) in accounts of differential age behavior is really "ability" (what he does do) It should also be remembered that laboratory findings frequently do not apply to practical problems, since laboratory and life situations are not comparable

Early work on the ability of older people (F L Ruch, 1933), the recent studies of Miles and his students (W R Miles, 1939), and other studies (T Weisenburg, A Roe, and K E McBride, 1935) all demonstrate that work decrements are to be expected in the majority of test situations after the twenties or thirties The range of the individual differences in ability at any given age is, however, many times larger than the year-to-year decrement These studies give little support to the rationalizations of those businessmen who wish to retire their employees at fifty, the majority of decrements are not very large by that age and are frequently more than compensated for by other social and economic factors The older man will, for example, probably be better satisfied with his job, be less likely to tire himself in social activities, etc

Not all researchers, however, are so optimistic about the potentialities of the later middle-aged Gilbert, for example, considers that "the results tend to support the contentions of those who insist on the necessity of a retirement age fixed in the sixties and those who refuse new employment to persons in the sixties" (J G Gilbert, 1935, p 42)

Studies of differential age ability indicate that the extent of the decline for any given age depends upon the following factors (a) the nature of the task, (b) the habits of the persons involved, and (c) the level of achievement under consideration (the point of reference), and, perhaps, still other factors Ruch's data (F L Ruch, 1934) can be taken as illustrative of factor (a). Additional information on this factor has been obtained from experiments on young and old athletes (A Walton, 1932) Age decrements were found to be large for sports in which speed of movement was of major importance but were smaller for sports in which precision was of

man importance See also "An investigation of reaction time in older adults, and its relationship to certain observed mental test patterns" (W Goldfarb, 1941) Comparisons of the intelligence scores made by young and old faculty members emphasizes the importance of good habits—factor (b)—in the preservation of abilities Although the scores of the older faculty men were in general a trifle poorer than those of the younger men, the members of the older group actually scored higher on the synonym-antonym items (K Sward, unpublished data) Sorenson also has shown that adults who keep active intellectually suffer less decline in learning ability than do those who relinquish efforts to learn (H Sorenson, 1930) The operation of factor (c), the point of reference, is shown in a study of chess masters A considerable age decrement appears when the matter is considered at the level of the chess masters' ability, age decline in the abilities of chess masters is, however, microscopic when viewed from the ability level of amateur chess players Thus viewed by other chess masters, the oldsters have become appreciably poorer, but as viewed by ordinary chess players, their decline in ability can scarcely be noticed (P Bottenwieser, 1935)

Strong has found that young men tend to score on his *Vocational interest blank* somewhat as do scientists, whereas older men tend to score more as do Y M C A secretaries and ministers In other words, young men tend to display, at least on paper, more interest in things, older men, more interest in people Strong has also found that likes, dislikes, interests, and ambitions, as measured by his interest test, change more between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five than between twenty-five and sixty-five years (E K Strong, Jr, 1931) See also *Adult interests* (E L Thorndike *et al*, 1935)

Watson claims that Methodist ministers over forty years of age are more "closed-minded" regarding Catholicism, modernism in religion, and revision of our moral standards than are younger Methodist clergymen (G Watson, 1925) Harper reports that American educators aged thirty-five to forty-five are slightly more conservative in their social beliefs than younger members of the same profession (M H Harper, 1927) The validity of the Watson and Harper findings stands or falls on the validity of their questionnaire techniques From these data and from his own findings—that the aged encounter a relatively greater difficulty in learning those materials that demand a tearing down of old habits—Ruch concludes that in general conservatism increases with age and that this increase "would seem to be a part of the biological heritage of senescent man" (F L Ruch, 1934) See also *The relation of age of human adults to some aspects of the ability to do fatiguing muscular work* (R G Barker, 1934), *Adult abilities* (H Sorenson, 1938), *Problems of ageing: biological and medical aspects* (G V Hamilton, 1939), and "Mental abilities at senescence a survey of present-day research" (G Lawton, 1938b)

55 The sociopsychological significance of the physiological changes of adolescence arises from the fact that their appearance may force the adolescent into new patterns of behavior Although sex is not the simple, instinctive "drive" it was once thought to be, we must adapt ourselves to it in some way or another Sex is in the nature of a capacity, the use of which depends upon experience It is not a hunger that leads the individual unerringly toward a single pattern of adjustment or that, if ungratified, inevitably results in mental instability Sexual capacities can be largely ignored, they can be utilized in effective and gratifying ways, or they can become the basis for such psychological tensions as have led Freud to consider sex the primary fact of life Society, rather than sex

itself, is the chief determinant of the uses to which the individual will put sexual capacities

In some primitive communities, such as that of Lesu, adolescent behavior is highly institutionalized. The importance of reaching sexual maturity is impressed upon the youth by means of elaborate and often painful rituals. Of no special value in itself, the initiation rite marks the transition from childhood to maturity, breaks the individual's attachment to preadolescent associates and modes of conduct, and introduces him into the pattern of behavior that is demanded of the sexually mature adult. Since he has observed those who are a year or two older enter into adult status through the portals of the initiation rites, he takes it all as a matter of course and tends to accept the conventional pattern of sexual adjustment as natural and hence normal (H. Powdermaker, 1933).

The primitive initiation at the time of adolescence may or may not involve selection of a sexual mate or mates. In some societies the youth's parents effectively guide him even to the point of picking out his wife. Such was the case in our old patriarchal family, in which the individual exercised no "choice." Even today the practice of arranging marriages for their children is adhered to by the more conservative Chinese. Such systems, and our own as well, allow in the main little premarital sexual experimentation. Although it is probable that far too much has been made of the dangers of sexual incompatibility between husband and wife, mismating must occur with considerable frequency under such a system as ours.

In some societies, the adolescent is allowed a considerable period of premarital sex experimentation.* Parents do not select the wives for their sons or the husbands for their daughters. Through trial and error, but within certain traditional limitations, adolescent boys and girls sort themselves out into compatible couples. Since in many societies no premium is put upon chastity, the psychological strains consequent upon this process are probably no greater than those incident to any form of undirected trial-and-error learning. Some anthropologists have been so much impressed by the adequacy of the sexual adjustments achieved by primitives under these conditions that they urge civilized peoples to resort to this method of handling the problems of adolescence. Certain tendencies in this direction are, in fact, already discernible. But one would be bold, indeed, were he to attempt to predict how far this trend will proceed in our own land.

56 Idealists may cling to the delusion that the typical modern marriage is a beautiful and harmonious relationship between a man and a woman and, perhaps, their children. But it would appear that a considerable measure of distressing disharmony occurs. The supposed causes, consequences, and possible palliatives for marriage and family discord are discussed in the following *Sexual apathy and coldness in women* (W. M. Gallichan, 1928), *What's wrong with marriage?* (G. V. Hamilton and Kenneth Macgowan, 1928), "Reconciliation of marital maladjustment: an analysis of 101 cases" (E. R. Hixenbaugh, 1931), *The modern American family* (D. R. Young, ed., 1932b), "The relation of home background and social

* Descriptions of the trial-and-error selection of sexual mates in primitive societies will be found in *Coming of age in Samoa* (M. Mead, 1928) and in *Sexual life of savages in North Western Melanesia* (B. Malinowski, 1929). For sharp contrasts in primitive systems of sex training see *Sex and temperament* (M. Mead, 1935). The general problem of the role of the child in various primitive societies has been treated in *The child in primitive society* (N. Miller, 1928).

relations to personality adjustment" (S R Cavan, 1934); *Personality and the family* (H Hart and E B Hart, 1935), *Personality adjustment and domestic discord* (H R Mowrer, 1935), *The future of marriage in Western civilization* (E Westermarck, 1936), *Marriage and the family* (E R Baber, 1939), *The family and its relationships* (E R Groves, E L Skinner, and S J Swenson, 1941), and *Marriage* (E R Groves, 1941)

During the past few years the problems of marriage have been studied through the use of questionnaires. Although the data suffer from the ills inherent in this tool, definite progress has been made. The data of two extensive cross-sectional* studies (L M Terman *et al*, 1938 and 1939, and E W Burgess and L S Cottrell, Jr, 1939) and one longitudinal study (E L Kelly, 1941) all demonstrate the importance of personality factors in marital adjustment. In Terman's investigations scores on personality and social-background items correlated to the extent of .54 with marital happiness of husbands and .47 with happiness of wives, the sexual-adjustment questions yielded correlations of .49 with happiness both of husbands and wives. "The 10 background circumstances most predictive of marital happiness are

- 1 Superior happiness of parents
- 2 Childhood happiness
- 3 Lack of conflict with mother
- 4 Home discipline that was firm, not harsh
- 5 Strong attachment to mother
- 6 Strong attachment to father
7. Lack of conflict with father
- 8 Parental frankness about matters of sex
- 9 Infrequency and mildness of childhood punishment
- 10 Premarital attitude toward sex that was free from disgust or aversion"

(L M Terman *et al*, 1938, p 372)

It is now clear that the personality characteristics associated with marital happiness determine aptitude for and are not a resultant of marriage. In other words, these characteristics are brought to, rather than produced by, marriage (L M Terman, 1939, E L Kelly, 1939, and R F Winch, 1941)

Spouses resemble each other in most ways, the resemblance being great in attitudes and small in personality (M Schooley, 1936, R Hofstatter, 1937; R. Stagner, 1938, and H M. Richardson, 1939). A number of other aspects of marital adjustment have also been attacked (J Bernard, 1935; P Popenoe, 1936, 1937a, 1937b, and 1938, W McKain and C Anderson, 1937, C Kirkpatrick, 1937, L W. Ferguson, 1938b, R R Willoughby, 1936 and 1938, C Landis *et al*, 1940, J L Moreno, 1940c, M Smith, 1941, B Solby, 1941, and E L Kelly, 1941)

57. The earlier studies of the relationship between delinquency and feeble-mindedness, which yielded extremely high coefficients of correlation, have been superseded by more carefully controlled surveys. It now appears that the better the controls, the more the relationship approaches zero. In fact, an examination of the best data to date shows that, when delinquents and nondelinquents are equated on the basis of age, parental background, etc., they tend to have very similar I.Q.'s (M A Merrill, unpublished data). See "Intelligence and delinquency" (H M Williams, 1940).

* In a longitudinal study the subjects are kept under observation for a long period of time; in a cross-sectional study they are contacted but once

Factors of family life may of themselves play an important role in molding the child's personality in ways that are antisocial, as has been shown by the following studies: "The economic status of families of delinquent boys in Wisconsin" (M G Caldwell, 1931), "Parental conditions of Wisconsin girl delinquents" (K Lumpkin, 1932), "Sibling position and juvenile delinquency" (R F Sletto, 1934), "Note on family position of certain delinquent boys" (R S Tolman, 1939), and "Family factors in the ecology of juvenile delinquency" (G H Barker, 1940).

But, in the main, it would appear to be a combination of unsatisfactory family circumstances and numerous antisocial external conditions that makes for the criminal personality. A criminal father may train his son or his daughter in criminal ways. It is apparently more common for the child to be forced by family circumstances to depend upon external and unregulated associations for his social development, as is indicated by most of the case studies of juvenile delinquency. See, for example, *Social factors in juvenile delinquency* (C Shaw and H McKay, 1931), *The delinquent child* (White House Conference, 1932), *Juvenile delinquency* (W Reckless and M Smith, 1932), *Facts about juvenile delinquency* (U S Children's Bureau, 1932), *One thousand juvenile delinquents* (S Glueck and E Glueck, 1934a); *Roots of crime* (F Alexander and W Healy, 1935), *Social determinants in juvenile delinquency* (T E Sullenger, 1936), *Preventing crime* (S Glueck and E Glueck, 1936); *New light on delinquency and its treatment* (W Healy and A F Bronner, 1936), *Social treatment in probation and delinquency* (P V Young, 1937), *Later criminal careers* (S Glueck and E Glueck, 1937), *Personality and the cultural pattern* (J S Plant, 1937), *Brothers in crime* (C Shaw et al, 1938), *Youth tell their story* (H M Bell, 1938), *The clinical treatment of the problem child* (C R Rogers, 1939), *Juvenile delinquents grown up* (S Glueck and E Glueck, 1940), *Criminal youth and the Borstal system* (W Healy and B Alper, 1941), and *Delinquency control* (L J Carr, 1940).

Studies that use the case-history method are criticized in "Self-consciousness on the part of the interviewer and its dangers" (G E Kimble, 1928), in "Some difficulties in analyzing social interaction in the interview" (V P Robinson, 1928), and in a number of other articles. The dangers in taking a person's own interpretation of the reasons why he is as he is are great. But, when taken in conjunction with studies of the external setup—such as those reported in *Delinquency areas* (C Shaw, 1929), *The taxi-dance hall* (P G Cressey, 1932), and "Delinquency areas in the Puget Sound region" (N S Hayner, 1933)—the personal case method should not be entirely misleading. In interpreting such reports, as much depends, however, upon the reader's capacity for human understanding as upon the critical insight of the one who recorded the behavior. It is difficult but necessary that both recorder and reader maintain a neat balance between the hard-boiled and the sentimental points of view; for the factors under consideration are far too complex to permit of objective, mechanical analysis that is free from the bias of personal interpretations.

58 In 1917 during World War I, R. S. Woodworth and his Committee on Emotional Fitness studied the symptoms of men who had difficulty in adjusting themselves to trying situations. From more than 200 questions originally considered, a list of 116 made up the so-called *Personal data sheet* (S I Franz, 1919). This questionnaire has since been modified in many ways and has appeared in part in many later tests. In fact, almost all modern adjustment inventories greatly resemble it. Perhaps the best known of the present tests of adjustment are *Personality schedule* (L. L. Thurstone and T G Thurstone, 1930); *The adjustment*

inventory (H M Bell, 1934), *The personality inventory* (R G Bernreuter, 1935, D E Super, 1942), and *The Humm-Wadsworth temperament scale* (D G Humm, 1942) A somewhat different type of adjustment questionnaire is *The Pressey X-O* or cross-out test (S L Pressey, 1921), on which the subject crosses out words that represent things he regards as unpleasant, wrong, worrisome, etc

No adjustment inventory can be taken at its face value At best it serves to warn the personality adjuster of possible potential dangers and to furnish clues for him to follow Many treatises have been published for and against the use of inventories (P M Symonds, 1934, J E W Wallin, 1935, L F Shaffer, 1936, W C Olson, 1936; C Landis, 1936, J G Darley, 1937, D D Feder and D R Mallett, 1937, N Keys and M S Guilford, 1937, R Pintner and G Forlano, 1937b and 1938, E L Schott, 1937, F McKinney, 1937 and 1939, P R Farnsworth and L W Ferguson, 1938, C O Weber, 1938, D Spencer, 1938, C I Mosier, 1938, D W Dysinger, 1939, R A Pedersen, 1940, K Young, 1940; P V Young, 1940, and M E Bonney, 1941)

Rating scales are often used in the attempt to measure lack of adjustment (R Wolf and H A Murray, 1937, T A Langhe, 1937, S M Harvey, 1938, M M Lombardi, 1938, W V Bingham, 1939, and E L Kelly, 1940) Sometimes used is a simple check list on which the presence or absence of the trait is to be noted A variation of the check-list method is the technique of having people and descriptions of idiosyncracies matched (P E Vernon, 1936)

There have been a number of attempts to measure what has been termed emotional maturity—in a sense, the opposite of emotional instability Three criteria or maturity have been employed—the tester's own view of what constitutes maturity, typical answers of older as opposed to younger children, and the presence of weak as opposed to strong emotions (as disclosed by examination of controlled diaries) The *Willoughby E M scale* (R R Willoughby, 1932) is based on the first criterion, *The Pressey interest-attitude tests* (S L Pressey and L C Pressey 1933) on the second, and Stratton's controlled diaries (G Stratton, 1926) on the third Unfortunately, none of these three procedures yields data at all comparable to the data of either of the other two (P R Farnsworth, 1938a) We are thus in the semantic difficulty of giving the name "emotional maturity" to several different phenomena See also "The concept of 'emotional age' and its measurement" (C O Weber, 1930) and "The emotional maturity of juvenile delinquents" (M A Durea, 1937)

A rather different approach to the study of instability is developing in sociometry (J L Moreno, 1941a, H H Jennings, 1941) Here, field observation (E D Chapple and C M Arensberg, 1940) which is somewhat on the order of anthropological research is employed One phase of sociometry deals with the measurement of attraction-rejection between individuals* In a typical sociometric experiment, institutionalized girls were asked to choose their tablemates Changes were made in accordance with the choices, and from time to time the

*Lundberg has studied attraction-rejection patterns for an entire Vermont village He has linked these patterns to socioeconomic status, church membership, geographic location, and other variables (G A Lundberg, 1937, G A Lundberg and M Lawsing, 1937, and G A Lundberg and M Steele, 1938) A number of other investigators are engaged in what is essentially sociometric work (R L Schanck, 1938, W I Newstetter, M J Feldstein, and T M Newcomb, 1938, and L D Zeleny, 1941a and 1941b)

procedure was repeated. Diagrams were made of the shifting patterns of friendship (H Jennings, 1937). After such changes instabilities tended to be lessened.

Moreno's psychodrama—or spontaneity stage—is a technique that appears to have considerable therapeutic worth. The patient is induced to act out his troubles, *i e.*, to project them into the character he makes of himself. If he resists participation in the psychodrama or needs more than one character, members of the staff of the institution assume his various dramatic roles for him and respond in terms of his delusional system (J L Moreno, 1940a, 1940b, and 1941b). The psychodrama has also been used with relatively “normal” individuals in attempting to resolve their marital tangles (J L Moreno, 1940c).

59 We know that the glands of internal secretion—adrenal, thyroid, pituitary, etc.—have a regulatory function and that this involves numerous effects upon the neural mechanism. From these facts, some endocrinologists have concluded that much—some seem to believe all—mental abnormality is traceable to glandular malfunctioning. In the reestablishment of glandular balance, either through the administration of glandular extracts or through the removal of diseased glands, they see the cure for mental disorders. But although the results of this endeavor are frequently remarkable, it would appear that glandular disorders are often as much the consequence as the cause of psychological abnormality. We are here, as is so often the case in the study of man and his society, dealing not with one-way cause-and-effect action but with interaction. Undoubtedly disease or accident may disturb the delicate balance of the endocrine system, and in turn this disturbance may provide an organic source for mental disorders. But glandular disequilibrium may also be an effect rather than a cause of psychological disturbance.

60 Lewin proposes three easily recognizable types of conflict situations that impel some sort of resolution (K Lewin, 1935). Type I is the *approach-approach* situation in which the subject is torn between two attractions that are about equal in strength. In type II, *approach-avoidance*, the subject is both attracted to and repelled by the same person or object. Thus, the child may love his parents because he derives many of his comforts from them, and at the same time dislike them because they supply most of the don't's. His attitude toward his parents can be described as ambivalent. Type III* *avoidance-avoidance* occurs when the subject is forced to choose between two disliked situations. This type of situation is usually the most serious of the three, in that it tends to be followed by psychopathic behaviors.

Type IV, a variant of type II, has been proposed by Hovland and Sears. It embraces situations “in which the organism faces two interlocking type II situa-

* Type III conflict situations have assertedly been produced with white rats (N R F Maier, N M Glaser, and J B Klee, 1940). The rats are trained to react positively to (*i e.*, approach) certain stimuli and negatively to (*i e.*, avoid) others. After the two sets of habits are well established, the animal is presented with two avoidance stimuli and is forced to react positively to one of them. The “neurotic” seizures that sometimes follow these frustrating circumstances (a complicating factor occurs in that they sometimes follow jingling noises as well) resemble the behaviors of human psychopaths. These oddities of animal behavior are being compared with those of metrazol-induced seizures, the “spells” into which human psychotics are often thrown in an effort to create periods of lucidity during which the psychiatrist may better contact them (J Sacks, N R F Maier, and N M Glaser, 1941).

tions at once (e.g., a man has two desirable appointments at the same hour, the neglect of either of which will produce punishment or disappointment)" (C I Hovland and R R Sears, 1938, p 477)

During the past few years a considerable number of studies of conflict and frustration have been made. The theoretical framework for those studies centering at Yale University is given in *Frustration and aggression* (J Dollard et al, 1939). See also "Factors determining substitute behavior and the overt expression of aggression" (L W Doob and R R Sears, 1939), "Minor studies of aggression I Measurement of aggressive behavior" (R R Sears, C I Hovland, and N E Miller, 1940), "Minor studies of aggression V Strength of frustration-reaction as a function of strength of drive" (R R Sears and P S Sears, 1940), "Minor studies of aggression VI Correlation of lynchings with economic indices" (C I Hovland and R R Sears, 1940), "Individual differences in behavior resulting from experimentally induced frustration" (C R Adams, 1940), "Criteria of frustration" (S H Britt and S Q Janus, 1940), "Experiments on motor conflict II Determination of mode of resolution by comparative strengths of conflicting responses" (R R Sears and C I Hovland, 1941), "I The frustration-aggression hypothesis" (N E Miller, 1941), "II Non-aggressive reactions to frustration" (R R Sears, 1941), "III Need-persistent and ego-defensive reactions to frustration as demonstrated by an experiment on repression" (S Rosenzweig, 1941), "IV The frustration-aggression hypothesis and culture" (G Bateson, 1941), "V The hostile act" (D M Levy, 1941), "VI Frustration phenomena in the social and political sphere" (G W Hartmann, 1941b), "VII Deprivation, threat and frustration" (A H Maslow, 1941), and "Frustration reactions of normal and neurotic persons" (M Sherman and H Jost, 1942)

61 The thesis that the incidence of psychological abnormality is fairly uniform from society to society and must, therefore, reflect some uniform biological inadequacy has derived from a number of apparent evidences. Winston (E Winston, 1934 and 1935) used the data that Mead had gathered from certain Polynesian groups to reverse Mead's conclusion and to show that the incidence of abnormality among these peoples was approximately the same as that among the people of rural America. A number of studies have led to the conclusion that neither war nor depression markedly affects the rates of functional psychoses in the United States or Great Britain (C Landis and J D Page, 1938, J S Jacob, 1938, H B Elkind, 1939, and R E Hemphill, 1941). It is thought that, if there is any annual increase, it is very small (B Malzberg, 1938 and 1940).

But the use of anthropological data for comparative purposes is a doubtful procedure. The anthropological observations so far made that bear on the problem have been rather casual and unstandardized. Insofar as the anthropological investigator uses the particular cultural definition of abnormality, degrees of deviation from the norm that in our society would pass more or less unnoticed may in a particular society indicate definite abnormality. In a comparatively homogeneous population the slightest deviation stands out, whereas in our society the individual must be very "queer" indeed before he is socially considered to have crossed the vague line that distinguishes the normal from the abnormal.

Data supporting the idea that war and depression do not cause a marked rise in the incidence of abnormality in no wise disprove the view that the functional psychoses are in large part the result of maladjustment and that such maladjustment is fostered by social disorganization and continuing change. These data

are necessarily gathered from institutional sources,* and institutional facilities are limited, are usually operated at capacity, and are but slowly expanded. A considerable increase in the real incidence could occur without being reflected in institutional records. When there is too much pressure for admission to institutions, the standard of abnormality is likely to rise. Moreover, the sociopsychological interpretation does not make necessary a rise in the real incidence of abnormality during periods of war or other crisis. In view of the complex nature of social organization and the effects upon the individual of disorganization, it is quite within the range of possibilities that as many individuals are released from conflict situations by the advent of war or depression as are forced into such situations. Furthermore, abnormal behavior is a delayed response. For all we now know, the abnormal fruits of the depression of 1929-1936 may not ripen for a decade or more, and those of World War II may not appear until we are well on our way to World War III.

The quantitative evidence that most strongly supports the view that social disorganization does foster abnormal behavior is that on the ecological distribution of abnormality within urban regions. The more disorganized urban areas (zones of transition) are said to have a very high incidence of abnormality. Although this evidence is subject to the limitations that were mentioned above, it suggests that some relation may exist between the degree of social disorganization and the incidence of abnormality. See "The ecology of the functional psychoses in Chicago" (H. W. Dunham, 1937), "Demography of urban psychotics with special reference to schizophrenia" (R. E. L. Faris, 1938), *Mental disorders in urban areas. an ecological study of schizophrenia and other psychoses* (R. E. L. Faris and H. W. Dunham, 1939), "The ecological study of mental disorders" (S. A. Queen, 1940); "Schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, and socio-economic status" (C. Tietze, P. Lemkau, and M. Cooper, 1941), "Alternative hypotheses for the explanation of some of Faris' and Dunham's results" (M. B. Owen, 1941), and the general discussion of the problem in *Mental conflicts and personality* (M. Sherman, 1938).

62. The phrase "social effects" has occasionally been broadened to include effects elicited by the physical presence of others even when there is no cooperation or competition among the members of the group. Many experiments have been set up in an attempt to determine the relative amount of work obtained from subjects when in isolation and when in the presence of others. Isolation situations have been divided into those in which the subject is isolated but knows that others are working simultaneously on similar tasks in other places, and those in which the subject is psychologically as well as physically isolated—in which the subject works alone on a task no one else is doing anywhere at that particular moment (J. F. Dashiell, 1930).

In his *Social psychology* (F. Allport, 1924) Allport claims that the social effects that appear in social situations in which rivalry is presumably reduced to a minimum are due largely to "social facilitation." Visual, auditory, and olfactory stimuli issuing from those near one may act to augment the major responses. It is proverbially difficult to work in a soundproof room in which the ordinary noises are eliminated. For we may have become so much habituated to these very noises, which we carelessly speak of as distractions, that we are "lost" without their contributory effects. These weaker stimuli strengthen the reactions

* Institutional records, poor at best, can give us little or no information as to the incidence of the psychoneuroses, as few "neurotics" are hospitalized.

elicited by the more important stimuli, much as a pinch, a loud sound, or a bright light that occurs at the instant the patellar area of the knee is tapped intensifies the knee-jerk. Arguing on the basis of analogies of this sort, Allport suggests that the minor stimuli caused by the presence of others may induce increases in the amount of work normally accomplished.

In general, the processes that function in situations involving rivalry (see Appendix note 47) appear to operate, although perhaps less strongly, when an individual is at work in the presence of others. These effects, it will be recalled, include increases in the amount of work done, particularly when the task is routine and the subjects are of ordinary intelligence, and decreases in the quality of work accomplished. But, as we shall see, the social effects that appear in many social situations do not follow these perhaps oversimplified statements of the effects of rivalry. The numerous published conclusions concerning social facilitation must be for the present considered as tentative only. Many situations are so complex that they defy analysis. It is always possible that what appear to be the effects of social facilitation may in part be effects of rivalry, since in many instances it is impossible to know whether or not rivalry is involved. In fact, it may be that social facilitation is no more than mild rivalry.*

In "The dynamogenic factors in pace-making and competition" (N Triplett, 1898) and "Ueber Einzel- und Gesamtleistung des Schulkindes" (A Mayer, 1903) precedents for a long series of studies by others were established. Typical of the many studies that have yielded positive results are *Experimentelle Massenpsychologie* (W Moede, 1920), "Mental work in isolation and in group" (N N Sengupta and C P N Sinha, 1926), "De l'influence du groupe sur les fonctions de la mémoire" (D Elkin, 1927), and "An investigation of ability to work in groups and in isolation" (N P Mukerji, 1940). But Krueger in "Note concerning group influence upon Otis S-A test scores" (W C F Krueger, 1936) and Farnsworth in "Concerning so-called group effects" (P R Farnsworth, 1928) report little or no social facilitation in certain of their experimental situations—such, for example, as when testing the "college aptitude" of college students while they were alone and while they were in the presence of others. Moreover in "The comparative effects of social and mechanical stimulation on memorizing" (J Pessin, 1933) Pessin reports that the social stimuli he used served as distracters.

"Isolation" has meant different things to various investigators, and some of the differences in test results may be traced to this fact. In certain of the experiments, the experimenter was present even when the subjects were supposedly "alone", in others, the tests were self-administered. In several of the experiments the subjects have been relatively ignorant of the test materials, in others, they were close to their physiological limits. Certain investigators have used very intelligent subjects, others those of average intelligence, and still others dull subjects. And the factor of intelligence would seem to be an important one in that

*Katz and Schanck have taken issue with this notion and have presented evidence which they feel proves the possibility of separating rivalry and social facilitation. They point out that "individuals working alone have their competitive spirit aroused by the knowledge that others are busy at the same task" and that "individuals are more highly motivated when actually confronted with their competitors than when working in isolation with a knowledge of competitors" (D Katz and R L Schanck, 1938, p 294). But these data, though interesting, would seem to the present authors to be beside the point.

ordinary subjects tend to show more social facilitation than do the very bright, who may even display work decrements. Being too rigid in their habits to adapt well to marked changes in their surroundings, very stupid subjects also may react poorly to being in a group (T. M. Abel, 1938 and 1939).

Other complications arise from the difficulty of obtaining adequate controls. Let us suppose that the question is, "Do college students in general achieve higher scores on the *Thorndike intelligence examination for high school graduates* when they are given this test in isolation or under classroom conditions?" The novice would probably think his procedure adequate if he tested the members of a group in isolation and then retested them together in the classroom. But to one even moderately well trained in experimental methods, it will be evident that the subjects' familiarity with the test items will tend to favor the retest unless such familiarity is balanced by increased fatigue, boredom, or both.

To give form *A* of the test to a group of students in isolation and then to give them form *B* in the classroom might tend to favor the classroom situation (if fatigue and boredom are excluded), since the subjects should be more "test-wise" by the time form *B* is taken. Even though the items of the two forms are different, the procedures would be more or less alike. One must also prove that forms *A* and *B* are equally difficult for the group in question. As is inevitable when virgin ground is being opened for research, many of the earlier experimenters followed such inadequate procedures as have been outlined here.

A somewhat better procedure would be to use two groups of subjects. If these groups are very large and relatively unselected, they can be assumed to have equal abilities. An added check could be made of their abilities by giving both groups form *B* and by making certain that the mean scores of the two groups on this form are roughly similar. A still better procedure would be to match subjects on form *B*, so that each person in the first group would have a matched mate in the second group who scored on form *B* as he did. Then if the members of one group could be tested in isolation on form *A* while the other group is tested in the group on form *A*, a fair but by no means perfect set of controls is in operation. A number of other procedures have been developed, but so far none is completely adequate in controlling all the numerous variables.

So far we have been considering the comparative performances of numbers of individuals working in isolation and in group situations. The question, "Does John Jones—a specific individual—do better on the *Thorndike* while in isolation or in the presence of a group?" is equally difficult to answer. The simplest procedure would probably be that in which John is given a large number of forms of the *Thorndike* in alternated order—form *A* alone, then form *B* in the group, next form *C* alone, form *D* in the group, etc. These should be given over a long period of time in order to avoid fatigue and ennui. The first few forms should probably not be scored, because to count them would be to ignore the factor of test wisdom, which increases rapidly at first. For additional consideration of the topic see "Experimental studies of the influence of social situations on the behavior of individual human adults" (J. F. Dashiell, 1935).

Allport (F. H. Allport, 1924, pp. 274-278) has maintained that a judgment made in the presence of a group tends to be less extreme than one made in isolation. Allport's claim is based on experiments in which subjects judged several weights relative to two standard weights, one of which was heavier and one lighter than any of the weights to be judged. In the presence of the group the subjects bunched their judgments, *i. e.*, when judged in the group, no one of the weights was thought

to be as near to either of the standards as it was when it was judged in isolation. This study has been checked under better conditions and found to be fairly sound statistically, see "A note on the attitude of social conformity" (P. R. Farnsworth and A. Behner, 1931). But whether or not this phenomenon is "social conformity," as Allport has claimed it to be, is not clear.

In "The influence of a social factor upon the appreciation of humor" (R. E. Perl, 1933) Perl reports that, when presented visually to a group, jokes are judged to be funnier than when rated by a subject in private, and the funniest and least funny jokes are much farther apart.

Although certain researchers believe that social factors are operative whenever a number of individual judgments are forced into a single value, such is not the case. Knight found that the average of the student estimates of the temperature of the classroom closely approximated the actual temperature, but that social factors were operative does not follow, nor does Knight presuppose that they were. Each of the class members might just as well have made his judgment while alone in the room (H. C. Knight, 1921). From the Knight study two facts can be deduced—that the subjects were fairly well acquainted with the room temperature and that their errors of judgment were such that their ballot values varied about equally above and below the true temperature. But if some outside and little understood factor, such as unusual dryness or higher-than-average moisture content, had been present and had affected all subjects in a more or less similar manner, the errors would have been mainly in the same direction, with the result that the average of the judgments would not have approximated the true temperature.

Such a situation has been demonstrated in experiments in which lifted weights were judged. The size-weight illusion effect was brought into the situation by the presentation of boxes of the same weight, but of varying size. It was found that the average of the judgment values did not approximate the true weights but varied above or below in accordance with the size-weight illusion principle. In these experiments, then, the errors of judgment all tended in the same direction and so pushed the average of the judgments away from the true value (P. R. Farnsworth and M. F. Williams, 1936).

Several writers have also seized upon social factors as explanatory principles for Gordon's findings on the subject of pooling, which are reported in "Group judgments in the field of lifted weights" (K. Gordon, 1924). Gordon found that two large groups of subjects with comparable social backgrounds will agree quite well in their judgments on even such "subjective" items as the beauty of Oriental rugs. Picked at random, any given person may disagree violently with some other individual, yet the composite or pooled ranks that are given to a set of pictures of rugs by a large group of people will correlate very highly with those which are given to the same pictures by a second large group of people of roughly similar backgrounds. The social factors in these studies are not social facilitation, rivalry, or cooperation, but are merely the results of similarities in the social antecedents of the various individuals. The ranks of the pooled ratings made by one hundred subjects from America will certainly not correlate well with those made by African primitives. See "A study of some social factors in perception" (M. Sherif, 1935a), "Further observations on group judgments of lifted weights" (K. Gordon, 1936), "Group judgments in the fields of lifted weights and visual discrimination" (R. S. Bruce, 1936); "Note on the reliability and the validity of the group judgment" (M. G. Preston, 1938), "The validity of judgments as a function of the number of judges" (H. J. Eysenck, 1939), "The validity and reliability of group judgments"

(B B Smith, 1941), and "Reply the validity and reliability of group judgments" (H J Eysenck, 1941)

The fact that most subhuman animals (even bacteria and plants) live to some extent in a "social atmosphere" even though their "language" behavior is non-existent or very small is made much of in *A handbook of social psychology* (C Murchison, ed, 1935a), eight of whose twenty-three chapters are devoted to what are designated as nonhuman social situations. The more recent animal studies yield data similar to those obtained on humans, social facilitation (or perhaps rivalry) is found in some social situations, *e g*, when certain animals are fed together (H F Harlow, 1932), but not in others. See "The effect of the presence of a second animal upon emotional behavior in the male albino rat" (E E Anderson, 1939) and "The social facilitation of locomotor behavior in the albino rat" (W M Lepley, 1939)

For examples of excellent studies of other aspects of animal social behavior see "A field study of the behavior and social relations of howling monkeys" (C R Carpenter, 1934), "A field study in Siam of the behavior and social relations of the gibbon (*Hylobates lar*)" (C R Carpenter, 1940), *The beginnings of social behavior in unicellular organisms* (H S Jennings, 1941), and "Social organization in insects, as related to individual function" (T C Schneirla, 1941)

63 Illustrations of the various points made in the discussion of institutionalized situations in the text have been drawn from many sources—historical, anthropological, and sociological. The following references, in addition to those already given, may help to provide an understanding of the institutional practices of some one people or of the different institutional patterns of different peoples

Primitive Societies

The Veddas (C G Seligman and B Z Seligman, 1911)

Argonauts of the western Pacific (B Malinowski, 1922)

Crime and custom in savage society (B Malinowski, 1926)

The maternal culture and social institutions of the simpler peoples (L T Hobhouse, G C Wheeler, and M Ginsberg, 1930)

Rebel destiny (M J Herskovits and F S Herskovits, 1934)

Our primitive contemporaries (G P Murdock, 1934)

Savage civilization (T H Harrison, 1937)

A black civilization a social history of an Australian tribe (W L Warner, 1937)

Primitive behavior an introduction to the social sciences (W I Thomas, 1937)

The Barga (V Elwin, 1939)

An introduction to cultural anthropology (R H Lowie, 1940)

Ancient Societies

The Aryan household (W E Hearn, 1891)

The life of the ancient Greeks (C B Gulick, 1903)

The Greek commonwealth (A E Zimmern, 1911)

Social life in ancient Egypt (W M F Petrie, 1923)

Roman society in Gaul in the Merovingian age (S Dill, 1926)

Medieval Society

The English village community (F Seebohn, 1896)

History of civilization in Europe (F P G Guizot, 1897)

The growth of the manor (P. Vinogradoff, 1905)

Life on a medieval barony (W S Davis, 1923)

*Chinese Society**Village and town life in China* (Y K Leong and L K Tao, 1924)*Chinese political thought* (E D Thomas, 1927)*China yesterday and today* (E T Williams, 1929)*The Chinese their history and culture*, vol II (K S Latourette, 1934)

Considerable portions of the materials of sociology, economics, and political science are, of course, descriptive of contemporary American institutions, but the following may prove a good starting point for the student who wishes to explore this field *Middletown* (R S Lynd and H M Lynd, 1929), *Small town stuff* (A Blumenthal, 1932), *Contemporary American institutions* (F S Chapin, 1935), and *Middletown in transition* (R S Lynd and H M Lynd, 1937)

64 For some years F H Allport has been bothered by the traditional procedure of treating mores, customs, and social habits in an all-or-none fashion as though there were only two possibilities of behavior—to conform or not to conform * A more realistic treatment, he believes, would be to regard conformity measurements as falling along some continuum Accordingly he proposes two major types of continua, the empirical and the nonempirical or telic (F H Allport, 1934) In empirical continua the measuring units are those typical of the physical sciences If we wished to plot data having to do with reaching eight-o'clock classes on time, we should thus employ the ordinary temporal units of minute or several-minute intervals The curve for a college population would resemble two J's placed back to back, hence the name "double J" given to it by Allport A very few students would be found to arrive 25 minutes early, a few to arrive 20 minutes ahead of time, more 15 minutes ahead of time, still more 10 minutes early, and so on until a high point or mode is reached Beyond this point fewer and fewer will be arriving Allport describes the typical curve as unimodal, likely to be off center (skewed), and steep (F H Allport, 1939) One researcher, however, claims that certain of his empirical conformity curves are normal rather than double-J in form (G J Dudycha, 1937).

Conformity data may also be plotted along nonempirical or telic continua Telic units are in terms of the degree of fulfillment of an end or purpose, *e.g.*, arriving at eight-o'clock classes on time, a little late, very late, etc For the actions in question to be labelled conformity behavior, 50 per cent or more of the cases must fulfill the institutional purpose, whether it be arriving at an engagement on time, obeying the traffic policeman at the street corner, or the like A telic continuum is in the shape of a single J (or a J reversed) For a description of the complicated manipulations necessary to change empirical distributions to telic distributions, see "Lengths of conversations a conformity situation analyzed by the telic continuum and J-curve hypothesis" (F H Allport and R S Solomon, 1939)

To illustrate the J curve, one of the present authors (Farnsworth) has gathered data similar to some collected by Allport The data contrast the behaviors of auto drivers at two different crossings—the first, a crossing of two equally important streets in a residential area that is unguarded by stop signs, lights, or policemen; and the second, a crossing guarded by stop signs and occasionally by a

* Perhaps the sociologists and certainly the anthropologists of a half century ago did actually treat cultural conformity in this all-or-none fashion No reputable contemporary sociologist or anthropologist would, however, think of doing so.

/ policeman Of 100 cars that arrived at the unguarded intersection, 1 stopped completely, 21 slowed up considerably, 65 slowed up a little, 12 went on as before, and 1 speeded up Of 100 cars that arrived at the second crossing, 74 cars stopped completely, 20 slowed up considerably, 5 slowed up a little, 1 went on as before, but none went faster When a policeman, leaning on his motorcycle, observed the cars at the guarded crossing, 98 stopped completely, 1 slowed up appreciably, and 1 (later arrested) slowed up only a little Here was conforming behavior that fitted the J-curve hypothesis

Another of the many situations in which Allport's J-curve hypothesis appears applicable occurs in the field of sex When sex behavior is not strongly institutionalized, *i e*, when it is left relatively free and unregulated, individual differences are distributed rather normally, but when sex behavior is highly institutionalized a mode appears at one end of the distribution (O L Harvey, 1935) See also "The J-curve hypothesis certain aspects clarified" (M Dikens and R Solomon, 1938), "The J-curve hypothesis a reply to Dickens and Solomon" (G J Dudyeha, 1939), "Further theoretical considerations of the J-curve hypothesis" (R S Solomon, 1939), "Normative collective behavior a classification of societal norms" (J Bernard, 1941), "Conforming behavior and the J-curve hypothesis" (F Fearing and E M Krise, 1941), and "The J distribution as a measure of institutional strength" (R H Waters, 1941)

65 Until quite recently there have been no experimental data on the subject of rumor The studies reported below appear, however, to furnish a good basis for further research on this subject. In the experiments reported in "Experimental studies of the influence of social situations on the behavior of individual human adults" (J F Dashiell, 1935), subjects were conducted into a room where they observed the activities of other subjects already present and those of the experimenter These "original observers" wrote out full accounts of all that they had seen and then passed their written accounts on to "secondhand observers," etc After passing on his account, each person was given an interrogatory The accounts and interrogatories were scored in terms of units of the story Certain of the subjects were retested in 7 days and others in 9 days The secondhand witnesses were found to have about 60 per cent of the "testimony capacity" of the firsthand observers, and the thirdhand observers to have only a little more than 40 per cent of the capacity of the firsthand observers The retention experiments showed the following figures original observers, an assumed 100 per cent; secondhand observers, about 60 per cent (7-day) and 40 to 54 per cent (9-day); thirdhand observers, 44 per cent (7-day) and 30 to 40 per cent (9-day)

In the experiment reported in "A tentative study in experimental social psychology" (C. Kirkpatrick, 1932), observers were presented with headlines, some of which referred to pleasant news and some to unpleasant and bad news In their retellings of it the observers did not show a reader acceptance of the unpleasant items or a wishful distortion of the news The preface "It is rumored that" was, however, usually eliminated from those items to which it was attached

In a British study, reported in *Remembering* (F C Bartlett, 1932), subjects were asked to observe a variety of materials After an interval of from 15 to 30 minutes, the subjects were asked to reproduce in writing what they had seen These written reports were viewed and reproduced by a second set of subjects, the written reports of the second set of subjects by a third, etc In the course of this artificially constructed "rumor spread," there appeared certain fairly definite

changes, such as omissions, transformations, and biases toward the concrete and away from deductions, opinions, etc

Continuing these memory studies, Northway found that the changes that appeared in recalled materials tended to be away from the unfamiliar toward the familiar and away from the less meaningful toward the more meaningful (M L Northway, 1936) That attitude also affects memory is shown by the fact that in recognition experiments pro-Negro subjects will recognize more pictures of Negroes than will anti-Negro subjects (V Seeleman, 1940)

66 An indirect experimental approach to the sociopsychological processes involved in the functioning of committees is reported in "Some psychological aspects of committee work" (E B South, 1927) Majority decisions on four types of problems were asked of the subjects who served as committee members South tried to find the size of the group and the personality and sex mixtures that were most adequate for committee work He concluded that small groups are better with material that lends itself to prompt formulation of opinion, whereas large groups function better with material for which many hypotheses are needed, that committees composed entirely of one sex are more efficient than those composed of both sexes, and that introverts and extroverts are equally good with abstract material, although the latter are better on personal and concrete problems

Other studies on work of a cooperative nature are reported in "Experimental sociology a preliminary note on theory and method" (L J Carr, 1929), *A study of mental work done by consulting pairs* (J F Bursch, 1927), "A comparison of group and individual performance at certain intellectual tasks" (G Watson, 1929a), "A comparison of individuals and small groups in the rational solution of complex problems" (M E Shaw, 1932), "An experimental study of the modification of social attitudes" (C Kirkpatrick, 1936a), "On what type of task will a group do well?" (R L Thorndike, 1938a), and "Cooperative versus solitary problem solution" (R W Husband, 1940) Since these studies are pioneering in character, no far-reaching conclusions are warranted Bursch's work shows that on certain tests the composite score made by two people working together is better than the score made by the brighter one working alone. The duller subject can often answer questions which the brighter cannot Kirkpatrick's findings indicate that a committee of mixed sex may achieve a compromise midway between the divergent attitudes of the two sexes Thorndike's data seem to support the hypothesis that group superiority in mental work is greater when the materials permit a large range of response

Since 1921 many articles have appeared concerning the effects on judgment of knowledge of majority opinions, expert opinions, and opinions of well-known, well-liked, or particularly dominant people The effects are often striking and are rarely, if ever, contrary to what common sense would have suggested See the following "The comparative influence of majority and expert opinion" (H T Moore, 1921); "Change of individual opinion to accord with group opinion" (D Wheeler and H Jordan, 1929), "Prestige as a factor in attitude changes" (C E Arnett, H H Davidson, and H N Lewis, 1931), "Social influences in the change of opinion" (A Jenness, 1932); "The comparative susceptibility of three age levels to the suggestion of group versus expert opinion" (C H Marple, 1933); "Halo prestige" (A O Bowden, F F Caldwell, and G. A. West, 1934), "The induction of opinion through suggestion by means of 'planted content'" (A D. Annis and N C. Meier, 1934); "The degrees of acceptance of dogmatic statements

and preferences for their supposed makers" (M Saadi and P R Farnsworth, 1934), "An experimental study of stereotypes" (M Sherif, 1935b); "Prestige, suggestion, and attitudes" (I Lorge and C C Curtiss, 1936), "A comparison of collective and individual judgments of fact" (H Gurnee, 1937), "The effect of discussion upon the correctness of group decisions, when the factor of majority influence is allowed for" (R L Thorndike, 1938b), "Experimental modification of children's food preferences through social suggestion" (K Duncker, 1938), and "An experiment in the measurement of social interaction in group discussion" (D C Miller, 1939)

The legal aspects of the committee situation, especially as seen in the jury, were considered experimentally as early as 1914 and reported in *Psychology and social sanity* (H Munsterberg, 1914). Among the publications since that time are "Studies in testimony" (W M Marston, 1924), *Legal psychology* (H E Burt, 1931), "An experience in identification testimony" (H B Brown, 1934), *Law and the lawyers* (E S Robinson, 1935), and "The psychology of testimony" (W Stern, 1939). Dashiell concludes that "a jury as a whole will give more complete and more accurate account on a definite number of details than an average individual jurymen" (J F Dashiell, 1935, pp 1135-1140).

For further references on the committee and the conference see *The process of group thinking* (H S Elliott, 1928); *International conferences* (J W Parkes, 1933), *Creative discussion* (A D Sheffield, 1933), *The art of conference* (F Walser, 1933), and *The principles and methods of discussion* (J H McBurney and K G Hance, 1939).

67 The development of polling services, national and even international in scope, has been of great importance to social psychology. Having started in a small way with attempts to forecast election returns, these services are now, as one expert expresses it, "taking the pulse of the nation" (G Gallup and S F Rae, 1940). In the early days, little attention was paid to the form of the questions, and all data were gathered through the mails. Indeed, it took the sensational failure of the *Literary Digest* polling service (which predicted a Republican victory in the Presidential election of 1936) to prove that the mere flooding of the mails with tons of straw ballots did not guarantee that the returns would be typical of the future actual ballots of the voting public. In place of sending out ballots by mail, personal interviews are now used.

The modern poller pretests his questions by trying them out beforehand on a small part of the population that is presumably typical of the larger population that he later expects to contact (R F Sletto, 1940, H Cantril, 1940a; A B Blankenship, 1940a, 1940b, 1940c, and 1941, J G Jenkins, 1941, G Gallup, 1941, and D Rugg, 1941). He chooses his interviewers with care, knowing that, if they are careless or poorly trained, they may influence the trend of the poll (A B Blankenship, 1940d). The principles followed in selecting the persons to be interviewed have been chosen only after considerable experimentation, for proper weighting schemes spell the difference between success and failure (G Gallup, 1938, E Roper, 1940 and 1941, and editors of *Fortune*, 1940).

For discussions of the 1936 attempts to forecast Presidential figures, see "Public opinion polls" (D Katz and H Cantril, 1937); "Straw polls in 1936" (A M Crossley, 1937), and "The validity of mail-ballot polls" (D Cahalan and N. C. Meier, 1939). The 1940 election predictions are discussed in "Gallup and *Fortune* polls" (Anon, 1940 and 1941) and in "The public opinion polls and the 1940 election" (D Katz, 1941). See also "The reliability of public opinion surveys"

(L. Wainer, 1939); "Editors' attitudes toward opinion polls" (N. C. Meier, 1939), "Polls and the science of public opinion" (F. H. Allport, 1940a), "America faces the war: a study in public opinion" (H. Cantril, 1940b), "Representative sampling and poll reliability" (S. S. Wilks, 1940), "Three criteria: knowledge, conviction, and significance" (D. Katz, 1940), "Studies in secret-ballot technique" (L. E. Benson, 1941), "A comparison of the Gallup and *Fortune* polls regarding American intervention policy" (R. Stagner, 1941b), and "Do the Gallup polls measure opinion?" (L. Rogers, 1941).

A modified form of the polling technique, known as the panel, has recently appeared. A number of people who are judged to be typical of some larger group are chosen for repeated interviews. *Fortune*, for example, has selected a panel of corporation heads as representative of big business. So far the panel plan shows considerable promise (P. F. Lazarsfeld, 1940a and 1941). See also "Effects of repeated interviews on the respondent's answers" (F. L. Ruch, 1941).

68 In the eighteenth century the phrase "public opinion" was coined to suggest that leaders under a democratic system of government must be quickly responsive to the wishes (opinions) of those whom they lead (the "public"). During recent years, there has been interminable controversy over the question of whether public opinion is a creator or a creation of political leadership. See, for example, *Public opinion* (W. Lippmann, 1922); *The phantom public* (W. Lippmann, 1925), and *The American public mind* (P. H. Odegard, 1930).

At least some of the confusion arises from faulty conceptualization. Political scientists and journalists particularly are prone so to personify the "public" that they lose sight of the fact that it is an abstraction. That there is an expression of public opinion at election time cannot be questioned, but that there is at any given time a single opinion toward public matters that is held by all, or even by a majority of, people is extremely doubtful.

See W. Bauer's "Public opinion" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 669-674), *The public mind* (N. Angell, 1926); *Readings in public opinion* (W. B. Graves, 1928), "The concept of public opinion in the social sciences" (R. C. Binkley, 1928), "Manipulating public opinion" (E. L. Bernays, 1928a), "Sudden changes in group opinion" (E. H. Paget, 1929), "Public opinion from a behavioristic viewpoint" (G. A. Lundberg, 1930), "Local opinion and public opinion" (C. H. Woody and S. A. Stouffer, 1930), "Some interpretations of public opinion" (V. R. Sedman, 1932), *Public opinion and world politics* (Q. Wright, 1933), "A reference guide to the study of public opinion" (H. L. Childs, 1934), *Public opinion* (W. Albright, 1939), and *An introduction to public opinion* (H. L. Childs, 1940).

69 Few terms used by social psychologists are as highly subjective as is "propaganda." Despite efforts to find an objective psychological criterion upon which to divide conversion pressures into those which are educational and those which are propaganda, the terms "education" and "propaganda" seldom signify more than that the user approves of those pressures to which he attaches the former term and disapproves of those to which he attaches the latter. There is, so far as the authors can see, no objective psychological criterion by which to distinguish a mother's persuading her child to behave "properly" from a newspaper editor's distorting news reports to serve his particular political bias. Such distinctions as rational versus irrational appeals, unselfish versus selfish appeals, and apparent source versus hidden source are neither factually nor conceptually sound. Because of the difficulties of separating facts from nonfacts, the distinction between fact and nonfact cannot be used to differentiate education from propaganda. There

is, however, a valid and significant quantitative distinction between those pressures (whatever their psychological character) which operate to bring a social minority into the behavior norms of the majority and those which are efforts of a minority to convert a majority. The former might well be termed education, the latter, propaganda (R. T. LaPiere, 1935).

The phrase "social pressures" is frequently used to indicate the totality of propagandistic efforts that impinge upon the individual and to distinguish them from other social forces that operate to bring the individual into line with the norms of social conduct. The sources of propagandistic pressures—minorities who are interested in acquiring dominance over the majority in political, economic, or social affairs—have been termed "pressure groups." For a history of such efforts and an excellent bibliography see R. M. MacIver's article "Social pressures" (*Encycl Soc Sci*, 12, 344-348).

Both voters and college students seem more affected by "emotionally"—dramatically—written appeals than by "rationally"—prosaically—written ones. At least the "emotional" leaflets had the greater appeal in an election at Allentown, Pa., in 1935 (G. W. Hartmann, 1936b). And "emotional" editorials favoring one side or another of a controversial issue were the more effective with college students (S. C. Menefee and A. G. Granneberg, 1940). Data so far gathered suggest that, when both sides of a rather academic controversial issue are listened to, already existing prejudices will be intensified. If, however, the issue is regarded as close to reality, more open-mindedness is likely to follow (R. L. Schanck and C. Goodman, 1939). In reacting to speeches of a neutral character, each listener tends to regard both the speaker and the contents of the speech as favorable to his own position (A. L. Edwards, 1941a).

See "An experimental comparison of the speech, the radio, and the printed page as propaganda devices" (W. H. Wilke, 1934), "How America became belligerent: a quantitative study of war news, 1914-17" (H. S. Foster, 1935), "How to detect propaganda" (Anon., 1937), and "Detecting and analyzing propaganda" (A. Jewett, 1940).

For references on propaganda, see the following and those listed under the heading of censorship: *A catalogue of Paris Peace Conference delegation propaganda in the Hoover War Library* (Stanford University, 1926), *Propaganda technique in the World War* (H. D. Lasswell, 1927), *Propaganda* (E. L. Bernays, 1928b), *Bibliography on censorship and propaganda* (K. Young and R. D. Lawrence, 1928), *The public pays: a study of power propaganda* (E. H. Gruening, 1931), "Propaganda and education" (W. W. Biddle, 1932), *The propaganda menace* (F. E. Lumley, 1933), *Artists in uniform* (M. Eastman, 1934), *Foreign relations in British labour politics* (W. P. Maddox, 1934), *Mobilizing for chaos* (O. W. Riegel, 1934), *The Cuban crisis as reflected in the New York press (1895-1898)* (J. E. Wisan, 1934), "Pressure groups and propaganda" (H. L. Childs, 1935), *Propaganda, its psychology and technique* (L. W. Doob, 1935), *Propaganda and promotional activities* (H. D. Lasswell, R. D. Casey, and B. L. Smith, 1935), *Road to war: America 1914-1917* (W. Millis, 1935), *Propaganda and the news* (W. Irwin, 1936), *Group leader's guide to propaganda analysis* (V. Edwards, 1938), *Words that won the war: the story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919* (J. R. Mock and C. Larson, 1939), *Conquering the man in the street: a psychological analysis of propaganda in war, fascism, and politics* (E. Freeman, 1940), *Political propaganda* (F. C. Bartlett, 1940), *War propaganda and the United States* (H. Lavine and J. Wechsler, 1940), "The psychology of propaganda" (R. Money-Kyrle, 1941), "Literature on propa-

ganda technique and public opinion" (B L Smith, 1941), and "The 'dangei' of propaganda" (E. Kris, 1941)

70. Dunlap has proposed the rather general "rules" of propaganda that are given below (by permission of the author and the publisher).

"1 If you have an idea to put over, keep presenting it incessantly Keep talking (or printing) systematically and persistently

"2 Avoid argument as a general thing Do not admit there is any 'other side', and in all statements scrupulously avoid arousing reflection or associated ideas, except those which are favorable Reserve argument for the small class of people who depend on logical processes, or as a means of attracting attention of those with whom you are not arguing

"3 In every possible way, connect the idea you wish to put over with the known desires of your audience Remember that wishes are the basis of the acceptance of ideas in more cases than logic is

"4 Make your statements clear, and in such language that your audience can repeat them, in thought, without the need of transforming them

"5 Use direct statements only when you are sure that a basis for acceptance has already been laid Otherwise, use indirect statement, innuendo, and implication Use direct statement in such a way that the attention of the audience shall be drawn to it sufficiently to take it in, but not sufficiently to reflect upon it

"6 For the most permanent eventual results, aim your propaganda at the children, mix it with your pedagogy. Follow the example, in this respect, of the successful propagandists of the past" (K Dunlap, 1934, pp 360-361)

71 The advertiser must cast his product in the role of hero and his potential customer in the role of heroine, almost as frequently he must fabricate a villain for the hero to pursue But, as is indicated in the following news report (reproduced by permission), during times of actual social crisis the villains of the advertisers' dramas become by comparison pleasant household pets

"Years of threats, appeals, persuasions by advertising men had almost convinced the U S citizen that he had halitosis, dandruff, fallen arches, falling hair, worn-out furniture, out-of-date bathrooms, obsolete washing machines and ineffective tooth paste in his inferior home, at his side an inferior wife whose hands were dish-pan red, whose linen was tattle-tale-grey, and who would be left in want when he was run over by a car with inferior brakes

"But war agencies have superseded the advertising men For many months U S citizens have been taking daily doses of strong medicine from Washington warnings, threats, appeals, horror stories, stern advice devised to wake a man up to the dangers of World War II, to arouse his patriotism, make him work longer hours, buy defense bonds, write his Congressman, give up luxuries, hand over his wife's kitchen aluminum, to fork out for the Community Chest . to pay more taxes, use less gasoline, strike less often, have his wife go without silk stockings

" The Average Citizen, his breath dubious, dandruff scales on his shoulders, his feet hurting, his son in the Army, his paycheck riddled by taxes, charities and higher prices, his dinner cold and leftover because his wife was out British-Bundling or Red-Crossing, picked up his newspaper, mechanically noted that, as usual, things would soon be worse, and turned to the football scores" (*Time*, Nov 24, 1941)

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